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Preface
Over the past years, respect for the rule of law has decreased in several EU 
Member States. This regression affects the whole of the European Union. The 
rule of law is not only a founding value of the EU as a political community, it 
is also the cornerstone of its operation as a legal order, based as it is on mutual 
recognition and trust between Member States.
Repeated Member States’ breaches of the rule of law have not only prompted the 
unprecedented activation of the EU procedure that may lead to the suspension 
of their membership rights (the so-called “Article 7 procedure”). The European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) has also been called upon, by the Commission and 
national judges alike, to engage in the preservation of the rule of law in the EU. 
As the present report demonstrates, this role has been remarkable. Through their 
case-by-case analysis of key decisions of the ECJ, the two authors show how the 
Court has operationalized the rule of law with a view to helping secure Member 
States’ compliance therewith. In particular, it has articulated specific standards 
which national judicial systems must meet for Member States to fulfill their 
Treaty-based obligation to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered 
by Union law. 
The report offers a comprehensive guide to navigate this fast expanding case 
law, and to appreciate the latter’s critical significance for the future of the EU. 
The study is published in the framework of a SIEPS’ research project on the EU 
Rule of Law toolkit, which purports to provide timely and critical analysis of EU 
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Executive summary 
The European Court of Justice is behind a recent and genuine enhancement of 
European constitutionalism, placing the rule of law, a long-established value and 
principle of EU law, at the centre stage. This rule of law-enhancing process of 
re-articulation of EU constitutionalism is ongoing and represents the Court of 
Justice’s incrementalist response to the process of rule of law backsliding which 
first emerged in Hungary before spreading to Poland. This volume aims to 
present and critically analyse this judicial response on a case-by-case basis taking 
the Court’s judgment of 27 February 2018 in Case C-64/16, ASJP (Portuguese 
Judges) as a departure point and its judgment of 15 July 2021 in Case C-791/19, 
Commission v. Poland (Disciplinary Regime for Judges) as a provisional end point. 
By offering key excerpts and a critical assessment of the Court of Justice’s most 
important orders and judgments which have reshaped the meaning and scope 
of the EU rule of law principle and associated legal obligations since 2018, this 
casebook-style volume will be of interest to those wishing to gain an expert 
understanding of the crucial recent evolution in the field of EU rule of law 
through the lens of the Court’s orders and judgments both taken individually 
and as a whole.
In order to better understand the meaning and scope of the EU Member States’ 
obligation to ensure that their courts meet the requirement of effective judicial 
protection, this volume first offers a detailed examination of the judgment which 
can be viewed as belonging to the Pantheon of the European Court of Justice’s 
rulings, on a par with Van Gend en Loos and Costa, that is, the Court’s Grand 
Chamber ruling in ASJP, a case informally known as Portuguese Judges. This 
judgment, which may also be understood as the Court’s first significant albeit 
indirect answer to the ongoing process of rule of law backsliding, first witnessed 
in Hungary and now under way in Poland, marked a new beginning for the rule 
of law as a fundamental and enforceable value of the EU legal order, referred 
to in Article 2 TEU and given concrete and justiciable expression by inter alia 
the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU: ‘Member States shall provide 
remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by 
Union law’.
The European Commission’s enforcement of the EU Member States’ obligation 
to ensure that their courts meet the requirement of effective judicial protection 
is then detailed via an examination of several Court of Justice’s orders and 
judgments. With respect to the Court’s orders, four of them issued within the 
framework of infringement cases C-441/17 R (Białowieża Forest); C-619/18 
R (Independence of Poland’s Supreme Court); C-791/19 R (Independence of the 
Disciplinary Chamber of Poland’s Supreme Court); and C-204/21 R (Poland’s 
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Muzzle Law) are presented. While the first one predates the Court’s ruling in 
Portuguese Judges, its inclusion in this volume was motivated by the fact that it 
prefigured the Court’s subsequent and unprecedented orders in infringement 
actions directly concerned with the protection of judicial independence in 
Poland. With respect to the Court’s judgments on the merits, the infringement 
rulings issued in Case C-192/18 (Independence of the ordinary courts); Case 
C-619/18 (Independence of the Supreme Court); and Case C-791/19 (Disciplinary 
regime for judges) are analysed. With these three judgments, Poland has become 
the first EU Member State to be found to have violated the second subparagraph 
of Article 19(1) TEU three infringement cases in a row. 
The two most important rulings to date issued by the Court of Justice in response 
to national requests for a preliminary ruling originating in both instances from 
Polish courts in relation to the requirements of judicial independence under 
Article 19(1) TEU and/or Article 47 CFR are then assessed: Joined Cases 
C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, A.K. e.a. (Independence of the disciplinary 
chamber of the Supreme Court) and Joined Cases C-558/18 and C-563/18 Miasto 
Łowicz and Prokurator Generalny. These two judgments, in addition to providing 
further clarification regarding the obligation to ensure that national courts 
meet the requirement of effective judicial protection, also illustrate a new trend 
whereby Article 267 TFEU has emerged as a tool of self-defence for the national 
judges under attack and thus serves as an instrument of enforcement of the 
EU’s fundamental values in a broader context where the European Commission 
appears keen to use infringement actions in the most leisurely and parsimonious 
way. Due to the lengthy nature of the present volume, the Court of Justice’s 
preliminary judgments of 20 April 2021 in Case C-896/19 (Maltese Judges) and 
of 18 May 2021 in Joined Cases C-83/19, C-127/19, C-195/19, C-291/19, 
C-355/19 and C-397/19 (Romanian Judges) are not examined individually 
but integrated in the analysis of the Court’s infringement judgment of 15 July 
2021 regarding Poland’s new disciplinary regime for judges (Case C-791/19) 
and the Court’s preliminary judgment of 2 March 2021 regarding Poland’s ‘fake 
judges’ (Case C-824/18). This is not, however, to deny their importance and 
significant added value to the extent that they both make clear inter alia that 
national authorities are under a negative but also positive obligation to respect 
EU requirements relating to judicial independence as well as an obligation not 
to regress in this area. In more practical terms, this means that a Member State 
cannot post accession adopt rules undermining judicial independence as this 
would violate the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU which prohibits 
national authorities from adopting new legislation amounting to a regression in 
the Member State concerned in the protection of the value of the rule of law, in 
particular the EU guarantees relating to judicial independence. It also means an 
obligation to refrain from adopting legislative changes which undermine the rule 
of law, which is the case when, for instance, a new special prosecution section is 
established and is used as an instrument of pressure and intimidation with regard 
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to judges, or when national authorities adopt new rules regarding the personal 
liability of judges which fail to provide guarantees designed to avoid any risk of 
external pressure on the content of judicial decisions. 
Looking beyond cases directly raising judicial independence issues, this volume 
also examines a number of cases which arguably show that the process of rule 
of law backsliding in some EU countries has had a significant albeit often 
implicit impact on other areas of the Court’s case law, with the Court arguably 
recalibrating its interpretation and approaches in relation to several fundamental 
concepts in EU law primarily in light of the situation in Poland. This impact 
can be first evidenced in the stricter interpretation of the meaning of ‘court of 
tribunal’ in the sense of Article 267 TFEU used in Case C-274/14 Banco de 
Santander. A similar tightening of the concept of ‘issuing judicial authority’ 
within the meaning of the European arrest warrant (EAW) can be detected in 
Joined Cases C-508/18 OG (Public Prosecutor’s Office of Lübeck) and C-82/19 
PPU PI (Public Prosecutor’s Office of Zwickau), as well as in Case C-509/18 PF 
(Prosecutor General of Lithuania). Another significant development, likely to 
have been brought about, at least in part, in reaction to Poland’s rule of law 
crisis, can be found in Case C-284/14 Commission v. France (Advance Payment), 
where the Court offered a long-awaited recalibration of CILFIT. The Court 
also pushed for a stricter defence of the jurisdiction of the national courts 
to ensure full effectiveness of EU law in Case C-284/16 Achmea, a stricter 
defence which however threatens to leave investors formerly covered by intra-
EU bilateral investment treaties (BITs) without any judicial protection at all 
in countries experiencing rule of law backsliding. The Court also enabled, at 
least theoretically, stricter scrutiny by judicial authorities called upon to execute 
EAWs of mutual trust obligations on account of systemic deficiencies which may 
affect the independence of a national judiciary in a backsliding Member State 
in Case C-216/18 PPU LM (Celmer). This recalibration may however be viewed 
as patently insufficient considering the systemic nature and current extent of 
Poland’s rule of law breakdown. Finally, the Court adopted a demanding 
interpretation of the requirement of ‘established by law’ to comprehensively 
review an EU judicial appointment procedure in its Grand Chamber judgment 
of 26 March 2020 in Joined Cases C-542/18 RX-II Simpson and C-543/18 RX-
II HG. While this judgment did not concern a national judicial appointment 
procedure, it was easy to see how the Court’s reasoning could be extrapolated 
to the situation in Poland where manifest irregularities have repeatedly affected 
the appointments of multiple individuals, in particular to the Supreme Court. 
This volume ends with the Court of Justice’s latest crucial challenge: how to deal 
with manifestly irregularly appointed ‘judges’. To understand the unprecedented 
and complex nature of this problem, an analysis of the Court’s judgment of 
2 March 2021 in Case C-824/18, AB et al. (Appointment of judges to the Supreme 
Court – Actions) – the most important judgment issued by the Court to date 
11SIEPS 2021:3 Respect for the Rule of Law in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice
regarding the extent to which EU law can be used to review national judicial 
appointment procedures and connected judicial review rules – is offered. AB is 
itself the Court of Justice’s third major judgment in a preliminary ruling case 
originating from a Polish court (in this instance, Poland’s Supreme Administrative 
Court) raising issues connected to Poland’s rule of law breakdown, out of a total 
of 37 (and counting) rule of law related national requests for a preliminary ruling 
submitted by Polish courts, compared to a total of four infringement actions 
lodged with the Court by the Commission to date. With so many preliminary 
cases remaining to be answered, one can expect the Court of Justice to provide 
further clarification on the extent to which EU law may be relied upon to deal 
with the situation of individuals appointed to judicial positions on the back 
of inherently deficient procedures which disclose an undue influence of the 
legislative and executive powers.
Following this largely chronological overview, the volume concludes with a 
transversal analysis of the core implications of the Court’s contribution to the 
fight against rule of law backsliding. While this includes identifying blind spots 
in the Court of Justices’ case law to date, the Court’s contribution amounts 
to one of the most important developments in the law of the Union since its 
foundational jurisprudence of the early 1960s. In other words, the multifaceted 
line of case law, which was prefigured by the Court’s interim order in Białowieża 
Forest before being fully exposed in the Court’s judgment in Portuguese Judges, 
has led to a deep renewal of the most essential features of EU’s constitutionalism. 
This renewal occurred through the articulation of a more substantive idea of the 
rule of law at the supranational level backed by the judicial ‘activation’ of the 
until then untapped potential of Article 19(1) TEU – an operationalisation of 
the EU principle of effective judicial protection fully justified and grounded in 
the Treaties – for the Court of Justice to intervene in defence of a core and well-
established component of the rule of law: the principle of judicial independence. 
In addition to the emergence of increasingly detailed standards of judicial 
independence binding on the Member States, these developments have resulted 
in upgrading the very nature of the judicial dialogue between the Court of 
Justice and the national courts. Essentially, the values of the EU are moving to 
the realm of the law, turning the Union into a true constitutional system where 
the rule of law and its core components have become an enforceable part of EU 
law, paving the way to the progressive ‘unification’ of European judicial power 
on the basis of fundamental principles that are binding and enforceable at both 
national and EU levels. In presiding over this development, the Court of Justice 
has reinforced the ‘values dimension’ of the EU, which now complements the 
internal market dimension of the EU construct.
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1 Introduction
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is behind a recent and genuine 
enhancement of European constitutionalism, placing at the centre stage the 
rule of law, a long-established value and principle of EU law.1 This rule of law-
enhancing process of re-articulation of EU constitutionalism is ongoing and 
represents the Court’s response to the process of rule of law backsliding, now 
approaching breaking point, which first emerged in Hungary in 2010 before 
spreading to Poland in 2015.2
In this casebook-style study, we aim to present and critically analyse this ongoing 
development on a case-by-case basis. In other words, the primary aim of this 
volume is to offer in a casebook format both a digest and a critical assessment 
of the Court of Justice’s most important judgments and orders, which have 
reshaped the meaning and scope of the rule of law principle since 2018: that is, 
from the point that the Portuguese Judges case was decided.3 This judgment can 
be viewed as belonging to the Pantheon of the most significant ECJ rulings, on 
a par with Van Gend en Loos and Costa.4 Indeed, it marked a new beginning for 
the rule of law as a fundamental and enforceable value of the EU legal order, 
referred to in Article 2 TEU and given concrete and justiciable expression by 
inter alia the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU: ‘Member States shall 
provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields 
covered by Union law’.
We hope that the selected excerpts from the Court’s orders and judgments 
and the associated critical analysis presented in this casebook-style volume 
will help readers quickly appreciate the importance and the added value of the 
Court’s orders and judgments, both individually and as a whole. What follows 
 
1 L. Pech, ‘A Union Founded on the Rule of Law: Meaning and Reality of the Rule of Law as a 
Constitutional Principle of EU Law’ (2010) 6 European Constitutional Law Review 359.
2 L. Pech and K. L. Scheppele, ‘Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU’ (2017) 
19 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 3. For an analysis focusing on the politics of 
democratic and rule of law backsliding in Europe, see R.D. Kelemen, ‘The European Union’s 
authoritarian equilibrium’ (2020) 27 Journal of European Public Policy 481.
3 Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (Portuguese Judges), EU:C:2018:117. The 
only temporal exception we will make in this volume concerns the Order of the Court (Grand 
Chamber) of 20 November 2017 in Case C-441/17 R Commission v. Poland (Białowieża Forest), 
EU:C:2017:877. While strictly speaking not a judicial independence case, the ground-breaking 
interim order adopted by the Court in the Białowieża Forest case was explicitly grounded on 
the need to more effectively defend the rule of law in the face of deliberate non-compliance 
and prefigured the Court’s ‘activation’ of Article 19(1) TEU in Case C-64/16 to better protect 
judicial independence. 
4 On Case 26/62 and Case 6/64, see the contributions assembled by M. Poiares Maduro and L. 
Azoulai (eds), The Past and the Future of EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th 
Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010). 
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is essentially a dynamic engagement with EU’s legal history in the making: as 
the story progresses, a clear picture will emerge of how the Court of Justice is 
building, brick-by-brick, a renewed set of principles and standards to help EU 
institutions and national courts more effectively defend the rule of law, primarily 
in its dimension of judicial independence. 
The Court’s increasing and sustained focus on judicial independence is of 
course directly connected and indeed may be viewed as a direct response to an 
unprecedented phenomenon, at least in the EU until a decade ago, of democratic 
and rule of law backsliding in several EU Member States, with Viktor Orbán’s 
Hungary and Jarosław Kaczyński’s Poland being respectively exhibit A and 
exhibit B.5 In the absence of prompt, forceful and effective reactions from the 
European Commission and the Council of the EU, the European Court of Justice 
has essentially been left with no choice but to come to the rescue of national 
courts and judges primarily on the back of national requests for a preliminary 
ruling. Since doing so, starting with Portuguese Judges which, in turn, led the 
Commission to launch a (meagre) total of four infringement actions in relation 
to Poland’s rule of law breakdown,6 the Court has achieved significant success, 
as this study will demonstrate. The Court has particularly focused its attention 
on the principle of judicial independence. This is a very logical choice, both in 
terms of jurisdiction and in terms of substance. As noted by the President of the 
Court of Justice, writing extra-judicially 
given that the principle of judicial independence stems from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States as one of the founding tenets of any  
 
5 In addition to Pech and Scheppele, ‘Illiberalism within’, op. cit., see also G. Halmai, ‘The 
rise and fall of constitutionalism in Hungary’ in P. Blokker (ed.), Constitutional Acceleration 
within the European Union and Beyond (Routledge, 2018), 217; P. Bárd and L. Pech, How 
to build and consolidate a partly free pseudo democracy by constitutional means in three steps: 
The ‘Hungarian model’, RECONNECT Working Paper no. 4, October 2019; W. Sadurski, 
Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown (Oxford: OUP, 2019); M. Smith, ‘Staring into the abyss: A 
crisis of the rule of law in the EU’ (2019) 25 European Law Journal 563; K. Kovács and K.L. 
Scheppele, ‘The Fragility of an Independent Judiciary: Lessons from Hungary and Poland 
– and the European Union’, in P.H. Solomon Jr. and K. Gadowska (eds), Legal Change in 
Post-Communist States: Progress, Reversions, Explanations (Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag, 2019), 55; 
O. Mader, ‘Enforcement of EU Values as a Political Endeavour: Constitutional Pluralism and 
Value Homogeneity in Times of Persistent Challenges to the Rule of Law’ (2019) 11 The Hague 
Journal of the Rule of Law 133. A number of scholarly volumes on these developments are also 
available: see e.g. A. von Bogdandy et al. (eds), Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member 
States (Berlin: Springer, 2021); A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and 
Values: Ensuring Member States’ Compliance (Oxford: OUP, 2017); T. Konstadinides, The Rule of 
Law in the European Union – The Internal Dimension (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017); C. Closa 
and D. Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2016); W. Schröder (ed.), Strengthening the Rule of Law in Europe: From a Common 
Concept to Mechanisms of Implementation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016); A. von Bogdandy, 
P. Sonnevend (eds), Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area: Theory, Law and 
Politics in Hungary and Romania (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015).
6 L. Pech, P. Wachowiec and D. Mazur, ‘Poland’s Rule of Law Breakdown: A Five-Year Assessment 
of EU’s (In)Action’ (2021) 13 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 1.
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democratic system of governance, it was assumed that national governments 
would not threaten it. That principle was “uncontested and incontestable.” It was 
taken as read that national governments would encourage citizens to trust the 
courts as the ultimate arbiters of any legal dispute, including in situations when a 
court ruling opposed the political majority of the day […] Recent developments 
show that this assumption cannot simply be taken for granted.7
Faced with what may be viewed as an existential threat to the functioning and 
long-term survival of the EU legal order,8 the Court of Justice has had to mobilise 
the fundamental values and principles on which the Union and the Member 
States are built9 to progressively articulate a more comprehensive, coherent, and 
effective system of rule of law protection.10
What can be viewed as amounting to a ground-breaking turn in the history of 
EU law was arguably prefigured by a seminal order of the Court issued the year 
before Portuguese Judges in the Białowieża forest case,11 which is why we have 
decided to make an exception and include an analysis of this pre-Portuguese Judges 
development in this volume. Faced with an unprecedented act of defiance with 
7 K. Lenaerts, ‘New Horizons for the Rule of Law Within the EU’ (2020) 21 German Law Journal 
29, 30–31. 
8 L.S. Rossi, ‘La valeur juridique des valeurs: L’article 2 TEU’ (2020) 3 Revue trimestrielle de droit 
européen 639; D. Kochenov, ‘The EU and the Rule of Law – Naïveté or a Grand Design?’ in 
M. Adams, E. Hirsch Ballin, A. Meuwese (eds), Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law. Bridging 
Idealism and Realism (Cambridge: CUP, 2017), 425.
9 B. Grabowska-Moroz, ‘Critical Discussion of the Rule of Law in the EU’ (2021) 
RECONNECT Deliverable 7.4: <https://reconnect-europe.eu/publications/deliverables/>; M. 
Klamert and D. Kochenov, ‘Article 2 TEU’, in M. Kellerbauer, M. Klamert and J. Tomkin (eds), 
The Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights – A Commentary (Oxford: OUP, 2019), 22; 
T. von Danwitz, ‘Values and the Rule of Law: Foundations of the European Union – An Inside 
Perspective from the ECJ’ (2018) 21 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 2; D. Kochenov, ‘The 
Acquis and Its Principles: The Enforcement of ‘Law’ versus the Enforcement of ‘Values’ in the 
European Union’, in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds) The Enforcement of EU Law and Values 
(Oxford: OUP, 2017), 8.
10 For further analysis, see e.g. T.T. Koncewicz, ‘The Supranational Rule of Law as First Principle 
of the European Public Space – On the Journey in Ever Closer Union among the Peoples of 
Europe in Flux’ (2020) 5 Palestra 167; K.L. Scheppele, D. Kochenov and B. Grabowska-Moroz, 
‘EU Values Are Law, after All’ (2020) 39 Yearbook of European Law 3; P. Van Elsuwege and F. 
Grimmelprez, ‘Protecting the Rule of Law in the EU Legal Order: A Constitutional Role for 
the Court of Justice’ (2020) 16 European Constitutional Law Review 8; C. Rizcallah and V. 
Davio, ‘L’article 19 du Traité sur l’Union européenne: sesame de l’Union de droit’ (2020) Revue 
trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 122, 156; G. Kelepouri, ‘Revisiting the Rule of Law in the 
European Context: The CJEU’s Recent Narrative in the Limelight’ (2020) European Politeia 71; 
D. Kochenov and P. Bárd, ‘The Last Soldier Standing? Courts versus Politicians and the Rule of 
Law Crisis in the New Member States of the EU’ (2019) 1 European Yearbook of Constitutional 
Law 243; K. Lenaerts, ‘Our Judicial Independence and the Quest for National, Supranational 
and Transnational Justice’, in G. Sevik, M.-J. Clifton, T. Haas, L. Lourenço and K. Schwiesow 
(eds), The Art of Judicial Reasoning: Festschrift in Honour of Carl Baudenbacher (Berlin: Springer, 
2019), 155; S. Adam and P. Van Elsuwege, ‘L’exigence d’indépendance du juge, paradigme de 
l’Union européenne comme union de droit’ (2018) 9 Journal de droit européen 334; L. Pech and 
S. Platon, ‘Judicial Independence under Threat: The Court of Justice to the Rescue in the ASJP 
Case’ (2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 1836.
11 Case C-441/17 R Commission v. Poland (Białowieża forest), EU:C:2017:877.
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Polish authorities publicly announcing that they would simply refuse to comply 
with a Court’s previous interim order, the Court responded in November 2017 
by stressing that the effective application of EU law is an essential component of 
the rule of law and ordering the payment of a penalty of at least €100,000 per 
day should the relevant Member State fail to immediately and fully comply with 
the Court’s order. In other words, the Court responded to an unprecedented 
challenge to the rule of law (and its own authority) with an unprecedented 
but justified and warranted ‘upgrading’ of the EU system of remedies which 
prefigured what the Court would decide in future interim relief cases in relation 
to more deliberate and direct attacks on judicial independence originating from 
Polish authorities. While the Court’s interim order in Białowieża forest was 
arguably radical, it was not directly connected to judicial independence, and 
it was not until 2018 that the Court of Justice made it unambiguously clear to 
all its interlocutors that it would not stand idle while ‘the independence of the 
judiciary is being severely threatened, and the separation of powers between the 
executive branch and the judicial branch is being dismantled.’12 
In the seminal case informally known as Portuguese Judges,13 the Court 
established a general obligation for Member States to guarantee and respect the 
independence of their national courts and tribunals on the basis of a combined 
reading of Article 19(1) TEU and Articles 2 and 4(3) TEU. In doing so, the 
Court brought about a renewed understanding of the most essential principles 
of EU law – covering procedural and substantive issues – and their place in 
the legal-political architecture of the Union. As observed by one of the present 
authors writing with Sébastien Platon
the Court’s ruling is reminiscent of the 1925 US judgment of Gitlow v. New York, 
in which the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment to the US 
Constitution had extended the reach of certain limitations on federal government 
authority set forth in the First Amendment to the governments of the individual 
States. In the instant case, one may argue that the Court has essentially made the 
EU principle of effective judicial protection (including the principle of judicial 
independence) a quasi-federal standard of review which may be relied on before 
national courts in virtually any situation where national measures target national 
judges who may hear actions based on EU law.14
12 Letter to the President-Elect of the European Commission from the president of the Network 
of Presidents of the Supreme Courts of the EU; The president of the European Association of 
Judges; and The president of the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary, Brussels,  
20 September 2019: https://www.encj.eu/node/535. 
13 Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, EU:C:2018:117.
14 L. Pech and S. Platon, ‘Judicial Independence under Threat: The Court of Justice to the Rescue 
in the ASJP Case’ (2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 1836, 1847.
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The Court’s decisive contribution to the fight against rule of law backsliding 
brought about by the Portuguese Judges’ ruling and its progeny, which saw the 
Court finally giving flesh to the strong and multi-layered legal mandate previously 
given to the EU to defend the rule of law, in particular in Article 19(1) TEU,15 
is multifaceted. It includes a profound strengthening of the EU Member States’ 
obligations in the area of judicial independence via the progressive crystallisation 
of a renewed and more detailed substantive understanding of the principle 
of judicial independence, a component of which (irremovability of judges) 
has since acquired the nature of a principle of ‘cardinal importance’; a much 
stricter understanding of basic EU law concepts such as the concept of a ‘court 
or tribunal of a Member State’; the possibility of a stricter enforcement of the 
rule of law with a renewed emphasis on interim measures and last but not least, 
the explicit consecration of a principle of non-regression – also described as a 
principle of EU law connected to Article 19(1) TEU and prohibiting rule of law 
backsliding – in the March 2021 judgment which we will refer to as the Maltese 
Judges ruling.16 As observed by one of the present authors writing with Aleksejs 
Dimitrovs
One of the immediately apparent flaws of the legal-political organization of 
European Union enlargements consisted in the so-called ‘Copenhagen dilemma’: 
EU’s inability to reshape the legal-political developments in the Member 
States falling outside the material scope of EU law post accession date […] By 
proclaiming an entirely new ‘non-regression’ principle in EU law based on the 
connection between Articles 49 TEU (EU Enlargement) and 2 TEU (EU values 
…), the Court of Justice achieved huge progress in addressing a well-known 
lacuna undermining the EU legal order.17
La boucle est bouclée, so to speak, with the Court of Justice taking just about three 
years – the Portuguese Judges ruling was issued on 27 February 2018 and the Maltese 
Judges ruling issued on 20 April 2021 – to provide the European Commission 
15 C. Hillion, ‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU: Legal mandate and means’, in C. Closa and 
D. Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing the Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2016), 59. 
16 Case C-896/19, Repubblika v. Il-Prim Ministru, EU:C:2021:31. 
17 D. Kochenov, A. Dimitrovs, ‘Solving the Copenhagen Dilemma: The Repubblika Decision of 
the European Court of Justice’, VerfBlog, 28 April 2021: <https://verfassungsblog.de/solving-
the-copenhagen-dilemma/>; M. Leloup, D. Kochenov and A. Dimitrovs, ‘Non-Regression: 
Opening the Door to Solving the “Copenhagen Dilemma”? All Eyes on Case C-896/19 
Repubblika v Il-Prim Ministru’ (2021), 46 European Law Review 668. While non-regression is 
new in the EU rule of law area, it was already implicit in the Court’s Portuguese Judges ruling in 
which the Court emphasised the EU law obligation to maintain, that is, not to reduce, existing 
guarantees relating to judicial independence. It is also a well-established principle in other areas 
such as constitutional law or environmental law. Coincidence or not, shortly after the Maltese 
Judges ruling, the European Parliament gave its consent to the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement, [2021] OJ L 149 64/10, which includes several non-regression provisions as regards 
for instance labour and social levels of protection. See also A. Dimitrovs and D. Kochenov, ‘Of 
Jupiters and Bulls: CVM as a Redundant Special Regime of the Rule of Law – Romanian Judges’, 
EU Law Live (Weekend edition) 5 June 2021.
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with all the legal ‘ammunition’ it needs to bring infringement actions against 
backsliding authorities to defend judicial independence and sanction violations of 
this principle. Indeed, the Court’s rule of law case law has resulted in:
(i) An explicit confirmation that while the organisation of justice in the 
EU Member States falls within the competence of those Member 
States, this competence cannot be exercised in a way which violates 
EU law and in particular the obligation which flows from the second 
paragraph of post Lisbon Article 19(1) TEU to ensure that their 
national courts meet the requirements essential to effective judicial 
protection in the ‘fields covered by Union law’ (thereby confirming 
that the ECJ’s jurisdiction under this provision is not limited to 
situations where Member States are implementing EU law), which 
also necessarily implies another obligation for the EU, and especially 
the Commission, to proactively defend the independence of the 
national judiciaries and the rule of law via infringement actions and 
all available other means;18 
(ii) An articulation of a clearer substantive understanding of the rule of 
law as a foundational value and a meta-principle of EU law, which 
is furthermore fully in line with the dominant understanding of 
the rule of law one may derive from most national legal systems in 
Europe not to forget the understanding adopted and promoted by 
the Council of Europe.19 This contrasts with the initial and arguably 
primarily procedural and, ultimately, circular understanding of 
the rule of law put forward in Les Verts20 at the earlier stage of EU 
constitutionalism;21
(iii) A ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’ of the principle of judicial independence, 
some sub-components of which now being seen as having ‘cardinal 
importance’22 such as the principle of the irremovability of judges, 
18 K.L. Scheppele, D. Kochenov and B. Grabowska-Moroz, ‘EU Values Are Law, after All’ (2020) 
39 Yearbook of European Law 3.
19 L. Pech and J. Grogan (eds), ‘Meaning and Scope of the EU Rule of Law’ (2020) 
RECONNECT Deliverable 7.2: <https://reconnect-europe.eu/publications/deliverables/> 
20 Case 294/83 Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. European Parliament, EU:C:1986:166. For an analysis 
of this judgment and its importance as regards the rule of law as a constitutional principle of 
EU law, see K. Lenaerts, ‘The Basic Constitutional Charter of a Community Based on the Rule 
of Law’, in M. Poiares Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds), The Past and the Future of EU Law: The 
Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2010), 304; L. Pech, ‘The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of the European Union’ 
(2009) Jean Monnet Working Papers No. 4/2009; M.L. Fernández Esteban, The Rule of Law in 
the European Constitution (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999).
21 D. Kochenov, ‘EU Law without the Rule of Law: Is the Veneration of Autonomy Worth It?’ 
(2019) 34 Yearbook of European Law 74.
22 See e.g. Case C-619/18 Commission v. Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court), 
EU:C:2018:1021, para. 79.
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with the fundamental right to a fair trial also described by the Court 
as a right which is of cardinal importance which is intrinsically 
connected to independent courts;  
(iv) A much stricter understanding of basic yet key notions such as, most 
importantly, the notion of a ‘court or tribunal’ of a Member State for 
the purposes of the preliminary reference procedure and the notion 
of ‘judicial authority’ for the purposes of the issuance of European 
Arrest Warrants;
(v) A more tightened enforcement of the rule of law, in particular via 
infringement actions, including applications for interim measures, 
which however remains to date insufficiently prompt and sustained 
to effectively tackle the worsening rule of law backsliding in Poland 
in particular;23
(vi) The making explicit of a principle of non-regression on the basis of 
a joint reading of Articles 2 and 49 TEU, which, as the Court had 
repeatedly explained before the Maltese Judges ruling, means that 
the EU is composed of countries which have freely and voluntarily 
committed themselves to the common values referred to in Article 
2 TEU. This means inter alia that a Member State cannot post 
accession adopt rules undermining judicial independence as this 
would violate the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU 
which prohibits inter alia national authorities from adopting new 
legislation amounting to a regression in the Member State concerned 
in the protection of the value of the rule of law, in particular the EU 
guarantees relating to judicial independence.24
Taken together, all of these developments amount in our view to welcome 
and crucial progress in the field of the rule of law: the Court of Justice has 
compellingly and repeatedly made crystal clear, as laid down in the Treaties, that 
the EU and its law are and must be based on the rule of law, a core binding legal 
principle rather than a non-binding political ornament. Equally importantly, the 
enforcement of the rule of law at Member State level is also a matter of EU law. 
The above developments allow for the progressive emergence of a renewed 
Union. It is no longer a would-be constitutional system25 based on an irrebuttable 
presumption of compliance with the values laid down in what is now Article 
23 L. Pech, P. Wachowiec and D. Mazur, ‘Poland’s Rule of Law Breakdown: A Five-Year Assessment 
of EU’s (In)Action’ (2021) 13 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 1.
24 Case C-896/19, Repubblika v. Il-Prim Ministru, EU:C:2021:31, paras 63–65. 
25 See, the diverging perspectives of J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution for Europe: ‘Do the New Clothes 
Have an Emperor?’ and Other Essays on European Integration (Cambridge: CUP, 1999) and P.L. 
Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation State (Oxford: OUP, 2010). 
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2 TEU – including democracy, human rights protection and the rule of law.26 
Instead, these core foundational and shared values are now backed with the 
possibility of stricter substantive enforcement through the EU’s institutional 
framework and system of remedies,27 with the Court, as noted above, confirming 
in 2021 that EU Law prohibits post accession regression when it comes to 
the rule of law and in particular the independence of national judges. By also 
confirming the obligation for every Member State under Article 19(1) TEU to 
ensure that their national courts are in a position to ensure effective judicial 
protection in the fields covered by EU law, the Commission had to move away 
from its pre-Portuguese Judges’ reluctance to directly enforce this obligation via 
infringement actions. This reluctance was arguably connected to the perceived 
limits of EU competence28 combined with the perceived lack of clarity in terms of 
the substance of the values in question. Clarity is being articulated at both levels 
now.29 With the simultaneous reinforcement of enforcement possibilities, the 
broad outlines of the nascent new constitutionalism in the EU are complete.30
Renewed attention to the rule of law and its elevation to an enforceable principle 
of EU law applicable across the legal orders is likely to be the most important 
legacy of Koen Lenaerts – first appointed judge at the EU General Court in 
1989, before being appointed judge at the Court of Justice in 2003 and elected 
President of the Court of Justice in 2015 – as he aspires to lead the Court in the 
‘quest for national, supranational and transnational justice’.31 
26 D. Kochenov, ‘The EU and the Rule of Law – Naïveté or a Grand Design?’ in M. Adams, E. 
Hirsch Ballin, A. Meuwese (eds), Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law. Bridging Idealism and 
Realism (Cambridge: CUP, 2017), 425.
27 L.S. Rossi, ‘La valeur juridique des valeurs: L’article 2 TEU’ (2020) 3 Revue trimestrielle de 
droit européen 639; T. von Danwitz, ‘Values and the Rule of Law: Foundations of the European 
Union – An Inside Perspective from the ECJ’ (2018) 21 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 2; 
R. Baratta, ‘La communauté de valeurs dans l’ordre juridique de l’Union européenne’ (2018) 
Revue des affaires européennes 81; D. Kochenov, ‘The Acquis and Its Principles: The Enforcement 
of ‘Law’ versus the Enforcement of ‘Values’ in the European Union’, in A. Jakab and D. 
Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values (Oxford: OUP, 2017), 8.
28 The European Commission did however and rightly interpret Article 7 TEU in 2003 as not 
being confined to areas covered by EU law, which means that the EU “could act not only in the 
event of a breach of common values in this limited field but also in the event of a breach in an 
area where the Member States act autonomously”. See Communication on Article 7 the Treaty 
on European Union, COM(2003) 606 final, 15 October 2003, p. 5.
29 G. Palombella, ‘Beyond Legality–before Democracy: Rule of Law Caveats in the EU Two-Level 
System’, in C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European 
Union (Cambridge: CUP, 2016).
30 R. Janse, De renaissance van de Rechtsstaat (Open Universiteit, 2018).
31 K. Lenaerts, ‘Our Judicial Independence and the Quest for National, Supranational and 
Transnational Justice’, op. cit. This understanding goes hand in hand with the gradual 
articulation of best practices in the field of the rule of law in the EU: see B. Grabowska-Moroz, 
‘Understanding the Best Practices in the Area of the Rule of Law’ (2020) RECONNECT 
Deliverable 8.1: <https://reconnect-europe.eu/publications/deliverables/>
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As we embark on the analysis of the most crucial case law underpinning this 
quest, a disclaimer is needed to explain what could not be included in this 
already lengthy casebook, for reasons of framing and space:
First, and most importantly, justice, especially EU justice, is a multifaceted 
and troublesome concept, and scholars, including one of the present authors, 
have emphasised Europe’s justice deficit and connected it to EU law’s very 
nature, rather than the avenues of its enforcement per se.32 Secondly, we will 
not directly tackle the Court of Justice’s arguable lack of consistency to date in 
applying and defending EU requirements relating to judicial independence in a 
situation where the mandate of a serving member of the Court was terminated 
prematurely on account of Brexit.33 
A supranational judiciary certainly requires wholehearted defence but also 
scrutiny, just like national ones do.34 However, as noted above, this study 
is primarily about the Court of Justice’s decisive contribution to a clearer, 
substantive and vertically integrated understanding of judicial independence in 
Europe as an indispensable part of the rule of law and a crucial factor behind 
the preservation of the unity of the multi-layered European legal system. These 
are painted here – albeit in broad strokes – with sufficient precision to hopefully 
help readers both appreciate the overall direction of the Court’s rule of law case 
law as well as the added value of each of the Court’s most important rulings.
To help readers appreciate the Court’s ‘voice’ as well as its incrementalist 
approach, we have decided, as previously noted, to follow a casebook format. 
The Court’s Portuguese Judges (Case C-64/16) ruling will be used as a starting 
point to discuss the extent of the EU Member States’ obligation to ensure that 
their courts meet the requirements of effective judicial protection. The European 
Commission’s enforcement of this obligation via application for interim 
measures35 and infringements actions,36 all relating to measures and (in)actions 
32 D. Kochenov, G. de Búrca and A. Williams (eds), Europe’s Justice Deficit? (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2015); A. von Bogdandy, ‘Beyond the Rechtsgemeinschaft, with Trust – Reframing 
the Concept of European Rule of Law’ (2018) MPIL Research Paper 2018/02. See also C. 
O’Brien, Unity in Adversity: EU Citizenship, Social Justice, and the Cautionary Tale of the UK 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017); D. Kochenov, ‘On Tiles and Pillars’, in D. Kochenov (ed.), 
EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017); A. Williams, The Ethos of Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 2009); A. Williams, ‘Taking Values 
Seriously: Towards a Philosophy of EU Law’ (2009) 29 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 549.
33 D. Kochenov and G. Butler, ‘The Independence and Lawful Composition of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union: Replacement of Advocate General Sharpston and the Battle for 
the Integrity of the Institution’ [2020] Jean Monnet Working Papers No. 2/2020; D. Kochenov 
and G. Butler, ‘CJEU’s Independence in Question (Part V)’, VerfBlog 19 June 2021; L. Pech, 
‘The Schrödinger’s Advocate General,’ VerfBlog, 29 May 2020: <https://verfassungsblog.de/the-
schroedingers-advocate-general>
34 A. Alemanno and L. Pech, ‘Thinking Justice Outside the Docket: A Critical Assessment of the 
Reform of the EU’s Court System’ (2017) 54 Common Market Law Review 129.
35 Case C-441/17 R; Case C-619/18 R; Case C-791/19 R and Case C-204/21 R.
36 Case C-192/18; Case C-619/18; Case C-791/19.
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involving current Polish authorities, will then be presented before an analysis of 
the Court of Justice’s answer to selected Polish courts’ requests for a preliminary 
ruling is offered.37 The casebook will then leave Polish related cases provisionally 
aside to focus on the Court of Justice’s recalibration of its previous approaches 
in several domains such as the notion of court and tribunal for the purposes of 
Article 267 TFEU and offer a critical overview of seven judgments.38 The Court 
of Justice’s latest crucial challenge – how to deal with Poland’s ‘fake judges’ – 
will be the last issue covered by this casebook before a transversal, concluding 
overview is offered.  
We do hope that this study’s casebook format will facilitate a better understanding 
of the importance of both the individual cases – and eventual shortcomings of 
the selected judgments or orders – and the case law, which has been evolving 
at lightning speed notwithstanding the Court’s incrementalist approach as 
previously noted. In doing so, we hope to have answered, at least in part, the 
European Commission’s call for academics to ‘play a part by ensuring a place for 
the rule of law in public debate and educational curricula’,39 and help promote 
the standards developed in the Court of Justice’s case law, bringing a stronger 
and more coherent system of EU law to life.
37 Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18; Joined Cases C-558/18 and C-563/18.
38 Case C-274/14; Case C-416/17; Case C-284/16; Joined Cases C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU; 
Case C-509/18; Case C-216/18 PPU; Joined Cases C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II.
39 European Commission communication, Strengthening the rule of law within the Union. A 
blueprint for action, COM(2019) 343 final, 6.
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2 The obligation to ensure 
that national courts 
meet the requirements 
of effective judicial 
protection
Case C-64/16 ASJP (Portuguese Judges)
The Court of Justice’s Grand Chamber ruling in ASJP, a case informally known 
as Portuguese Judges, 40 is arguably ‘the most important judgment since Les Verts as 
regards the meaning and scope of the principle of the rule of law in the EU legal 
system’.41 This judgment may also be understood as ‘the Court’s first significant 
albeit indirect answer to the worrying and ongoing process of “rule of law 
backsliding”, first witnessed in Hungary and now under way in Poland’.42 
The most significant outcome of this case is the Court’s compelling interpretation 
of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU (‘Member States shall provide 
remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by 
Union law’) from which the Court derived a general and justiciable obligation for 
every Member State, not only to guarantee but also maintain the independence 
of their national courts and tribunals.43 
40 EU:C:2018:117.
41 L. Pech and S. Platon, ‘Judicial independence under threat: The Court of Justice to the rescue 
in the ASJP case’ (2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 1827, 1827. See also M. Bonelli and 
M. Claes, ‘Judicial serendipity: how Portuguese judges came to the rescue of the Polish judiciary’ 
(2018) 14 European Constitutional Law Review 622.
42 L. Pech and S. Platon, ibid., 1828. 
43 A few days after the Portuguese Judges ruling, the ECJ made extensive references to it in yet 
another seminal ruling, in Achmea, which is analysed infra in Section 5.3.
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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)
27 February 2018
Case C-64/16
REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the 
Supremo Tribunal Administrativo (Supreme Administrative Court, 
Portugal)
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v. Tribunal de Contas
[For ease of reading, references to previous cases have been omitted]
Excerpts: 
29 First of all, the Court of Justice points out that as regards the material 
scope of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, that provision 
relates to ‘the fields covered by Union law’, irrespective of whether the 
Member States are implementing Union law, within the meaning of Article 
51(1) of the Charter.
30 According to Article 2 TEU, the European Union is founded on values, 
such as the rule of law, which are common to the Member States in a society 
in which, inter alia, justice prevails. In that regard, it should be noted that 
mutual trust between the Member States and, in particular, their courts and 
tribunals is based on the fundamental premises that Member States share a 
set of common values on which the European Union is founded, as stated 
in Article 2 TEU.
31 The European Union is a union based on the rule of law in which 
individual parties have the right to challenge before the courts the legality of 
any decision or other national measure relating to the application to them 
of an EU act.
32 Article 19 TEU, which gives concrete expression to the value of the 
rule of law stated in Article 2 TEU, entrusts the responsibility for ensuring 
judicial review in the EU legal order not only to the Court of Justice but also 
to national courts and tribunals.
33 Consequently, national courts and tribunals, in collaboration with the 
Court of Justice, fulfil a duty entrusted to them jointly of ensuring that in 
the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed.
34 The Member States are therefore obliged, by reason, inter alia, of 
the principle of sincere cooperation, set out in the first subparagraph of 
Article 4(3) TEU, to ensure, in their respective territories, the application 
of and respect for EU law. In that regard, as provided for by the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Member States are to provide remedies 
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sufficient to ensure effective judicial protection for individual parties in the 
fields covered by EU law. It is, therefore, for the Member States to establish 
a system of legal remedies and procedures ensuring effective judicial review 
in those fields.
35 The principle of the effective judicial protection of individuals’ rights 
under EU law, referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, 
is a general principle of EU law stemming from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, which has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 
13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, and which 
is now reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter.
36 The very existence of effective judicial review designed to ensure 
compliance with EU law is of the essence of the rule of law.
37 It follows that every Member State must ensure that the bodies which, as 
‘courts or tribunals’ within the meaning of EU law, come within its judicial 
system in the fields covered by that law, meet the requirements of effective 
judicial protection.
38 In that regard, the Court notes that the factors to be taken into account 
in assessing whether a body is a ‘court or tribunal’ include, inter alia, 
whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its 
jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it 
applies rules of law and whether it is independent.
39 In the present case, it must be noted that, according to the information 
before the Court which it is for the referring court to verify, questions relating 
to EU own resources and the use of financial resources from the European 
Union may be brought before the Tribunal de Contas (Court of Auditors) […]
40 Consequently, to the extent that the Tribunal de Contas (Court of 
Auditors) may rule, as a ‘court or tribunal’, within the meaning referred 
to in paragraph 38 above, on questions concerning the application or 
interpretation of EU law, which it is for the referring court to verify, the 
Member State concerned must ensure that that court meets the requirements 
essential to effective judicial protection, in accordance with the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. 
41 In order for that protection to be ensured, maintaining such a court 
or tribunal’s independence is essential, as confirmed by the second 
subparagraph of Article 47 of the Charter, which refers to the access to an 
‘independent’ tribunal as one of the requirements linked to the fundamental 
right to an effective remedy.
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42 The guarantee of independence, which is inherent in the task of 
adjudication, is required not only at EU level as regards the Judges of the 
Union and the Advocates-General of the Court of Justice, as provided for 
in the third subparagraph of Article 19(2) TEU, but also at the level of the 
Member States as regards national courts.
43 The independence of national courts and tribunals is, in particular, 
essential to the proper working of the judicial cooperation system embodied 
by the preliminary ruling mechanism under Article 267 TFEU, in that, in 
accordance with the settled case-law referred to in paragraph 38 above, that 
mechanism may be activated only by a body responsible for applying EU 
law which satisfies, inter alia, that criterion of independence.
44 The concept of independence presupposes, in particular, that the body 
concerned exercises its judicial functions wholly autonomously, without 
being subject to any hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other 
body and without taking orders or instructions from any source whatsoever, 
and that it is thus protected against external interventions or pressure liable 
to impair the independent judgment of its members and to influence their 
decisions.
45 Like the protection against removal from office of the members of the 
body concerned, the receipt by those members of a level of remuneration 
commensurate with the importance of the functions they carry out 
constitutes a guarantee essential to judicial independence.
46 In the present case, it should be noted that, as is apparent from the 
information provided by the referring court, the salary-reduction measures at 
issue in the main proceedings were adopted because of mandatory requirements 
linked to eliminating the Portuguese State’s excessive budget deficit and in the 
context of an EU programme of financial assistance to Portugal.
[…]
48 The measures were applied not only to the members of the Tribunal 
de Contas (Court of Auditors), but, more widely, to various public office 
holders and employees performing duties in the public sector, including the 
representatives of the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.
49 Those measures cannot, therefore, be perceived as being specifically 
adopted in respect of the members of the Tribunal de Contas (Court of 
Auditors). They are, on the contrary, in the nature of general measures seeking 
a contribution from all members of the national public administration to 
the austerity effort dictated by the mandatory requirements for reducing the 
Portuguese State’s excessive budget deficit.
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[…]
51 In those circumstances, the salary-reduction measures at issue in the 
main proceedings cannot be considered to impair the independence of the 
members of the Tribunal de Contas (Court of Auditors).
Analysis
The answer provided by the European Court of Justice to the referring national 
court may seem, at first sight, rather innocuous, as the Court merely concluded that 
‘the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU must be interpreted as meaning 
that the principle of judicial independence does not preclude’ the general salary-
reduction measures adopted by Portuguese authorities to eliminate an excessive 
budget deficit from being applied to the members of the Portuguese Court of 
Auditors. Advocate General (‘AG’) Saugmandsgaard Øe had previously concluded 
the same. He however did so on the dual basis of the second subparagraph of 
Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU (‘CFR’), while also opining on the one hand that the principle of judicial 
independence is not directly protected by Article 19(1) TEU and, on the other 
hand that the dispute before the referring court did not in fact relate to judicial 
independence as such.44 The reasoning adopted by the Court of Justice to reach 
the same conclusion was radically different and we would submit, rightly so.45 
44 Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe delivered on 18 May 2017 in Case C-64/16, 
EU:C:2017:395.
45 While ground-breaking, the Court’s interpretation in this case is less revolutionary that it may 
seem at first sight. Indeed, it is solidly rooted both in the Court’s previous case law (see Case 
C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores, EU:C:2002:462) and in the academic literature: 
see in particular the remarkable work of John Usher regarding the predecessor of Article 19(1) 
TEU, i.e., Article 164 EEC. Professor Usher opined that ‘the door appears to have been opened 
to the exercise of new sorts of judicial control in the complex relationship between Community 
institutions and Member States, going beyond the broad interpretation which the Court had 
already given under the Treaties’: J.A. Usher, ‘General Course: The Continuing Development 
of Law and Institutions’, in F. Emmert, Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law 
(1991) European Community Law. Vol II, Book 1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1992), esp. Part v. ‘The European Court of Justice and its Jurisdiction’, 122–135; J.A. Usher, 
‘How limited is the jurisdiction of European Court of Justice?’, in J. Dine, S. Douglas-Scott, 
I. Persaud (eds), Procedure and the European Court (London: Chancery Law Publishing 1991), 
77. See also C.N. Kakouris, ‘La Cour de Justice des Communautés européennes comme cour 
constitutionnelle: trois observations’, in O. Due, M. Lutter, J. Schwarze (eds), Festschrift für 
Ulrich Everling (Baden Baden: Nomos, 1995), 629; C.N. Kakouris, ‘La Mission de la Cour de 
Justice des Communautés Européennes et l’ethos du Juge’ (1994) 4 Revue des affaires européennes 
35, all as cited in L. Pech and J. Grogan (eds), The Meaning and Scope of EU Rule of Law (2020) 
RECONNECT Deliverable 7.2., at 20 et seq. See also supporting this view, K. Lenaerts, ‘The 
Rule of Law and the Coherence of the Judicial System of the European Union’ (2007) 44 
Common Market Law Review 1625; C. Closa, D. Kochenov and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Reinforcing 
the Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union’, EUI RSCAS Working Paper No. 2014/25, 
19–13; K. Lenaerts, ‘The Court of Justice as the Guarantor of the Rule of Law within the 
European Union’, in G. De Baere and J. Wouters (eds), The Contribution of International and 
Supranational Courts to the Rule of Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015), 242.
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Before outlining the key aspects of the Court’s reasoning, one should note that 
the European Commission, rather than arguing for a rule of law-enhancing 
interpretation of Article 19(1) TEU, thought it best to raise objections as regards 
the admissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling. Indeed, the Commission 
argued that the national legislation at issue was not a measure implementing EU 
law within the meaning of Article 51 CFR and, as such, was not a measure which 
could be reviewed in light of Article 19(1) TEU. The Court disagreed. 
Before outlining the most ground-breaking elements of the Court’s reasoning, 
the basic principles recalled by the Court will be briefly presented. 
Well-established principles prior to Portuguese Judges 
When dealing with the substance of the question submitted by the referring 
court, the Court first mostly reiterates well-established principles: The EU is 
established on a number of fundamental and common values and its legal order 
is based on the assumption that EU Member States will comply with values. 
The Court then makes a number of basic points which are nonetheless worth 
repeating: 
(i) The rule of law in the EU essentially means that individuals have the 
right to judicially challenge EU measures but also national measures 
which relate to EU law; 
(ii) Responsibility for ensuring judicial review is entrusted not only to 
the EU courts but also to national courts and tribunals;
(iii) Member States are under an obligation to apply and respect EU law 
and it is their responsibility to establish a system of legal remedies 
and procedures ensuring effective judicial review in the fields 
covered by EU law; 
(iv) The principle of the effective judicial protection of individuals’ right 
under EU law is a general principle of EU law;
(v) Effective judicial review designed to ensure compliance with EU 
law is the essence of the rule of law; 
(vi) The independence of national courts and tribunals is essential to the 
proper working of the EU judicial cooperation system; 
(vii) The concept of judicial independence has an internal dimension 
(which is primarily about guaranteeing impartiality) as well as an 
external dimension (which is primarily about protecting judges 
against external interventions or pressures). 
28 Respect for the Rule of Law in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice SIEPS 2021:3
These broad and well-established principles are subsequently relied upon by the 
Court to guide its interpretation of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) 
TEU, which – one must recall – was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.46 According 
to the Court, the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU establishes a 
justiciable obligation for every Member State to ‘ensure that the bodies which, 
as “courts or tribunals” within the meaning of EU law, come within its judicial 
system in the fields covered by that law, meet the requirements of effective judicial 
protection’.47 This obligation includes not merely an obligation to respect but also 
an obligation to maintain the independence of national courts or tribunals. This 
twofold obligation is connected with and derives from the right of access to 
an independent tribunal laid down in the second subparagraph of Article 47 
CFR but also Article 2 TEU, with Article 19(1) TEU appropriately described as 
giving concrete expression to the principle of the rule of law. 
Scope of application 
The scope of application of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU 
and the scope of application of the second subparagraph of Article 47 CFR 
must however be distinguished, as Article 19(1) TEU refers to the notion of 
‘fields covered by Union law’ whereas Article 51 CFR refers to the notion of 
implementation of Union law as far as the Member States are concerned.48 
For the Court, the material scope of application of the obligation to protect 
judicial independence laid down in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) 
TEU is broader than the right to an independent tribunal laid down second 
subparagraph of Article 47 CFR.49 Indeed, the second subparagraph of Article 
19(1) TEU covers any national court or tribunal which may rule as a court 
or tribunal on questions concerning the application or interpretation of EU 
law. Matteo Bonelli and Monica Claes have aptly referred in this context to the 
emergence of a new ‘functional’ sphere of EU law:
The new sphere of EU law seems to be a ‘functional’ rather than a traditional 
‘substantive’ one: the key factor for falling under the jurisdiction of the Court is 
not whether the circumstances of the case touch upon matters regulated by Union 
law, but the function of national courts as part of the European judiciary. A link 
46 In doing so, the Lisbon Treaty merely codified the Court’s case law. See in particular Case C-50/00 
P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores, EU:C:2002:462, para. 41: ‘it is for the Member States to 
establish a system of legal remedies and procedures which ensure respect for the right to effective 
judicial protection’. For further analysis, see M. Klamert and B. Schima, ‘Article 19’ in M. 
Kellerbauer, M. Klamert and J. Tomkin (eds), The Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
– A Commentary (Oxford: OUP, 2019), 172; K. Lenaerts, ‘The Rule of Law and the Coherence of 
the Judicial System of the European Union’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 1625.
47 Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, op. cit., para 37.
48 Ibid., para. 29.
49 This distinction, while compelling, can however have negative implications if a CFR route for 
the protection of the rule of law is chosen, as could be observed in Case C-216/18 PPU LM, for 
example, which is analysed infra in Section 5.5.
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with a ‘substantive rule of EU law’ is thus still required, but it can be more indirect; 
it is sufficient for the relevant court to ‘potentially apply or interpret EU law’.50
This complex issue has been tackled directly by the Court in the cases of Miasto 
Łowicz and Prokurator Generalny,51 which we analyse infra in Section 4.2. At this 
stage, let us emphasise that the practical, if not far-reaching, consequence of the 
Court’s interpretation in Portuguese Judges is that private parties, in particular 
judges when acting as plaintiffs, have been empowered to rely upon the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU directly to challenge, in the context of 
domestic proceedings, national measures which can be considered to undermine 
the independence of any national court or tribunal which may apply or interpret 
EU law. And while the Court of Justice only initially implicitly recognised that 
the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU has direct effect, the Court has 
recently explicitly confirmed that this is indeed the case in A.B. and Others, by 
holding that ‘the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU imposes on the 
Member States a clear and precise obligation as to the result to be achieved and 
[…] that obligation is not subject to any condition as regards the independence 
which must characterise the courts called upon to interpret and apply EU law’.52 
In other words, and to quote AG Bobek, ‘that provision is endowed with direct 
effect and thus entitles a national court, by virtue of the principle of primacy 
of EU law, to do whatever is in its power to secure the compliance of national 
law with EU law’.53 The Portuguese Judges ruling also finally convinced the 
Commission to launch infringement actions directly on the basis of Article 
19(1) TEU, which the Commission did soon afterwards.54
50 M. Bonelli and M. Claes, ‘Judicial serendipity’, op. cit., 631. See also M. Krajewski, ‘Associação 
Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses: The Court of Justice and Athena’s Dilemma’ (2018) 3 European 
Papers 395.
51 Joined Cases C-558/18 and C-563/18 Miasto Łowicz and Prokurator Generalny, EU:C:2020:234.
52 Case C-824/18 A.B. et al. (Appointment of judges to the Supreme Court – Actions), 
EU:C:2021:153. For further analysis, see infra Section 6. 
53 Opinion of AG Bobek delivered on 20 May 2021 in Joined Cases C-748/19 to C-754/19, 
Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim et al., EU:C:2021:403, para. 196. 
54 See Case C-192/18 Commission v. Poland (Independence of Ordinary Courts), EU:C:2019:924 
and Case C-619/18 Commission v. Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court), EU:C:2018:1021 
where the Commission requested the Court, inter alia, to declare a violation of the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of Article 47 CFR, and analysed infra 
in Section 3.2. This approach had been previously advocated by K.L. Scheppele, C. Hillion, 
and the present authors: See e.g. D. Kochenov and L. Pech, ‘Better late than never: On the 
European Commission’s Rule of Law Framework and its first activation’ (2016) 54 Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 1062–1074, and Pech et al., ‘An EU mechanism on democracy, the 
rule of law and fundamental rights – Annex I (EPRS study)’ (2016) PE 579.328, 200 (use 
of infringement actions based on Article 2 TEU in conjunction with Articles 4(3) and/or 
19(1) TEU is presented as one of the options the Commission should explore in order better 
to protect the rule of law in the EU); C. Hillion, ‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU: 
Legal mandate and means’, in C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing the Rule of Law 
Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge: CUP, 2016); K.L. Scheppele, ‘Enforcing the Basic 
Principles of EU Law through Systemic Infringement Actions’, in C. Closa and D. Kochenov 
(eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge: CUP, 2016). See 
also C. Closa, D. Kochenov and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Reinforcing the Rule of Law Oversight in the 
European Union’ (2014) EUI RSCAS Research Paper 2014/25.
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Challengeable national measures 
As regards the type of national measures which could be challenged for violating 
the principle of judicial independence, the Portuguese Judges ruling clarified that 
any national measure of a financial nature which, for instance, would specifically 
target judges could be reviewed in light of Article 19(1) and would violate 
it should the measure be found to impair judicial independence. The Court 
similarly clarified that the principle of judicial independence may be relied upon 
to protect judges against financial measures such as pay cuts in a situation where 
judges are specifically targeted on the ground that ‘the receipt by those members 
of a level of remuneration commensurate with the importance of the functions 
they carry out constitutes a guarantee essential to judicial independence’.55 
Subsequently to this judgment, the Court (second chamber) was asked by a 
Spanish court to review salary-reduction measures following litigation initiated by 
a Spanish judge.56 Unsurprisingly, and in line with the answer provided in respect 
of the Portuguese general salary-reduction measures, the Court held that the 
disputed ‘measures were applied not only to the members of the Spanish judiciary 
but, more widely, to various public office holders and employees performing 
duties in the public sector’.57 Due to their general nature, and in the absence 
of circumstances indicating the contrary, the Court found that the national 
legislation at issue did not give rise to an ‘infringement of the principle of judicial 
independence, as guaranteed by the second paragraph of Article 19(1) TEU’.58
However, the Court added that it is for the referring court to ascertain whether 
the level of remuneration received by the applicant judge ‘after application of 
the salary reduction at issue is commensurate with the importance of the duties 
he performs and, accordingly, guarantees his independent judgment’.59 This is a 
new and welcome qualification which implies that a Member State could still fall 
foul of Article 19(1) TEU in a situation where, for instance, under the pretext of 
reducing its public sector bill, national authorities aimed in fact to undermine 
the independence of national judges.60
55 Case C-64/16, op. cit., para. 45.
56 The broader context of the case law on austerity measures predating Portuguese judges is 
also of interest. As Georgia Kelepouri rightly underlines, the ruling appears to be a reversal 
– concerning the judiciary – of the Court’s previous approach regarding national measures 
resulting in the lowering of salaries in the public sector. See G. Kelepouri, ‘Revisiting the Rule of 
Law in the European Context: The CJEU’s Recent Narrative in the Limelight’ (2020) European 
Politeia 71, at 75, note 5. 
57 Case C-49/18 Carlos Escribano Vindel v. Ministerio de Justicia, EU:C:2019:106, para. 67.
58 Ibid., para. 73.
59 Ibid., para. 74.
60 A potential danger highlighted by Pech and Platon, op. cit., at 1851: ‘By making inter alia 
the specific targeting of judges part of its test to decide when a violation of the EU principle 
of judicial independence may be directly raised via Article 19(1) TEU, the Court leaves open 
one possible option for autocratic governments to annihilate judicial independence without 
activating Article 19(1): the option to act against all checks and balances simultaneously, for 
instance, by cutting their budgets all at once so that the judiciary is not singled out’.
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Aspects left to be clarified by subsequent case law
A number of aspects remained unclear after the Portuguese Judges ruling: to 
begin with, the Court was relatively ambiguous when it came to the seemingly 
different scopes of application of the Article 19(1) TEU principle of judicial 
independence and the Article 47 CFR right to an effective remedy and to a 
fair trial. While the scope of Article 19(1) TEU is understood by the Court as 
broader than the scope of Article 47 CFR, the Court’s ruling did not clarify 
how much broader it should be. Subsequent judgments examined infra have 
raised this issue and we will therefore discuss it again when analysing the Court’s 
judgments in response to the Commission’s infringement actions in respect of 
Poland’s so-called ‘judicial reforms’.61
Another area of uncertainty concerned the relationship between Article 19(1) 
TEU and Article 267 TFEU: ‘Since Article 19(1) TEU empowers the Court to 
review whether a national measure affects the independence of most national 
courts, this raises the question of how this “Article 19(1) test” relates, if at 
all, to the “Article 267 test” (i.e., whether the body that made a request for a 
preliminary ruling is a “court or tribunal”). Is the latter likely to spill over to 
the former?’62 This issue was clarified to some extent in Banco de Santander SA,63 
where the Court tightened the minimal standards of independence necessary to 
be considered a court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 267 TFEU.64
Some uncertainty also remained as regards the concrete situations in which 
the principle of judicial independence expressed in the second subparagraph 
of Article 19(1) TEU may be relied upon by litigants before national courts. 
In Portuguese Judges, the litigation was initiated by a union of judges who 
challenged salary-reduction measures which were directly applied to judges. It 
was left unclear to what extent, if at all, a national court could refer questions 
regarding national measures targeting the referring judges and/or undermining 
judicial independence structurally in the context of a domestic dispute pending 
before the national referring court when the dispute itself does not fall within 
the scope of EU law. In other words, it was unclear after the Portuguese Judges 
ruling whether the Court would accept responding to Article 19(1) TEU-related 
questions if the main national case did not itself fall within the scope of EU law, 
or whether the Court would admit such questions if the referring court raised 
the issue of ‘incidental’ national measures which affected the independence of 
 
61 Most importantly, the Court did seem to imply in this later case law that Article 47 CFR 
can still be complied with – quite counter-intuitively – in specific individual cases even if the 
judiciary as a whole has been captured and that the executive and legislative powers can thus 
interfere with judicial output at will, as has been observed in LM and is analysed infra in  
Section 5.5.
62 Pech and Platon, op. cit., at 1842. 
63 Case C-274/14 Banco de Santander SA, EU:C:2019:802.
64 See infra Section 5.1.
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a court which ‘could’ rule on EU law, even if the main case pending before that 
court were not itself connected with EU law? Some answers to these complex 
issues have since been provided by the Court, in particular in Joined Cases 
C-558/18 and C-563/18 Miasto Łowicz and Prokurator Generalny, examined 
infra in Section 4. 
To conclude, the Court’s seminal judgment in Portuguese Judges must be 
understood as being on par with the Court’s judgments in Van Gend en Loos 
and Costa. It is yet another grande décision which shows, to follow President 
Lenaerts, that ‘national courts are called upon to play a pivotal role in European 
integration, and that the ECJ is committed to upholding the rule of law within 
the EU’.65 Subsequent judgments and orders have shown the strength of the 
Court of Justice’s commitment to play its part in defending the independence of 
national courts. Before reviewing the most significant preliminary rulings issued 
by the Court post Portuguese Judges, the next section will outline the decisive 
contribution to judicial independence made by the Court of Justice in the 
context of the infringement actions brought by the Commission against Polish 
authorities. 
65 K. Lenaerts, ‘Our Judicial Independence and the Quest for National, Supranational and 
Transnational Justice’, op. cit., at 164.
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3 Enforcement of the 
obligation to ensure that 
national courts meet the 
requirements of effective 
judicial protection
The European Commission, in its capacity as Guardian of the Treaties (Article 
17(1) TEU), has launched a total of four infringement actions to protect judicial 
independence to date in relation to the rule of law situation in Poland. Three 
out these four actions have been decided by the Court of Justice at the time of 
writing with the Court finding in each instance multiple violations of the Polish 
authorities’ obligation to respect and maintain the independence of the Polish 
courts.66 
The developments below will offer an analysis of the Court’s rulings in Case 
C-619/18, Commission v. Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court); Case 
C-192/18, Commission v. Poland (Independence of the ordinary courts) and Case 
C-791/19, Commission v. Poland (Disciplinary regime for judges), in which 
Poland was the first EU Member State to be found to have violated the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU three cases in a row. Before offering a critical 
analysis of these judgments on the merits issued in relation to Poland’s so-called 
‘judicial reforms’, often more accurately described as ‘deforms’, four interim 
reliefs orders will be reviewed. The first one, issued by the Court on 20 November 
2017 to protect Białowieża Forest from unlawful logging, while seemingly not 
directly connected to Poland’s rule of law crisis, may in fact be viewed as a key 
episode as it offered the first illustration of current Polish authorities’ mounting 
disregard for the authority of the Court of Justice while also prefiguring the 
Court’s subsequent and unprecedented orders in infringement actions directly 
concerned with the protection of judicial independence in Poland. As such, its 
inclusion in this Rule of Law casebook is warranted. As regards the order of the 
Court of 14 July 2021 issued within the framework of pending infringement Case 
C-204/21 which concerns Poland’s ‘muzzle law’, yet another unconstitutional 
piece of legislation targeting independent Polish judges whose incompatibility 
66 See generally, L. Pech, P. Wachowiec and D. Mazur, ‘Poland’s Rule of Law Breakdown: A Five-
Year Assessment of EU’s (In)Action’ (2021) 13 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 1.
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with EU membership is manifest,67 it will be examined alongside the Court’s 
order in Case C-791/19 R as they both primarily concern one of the new bodies 
created by Polish authorities which is known as the ‘Disciplinary Chamber’. 





ECJ judgment (5 
November 2019): New 
Polish retirement rules are 
incompatible with EU Law, 
including the principles of 
irremovability of judges and 
of judicial independence
Case C-791/19 
Protecting Polish Judges from Political 
Control
ECJ order (8 April 2020): Poland must immediately 
suspend the ‘Disciplinary Chamber’ with regard to 
disciplinary cases
(Notwithstanding violation of ECJ order, Commission did not ask 
for penalty payment but submitted additional LFN/RO in ‘Muzzle 
Law’ action)
ECJ judgment (15 July 2021): New disciplinary regime 
for judges / ‘Disciplinary Chamber’ is not compatible 
with EU Law
Commission v. Poland: Rule of law related 
infringement actions since January 2016* 
(total of 4 versus total of 37 national requests 
for a preliminary ruling (PR) originating from Poland)
Case C-619/18 
Independence of Supreme Court 
ECJ order (17 December 2018): 
Application of Polish legislation must 
be immediately suspended
ECJ judgment (24 June 2019): Polish 
legislation concerning the lowering 
of retirement age of Supreme Court 
judges is incompatible with principles 
of irremovability of judges and of 
judicial independence
Case C-204/21 (pending) 
Safeguarding the Independence of 
Polish Judges post ‘Muzzle law’
ECJ order (14 July 2021): Poland must 
immediately suspend i.a. the ‘Disciplinary 
Chamber’ with regard to lifting of judicial 
immunity cases
(ECJ expected to find the ‘Muzzle Law’ 
of 20 December 2019 incompatible with 
EU Law, including judicial independence, 
primacy of EU law & PR mechanism)
* On 13 January 2016, the European Commission activated its ‘Rule of Law Framework’.
67 According to the Commission, the ‘muzzle law’ law of 20 December 2019 undermines the 
independence of Polish judges, is incompatible with the primacy of EU law and prevents Polish 
judges through various means – including the threat of disciplinary proceedings – from directly 
applying certain provisions of EU law protecting judicial independence and from putting 
references for preliminary rulings on such questions to the Court of Justice. The Commission 
subsequently added one more item to this fourth infringement action: the lifting of judicial 
immunity by the ‘Disciplinary Chamber’ whose disciplinary activities were supposed to have 
been suspended following the ECJ order of 8 April 2020 in Case C-791/19 R. See Rule of 
Law: European Commission refers Poland to the European Court of Justice to protect the 
independence of Polish judges and asks for interim measures, IP/21/1524, 31 March 2021. 
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3.1 The Commission’s applications for interim measures in 
respect of Poland’s so-called ‘judicial reforms’
In the past four years, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice has issued 
four far-reaching interim relief orders when faced with (i) an open and 
defiant violation of a previous order that the Court of Justice had issued in 
an environmental related case (Case C-441/17 R); (ii) an obvious attempt 
to ‘purge’ Poland’s Supreme Court under false pretences (Case C-619/18 R); 
(iii) the manifest and deliberate violation by Polish authorities and their proxy 
allegedly judicial bodies of several rulings issued by Poland’s Supreme Court in 
application of the Court of Justice’s preliminary ruling regarding the so-called 
‘Disciplinary Chamber’ (Case C-791/19 R); and (iv) the repeated abusive use of 
the procedure of lifting judicial immunity of critical judges by the supposedly 
already suspended Disciplinary Chamber on the back of criminal charges lacking 
any credibility (Case C-204/21 R). These orders have opened the way for a more 
effective protection of the rule of law, considering the shortcomings of Article 
260 TFEU,68 provided that the Commission is willing to make full and prompt 
use of Article 279 TFEU which provides as follows: ‘The Court of Justice of 
the European Union may in any cases before it prescribe any necessary interim 
measures’.
3.1.1 Early warning in a non-judicial independence case: Case 
C-441/17 R Commission v. Poland (Białowiez
.
a forest) 69
In July 2017 the Commission decided to refer Poland to the Court of Justice 
and request interim measures due to increased logging in the Białowieża Forest, 
a protected site under EU law.70 As soon as the Court of Justice provisionally 
granted the Commission’s request for interim measures on 27 July 2017, Polish 
authorities, in what was then an unprecedented act of public defiance, bluntly 
indicated that they would not suspend logging notwithstanding the Court’s 
order. As a consequence, the Commission requested the Court to order Poland 
to pay a periodic penalty payment should it fail to comply with the Court’s 
orders. In its order of 20 November 2017, examined below, the Court, for the 
first time, agreed with the Commission’s request and decided that Poland would 
 
68 Under Article 260 TFEU, in a situation where a Member State has failed to take the necessary 
measures to comply with an infringement judgment of the Court of Justice, the Commission 
may refer the matter to the Court and request financial sanctions. For further analysis, see 
e.g. B. Schima, ‘Article 260’, in M. Kellerbauer, M. Klamert and J. Tomkin (eds), The EU 
Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. A Commentary (Oxford: OUP, 2019), 1792; P. 
Wennerås, ‘Making Effective Use of Article 260 TFEU’ in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds), The 
Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Methods against Defiance (Oxford: OUP, 2017); M. Smith, 
‘The Evolution of Infringement and Sanction Procedures. Of Pilots, Diversions, Collisions, and 
Circling’, in A. Arnull and D. Chalmers (eds), The Oxford Handbook of European Law (Oxford: 
OUP, 2015), 350; B. Jack, ‘Article 260(2) TFEU: An Effective Judicial Procedure for the 
Enforcement of Judgements?’ (2013) 19 European Law Journal 404.
69 EU:C:2017:877.
70 The ancient forest is currently divided between Poland and Belarus. The forest as a whole is 
designated as a UNESCO World Heritage site: <https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/33>.
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have to pay a penalty payment of at least €100,000 per day should it fail to 
immediately and fully comply with this order.71
ORDER OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)
20 November 2017
In Case C-441/17 R
APPLICATION for interim measures under Article 279 TFEU and
Article 160(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice
European Commission v. Republic of Poland
[For ease of reading, references to previous cases have been omitted]
Excerpts: 
102 It must, however, be stated that, first, a periodic penalty payment 
cannot, in the circumstances of the present case, be seen as a punishment 
and, second, the Republic of Poland’s interpretation of the system of legal 
remedies under EU law in general, and of proceedings for interim measures 
in particular, would have the effect of considerably reducing the likelihood 
of those proceedings achieving their objective in the event of the Member 
State concerned failing to comply with the interim measures ordered against 
it. The purpose of seeking to ensure that a Member State complies with 
interim measures adopted by the Court hearing an application for such 
measures by providing for the imposition of a periodic penalty payment in 
the event of non-compliance with those measures is to guarantee the effective 
application of EU law, such application being an essential component of the 
rule of law, a value enshrined in Article 2 TEU and on which the European 
Union is founded.
103 Thus, while it is true that the scope of proceedings for interim measures 
under Article 279 TFEU is limited by their ancillary nature vis-à-vis the main 
action and by the provisional nature of the measures that may be adopted in 
those proceedings, a feature of that scope is nonetheless the breadth of the 
powers which are afforded to the Court hearing an application for interim 
measures in order to enable it to guarantee the full effectiveness of the final 
decision.
104 To that end, if the Court hearing an application for interim measures 
considers that the circumstances of the case require additional measures to  
71 P. Wennerås, ‘Saving a forest and the rule of law: Commission v. Poland. Case C-441/17 R, 
Commission v. Poland, Order of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 20 November 2017’ (2019) 
56 Common Market Law Review 541; L. Coutron, ‘La Cour de justice au secours de la forêt de 
Białowieża’ (2018) 4–6 Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 321; Editorial Comments, ‘Winter Is 
Coming. The Polish Woodworm Games’ (2017) 2 European Papers 797.
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be taken in order to ensure the effectiveness of the measures requested, it has 
power under Article 279 TFEU, inter alia, to provide for a periodic penalty 
payment to be imposed on a Member State in the event that that Member 
State fails to comply with the interim measures ordered.
105 Since the prospect of a periodic penalty payment being imposed in 
such a situation encourages the relevant Member State to comply with the 
interim measures ordered, it enhances the effectiveness of those measures 
and guarantees the full effectiveness of the final decision, thus falling entirely 
within the ambit of the objective of Article 279 TFEU.
[…]
114 Having regard to the particular circumstances of the present case, and 
having explained, in paragraphs 81 and 82 of the present order, as requested 
by the Commission at the hearings of 11 September 2017 and 17 October 
2017, the scope of the public safety exception, the Court therefore considers 
it necessary to enhance the effectiveness of the interim measures set out in 
the present order by providing for a periodic penalty payment to be imposed 
in the event of the Republic of Poland failing to comply immediately and 
fully with those interim measures, in order to deter it from delaying its 
compliance with the present order.
[…]
118 If there is found to be an infringement, the Court will order the Republic 
of Poland to pay to the Commission a periodic penalty payment of at least 
EUR 100 000 per day, from the date of notification of the present order to 
the Republic of Poland until such time as that Member State complies with 
this order or until final judgment in Case C-441/17 is delivered.
Analysis
This order may be understood as the first rule of law ‘warning’ given to the 
Polish authorities by the Court of Justice, hence its inclusion in the present 
casebook.72 However, the Court did so not in a case which directly raises judicial 
independence issues but in a case concerning an unlawful increase in logging 
in ‘one of the best preserved natural forests in Europe, characterised by large 
72 D. Sarmiento, ‘Provisional (And Extraordinary) Measures in the Name of the Rule of Law’, 
VerfBlog 24 November 2017: <http://verfassungsblog.de/provisional-and-extraordinary-
measures-in-the-name-of-the-rule-of-law/> (‘The showdown was inevitable. At some point, the 
Court of Justice had to show its teeth and remind the Polish government of its duty to comply 
with the rule of law and with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU’).
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quantities of dead wood and ancient trees, some of which are centuries old’.73 
Rather unexpectedly, it is in this context that the authority of the Court of 
Justice itself was, for the first time, directly and disrespectfully challenged by 
the Polish authorities at a time where Article 7(1) TEU had yet to be activated 
against them. 
Significance of order
The Court of Justice’s order of 20 November 2017 is significant both from a 
political and legal perspective. Politically speaking, it was widely noted at the 
time that no EU Member State had ever so openly defied the authority of the 
Court, in this case by straightforwardly and publicly ignoring the first order 
issued by the Vice-President of the Court of 27 July 2017,74 requiring certain 
operations be temporarily suspended.75 In doing so, Poland ‘made it into the 
textbooks of European integration as the first member state’76 to refuse to obey 
a Court’s order. 
Legally speaking, the order adopted by the Grand Chamber is also particularly 
noteworthy for the parallels it draws between Articles 260 and 279 TFEU, 
and its rule-of-law-based enhancing interpretation of the scope of Article 279 
TFEU, which confers on the Court the power to prescribe ‘any necessary interim 
measures’ in cases pending before it. To guarantee the effective application of 
EU law, which is, for the first time,77 directly connected to Article 2 TEU and 
referred to as ‘an essential component of the rule of law’,78 the Court, also for the 
first time, held that it has the power to impose a periodic penalty payment on a 
Member State should this Member State fail to comply with the interim measure 
or measures being ordered. 
73 Case C-441/17 R Commission v. Poland, EU:C:2017:622, para. 22. As part of a PR campaign 
to justify the illegal logging, Poland organised an event at the European Parliament in Brussels, 
inviting a ‘Roman Catholic priest Tomasz Duszkiewicz, who cited the Bible as having said that 
men should “subdue” the earth. He said the EU must base its decisions on the Biblical Ten 
Commandments otherwise it would “turn into dust”’, as EU Observer reported: A. Ericsson, 
‘Poland Seeks Support for Logging in Ancient Forest’, EU Observer, 1 September 2016: 
<https://euobserver.com/environment/134841>.  
74 Case C-441/17 R Commission v. Poland, EU:C:2017:622.
75 See e.g. Poland’s environment minister, Jan Szyszko: ‘we will not be insulted by those who don’t 
know about the rules of protection of environment’, quoted in J. Berendt, ‘Defying E.U. Court, 
Poland Is Cutting Trees in an Ancient Forest’, New York Times, 31 July 2017: <https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/07/31/world/europe/poland-bialowieza-forest-bison-logging.html>
76 R. Grzeszczak and I.P. Karolewski, ‘Białowieża Forest, the Spruce Bark Beetle and the EU Law 
Controversy in Poland’, VerfBlog, 27 November 2017: <http://verfassungsblog.de/bialowieza-
forest-the-spruce-bark-beetle-and-the-eu-law-controversy-in-poland/> 
77 P. Wennerås, ‘Saving a forest and the rule of law’, op. cit.
78 Case C-441/17 R Commission v. Poland, para. 102.
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Applying this reasoning to the present case, the Court ruled that Poland would 
have to pay a periodic penalty payment of at least €100,000 per day should 
it be found to have violated the interim measures ordered in this case, having 
previously noted that ‘there is sufficient material in the file to give the Court 
grounds for doubting’79 that Poland had complied with the first order or was 
prepared to comply with the Court’s second order. 
The duty to ensure the effective application of EU law
What is particularly striking in this order, if not entirely justified, is the repeated 
emphasis on the Court’s duty to ensure the effective application of EU law, 
which includes the full effectiveness of its decisions (‘effectiveness’ being used 
eleven times in the order). And indeed, as rightly recalled by the Court, the very 
‘purpose of the procedure for interim relief is to guarantee the full effectiveness 
of the future final decision, in order to avoid a lacuna in the legal protection 
afforded by the Court’.80 This fundamental aspect – although fully rooted in EU 
primary law – has been criticised by Pål Wennerås. Indeed, rather than doing 
the ‘leg work’, the Court focused on the aims of Article 279 TFEU (virtually 
unaltered since its first incarnation as Article 186 EEC in the original 1957 
Treaty of Rome).81 However, ‘by emphasizing the objectives and effectiveness 
of Article 279 TFEU rather than its wording, and treating counterarguments 
sparsely’, the order ‘unnecessarily gives the impression of creating the law rather 
than declaring it’.82 Be that it as it may, we find the Court’s conclusion in relation 
to the scope of Article 279 TFEU compelling. 
The case itself concluded with a Grand Chamber judgment issued on 18 April 
2018. The Court ruled that Poland had failed to fulfil its obligations under EU 
law.83 This outcome was the exact opposite of what had been predicted by the 
then environment minister of Poland – a professor of forestry – who anticipated 
a total ‘victory’ in Luxembourg as Poland allegedly was 100% compliant with 
EU law.84 However, the Polish government’s ‘scientific’ arguments appear to have 
been non-existent since, as Pål Wennerås reported, the Polish authorities allowed 
the cutting down of any trees in the name of saving the forest from a spruce beetle. 
Indeed, while ‘the chainsaws had also torn through pine, hornbeam, oak, alder, 
ash, willow and poplar trees […] the spruce bark beetle, as its name suggests, is 
79 Ibid., para. 109.
80 Ibid., para. 94.
81 Suddenly reinventing the meaning of this provision now, more than sixty years after its entry 
into force, does not help meet the condition of legal certainty, one might argue: P. Wennerås, 
‘Saving a forest and the rule of law’ op. cit., at 547.
82 Ibid., 541 (emphasis added).
83 Case C-441/17 Commission v. Poland, EU:C:2018:255. 
84 B. Bodalska, ‘Environment minister: Poland has to win at the European Court of Justice’, 
Euractiv, 5 December 2017: <http://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/
environment-minister-poland-has-to-win-at-the-european-court-of-justice/>
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fond of spruces (coniferous trees) and not broad leaf trees.’85 Moreover, the forest 
management plan itself recognised that ‘removing spruce colonised by the beetle 
[…] actually threatened the favourable conservation of habitats’.86 
Playing dumb
Notwithstanding credible reports of continuing non-compliance on the ground, 
the Commission never undertook any subsequent thorough investigation to the 
best of our knowledge.87 The Commission also failed to apply for the imposition 
of financial penalties for the obvious period of non-compliance with the Court’s 
order of 27 July 2017, which lasted until at least the Court’s second order of 20 
November 2017. There was similarly no attempt to sanction Poland for the five 
months it took formally to comply with the order to suspend logging activities in 
relevant areas.88 The Commission’s failure even to attempt to financially sanction 
Polish authorities for their defiant, legally established and long-lasting violation 
of a Court order may leave one perplexed. It brings to the fore the absence of 
any legal avenue when the Guardian of the Treaties is unwilling to return to the 
Court of Justice to sanction obvious violations of the Court’s previous orders, 
thus seriously and significantly undermining the effectiveness of the EU legal 
system – this notwithstanding the fact that the goal of enforcement is to bring 
about compliance, not punishment, as the Court underlined itself89 and as is 
clear from the literature.90 Neither is it supposed to compensate for the damage 
caused.91 The Commission’s reluctance to sanction the deliberate disregard of 
the Court’s orders and/or judgments was unsurprisingly understood as a sign 
of weakness by the current Polish authorities which increasingly stopped hiding 
their non-compliance. It was not however until 18 February 2021 – almost three 
years later – that the Commission finally but belatedly adopted a letter of formal 
notice in which it asked the Polish authorities to take all required measures to 
implement the Court of Justice’s judgment of 17 April 2018.92 Polish authorities 
85 P. Wennerås, ‘Saving a forest and the rule of law’, op. cit., at 544.
86 Ibid.
87 A. Barteczko, ‘Poland spares forest to win EU favour, but damage already done’, Reuters, 19 
February 2018: <https://reut.rs/2CvFoa0> 
88 ‘Minister środowiska chce uchylenia decyzji ws. usuwania drzew’, TVN24, 15 May 2018: 
<https://tvn24.pl/biznes/z-kraju/minister-srodowiska-chce-uchylenia-decyzji-ws-usuwania-
drzew-ra837224-4500886>. For further analysis, see T.T. Koncewicz, ‘The Politics of 
Resentment and First Principles in the European Court of Justice’, in F. Bignami (ed.), The 
European Law in Populist Times (Cambridge: CUP, 2020), 457. 
89 See, e.g., para. 102.
90 K. Lenaerts, ‘Our Judicial Independence and the Quest for National, Supranational and 
Transnational Justice’, in G. Sevik, M.-J. Clifton, T. Haas, L. Lourenço and K. Schwiesow 
(eds), The Art of Judicial Reasoning: Festschrift in Honour of Carl Baudenbacher (Berlin: Springer, 
2019), 155, at 156; L.W. Gormley, ‘Infringement Proceedings’, in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov 
(eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values (Oxford: OUP, 2017), 65.
91 Case C-304/02 Commission v. France, EU:C:2005:444, para. 91.
92 European Commission, ‘Nature protection: Commission is calling on POLAND to 
implement the Court of Justice ruling on nature protection in the Białowieża Forest’, February 
infringements package: key decisions, 18 February 2021, INF/21/441. 
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replied to the letter of formal notice on 19 April 2021 with the Commission yet 
to decide at the time of writing whether a reasoned opinion is necessary.93 
Leaving aside the issue of persistent non-compliance and the Commission’s 
rather nonchalant attitude in this respect, the most crucial outcome of the 
Białowieża Forest case seems to go way beyond the rethinking of Article 279 
TFEU potential and saving a UNESCO heritage site from national authorities 
having gone rogue. In agreement with Wennerås’ analysis, possibly the most 
important lesson one can draw from the Court’s interim order of 20 November 
2017 is the imperative requirement for national courts (which, of course, assume 
there are still independent courts left in the relevant country) to be fully prepared 
to similarly adopt interim freezing measures when EU law would so require, a 
particularly important point in the context of the ongoing rule of law breakdown 
in a country such as Poland:
Insofar as Polish Forest finds that [the necessity to guarantee availability of robust 
interim relief ] is also dictated by the rule of law in Article 2 TEU, Associação 
Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses suggests that the same applies to domestic courts as 
fellow guardians of the rule of law by virtue of Articles 19(1) and 4(3) TEU. 
Consequently, if indeed effective judicial review requires that non-compliance 
with interim measures can be sanctioned, it follows that the Member States 
must make such a sanction available in order to fulfil their obligation to provide 
remedies sufficient to ensure effective judicial protection in the fields covered by 
EU law.94
Almost a year later, yet another unprecedented order was adopted by the Court, 
this time not to defend its own authority, but to preserve the independence 
of Poland’s Supreme Court. In doing so, the Court continued building what 
Professor Koncewicz described as the Court’s ‘existential jurisprudence’.95
3.1.2 Moving beyond warnings: Case C-619/18 R Commission 
v. Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court)
On 2 July 2018 the Commission launched an infringement procedure against 
Poland in respect of the new Polish law on the Supreme Court which, inter alia, 
retroactively lowered the retirement age of Supreme Court judges, including the 
then First President of the Supreme Court, notwithstanding the fact that her 
six-year mandate was explicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.96 For the Polish 
93 Commission’s Answer to Parliamentary question E-001681/2021, 27 May 2021.  
94 P. Wennerås, ‘Saving a forest and the rule of law’, op. cit., at 556 (footnotes omitted, emphasis 
added).
95 T.T. Koncewicz, ‘The Białowieża case. A Tragedy in Six Acts’, VerfBlog, 17 May 2018: <https://
verfassungsblog.de/the-bialowieza-case-a-tragedy-in-six-acts/>.
96 Case C-619/18 R Commission v. Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court), EU:C:2018:1021. 
See I. Pingel, ‘L’affaire Indépendance de la Cour suprême devant la Cour de justice: réflexions sur 
“l’indispensable liberté des juges”’ (2019) 4(3) European Papers 823.
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government, the express constitutional guarantee did not matter as ‘just like 
every Pole’, the First President ‘is bound by the law’,97 which apparently does not 
however include the Polish Constitution. 
This was a tactic previously used in Hungary,98 which had resulted in a Pyrrhic 
victory for the Commission. Indeed, even though the Court of Justice established 
a violation of the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of age, the 
government of what has since become ‘the EU’s first ever authoritarian member 
state’,99 was allowed, de facto, to profit from its deliberate blatant violation of 
the principle of the irremovability of judges. In other words, the Court’s ruling 
did not prevent in any way the capture of the senior echelons of the Hungarian 
judiciary.100 This exemplifies what one of the present authors, writing together 
with Kim Scheppele and Barbara Grabowska-Moroz, has described as the 
Commission’s record of ‘losing by winning’.101 If it is any consolation for the 
EU in this context, the European Court of Human Rights has not performed 
any better when it comes to sanctioning this targeted purge of Hungary’s senior 
judicial leadership.102 
The European Commission did however finally learn from its erroneous framing 
of the issue and rightly decided, following the Court’s not so subliminal message 
in Portuguese Judges, to challenge the Polish government’s planned purge of 
Poland’s Supreme Court on the basis of Article 19(1) TEU read in connection 
with Article 47 CFR. In this context, the Commission, in the absence of any 
satisfactory answers from Polish authorities, not only referred Poland to the 
Court of Justice but also requested it to order interim measures until it issues a 
judgment on the merits. In an unprecedented, crucial and welcome development, 
the Commission also requested the Court to order measures which would restore 
Poland’s Supreme Court to its situation before 3 April 2018 when the contested 
 
97 C. Davies, ‘Poland’s supreme court constitutional crisis approaches a standoff’, The Guardian, 
2 July 2018: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/02/polands-supreme-court-
constitutional-crisis-comes-to-a-head>.
98 Case C-286/12 Commission v. Hungary (Judicial Retirement Age), EU:C:2012:687.
99 S.F. Maerz et al., ‘State of the world 2019: autocratisation surges – resistance grows’ (2020) 
27(6) Democratization 909. 
100 U. Belavusau, ‘On Age Discrimination and Beating Dead Dogs: Commission v. Hungary’ (2013) 
50 Common Market Law Review 1145; T. Gyulavári and N. Hôs, ‘Retirement of Hungarian 
Judges, Age Discrimination and Judicial Independence: A Tale of Two Courts’ (2013) 42 
Indiana Law Journal 289; A. Vincze, ‘The ECJ as the Guardian of the Hungarian Constitution: 
Case C-286/12 Commission v. Hungary’ (2013) 19 European Public Law 489; K.L. Scheppele, 
‘Constitutional Coups and Judicial Review: How Transnational Institutions Can Strengthen 
Peak Courts at Times of Crisis (With Special Reference to Hungary)’ (2014) 23 Transnational 
Law & Contemporary Problems 51; G. Halmái, ‘The Early Retirement Age of Hungarian Judges’, 
in F. Nicola and B. Davies (eds), EU Law Stories (Cambridge: CUP, 2017), 471.
101 K.L. Scheppele, D. Kochenov and B. Grabowska-Moroz, ‘EU Values Are Law, after All’ (2020) 
39 Yearbook of European Law 3.
102 See e.g. D. Kosař and K. Šipulová, ‘The Strasbourg Court Meets Abusive Constitutionalism: 
Baka v. Hungary and the Rule of Law’ (2018) 10 Hague Journal of the Rule of Law 83.
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measures were adopted. The Court obliged and ordered Polish authorities to 
immediately suspend the application of the relevant measures as requested by 
the Commission. 
ORDER OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)
17 December 2018
In Case C-619/18 R,
APPLICATION for interim measures under Article 279 TFEU
and Article 160(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice
European Commission v. Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court)
[For ease of reading, references to previous cases have been omitted]
Excerpts: 
2 The Commission has also requested […] that the interim measures referred 
to in paragraph 1 above be granted before the defendant has submitted its 
observations, owing to the immediate risk of serious and irreparable damage 
to the right to effective judicial protection in the context of the application 
of EU law.
3 Those requests have been made in the context of an action for failure 
to fulfil obligations under Article 258 TFEU brought by the Commission 
on 2 October 2018 (‘the action for failure to fulfil obligations’) seeking 
a finding that by, first, lowering the retirement age for judges of the Sąd 
Najwyższy (Supreme Court) and applying that measure to serving judges 
who were appointed to that court before 3 April 2018 and, second, granting 
the President of the Republic of Poland the discretion to extend the period 
of active judicial service of judges of that court beyond the newly-set 
retirement age, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations 
under the combined provisions of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) 
TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (‘the Charter’). That action was registered as Case C-619/18.
[…]
44 It cannot be excluded, prima facie, that the provisions of national 
legislation at issue are at odds with the Republic of Poland’s obligation 
under the combined provisions of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) 
TEU and Article 47 of the Charter to ensure effective judicial protection in 
the fields covered by EU law.
[…]
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68 Consequently, the fact that, because of the application of the provisions 
of national legislation at issue, the independence of the Sąd Najwyższy 
(Supreme Court) may not be guaranteed pending delivery of the final 
judgment is likely to cause serious damage to the EU legal order and thus to 
the rights which individuals derive from EU law and to the values, set out 
in Article 2 TEU, on which the European Union is founded, in particular 
the rule of law.
69 Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that national supreme courts 
play a crucial role, within the judicial systems of the Member States of 
which they form part, in the implementation, at national level, of EU law, 
so that any threat to the independence of a national supreme court is likely 
to affect the entirety of the judicial system of the Member State concerned.
70 In addition, the serious damage referred to in paragraph 68 above is also 
likely to be irreparable.
71 First, as a court adjudicating at last instance, the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme 
Court) makes decisions, including in cases giving rise to the application of 
EU law, which have the authority of res judicata and are thus likely to have 
an irreversible effect on the EU legal order.
[…]
73 Second, because of the authority of decisions of the Sąd Najwyższy 
(Supreme Court) with regard to lower national courts or tribunals, the 
fact that, in the event that the provisions of national legislation at issue are 
applied, the independence of that court may not be guaranteed pending 
delivery of the final judgment is likely to undermine the trust of the Member 
States and their courts in the Republic of Poland’s judicial system and, as a 
result, in that Member State’s observance of the rule of law.
74 In such circumstances, the principles of mutual trust and mutual 
recognition between Member States, which are justified by the premise that 
the Member States share a series of common values on which the European 
Union is founded, such as the rule of law, could be jeopardised.
75 As is noted by the Commission, the undermining of those principles 
may have serious and irreparable effects on the proper functioning of the 
EU legal order, in particular in the area of judicial cooperation in civil 
and criminal matters, which is based on a particularly high degree of trust 
between the Member States in the compliance of their judicial systems with 
the requirements of effective judicial protection.
[…]
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78 It must therefore be held that the Commission has established that, in the 
event of a refusal to grant the interim measures sought, the application of the 
provisions of national legislation at issue pending delivery of the final judgment 
is likely to cause serious and irreparable damage to the EU legal order.
[…]
95 The Republic of Poland’s arguments are, however, based on a 
misunderstanding of the nature and effects of the interim measures 
sought by the Commission in the present interlocutory proceedings. 
Indeed, granting such interim measures entails an obligation for that 
Member State immediately to suspend the application of the provisions 
of national legislation at issue, including those whose effect is to repeal 
or replace the previous provisions governing the retirement age for judges 
of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court), so that those previous provisions 
become applicable again pending delivery of the final judgment. Thus, the 
implementation of an interim measure suspending the application of a 
provision entails an obligation to ensure that the rule of law preceding the 
entry into force of that provision – in the present case, the legal regime laid 
down by the provisions of national legislation repealed or replaced by the 
provisions of national legislation at issue – is restored.
[…]
115 Thus, it is apparent from the examination carried out in accordance 
with the case-law cited […] above that there would be a risk that the general 
interest of the European Union in the proper functioning of its legal order 
would be seriously and irreparably affected, pending the final judgment, if 
the interim measures sought by the Commission were not ordered but the 
action for failure to fulfil obligations were to be upheld.
116 By contrast, the Republic of Poland’s interest in the proper functioning 
of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) is not likely to be thus affected in 
the event that the interim measures sought by the Commission are granted 
but the action for failure to fulfil obligations is dismissed, given that that 
grant would merely have the effect of maintaining, for a limited period, the 
application of the legal system which existed prior to the adoption of the 
Law on the Supreme Court.
117 In those circumstances, it must be concluded that weighing up the 
interests involved supports granting the interim measures requested by the 
Commission.
118 Having regard to all of the foregoing, it is appropriate to grant the 
Commission’s request for interim measures […]
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Analysis
About six months following the first ever activation of Article 7(1) TEU on the 
ground that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by Poland of the rule of law,103 
the Commission finally decided to launch, for the first time, an infringement 
action in respect of one of the key problematic issues highlighted in its own 
reasoned proposal under Article 7(1): the new retirement regime of the Supreme 
Court judges, including the First President of the Supreme Court, and the 
connected regime governing the prolongation of the judicial mandates forcibly 
retired on the basis of a retroactive application of a lower retirement age. In its 
Article 7(1) reasoned proposal, the Commission had previously summarised its 
concerns as follows:
• The compulsory retirement of a significant number of the current 
Supreme Court judges combined with the possibility of prolonging 
their active judicial mandate, as well as the new disciplinary regime for 
Supreme Court judges, structurally undermine the independence of 
the Supreme Court judges, whilst the independence of the judiciary is 
a key component of the rule of law; 
• The compulsory retirement of a significant number of the current 
Supreme Court judges also allows for a far reaching and immediate 
recomposition of the Supreme Court. That possibility raises concerns 
in relation to the separation of powers, in particular when considered 
in combination with the simultaneous reforms of the National 
Council for the Judiciary. In fact all new Supreme Court judges will be 
appointed by the President of the Republic on the recommendation of 
the newly composed National Council for the Judiciary, which will be 
largely dominated by the political appointees. As a result, the current 
parliamentary majority will be able to determine, at least indirectly, 
the future composition of the Supreme Court to a much larger extent 
than this would be possible in a system where existing rules on the 
duration of judicial mandates operate normally – whatever that 
duration is and with whichever state organ the power to decide on 
judicial appointments lies.104
Faced with a flagrant and irreversible violation of the rule of law in its judicial 
independence dimension, and in the absence of any changes addressing its 
concerns, the Commission finally decided on 2 July 2018 to bring to the 
Court of Justice’s attention an infringement action based directly on Article 
 
103 D. Kochenov, L. Pech and K.L. Scheppele, ‘The European Commission’s Activation of Article 
7: Better Late than Never?’, VerfBlog 23 December 2017: <https://verfassungsblog.de/the-
european-commissions-activation-of-article-7-better-late-than-never/>
104 Reasoned proposal in accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union regarding 
the rule of law in Poland, 2017/0360 (APP), 20 December 2017, recital 175. 
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19(1) TEU read in connection with Article 47 CFR. A few months prior to 
this, the Commission had inaugurated the use of this analytical framework in 
Case C-192/18 Commission v. Poland (Independence of Ordinary Courts) which 
concerned the lowering of the retirement age for judges of the ordinary Polish 
courts. In this latter case, lodged with the Court on 15 March 2018 but only 
decided by the Court on 5 November 2019, after Case C-619/18 had been 
decided on the merits on 24 June 2019, the Commission did not however – and 
we would argue wrongly – request interim measures. 
Be that as it may, we will focus here on the Court’s interim relief order in Case 
C-619/18 R, which is also noteworthy for being the first where the Commission 
raised the problematic and potentially unlawful composition of a national 
council for the judiciary. In the case of Poland, the Commission was of the view 
that the new body – re-established in 2018 following the premature termination 
of the members of Polish National Council for the Judiciary (the ‘NCJ’) – was 
no longer ‘in line with European standards on judicial independence’.105
First application for interim measures based on Article 19(1) TEU read in connection 
with Article 47 CFR
Having been prepared on an expedited basis, and in the absence of any answers 
from Polish authorities alleviating its legal concerns, the Commission announced 
its decision to refer Poland to the Court of Justice on 24 September 2018. When 
it did so, the European Commission took another unprecedented but, in our 
view, indispensable step: it asked the Court to order interim measures, for the 
first time, on the basis of Article 19(1) TEU read in connection with Article 47 
CFR so as to prevent serious and irreparable damage to judicial independence 
in Poland, which the Commission noticeably and rightly equated with a risk of 
serious and irreparable damage of the EU legal order. Even more importantly and 
strikingly, the Commission also asked the Court to restore ‘Poland’s Supreme 
Court to its situation before 3 April 2018, when the contested new laws were 
adopted,’106 new laws which the First President of the Supreme Court accurately 
described as organising a ‘purge’ of the Supreme Court.107
105 European Commission, Rule of Law: Commission launches infringement procedure to protect 
the independence of the Polish Supreme Court, Press release IP/18/4341, 2 July 2018. For 
further analysis on Poland’s neo-NCJ, see our analysis of Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and 
C-625/18, A.K. e.a. (Independence of the disciplinary chamber of the Supreme Court) in Section 4.1. 
106 European Commission, Rule of Law: European Commission refers Poland to the European 
Court of Justice to protect the independence of the Polish Supreme Court, Press release 
IP/18/5830, 24 September 2018.
107 ‘Poland Supreme Court judges return to work after EU court ruling’, Euractiv, 23 October 2018:  
<https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/poland-supreme-court-judges-return-to-
work-after-eu-court-ruling/>
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Prior to the final order of 17 December 2018, and as requested by the 
Commission, the Vice-President of the Court adopted an order on 19 October 
2018 before Poland submitted its observations in the interim proceedings, which 
provisionally granted all of the Commission’s requests.108 Both interim orders can 
be viewed as ground-breaking not least because they forced the Polish authorities, 
despite initial threats of non-compliance similar to those we observed in Case 
C-441/17 R Białowieża Forest,109 grudgingly to accept what the Commission 
had requested from the Court: the restoration of the legal situation which had 
existed prior to the entry into force of the provisions in dispute. At last, the 
Commission appeared to have finally learnt from the unfortunate example of its 
hollow legal victory against Hungary110 which, although identical on the facts, 
did not lead to any improvement of the rule of law situation on the ground, as a 
return to the status quo ante never happened and was indeed not even requested 
by the Commission.111
Innovative aspects of the Court’s reasoning
The Court’s reasoning in its order of 17 December 2018 is particularly rich and 
instructive. The reasoning’s most striking element is arguably the unprecedented 
emphasis on the imperative need to protect the general interest of the EU in the 
proper functioning of its legal order and the link made between the preservation 
of the independence of Poland’s Supreme Court and the preservation of the 
proper functioning of the EU legal order. The Commission did indeed, and one 
may add appropriately, raise the issue of the serious and irreparable damage to 
the proper functioning of the EU legal order that the application of the disputed 
national legal provisions would create. The Grand Chamber of the Court accepted 
the argument and held that the application of these legal provisions would be 
‘likely to cause serious damage to the EU legal order and thus to the rights which 
individuals derive from EU law and to the values, set out in Article 2 TEU, on 
which the European Union is founded, in particular the rule of law’.112 
108 Order of the Vice-President of the Court in Case C-619/18 R Commission v. Poland, 
EU:C:2018:852. 
109 J. Shotter et al., ‘Poland warns European Court of Justice to stay out of judicial reforms’, 
Financial Times, 27 August 2018: ‘Poland’s deputy prime minister warned that any adverse 
ruling of the Court would have to be ignored “as contrary to the Lisbon Treaty and the whole 
spirit of European integration”.’
110 D. Kochenov and P. Bárd, ‘The Last Soldier Standing? Courts versus Politicians and the Rule of 
Law Crisis in the New Member States of the EU’ (2019) 1 European Yearbook of Constitutional 
Law 243.
111 See e.g. K.L. Scheppele, ‘Constitutional Coups and Judicial Review: How Transnational 
Institutions Can Strengthen Peak Courts at Times of Crisis (With Special Reference to 
Hungary)’ (2014) 23 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 51.
112 Case C-619/18 R Commission v. Poland, para. 68.
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This was, to the best of our knowledge, the first direct connection made by 
the Court between the notion of potential damage to the EU legal order and 
Article 2 TEU, endowing the latter with a practical justiciable deployment, the 
possibility of which some scholars had previously doubted.113 Another particularly 
remarkable and yet again, in our view, entirely justified element of the Court’s 
reasoning are the two successive explicit links made, on the one hand, between 
‘any threat to the independence of a national supreme court’ and the likelihood 
of this threat having a negative and serious impact on ‘the entirety of the judicial 
system of the Member State concerned’;114 and, on the other hand, between 
the undermining of the independence of a national supreme court and the 
likelihood of a negative ‘irreversible effect on the EU legal order’,115 in particular 
by undermining the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition. 
Commentators noted that it is not only the clarity and depth of the legal 
argument used by the Court, but the sheer swiftness of the injunction and its 
political significance, that make this order stand out: the Commission and the 
Court of Justice finally found in this case the right language in which to speak to 
the autocrats in the backsliding Member State, as noted by Professor Adamski:
By the very act of bringing an action against Poland for infringing EU law the 
Commission effectively deprived the Polish Government of an opportunity to 
peddle its (illiberal) concepts of the rule of law and democracy. The ECJ does not 
offer the parties before it a forum to engage in heated political debates, or to deliver 
emotional speeches riveting the attention of the broader society. Compared to the 
alternative, inherently political, procedures, the very specifics of court proceedings 
force litigants to use complex arguments expressed in legalese. Nor does the 
complicated and sophisticated language used by the Court when justifying its 
decisions offer illiberals a rewarding fodder reducible to a simple message tailored 
to their electoral base. […] This could be seen as a sign of excessive recklessness 
even among PiS voters, especially when, after the initial swaggering reactions, the 
government soon gave in and expeditiously adopted the requested domestic legal 
adjustments.116
113 M. Avbelj, ‘Pluralism and Systemic Defiance in the European Union’, in A. Jakab and D. 
Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values (Oxford: OUP, 2017); G. Itzcovich, ‘On 
the Legal Enforcement of Values: The Importance of the Institutional Context’, in A. Jakab and 
D. Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values (Oxford: OUP, 2017). To contrast 
with L. Pech, ‘“A Union Founded on the Rule of Law”: Meaning and Reality of the Rule of Law 
as a Constitutional Principle of EU Law’ (2010) 6 European Constitutional Law Review 359.
114 Ibid., para. 69.
115 Ibid., para. 71.
116 D. Adamski, ‘The Social Contract of Democratic Backsliding in the “New EU” Countries’ 
(2019) 56 Common Market Law Review 623, at 653–654.
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Indeed, having previously threatened to disregard any adverse order from the 
Court of Justice, the Polish authorities did comply, albeit reluctantly.117 The 
now credible threat, following the Court’s order in Białowieża Forest, of being 
subjected to a daily and significant penalty payment for non-compliance may 
have played a role here, in part, since such fines are difficult to present to voters 
as a matter of political revenge.118 Reluctant compliance was however also 
facilitated here by the fact that the Commission did not seek to prevent Poland’s 
ruling coalition from unlawfully appointing a sizeable number of ‘fake judges’ to 
capture the Supreme Court from within.119 Furthermore, history soon repeated 
itself with more threats of non-compliance from Polish authorities (followed by 
actual non-compliance) after the Commission submitted a belated application 
for interim measures in the context of its third rule of law-based infringement 
action against Polish authorities, this time in respect of its new disciplinary 
regime for judges, and which is examined next. The situation has since gone 
from bad to worse following the Court of Justice’s latest order suspending the 
‘Disciplinary Chamber’ in Case C-204/21 R, with current Polish authorities 
no longer recognising the authority of the Court to issue interim orders in 
relation to its judicial ‘reforms’ on account of the (alleged) unconstitutionality 
of these orders following a ‘judgment’ issued by Poland’s (unlawfully composed) 
Constitutional Tribunal as will be explained below.  
3.1.3 First significant blows: Case C-791/19 R Commission v. 
Poland (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the 
Supreme Court) 120 and Case C-204/21 R Commission v. 
Poland (Muzzle Law) 121
On 3 April 2019, the European Commission launched its third infringement 
action in respect of the new disciplinary regime for judges organised by 
Poland’s ruling party, an issue which the Commission had previously repeatedly 
highlighted in its rule of law opinions, its Article 7(1) Reasoned Proposal and its 
contributions to the Council prior to each of the Article 7(1) hearings organised 
to date. Within the framework of this infringement action (C-791/19), decided 
on the merits on 15 July 2021, the Court, on 8 April 2020, issued yet another 
unprecedented interim relief order to deal with a similarly unprecedented 
attempt by an EU Member State to subject national judges to disciplinary 
investigations, procedures and ultimately sanctions, on account of the content 
of their judicial decisions, including any eventual decisions to refer questions 
to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. The continuing deterioration 
 
117 A. Rettman, ‘Polish president attacks EU court on eve of divisive march’, EUObserver, 9 
November 2018: <https://euobserver.com/justice/143339>
118 D. Adamski, ‘The Social Contract of Democratic Backsliding in the “New EU” Countries’, op. 
cit., at 654. 
119 For further analysis of the Polish ruling coalition’s ‘court packing’, see infra Section 6. 
120 EU:C:2020:277.
121 EU:C:2021:593. 
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of the situation in Poland led the Commission, as previously noted, to launch 
a fourth infringement action which was lodged with the Court of Justice on 1 
April 2021 and included another request for interim measures under Article 
279 TFEU. On 14 July 2021, in Case C-204/21 R, the Vice-President of 
the Court of Justice ordered the immediate suspension of the application of 
certain provisions of the law of December 2019 on the judiciary (Poland’s 
‘muzzle law’), including on the functioning of the ‘Disciplinary Chamber’. This 
was the second time this body was suspended by the Court in little over 16 
months. At the time of writing, Polish authorities, including the (irregularly 
appointed) First President of Poland’s Supreme Court, have publicly indicated 
their intention to disregard both the Court’s order in Case C-204/21 R and the 
Court’s judgment in C-791/19.122 In order to assuage the EU and help secure 
the approval of its recovery and resilience and receive billions of EU grants and 
loans, Poland’s de facto leader has nonetheless announced the future dissolution 
of the ‘Disciplinary Chamber’ while publicly stating that he does ‘not recognise’ 
the ECJ order and judgment ‘as they clearly go beyond the Treaties’.123 However, 
this eventual dissolution is nothing less than a smokescreen as the disciplinary 
chamber would just be reconstituted within the criminal chamber and in any 
event, the mere future dissolution of the ‘Disciplinary Chamber’ does not in 
and of itself constitute full compliance with either the Court’s order in Case 
C-204/21 R or the Court’s judgment in C-791/19.124 In the meantime, the 
‘Disciplinary Chamber’ continues to openly operate in violation of the Polish 
Constitution, EU law but also ECHR law as will be explained infra.
122 See D. Tilles, ‘Polish government “not planning” to implement EU court rulings’, Notes from 
Poland, 16 July 2021 and ‘Polish justice minister says Warsaw cannot comply with EU’s court 
ruling’, Euractiv.com, 22 July 2021. This led thousands of Polish judges to publicly call on the 
government and the ‘First President’ of the Supreme Court to comply with the Court of Justice’s 
rulings: ‘Historical appeal of 2073 Polish judges in defense of EU Law’, Rule of Law in Poland, 
27 July 2021.
123 A. Ptak, ‘Poland to dissolve judges’ Disciplinary Chamber to meet EU demands’, Reuters, 
7 August 2021: <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-will-change-disputed-
disciplinary-chamber-ruling-party-head-says-2021-08-07/> 
124 For further analysis, see W. Sadurski, ‘The Disciplinary Chamber May Go – but the Rotten 
System will Stay’, Verfblog, 11 August 2021: <https://verfassungsblog.de/the-disciplinary-
chamber-may-go-but-the-rotten-system-will-stay/> and Iustitia report on the activities of the 
Polish authorities following the rulings of the ECJ of 14 July 2021 in Case C-204/21 and 
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ORDER OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)
8 April 2020
In Case C-791/19 R,
APPLICATION for interim measures under Article 279 TFEU
and Article 160(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice
European Commission v. Poland (new disciplinary regime for judges)
[For ease of reading, references to previous cases have been omitted]
Excerpts 
1 By its application for interim measures, the European Commission claims 
that the Court should:
–  order the Republic of Poland, pending the judgment of the Court of 
Justice ruling on the substance of the case:
–  to suspend the application of the provisions of Article 3(5), Article 
27 and Article 73(1) of the ustawa o Sądzie Najwyższym (Law on 
the Supreme Court) of 8 December 2017 (Dz. U. of 2018, item 
5), as amended (‘the Law on the Supreme Court’), forming the 
basis of the jurisdiction of the Izba Dyscyplinarna (Disciplinary 
Chamber) of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland) (‘the 
Disciplinary Chamber’) to rule, both at first instance and on appeal, 
in disciplinary cases concerning judges;
–  to refrain from referring the cases pending before the Disciplinary 
Chamber to a panel whose composition does not meet the 
requirements of independence defined, in particular, in the 
judgment of 19 November 2019, A. K. and Others (Independence 
of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court) (C-585/18, 
C-624/18 and C-625/18, EU:C:2019:982; ‘the judgment in A.K.’), 
and
–  to inform the Commission, at the latest one month after being 
notified of the order of the Court imposing the requested interim 
measures, of all the measures that it has adopted in order to comply 
fully with that order;
– order the Republic of Poland to pay the costs of the proceedings.
[…]
35 It is therefore for all Member States, pursuant to the second subparagraph 
of Article 19(1) TEU, to ensure that the disciplinary regime applicable to the 
judges of national courts within their judicial system in the fields covered by 
EU law complies with the principle of judicial independence, in particular by 
ensuring that decisions given in disciplinary proceedings brought against the 
judges of those courts are reviewed by a body which itself satisfies the guarantees 
inherent in effective judicial protection, including that of independence.
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[…]
41 Consequently, and contrary to the Republic of Poland’s submissions, the 
Court has jurisdiction to adopt interim measures of the kind sought by the 
Commission.
[…]
78 Consequently, without ruling at this stage on the merits of the arguments 
put forward by the parties in the action for failure to fulfil obligations, 
which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court adjudicating on 
the substance, it must be held that, in the light of the facts put forward 
by the Commission and the interpretative guidance provided, inter alia, 
by the judgment of 24 June 2019, Commission v Poland (Independence of 
the Supreme Court) (C-619/18, EU:C:2019:531), and by the judgment in 
A.K., the arguments presented by the Commission in the second complaint 
of the first plea in the action for failure to fulfil obligations, which underlies 
this application for interim measures, appear, prima facie, not to be 
unfounded, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 52 of 
this order.
[…]
81 In the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be concluded that 
the requirement that a prima facie case be established has been satisfied in 
this case.
[…]
90 The mere prospect, for the judges of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) 
and the ordinary courts, of being exposed to the risk of a disciplinary 
procedure capable of leading to proceedings being brought before a 
body whose independence is not guaranteed is liable to affect their own 
independence. The number of proceedings actually brought, to date, with 
regard to such judges and the outcome of those proceedings is irrelevant in 
that regard.
[…]
93 It follows from the foregoing that the application of the national 
provisions at issue, in so far as they confer jurisdiction to rule on disciplinary 
matters relating to the judges of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) and 
the ordinary courts to a body, in the present case the Disciplinary Chamber, 
whose independence may not be guaranteed, is liable to cause serious and 
irreparable harm to the EU legal order.
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[…]
103 In the light of the above considerations, it must be held that the 
requirement that a prima facie case be established has been satisfied in the 
present case.
[…]
109 In that regard, it should, first of all, be noted that, as recalled in 
paragraph 29 of the present order, although the organisation of justice of 
the Member States falls within their competence, the fact remains that, in 
exercising that power, the Member States are required to comply with their 
obligations under EU law and, in particular, the second subparagraph of 
Article 19(1) TEU.
110 Next, as has been pointed out in paragraphs 44 and 47 of the present 
order, the grant of the interim measures sought would entail neither the 
dissolution of the Disciplinary Chamber nor, accordingly, the removal of its 
administrative and financial services, but the provisional suspension of its 
activity until delivery of the final judgment.
111 Furthermore, inasmuch as granting those measures would mean that 
the processing of cases pending before the Disciplinary Chamber must be 
suspended until delivery of the final judgment, the harm resulting for the 
individuals concerned from the suspension of those cases would be less 
than that resulting from the examination of those cases by a body, namely 
the Disciplinary Chamber, whose lack of independence and impartiality 
cannot, prima facie, be ruled out.
112 Finally, the budgetary difficulties invoked by the Republic of Poland 
which would be connected with the grant of the interim measures sought 
cannot take precedence over the risk of harm to the general interest of the 
European Union with regard to the proper functioning of its legal order.
113 In those circumstances, it must be concluded that the balance of 
interests leans in favour of granting the interim measures requested by the 
Commission.
114 In the light of all the foregoing, the Court grants the Commission’s 
application for interim measures referred to in paragraph 1 of the present 
order.
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Analysis
The Court of Justice’s order in Case C-791/19 R is the third instance where the 
Court has granted interim measures applied for by the Commission to preserve 
the rule of law from being seriously and irreparably harmed by the Polish 
authorities.125 As previously analysed, the first time the Court had to noticeably 
step in was in November 2017 when the Polish authorities publicly refused to 
obey a previous order of the Court to stop logging in the Białowieża forest.126 
The second time the Court was forced to make history happened the following 
year when the Polish authorities attempted to forcibly dismiss judges of Poland’s 
Supreme Court on the basis of a lowered retirement age applied retroactively. 
The Court then ordered the immediate suspension of the application of relevant 
national rules which meant that Polish authorities had to restore the Supreme 
Court to its situation prior to the entry into force of the law being challenged by 
the Commission.127 
The beginning of the end for Poland’s ‘star chamber’128
In the present and third instance, the Court of Justice ordered the immediate 
suspension of the activities of the ‘Disciplinary Chamber’ (‘DC’) as regards 
disciplinary cases concerning judges. The Court’s order is connected to Case 
C-719/19 (which was decided on 15 July 2021129), which is itself the third 
infringement action launched by the Commission on the basis of Article 19(1) 
TEU to protect Polish judges from their national authorities.130 This is also 
the third infringement action which brought to the Court’s attention issues 
the Commission had previously repeatedly raised as part of the Rule of Law 
Framework and subsequently as part of the Article 7(1) procedure. In this case, 
the main subject matter of the action is the DC, a body established in 2017 
and whose lack of independence and impartiality has been repeatedly raised by 
125 The analysis in this section directly draws from L. Pech, ‘Protecting Polish Judges from the 
Ruling Party’s “Star Chamber”: The Court of Justice’s interim relief order in Commission v. 
Poland (Case C-791/19 R)’, VerfBlog, 9 April 2020: <https://verfassungsblog.de/protecting-
polish-judges-from-the-ruling-partys-star-chamber/>. For a more comprehensive analysis of the 
Court’s order and subsequent non-compliance by Polish authorities, see L. Pech, ‘Protecting 
Polish judges from Poland’s Disciplinary “Star Chamber”’ (2021) 58 Common Market Law 
Review 137. 
126 See supra 3.1.1.
127 See supra 3.1.2.
128 We are alluding here to the infamous English court that developed in the late 15th century. See 
E. Cheyney, “The Court of Star Chamber” (1913) 18(4) The American Historical Review 727, p. 
727: ‘the Court of Star Chamber won enough prominence and enough odium in the sixteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries to obtain formal abolition by act of Parliament in 1641. It has 
left its name to later times as a synonym for secrecy, severity, and the wresting of justice.’
129 See infra 3.2.3. 
130 In his Opinion delivered on 6 May 2021 in Case C-791/19, EU:C:2021:366, AG Tanchev 
advised the Court to rule that the new Polish disciplinary regime for judges is contrary to EU law.
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multiple organisations and experts specialising in rule of law matters.131 In this 
context, it is also worth noting that the European Commission, for the very first 
time, simultaneously and appropriately raised a violation of Article 267 TFEU 
to the extent that the new disciplinary regime would create ‘a chilling effect for 
making use of this mechanism’.132 
The Commission did not however initially apply for interim measures when it 
decided to refer Poland to the Court of Justice on 10 October 2019, although 
the Commission did request the Court to expedite the proceedings, which was 
however subsequently rejected by the Court on the grounds that its action raised 
sensitive and complex legal problems.133 By contrast, in the case relating to the 
independence of Poland’s Supreme Court, the Commission requested both 
interim measures and expedited proceedings and was granted both, and this 
is what should have been done in the present dispute as well. In any event, 
following the Polish authorities’ repeated public refusal to comply with the ruling 
of the Labour and Social Security Chamber of Poland’s Supreme Court, which 
found the DC not to constitute a court within the meaning of EU and Polish 
law by application of the preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice in A.K,134 
the Commission belatedly decided to apply for interim measures on 14 January 
2020. As correctly noted by the Commission itself, ‘despite [our emphasis] the 
judgments, the Disciplinary Chamber continues to operate, creating a risk of 
irreparable damage for Polish judges and increasing the chilling effect on the 
Polish judiciary’.135 
131 See e.g. Venice Commission, Poland Opinion on the draft Act amending the Act on the National 
Council of the Judiciary, on the draft Act amending the Act on the Supreme Court and on the Act 
on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts (11 December 2017) CDL-AD(2017)031, para. 89 and 
paras 91–92: ‘The proposed reform, if implemented, will not only threaten the independence of 
the judges of the SC, but also create a serious risk for the legal certainty and enable the President 
of the Republic to determine the composition of the chamber dealing with the politically 
particularly sensitive electoral cases. While the Memorandum speaks of the “de-communization” 
of the Polish judicial system, some elements of the reform have a striking resemblance with the 
institutions which existed in the Soviet Union and its satellites […] there is a risk that the whole 
judicial system will be dominated by these new judges, elected with the decisive influence of the 
ruling majority’. On the issue of whether these ‘new judges’ may be correctly described as judges 
or should rather be viewed as usurpers (within the meaning of English law), considering the 
fundamental irregularities which have characterised their appointment, see infra Section 6.
132 European Commission, Rule of Law: European Commission launches infringement procedure 
to protect judges in Poland from political control, Press release IP/19/1957, 3 April 2019. On 
the increasing use and untapped potential of the concept of chilling effect to better protect inter 
alia judicial independence, see L. Pech, The Concept of Chilling Effect: Its Untapped Potential 
to Better Protect Democracy, the Rule of Law, and Fundamental Rights in the EU, March 2021: 
<https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/the-concept-of-chilling-effect> 
133 Case C-791/19 R, op. cit., para. 102. 
134 The Court’s judgment in A.K. is analysed infra in Section 4.1.
135 European Commission, Court of Justice for interim measures regarding the Disciplinary 
Chamber of the Supreme Court in Poland, MEX/20/56, Daily news, 14 January 2020.
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Commission’s misguided litigation strategy 
The Court’s order deals with this aspect, which was unsurprisingly raised by 
the Polish government at the stage of the examination of the urgency of the 
Commission’s request for interim measures. Instructively, the Court makes clear 
the Commission’s rationale. In a nutshell, the Commission decided not to apply 
for interim measures because it expected the A.K. preliminary ruling to deal with 
the issue of the DC.136 While the Court found the Commission’s rationale to be 
‘reasonable’, we find it neither coherent nor judicious. As the Court of Justice 
itself explained in a not so subliminal message to the Commission in Miasto 
Łowicz and Prokurator Generalny:137 ‘the task of the Court must be distinguished 
according to whether it is requested to give a preliminary ruling or to rule on 
an action for failure to fulfil obligations’. In other words, the Commission is 
implicitly but unambiguously told not to abstain from launching infringement 
actions on the basis of similar issues being raised in the context of national 
requests for a preliminary ruling. Indeed, as recalled by the Court itself, its 
preliminary ruling jurisdiction is much more limited than its jurisdiction in 
infringement cases, where the Court can directly find that a Member State has 
violated the principle of judicial independence. 
In this context, we might find it difficult to understand why the Commission 
did not follow the same path that it had in the case relating to the independence 
of the Supreme Court, and request that the Court provisionally grant interim 
measures before submission by Poland of its observations and until such time 
as an order is made closing the interim proceedings. Considering the repeated 
threats of non-compliance with the Court of Justice’s rulings and the current 
Polish authorities’ track record of non-compliance with rulings of the Polish 
courts,138 the Commission’s failure to ask the Court to impose a penalty payment 
in case of non-compliance could also leave us perplexed. In this instance, 
the Commission only deemed it necessary to reserve the right to submit an 
additional request seeking that payment of a fine be ordered in case of non-
compliance with the interim measures ordered, following its initial request 
for interim relief. However, the choice not to make this request from the start 




136 Case C-791/19 R, op. cit., paras 97–98.
137 The Court’s judgment in Miasto Łowicz is analysed infra in Section 4.2.
138 For further evidence, see e.g. T.T. Koncewicz, ‘Of Institutions, Democracy, Constitutional Self-
Defence, and the Rule of Law’ (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review 1753; T.T. Koncewicz, 
‘The Capture of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and Beyond: Of Institution(s), Fidelities 
and the Rule of Law in Flux’ (2018) 43 Review of Central and East European Law 116; W. 
Sadurski, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown (Oxford: OUP, 2019). For a broader take on how 
constitutional courts can be transformed into anti-rule of law bodies, see P. Castillo-Ortiz, ‘The 
Illiberal Abuse of Constitutional Courts’ (2019) 15 European Constitutional Law Review 48.
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both the government and the DC had indicated publicly they would refuse to 
comply with it.139
The order’s most significant aspects
Leaving the issue of non-compliance aside, and to keep this analysis as brief as 
possible, only the most significant aspects of the Court’s order will be highlighted 
below. 
To begin with, following the line of case law developed since its seminal Portuguese 
Judges ruling, the Court reiterates that every Member State of the EU is legally 
obliged to respect and maintain the independence of their national courts or 
tribunals (which may apply or interpret EU law). This general obligation includes 
a specific obligation to comply with the principle of independence of judges as 
far as disciplinary proceedings against judges are concerned.140 This means inter 
alia that EU law precludes the setting up of disciplinary bodies which themselves 
fail to satisfy the guarantees inherent in effective judicial protection, including 
that of independence. While not surprising, this was a new and welcome 
clarification. 
Secondly, by including unusual developments outlining how its own A.K. ruling 
and connected rulings issued by the Polish Supreme Court were disregarded 
by the Polish authorities and in particular the (unconstitutional) DC at the 
beginning of its order,141 the Court implicitly but unmistakeably indicated its 
disapproval at the DC’s persistent and unprecedented refusal to obey both EU 
and Polish law. This was bound to have legal weight when the Court came to 
decide whether the Commission had correctly established that the granting 
of the requested interim measures satisfied the condition in relation to the 
existence of fumus boni juris. Unsurprisingly, having first meticulously recalled 
what it had previously decided in A.K. as regards the scope of the requirements 
of independence and impartiality, the Court held that the Commission’s claim 
regarding the lack of a guarantee as to the independence and impartiality of the 
DC appeared, prima facie, not unfounded. 
139 S. Bodoni and M. Strzelecki, ‘Poland Ordered to ‘Immediately’ Halt Judge-Discipline System’, 
Bloomberg, 8 April 2020: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-08/poland-
told-to-immediately-halt-judicial-disciplinary-system> (‘The government hit back, questioning 
the EU court’s ability to rule on matters in Poland. Warsaw will refer the decision to Poland’s 
Constitutional Tribunal before responding to the bloc, Premier Mateusz Morawiecki said 
Wednesday’). The DC similarly refused to immediately and fully comply with the ECJ’s interim 
order and referred it to the captured ‘Constitutional Tribunal’ notwithstanding the obvious lack 
of jurisdiction of this body, not to mention its illegal composition: See DC press release, I DO 
16/19, 10 April 2020.
140 Case C-791/19 R, op. cit., para. 35.
141 Ibid., paras 18–24.
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Thirdly, as regards urgency, in an unprecedented step (to the best of our 
knowledge), the Court found that a body such as the DC could pose a threat 
of serious and irreparable harm to the EU legal order due to the scope of its 
disciplinary jurisdiction as regards Polish judges and the fact that its lack of 
independence and impartiality could not be, prima facie, ruled out. The Court’s 
holistic approach, which considered the broader and systemic impact that the 
DC’s seeming lack of independence could have on ordinary courts and the 
Supreme Court as a whole, is both warranted and compelling. Particularly 
significant is the Court’s observation that the ‘mere prospect’ for Polish judges 
to be referred to a body whose independence would not be guaranteed, is likely 
to affect their independence regardless of how many proceedings may have been 
initiated or the outcomes of these proceedings to date.142
Fourthly, the Court has suspended, again for the first time to the best of our 
knowledge, the activity of a body whose members as well as the national 
authorities responsible for establishing this body in the first place, claim is a 
court. In this context, the Polish government argued that the Commission 
was asking the Court to take measures which would violate the ‘fundamental 
structural principles of the Polish state’,143 having previously and ludicrously 
claimed a violation of the principle of irremovability of judges,144 which the 
Polish authorities were held to have violated twice by the Court in the two 
previous unprecedented infringement rulings examined infra.145 In its answer to 
this claim, the Court of Justice patiently explained that its order does not in 
fact require the dissolution of the DC, nor the suspension of its administrative 
and financial services or the dismissal of the individuals appointed to this body 
which, as noted by the Court of Justice itself, was already found not to constitute 
a court by Poland’s Supreme Court prior to the Court of Justice’s order. Since 
then, the Polish authorities had not only actively and purposely organised the 
systemic violation of the ruling of the Court of Justice of 19 November 2019 
and connected rulings of the Supreme Court (the not yet captured parts of it), 
they had also refused to acknowledge, let alone comply with, the resolution 
adopted by three (then still independent) chambers of Poland’s Supreme Court 
on 23 January 2020, which reiterated that the DC is not a court and which 
cannot therefore issue any rulings.146
In light of the above, and unsurprisingly, the Court granted the Commission’s 
application for interim measures. 
142 Ibid., para. 90.
143 Ibid., para. 106.
144 Ibid., para. 43.
145 See Section 3.
146 Supreme Court of Poland, Resolution of the formation of the combined Civil Chamber, 
Criminal Chamber, and Labour Law and Social Security Chamber, Case BSA I-4110-1/20, 23 
January 2020, para. 55. This Resolution is briefly presented infra in Section 6.  
60 Respect for the Rule of Law in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice SIEPS 2021:3
Ignoring violations of the Court’s order 
A particularly dispiriting aspect of this belated application for interim measures 
is the Commission’s failure to promptly and decisively react to the repeated 
violations of the Court’s order of 8 April 2020 within the framework of the 
previously lodged Case C-791/19. Indeed, and to put it concisely, notwithstanding 
this Court’s order of April 2020, the DC had continued to impose disciplinary 
sanctions when lifting the judicial immunity of judges who happened – pure 
coincidence no doubt – to be the most vocal defenders of judicial independence. 
The DC did so after being found to be a body established in violation of the 
Polish Constitution by the independent chambers of Poland’s Supreme Court. 
To add insult to injury, these requests to lift judicial immunity originates from 
a special unit established in 2016 within the national prosecutor’s office tasked 
with investigating judges and prosecutors which experts have long argued is itself 
a body which flagrantly violates EU law as it does not demonstrate any degree 
of operation and investigative independence and has been used as an instrument 
of pressure and intimidation against Polish judges and prosecutors.147 And yet 
the Commission has persistently refused to launch an infringement action 
either in respect of this special unit or a similar body established in Romania 
to go after independent judges and prosecutors. In the first judgment it issued 
in relation to the situation regarding judicial independence in Romania, the 
Court of Justice could not have made it clearer that the Commission was wrong 
not to have done so. Indeed, the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU 
also covers the creation and functioning of any specialised section of a national 
public prosecutor’s office with exclusive competence to investigate offences 
committed by judges and prosecutors. In order to be compatible with EU law, 
any prosecutorial unit of this nature must inter alia exercise its competence in 
compliance with the requirements of the EU Charter and in particular, Articles 
47 and 48 of the Charter, while being regulated by legislation which ensures that 
this type of unit cannot be used as an instrument of political control over the 
activities of judges and prosecutors.148
To return to the issue of Poland’s DC, when finally shamed into action following 
inter alia the unusual public statement by a sitting ECJ judge, making it 
unambiguously clear that the ECJ’s order was being violated,149 the Commission 
147 L. Pech, P. Wachowiec and D. Mazur, ‘Poland’s Rule of Law Breakdown: A Five-Year Assessment 
of EU’s (In)Action’ (2021) 13 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 1, pp. 24–25. 
148 Joined Cases C-83/19, C-127/19, C-195/19, C-291/19, C-355/19 and C-397/19, Asociaţia 
‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’ et al., EU:C:2021:393, paras 213–223.
149 See ECJ Judge Safjan quoted in A. Wójcik, ‘Sedzia TSUE: Izba Dyscyplinarna nie ma prawa 
orzekać takich sankcji jak wobec Tulei i Morawiec’, OKO.press, 25 November 2020: <https://
oko.press/izba-dyscyplinarna-nie-ma-prawa-orzekac/>. See also the judgment of Amsterdam 
Court of 10 February 2021, NL:RBAMS:2021:420, para. 5.3.5: ‘the Court finds that a 
disciplinary chamber was set up in Poland and is actually operating, although this is contrary to 
the interim measure of the Court of Justice, based on which the operation of this disciplinary 
chamber should have been suspended’.
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opted for the least effective way forward possible by adopting an additional 
letter of formal notice on 3 December 2020 in connection to its infringement 
procedure against Poland’s ‘muzzle law’.150 While we fully agree with the 
Commission’s assessment that Polish authorities continue to violate EU law by 
allowing the DC ‘to decide on further matters which directly affect judges’,151 
including cases for the lifting of judicial immunity, the Commission should 
have instead immediately returned to the Court of Justice and requested that 
it fine the Polish authorities for their repeated and open violations of the order 
of 8 April 2020. The Commission’s failure to do so has meant many months of 
unnecessary additional mental distress and irreparable damage for those subject 
to the unlawful harassment and sanctions organised by Poland’s ruling coalition 
and their satellite bodies such as the (unconstitutional) DC. Be that as it may, 
the Commission did ultimately return to the Court and at least requested a 
comprehensive set of interim measures which were all granted by the Vice-
President of the Court of Justice on 14 July 2021. 
The second suspension of Poland’s ‘Star Chamber’ in Case C-204/21 R152
In its request for interim measures, the Commission asked the Court to inter alia 
suspend the provisions empowering the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme 
Court to decide on requests for the lifting of judicial immunity; suspend the 
effects of decisions already taken by the Disciplinary Chamber on the lifting of 
judicial immunity, and suspend the provisions preventing Polish judges from 
directly applying certain provisions of EU law protecting judicial independence, 
and from putting references for preliminary rulings on such questions to the 
Court of Justice as well as the provisions qualifying action taken by judges in that 
respect as disciplinary offences.
On 14 July 2021, the day before the Court’s judgment in C-791/19, the Vice-
President of the Court granted these measures and ordered what amounts to 
the second suspension of the Disciplinary Chamber, this time to prevent it 
from waiving the judicial immunity of Polish judges. Conceptually, the most 
significant aspect of the Court’s order of 14 July 2021 is the first explicit 
clarification that decisions regarding the lifting of judicial immunity are directly 
connected to the status and conditions of exercise of judicial functions. As such, 
this type of decisions cannot fall within the jurisdiction of a body which itself 
lacks independence. 
150 European Commission, Rule of Law: Commission follows up on infringement procedure to protect 
judicial independence of Polish judges, INF/20/2142, 3 December 2020. 
151 Ibid. 
152 The text below borrows from L. Pech, ‘Protecting Polish Judges from Political Control: A brief 
analysis of the ECJ’s infringement ruling in Case C-791/19 (disciplinary regime for judges) and 
order in Case C-204/21 R (muzzle law)’, VerfBlog, 20 July 2021: <https://verfassungsblog.de/
protecting-polish-judges-from-political-control> 
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Practically, the most significant aspect of the Court’s order is the suspension of the 
DC for any case regarding any judge as well as the first ever suspension (albeit to 
a limited extent) of the second new chamber created by current Polish authorities 
known as the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs (CECPA) 
and which, similarly to the DC, consists entirely of defectively appointed 
‘judges’.153 This aspect has largely gone unnoticed. To oversimplify, in open 
violation of the Court of Justice’s Simpson and HG judgment154 and the stricter 
interpretation of the right to a tribunal established by law contained therein, the 
muzzle law gave the CECPA the exclusive competence assessing whether courts, 
chambers or panels involving Poland’s ruling coalition’s appointed ‘judges’ are 
still tribunals established by law. This was done, in manifest violation of EU law, 
to prevent (independent) Polish judges from undertaking this type of check. 
This means, however, and to put it bluntly, that CECPA’s (fake) ‘judges’ were 
put in charge of assessing whether other (fake) ‘judges’ are not in fact (fake) 
‘judges’… Remarkably, in this context, the Polish government has (accidently) 
admitted that a Polish judge applying the EU legality and independence checks 
required under Article 19(1) TEU/Article 47 CFR could face disciplinary 
proceedings for doing so!155 In any event, the Court of Justice has now suspended 
the activities of the CECPA in this respect due to the serious doubts surrounding 
its independence from political interference. 
Another key but not unprecedented aspect of the Court’s order156 is that 
it suspends the effects of decisions already taken by the DC on the lifting of 
judicial immunity. This means for instance that well-known Judge Igor Tuleya157 
ought to be able immediately return to work. He was however once again 
(unlawfully) barred from doing so on account that his suspension ordered by the 
twice-suspended DC is still binding notwithstanding that the Court of Appeal 
of Warsaw on 26 February 2021 already ruled otherwise.158 
Violating the Court’s order (bis repetita)
In addition to the concrete example just mentioned, the Court’s general 
jurisdiction to issue orders relating to Poland’s judicial ‘reforms’ has been found 
153 This is discussed in detail in Section 6 infra.
154 EU:C:2020:232. For further analysis, see Section 5.6 infra.
155 EU:C:2021:593, para. 185.
156 See previously the order adopted by the Court in Case C-619/18 R which demanded the 
restoration of Poland’s Supreme Court’s situation which existed before the adoption of the new 
law on the Supreme Court of 3 April 2018 challenged by the Commission.
157 D. Tilles, ‘Judge critical of Polish government barred from returning to work as dispute 
over judiciary deepens’, Notes from Poland, 1 March 2021: <https://notesfrompoland.
com/2021/03/01/judge-critical-of-polish-government-barred-from-returning-to-work-as-
dispute-over-judiciary-deepens/> 
158 M. Jałoszewski, ‘Jest zawiadomienie do prokuratury na Nawackiego, Radzika i Schaba za niewykonanie 
orzeczeń TSUE’, OKO.press, 26 July 2021: <https://oko.press/jest-zawiadomienie-do-prokuratury-
na-nawackiego-radzika-i-schaba-za-niewykonanie-orzeczen-tsue/> 
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unconstitutional by the unlawfully composed Constitutional Tribunal of Poland 
on the same day the order in Case C-204/21 R was issued, prompting warning 
about a creeping Polexit from the EU’s legal order. This resulted, at last, in a 
prompt reaction from the Commission:
The Commission is deeply concerned by the decision of the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal, which states that the interim measures ordered by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union in the area of the functioning of the judiciary, are inconsistent 
with the Polish Constitution. This decision reaffirms our concerns about the state 
of the rule of law in Poland.
[…]
The European Commission expects Poland to ensure that all decisions of the 
European Court of Justice are fully and correctly implemented. This includes also 
yesterday’s Court order to impose the interim measures on Poland to immediately 
suspend the application of certain provisions of the law of December 2019 on 
the judiciary, including on the functioning of the Disciplinary Chamber of the 
Supreme Court.
The Commission will not hesitate to make use of its powers under the Treaties to 
safeguard the uniform application and integrity of Union law.159
At the time of finalising this study, and in the face of yet more open violations 
of the Court’s orders160 but also judgments by current Polish authorities and 
their (captured) ‘courts’ such as the unlawfully composed Constitutional 
Tribunal, the European Commission did, for once, promptly and decisively 
react: On 7 September 2021, the European Commission did finally react to the 
open violation of both the Court’s order of 14 July 2021, analysed above, and 
the Court’s infringement judgment of 15 July 2021 in Case C-791/19, to be 
159 Statement by the European Commission on the decision of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal 
of 14 July, 21/3726, 15 July 2021: <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/
statement_21_3726>
160 With this pattern of systemic non-compliance not limited to rule of law issues but also now 
re-affecting EU environmental law: See European Commission, 2021 Rule of Law Report. 
Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, 20 July 2021, SWD(2021) 722 final, 
p. 4: ‘the Polish Government has openly defied the binding nature of an interim measures 
order issued by the Court of Justice on 21 May 2021 in a case lodged against Poland for breach 
of EU environmental law’ (this case is known as C-121/21 R Czech Republic v. Poland). 
The Czech Republic has since asked the Court of Justice to impose a daily penalty payment 
of €5 million per day until Poland complies with the Court’s order. On 20 September 2021 
(EU:C:2021:752), the Vice-President of the Court ordered Polish authorities to pay the 
European Commission a daily penalty payment of €500,000 per day on account of their failure 
to comply with the measures ordered previously by the Vice-President of the Court on 21 May 
2021 (EU:C:2021:420) starting from the date of notification of the order of 20 September 2021 
to Poland and until that Member State complies with the interim order.
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analysed below.161 With respect to the order, the Commission has requested the 
ECJ to impose a daily penalty payment as long as the interim measures ordered 
by the Court are not fully complied with. With respect to the judgment, the 
Commission has launched a separate procedure under Article 260(2) TFEU and 
sent a letter of formal notice to the Polish authorities. This judgment, which is 
the third judgment issued by the Court of Justice on the basis of an infringement 
action lodged by the Commission, will be analysed below, alongside the other 
infringement actions decided to date by the Court. 
3.2 The Commission’s infringement actions in respect of 
Poland’s so-called ‘judicial reforms’
To date, the European Commission has launched a total of four infringement 
actions on the basis of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU to protect 
judicial independence in Poland as well as prevent irreparable damage to the 
EU legal order. While each of these actions was entirely warranted, this gives 
us an average of less than one infringement action per year since Poland’s rule of 
law breakdown began in late 2015. The most recent action (C-204/21) took in 
practice more than fifteen months to reach the Court of Justice, hardly projecting 
the sense of urgency one would expect to see from the Guardian of the Treaties 
when faced, according to the Commission’s own analysis, with a piece of 
legislation (informally known as the ‘muzzle law’) which deliberately organises a 
de facto Polexit from the fundamental principles underlying the EU legal order by 
inter alia prohibiting judges from applying EU requirements relating to judicial 
independence failing what disciplinary proceedings and sanctions may ensue.162 
This arguably parsimonious as well as painstakingly slow use of the infringement 
procedure by the Commission offers a striking contrast to the unprecedented 
rapidity of Poland’s descent into authoritarianism, with Poland having been 
identified as the world’s most autocratising country for the period 2010–2020 by 
democracy experts. The world’s second most autocratising country in the world 
for the same period is Orbán’s Hungary, which is itself no longer considered a 
democracy and can therefore be considered as being structurally in breach of the 
most basic condition of EU membership. 
161 Independence of Polish judges: Commission asks European Court of Justice for financial 
penalties against Poland on the activity of the Disciplinary Chamber, IP/21/4587, 7 September 
2021: <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_4587>
162 See L. Pech, K.L. Scheppele, W. Sadurski, ‘Before It’s Too Late’, VerfBlog, 28 September 2020: 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/before-its-too-late/>; M. Taborowski, ‘On the PM Morawiecki motion 
to the Constitutional Tribunal regarding EU Treaties conformity with the Polish Constitution’, 
Rule of Law in Poland, 27 April 2021: <https://ruleoflaw.pl/on-the-pm-morawiecki-motion-
to-the-constitutional-tribunal-regarding-eu-treaties-conformity-with-the-polish-constitution-
case-k-3-21/>; T.T. Koncewicz, ‘How the EU is becoming a rule-of-law-less union of States. 
From Polexit to E(U)exit?’, VerfBlog, 28 April 2021, < https://verfassungsblog.de/how-the-eu-
is-becoming-a-rule-of-law-less-union-of-states/>. As previously mentioned, Poland’s (unlawfully 
composed) Constitutional Tribunal has also decided that interim measures ordered by the Court of 
Justice in the area of the functioning of the judiciary cannot be obeyed as they would be allegedly 
unconstitutional. Another pending motion before the captured Constitutional Tribunal is asking 
this body to confirm that the same can be said of the Court of Justice’s judgments. 
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Source: V-Dem Institute, Autocratization Turns Viral. Democracy Report 2021, March 2021, p. 38.
From an EU law perspective, we should stress the total absence of any infringement 
action on judicial independence grounds launched by the Commission as regards 
Hungary even when faced with a blatant violation of Article 19(1) TEU and 
Article 267 TFEU by the Hungarian authorities, including Orbán’s captured 
Supreme Court, following disciplinary proceedings targeting a national judge 
who referred judicial independence-related questions to the Court of Justice.164
163 See V-Dem Institute, Autocratization Turns Viral. Democracy Report 2021, March 2021, p. 38. 
Regarding the rule of law specifically, see also World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2020 
Insights, 2020, p. 20, which identifies Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria as belonging to the group 
of countries which have experienced the biggest declines in constraints on government powers 
in the world since 2015. With a decline of -6.8% over the past five years in relation to this 
benchmark, which aims to identify countries engaged in a process of autocratisation, Poland has 
experienced the worst decline in the world, which is only surpassed by Egypt.
164 P. Bárd, ‘Jeopardizing Judicial Dialogue is Contrary to EU Law: The AG Opinion in the IS case’, 
VerfBlog, 20 April 2021: <https://verfassungsblog.de/jeopardizing-judicial-dialogue-is-contrary-
to-eu-law> 
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As regards Poland, the attacks on judicial independence have been so flagrant 
and sustained that it has been impossible for the Commission to look the other 
way. By making unambiguously clear in the Portuguese Judges case that national 
authorities are under a strict EU law obligation to ensure that national courts 
meet the requirements essential to effective judicial protection, which includes an 
obligation to maintain these courts’ independence, the Court of Justice pushed 
the Commission finally to proceed with infringement actions directly alleging a 
violation of the EU principle of judicial independence on the basis of the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. The Commission did so twice in 2018. It 
was a belated but welcome change in the Commission’s infringement approach 
and its traditionally restrictive understanding of what can be achieved within the 
framework of the infringement procedure to defend judicial independence. In 
doing so, the Commission went beyond, and rightly so one may add, what had 
been anticipated by scholars in framing its infringement proceedings,165 although 
we are still waiting for the Commission to go further and launch systemic 
infringement actions in order to address systemic attacks against the rule of law.166 
The same cannot be said of the Masters of the Treaties, which continue to 
hide behind the Commission’s role as Guardian of the Treaties to justify their 
continuing refusal to launch their own infringement actions under Article 259 
TFEU.167 This is extremely regrettable, if not irresponsible, as the Commission 
has persistently failed to bring infringement actions in relation to a number 
of systemic rule of law problems and violations committed inter alia by 








165 See in particular M. Schmidt and P. Bogdanowicz, ‘The infringement procedure in the rule of 
law crisis: How to make effective use of Article 258 TFEU’ (2018) 55 Common Market Law 
Review 1061; P. Bárd and A. Śledzińska-Simon, ‘Rule of Law Infringement Procedures: A 
Proposal to Extend the RU’s Rule of Law Toolbox’ (2019) CEPS Paper No. 9; L.W. Gormley, 
‘Infringement Proceedings’, in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law 
and Values (Oxford: OUP, 2017), 65; M. Smith, ‘The Evolution of Infringement and Sanction 
Procedures. Of Pilots, Diversions, Collisions, and Circling’, in A. Arnull and D. Chalmers (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of European Law (Oxford: OUP, 2015), 350.
166 K.L. Scheppele, ‘Enforcing the Basic Principles of EU Law through Systemic Infringement 
Actions’, in C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European 
Union (Cambridge: CUP, 2016); D. Kochenov, ‘On Policing Article 2 TEU Compliance – 
Reverse Solange and Systemic Infringements Analyzed’ (2013) Polish Yearbook of International 
Law 163.
167 D. Kochenov, ‘Biting Intergovernmentalism: The Case for the Reinvention of Article 259 TFEU 
to Make It a Viable Rule of Law Enforcement Tool’ (2015) 7 The Hague Journal of the Rule of 
Law 170.
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for the Judiciary’ and ‘Constitutional Tribunal’, notwithstanding the repeated 
invitations to do so originating from the European Parliament.168 
3.2.1 First ever violation of the second subparagraph of Article 
19(1) TEU: Case C-619/18, Commission v. Poland 
(Independence of the Supreme Court)169
In the Independence of the Supreme Court case, the Court, for the very first time, 
reviewed the compatibility of a set of national measures specifically targeting 
the sitting judges of a national supreme court with the principle of judicial 
independence in the context of an infringement action. This judgment may also 
be viewed as the most important ruling to date regarding the applicability and 
the scope of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and its relationship 
with Article 47 CFR, first clarified in the Portuguese Judges ruling, which was 
issued in the context of a national request for a preliminary ruling. This is also 
the Court’s first judgment which unambiguously rejected the validity of the 
claim, repeated ad nauseam by Polish and Hungarian authorities, that the Court 
of Justice would allegedly lack the jurisdiction to review national ‘reforms’ of the 
national justice systems. 
168 See the European Parliament resolution regarding the rule of law situation in Poland in which 
the Parliament urged the Commission to launch further infringement actions in relation to the 
unlawfully composed ‘Constitutional Tribunal’; the unlawfully composed ‘National Council for 
the Judiciary’ and the unlawfully composed new ‘extraordinary control’ chamber within Poland’s 
Supreme Court: European Parliament resolution of 17 September 2020 on the proposal for 
a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of 
Poland of the rule of law, P9_TA(2020)-225. In a judgment of 7 May 2021, the European 
Court of Human Right confirmed the unlawful composition of the current ‘Constitutional 
Tribunal’: Xero Flor w Polsce sp. z o.o. v. Poland, CE:ECHR:2021:0507JUD000490718: The 
bench which heard the case regarding the applicant included an individual unlawfully elected 
to the Constitutional Tribunal and cannot therefore be considered a tribunal established by law. 
For further analysis, see most recently B. Grabowska-Moroz, ‘Strasbourg Court Entered the 
Rule of Law Battlefield’, Strasbourg Observers, 13 September 2021.
169 EU:C:2019:531. For further analysis, see P. Bárd and A. Sledzińska-Simon, ‘On the principle of 
irremovability of judges beyond age discrimination: Commission v. Poland’ (2020) 57 Common 
Market Law Review 1555; P. Bogdanowicz and M. Taborowski, ‘How to save a Supreme 
Court in a rule of law crisis: The Polish Experience’ (2020) 16 European Constitutional Law 
Review 306; P. Filipek, ‘Nieusuwalność sędziów i granice kompetencji państwa członkowskiego 
do regulowania krajowego wymiaru sprawiedliwości - uwagi w świetle wyroku Trybunału 
Sprawiedliwości z 24.06.2019 r., C-619/18, Komisja Europejska przeciwko Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej’ (2019) 12 Europejski Przegląd Sądowy 4.
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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)
24 June 2019
Case C-619/18
ACTION under Article 258 TFEU for failure to fulfil obligations
European Commission v. Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court)
[For ease of reading, references to previous cases have been omitted]
Excerpt: 
42 As is apparent from Article 49 TEU, which provides the possibility for 
any European State to apply to become a member of the European Union, 
the European Union is composed of States which have freely and voluntarily 
committed themselves to the common values referred to in Article 2 TEU, 
which respect those values and which undertake to promote them, EU law 
being based on the fundamental premise that each Member State shares 
with all the other Member States, and recognises that those Member States 
share with it, those same values.
43 That premise both entails and justifies the existence of mutual trust 
between the Member States and, in particular, their courts that those values 
upon which the European Union is founded, including the rule of law, will 
be recognised, and therefore that the EU law that implements those values 
will be respected.
[…]
52 Furthermore, although, as the Republic of Poland and Hungary point 
out, the organisation of justice in the Member States falls within the 
competence of those Member States, the fact remains that, when exercising 
that competence, the Member States are required to comply with their 
obligations deriving from EU law and, in particular, from the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. Moreover, by requiring the Member 
States thus to comply with those obligations, the European Union is not 
in any way claiming to exercise that competence itself nor is it, therefore, 
contrary to what is alleged by the Republic of Poland, arrogating that 
competence.
[…]
56 In the present case, it is common ground that the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme 
Court) may be called upon to rule on questions concerning the application 
or interpretation of EU law and that, as a ‘court or tribunal’, within the 
meaning of EU law, it comes within the Polish judicial system in the ‘fields 
covered by Union law’ within the meaning of the second subparagraph 
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of Article 19(1) TEU, so that that court must meet the requirements of 
effective judicial protection.
57 To ensure that a body such as the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) is in a 
position to offer such protection, maintaining its independence is essential, 
as confirmed by the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, which 
refers to access to an ‘independent’ tribunal as one of the requirements 
linked to the fundamental right to an effective remedy.
58 That requirement that courts be independent, which is inherent in the 
task of adjudication, forms part of the essence of the right to effective judicial 
protection and the fundamental right to a fair trial, which is of cardinal 
importance as a guarantee that all the rights which individuals derive from EU 
law will be protected and that the values common to the Member States set out 
in Article 2 TEU, in particular the value of the rule of law, will be safeguarded.
59 Having regard to the foregoing, the national rules called into question 
by the Commission in its action may be reviewed in the light of the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and it is therefore necessary to examine 
whether the infringements of that provision alleged by that institution are 
established.
[…]
78 In the present case, it must be held that the reform being challenged, 
which provides that the measure lowering the retirement age of judges of 
the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) is to apply to judges already serving 
on that court, results in those judges prematurely ceasing to carry out their 
judicial office and is therefore such as to raise reasonable concerns as regards 
compliance with the principle of the irremovability of judges.
79 In those circumstances, and having regard to the cardinal importance 
of that principle […] such an application is acceptable only if it is justified 
by a legitimate objective, it is proportionate in the light of that objective 
and inasmuch as it is not such as to raise reasonable doubt in the minds 
of individuals as to the imperviousness of the court concerned to external 
factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests before it.
80 In the present case the Republic of Poland claims that the decision to 
lower to 65 the retirement age of the judges of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme 
Court) was taken with the goal of standardising that age with the general 
retirement age applicable to all workers in Poland and, in doing so, of 
improving the age balance among senior members of that court.
[…]
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82 However, it must be observed, first, that, as the Commission points 
out and as has already been observed by the European Commission for 
Democracy through Law (‘Venice Commission’) […] the explanatory 
memorandum to the draft New Law on the Supreme Court contains 
information that is such as to raise serious doubts as to whether the reform 
of the retirement age of serving judges of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme 
Court) was made in pursuance of such objectives, and not with the aim of 
side-lining a certain group of judges of that court.
[…]
96 Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, it must be held that 
the application of the measure lowering the retirement age of the judges 
of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) to the judges in post within that 
court is not justified by a legitimate objective. Accordingly, that application 
undermines the principle of the irremovability of judges, which is essential 
to their independence.
[…]
110 Furthermore, although it is for the Member States alone to decide 
whether or not they will authorise such an extension to the period of judicial 
activity beyond normal retirement age, the fact remains that, where those 
Member States choose such a mechanism, they are required to ensure that 
the conditions and the procedure to which such an extension is subject are 
not such as to undermine the principle of judicial independence.
[…]
112 To that end, it is necessary, in particular, that those conditions and 
procedural rules are designed in such a way that those judges are protected 
from potential temptations to give in to external intervention or pressure 
that is liable to jeopardise their independence. Such procedural rules must 
thus, in particular, be such as to preclude not only any direct influence, 
in the form of instructions, but also types of influence which are more 
indirect and which are liable to have an effect on the decisions of the judges 
concerned.
113 In the present case, the conditions and the detailed procedural rules 
provided for under the New Law on the Supreme Court with regard to a 
potential extension beyond normal retirement age of the period for which a 
judge of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) carries out his or her duties do 
not satisfy those requirements.
[…]
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123 It follows that the Commission’s second complaint, alleging breach of 
the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, and, accordingly, the action 
in its entirety, must be upheld.
Analysis
With this infringement ruling, Poland made history (again)170 by becoming the 
first EU Member State held by the Court of Justice to have failed to fulfil its 
obligations under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. According 
to the Court, Polish authorities did not merely violate the principle of judicial 
independence, they also violated the principle of the irremovability of judges 
following their attempted ‘reform’ of the Polish Supreme Court, which the then 
First President of the Supreme Court more accurately described as an attempted 
‘purge’.171 
Recalling the basics 
Before highlighting the most significant aspects of the Court’s ruling, we 
should briefly recall what it unsurprisingly confirmed. To begin with, the Court 
reiterated that while the content of Article 19(1) TEU is informed by Article 
47 CFR when it comes for instance to interpreting the principle of effective 
legal protection, Article 19(1) TEU can be applied independently from Article 
47 CFR to review the compatibility of national law with EU law. Article 19(1) 
TEU has also a wider scope of application as it is not limited by Article 51 CFR. 
As observed by AG Tanchev, by virtue of the Portuguese Judges ruling, ‘Article 
19(1) TEU constitutes an autonomous standard for ensuring that national 
measures meet the requirements of effective judicial protection, including 
judicial independence, which complements Article 47 of the Charter (and 
other provisions of the Charter as the case may be)’.172 In other words, national 
measures which may not be implementing EU law within the meaning of Article 
51 CFR may still fall foul of the requirements of effective judicial protection, 
including judicial independence, as guaranteed by the second subparagraph of 
Article 19(1) TEU. 
170 We could for instance mention (without being exhaustive) that Poland became the first EU 
Member State subject to the Commission’s Rule of Law Framework in January 2016; the first 
EU Member State subject to Article 7(1) TEU in December 2017; and, following the ECJ order 
issued on 20 November 2017, also the first EU Member State found liable to a periodic penalty 
payment of at least €100,000 per day were it to continue to disobey a previous interim order 
(see supra Section 3.1.1 for an analysis of the Court’s order in the Białowieza Forest case).
171 ‘Poland Supreme Court judges return to work after EU court ruling’, Euractiv, 23 October 
2018:  <https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/poland-supreme-court-judges-return-
to-work-after-eu-court-ruling/>
172 Opinion delivered on 11 April 2019, EU:C:2019:35, para. 58. 
72 Respect for the Rule of Law in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice SIEPS 2021:3
With extensive references made to its previous Portuguese Judges ruling (which the 
Court referred to no less than thirteen times), the Court furthermore reiterated 
the duty of each Member State to comply with its obligations deriving from EU 
law. This includes an obligation to ensure that all national courts or tribunals 
which may be called upon to rule on questions concerning the application or 
interpretation of EU law meet the requirements of effective judicial protection, 
which necessarily means that national authorities must also maintain the 
independence of these national courts or tribunals. While the Court did not 
explicitly tackle this aspect, its judgment implicitly confirmed that the Commission 
may initiate an infringement action under Article 258 TFEU regarding a subject-
matter falling with the scope of EU law which is simultaneously discussed within 
the framework of an ongoing Article 7(1) TEU procedure.173 
Polish authorities’ bad faith
It is in relation to the second and third aspects mentioned above that the 
Court offers damning developments and goes further than the Opinion of AG 
Tanchev, although he did also previously conclude that Poland had violated 
the principles of the irremovability and the independence of judges. Indeed, 
the Court comes close to publicly stating that the Polish government sought to 
deliberately mislead it. One may for instance refer to paragraph 82 of the ruling 
where the Court expresses its ‘serious doubts as to whether the reform of the 
retirement age of serving judges’ of the Supreme Court was made in pursuance 
of the objectives rather than ‘with the aim of side-lining a certain group of judges 
of that court’. The blunt nature of the Court’s judgment and the unambiguous 
rejection of the legitimacy of the objectives officially put forward by the Polish 
government make quite a contrast with the gentle, if not naïve, approach of the 
Court a few years earlier in Commission v. Hungary.174 In this case, the Court held 
that the objectives put forward by the Hungarian government were legitimate 
but the means used to achieve them disproportionate. There was however little 
doubt then that the real and only objective pursued by Orbán’s government was 
to clear out the senior ranks of the Hungarian judiciary, to replace the forcibly 
173 This aspect was dealt with by AG Tanchev in his Opinion delivered on 11 April 2019, para. 
50: ‘There are firm grounds for finding that Article 7 TEU and Article 258 TFEU are separate 
procedures and may be invoked at the same time’. For a rejection of the (unpersuasive) lex 
specialis argument and a call for more infringement actions on the issues already highlighted 
in the Commission’s Article 7(1) TEU reasoned proposal prior to the Court’s ruling in the 
present case, see L. Pech and P. Wachowiec, ‘1095 Days Later: From Bad to Worse Regarding 
the Rule of Law in Poland (Part II)’, VerfBlog 17 January 2019: <https://verfassungsblog.
de/1095-days-later-from-bad-to-worse-regarding-the-rule-of-law-in-poland-part-ii/>, and see 
also K.L. Scheppele, L. Pech and R.D. Kelemen, ‘Never Missing an Opportunity to Miss an 
Opportunity: The Council Legal Service Opinion on the Commission’s EU budget-related rule 
of law mechanism’, VerfBlog, 12 November 2018: <https://verfassungsblog.de/never-missing-an-
opportunity-to-miss-an-opportunity-the-council-legal-service-opinion-on-the-commissions-eu-
budget-related-rule-of-law-mechanism/>.
174 Case C-286/12 Commission v. Hungary (Judicial Retirement Age), EU:C:2012:687. 
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‘retired’ judges with autocracy-compatible senior judges.175 In framing the case 
as an age-discrimination problem, the Commission and the Court missed a 
decisive opportunity to protect judicial independence in Hungary. Positively, by 
approaching the attempted purge of Poland’s Supreme Court through the lens 
of Article 19(1) TEU, the Court avoided the pitfalls of its previous approach.176
In the present case, by emphasising repeatedly its ‘serious doubts’ regarding the 
genuine nature of the ruling coalition’s ‘reform’, as well as its ‘doubts’ regarding 
the ‘true aims’ of the ‘reform’ being challenged, the Court could not have made 
clearer its ire at this deliberate attempt to mislead it. One cursory look at the 
Polish government’s so-called White Paper on the Reform of the Polish Judiciary 
of March 2018177 is indeed all it takes to realise that the Polish authorities never 
aimed to standardise the retirement age of Supreme Court Judges ‘with the 
general retirement age applicable to all workers in Poland and, in doing so, of 
improving the age balance among senior members of that court’.178 Instead, 
and according to the White Paper itself, the main aims justifying the (alleged) 
‘reform of judicial retirement age’ are ‘historical experiences of communism, the 
failure to account for the past for many years, and pathological [sic] mechanisms 
of the functioning of courts that have been perpetuated for years’.179
These were never serious evidence-based claims. As regards the often advertised 
‘decommunisation’ objective, one may for instance stress that 80% of Poland’s 
Supreme Court judges were removed in 1990 and that ‘the average age of a Polish 
judge is approximately 42 years, which means on average, they were 12 years old 
when the Communist regime fell’.180 We could also note the obvious contradiction 
between the alleged need to ‘decommunise’ and ‘rejuvenate’ the Polish judiciary, 
and the decision of Poland’s ruling party to appoint two individuals181 to the by 
then already captured ‘Constitutional Tribunal’ who were both aged 67 at the 
time, with one of the two appointees having been a ‘member of communist party 
for 22 years’ and a ‘former prosecutor, who had worked during the period of 
martial law and prosecuted members of the anti-communist opposition’.182
175 For further analysis and references, see K. Kovacs and K.L. Scheppele, ‘The fragility of an 
independent judiciary: Lessons from Hungary and Poland – and the European Union’ (2018) 
51(3) Communist and Post-Communist Studies 189.
176 For further analysis, see D. Kochenov and P. Bárd, ‘The Last Soldier Standing? Courts versus 
Politicians and the Rule of Law Crisis in the New Member States of the EU’, op. cit.
177 See Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów, ‘The government presents a White Paper on the reforms 
of the Polish justice system’, 8 March 2018: <http://www.premier.gov.pl/en/news/news/the-
government-presents-a-white-paper-on-the-reforms-of-the-polish-justice-system.html>. 
178 Case C-619/18, op. cit., para. 80.
179 Ibid., para. 99.
180 A.R. Gustafsson and P. Omtzigt, The functioning of democratic institutions in Poland (explanatory 
memorandum) (13 December 2019) Council of Europe (PACE), paras 88 and 18.
181 Reasoned proposal in accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union regarding 
the rule of law in Poland, 2017/0360 (APP), 20 December 2017, recital 57. 
182 Batory Foundation and European Stability Initiative, ‘Poland’s deepening crisis. When the rule 
of law dies in Europe’, 14 December 2019, 7.
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Considering the lack of seriousness and candour of the Polish government, the 
Court had no choice but to find that Polish authorities had violated the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU by providing that the measure consisting in 
lowering the retirement age of the judges of the Supreme Court should apply 
to judges in post who had been appointed to that court before 3 April 2018 
and, secondly, by granting the President of the Republic the discretion to extend 
the period of judicial activity of judges of that court beyond the newly fixed 
retirement age.
A template to follow
The Court has since deplored – albeit implicitly – a similar lack of good 
faith from the Polish authorities in Case C-192/18 Commission v. Poland 
(Independence of Ordinary Courts). Before reviewing the Court’s judgment in 
what was chronologically speaking the first infringement action brought by the 
Commission against Poland on the basis of Article 19(1) TEU, this analysis 
can be concluded by stressing the highly effective nature of the Commission’s 
infringement action in the present case. To put it differently, the way the 
Commission has brought this action ought to be viewed as the template to 
follow to preserve the rule of law from serious and irreparable damage when it is 
threatened in a Member State. As time is absolutely of the essence when acting 
to preserve the rule of law, the Commission must systematically give no more 
than a month to the relevant Member State to reply to its letter of formal notice 
and to its reasoned opinion. Furthermore, as soon as the pre-litigation procedure 
has ended, the Commission ought to systematically submit an application for 
interim measures as well as request the relevant interim measures be granted 
before the defendant has submitted its observations, so as to avoid serious and 
irreparable damage to the principle of effective judicial protection, and failing 
which would leave the defendant free to waste time and change the facts on 
the ground, which is also why the Commission must systematically request the 
Court to restore the situation prior to the adoption of the national provisions in 
dispute. Finally, the Commission ought systematically to request the Court of 
Justice to decide the case under the expedited procedure. 
3.2.2 Second ever violation of the second subparagraph 
of Article 19(1) TEU: Judgment of the Court (Grand 
Chamber) in Case C-192/18, Commission v. Poland 
(Independence of the ordinary courts)183
With this ruling, Poland became the first EU Member State to be found to have 
failed to fulfil its Treaty obligations under the second subparagraph of Article 
19(1) TEU twice in a row. While this infringement action was launched by the 
183 EU:C:2019:924. For further analysis, see e.g. A. Rasi, ‘Effetti indiretti della Carta dei diritti 
fondamentali? In margine alla sentenza Commissione c. Polonia (Indépendance de la Cour 
suprême)’ (2019) 4(2) European Papers 615.
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Commission on 29 July 2017 and lodged with the Court on 15 March 2018, 
and therefore prior to the launch of the infringement action targeting the new 
retirement regime devised for sitting judges of Poland’s Supreme Court, Case 
C-192/18 was decided after Case C-619/18 on 5 November 2019. 
In this judgment, the Court unsurprisingly held that the Polish rules adopted 
in 2017 relating to the retirement age of prosecutors and judges of the ordinary 
courts, coupled with the new rules governing a possible extension to the period of 
active service of those judges, are not compatible with the requirements relating 
to the independence of judges and in particular the principle of irremovability 
of judges.184 The Commission’s additional submission that Poland had also 
infringed Article 157 TFEU and Articles 5(a) and 9(1)(f ) of Directive 2006/54 
because the rules in dispute fixed different retirement ages directly on the basis 
of sex, was also upheld by the Court. The following excerpts and subsequent 
analysis will however only focus on aspects relating to judicial independence. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)
5 November 2019
In Case C-192/18,
ACTION for failure to fulfil obligations under Article 258 TFEU
European Commission v. Poland (Independence of the ordinary courts)
[For ease of reading, references to previous cases have been omitted]
Excerpts:
104 In the present case, it is not in dispute that the ordinary Polish courts 
may, in that capacity, be called upon to rule on questions relating to the 
application or interpretation of EU law and that, as ‘courts or tribunals’ 
within the meaning of EU law, they come within the Polish judicial system 
in the ‘fields covered by Union law’, within the meaning of the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, so that those courts must meet the 
requirements of effective judicial protection.
105 To ensure that such ordinary courts are in a position to offer such 
protection, maintaining their independence is essential, as confirmed by the 
second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, which refers to access to an 
‘independent’ tribunal as one of the requirements linked to the fundamental 
right to an effective remedy.
184 This infringement action did not, however, target the Polish Minister of Justice’s arbitrary 
power to appoint and dismiss presidents of courts in total impunity, an obvious threat to 
judicial independence and one of the core issues highlighted in the Commission’s Article 7(1) 
TEU proposal. For a critique of this incomprehensible omission, see M. Taborowski, ‘The 
Commission takes a step back in the fight for the Rule of Law’, VerfBlog, 3 January 2018: 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/the-commission-takes-a-step-back-in-the-fight-for-the-rule-of-law/>
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106 That requirement that courts be independent, which is inherent in 
the task of adjudication, forms part of the essence of the right to effective 
judicial protection and the fundamental right to a fair trial, which is of 
cardinal importance as a guarantee that all the rights which individuals 
derive from EU law will be protected and that the values common to the 
Member States set out in Article 2 TEU, in particular the value of the rule 
of law, will be safeguarded.
107 In the light of the foregoing, the national rules which are the subject 
of the second complaint set out by the Commission in its action may be 
reviewed in the light of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and 
it should accordingly be examined whether, as the Commission contends, 
the Republic of Poland has infringed that provision.
[…]
116 In the present case, as explained both at the hearing and in its written 
pleadings, by its second complaint the Commission does not seek to criticise 
the measure lowering the retirement age of judges of the ordinary Polish 
courts in itself. This complaint is essentially directed at the mechanism with 
which that measure was coupled, under which the Minister for Justice has 
the right to authorise judges of those courts to continue actively to carry out 
judicial duties beyond the retirement age, as lowered. In the Commission’s 
submission, in the light of its characteristics that mechanism undermines 
the independence of the judges concerned in that it does not enable it to 
be guaranteed that they will carry out their duties wholly autonomously 
and be protected against external intervention or pressure. Furthermore, 
the combination of the measure and the mechanism undermines their 
irremovability.
[…]
120 To that end, it is necessary, in particular, that those conditions and 
procedural rules are designed in such a way that those judges are protected 
from potential temptations to give in to external intervention or pressure 
that is liable to jeopardise their independence. Such procedural rules must 
thus, in particular, be such as to preclude not only any direct influence, 
in the form of instructions, but also types of influence which are more 
indirect and which are liable to have an effect on the decisions of the judges 
concerned.
121 In the present case, the conditions and the detailed procedural rules 
which the contested national provisions impose in relation to the possibility 
that judges of the ordinary Polish courts continue to carry out their duties 
beyond the new retirement age do not satisfy those requirements.
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[…]
124 Having regard to the foregoing, it must be found that the power 
held in the present instance by the Minister for Justice for the purpose of 
deciding whether or not to authorise judges of the ordinary Polish courts to 
continue to carry out their duties, from the age of 60 to 70 years in the case 
of women and the age of 65 to 70 years in the case of men, is such as to give 
rise to reasonable doubts, inter alia in the minds of individuals, as to the 
imperviousness of the judges concerned to external factors and as to their 
neutrality with respect to any interests that may be the subject of argument 
before them.
125 Furthermore, that power fails to comply with the principle of 
irremovability, which is inherent in judicial independence.
126 In that regard, it is to be noted that that power was conferred on the 
Minister for Justice in the more general context of a reform that resulted in 
the lowering of the normal retirement age of, amongst others, judges of the 
ordinary Polish courts.
127 First, having regard, in particular, to certain preparatory documents 
relating to the reform at issue, the combination of the two measures referred 
to in the previous paragraph is such as to create, in the minds of individuals, 
reasonable doubts regarding the fact that the new system might actually have 
been intended to enable the Minister for Justice, acting in his discretion, 
to remove, once the newly set normal retirement age was reached, certain 
groups of judges serving in the ordinary Polish courts while retaining others 
of those judges in post.
[…]
130 […] the combination of the measure lowering the normal retirement 
age to 60 years for women and 65 years for men and of the discretion vested 
in the present instance in the Minister for Justice for the purpose of granting 
or refusing authorisation for judges of the ordinary Polish courts to continue 
to carry out their duties, from the age of 60 to 70 years in the case of women 
and 65 to 70 years in the case of men, fails to comply with the principle of 
irremovability.
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Analysis
This is the second infringement action where the Commission litigated issues 
previously raised in the context of the Rule of Law Framework and subsequently, 
in the Commission’s Article 7(1) reasoned proposal which summarised the main 
problems as regards the Polish ordinary courts, as follows: 
• by decreasing the retirement age of judges while making prolongation 
of the judicial mandate conditional upon the discretionary decision 
of the Minister of Justice, the new rules undermine the principle of 
irremovability of judges which is a key element of the independence 
of judges; 
• the discretionary power of the Minister of Justice to appoint and 
dismiss presidents of courts without being bound by concrete criteria, 
with no obligation to state reasons, with no possibility for the 
judiciary to block these decisions and with no judicial review available 
may affect the personal independence of court presidents and of other 
judges.185
Unlike the first infringement action decided by the Court of Justice on the sole 
basis of Article 19(1) TEU, in this instance, the Court also decided the action on 
the basis of Article 157 TFEU and Directive 2006/54, with the legislation at issue 
found in breach of both.186 The judgment’s examination of the Polish legislation 
in light of the principles of judicial independence and the irremovability of judges 
are fully in line with the Court’s approach, first developed in its Independence of 
the Supreme Court ruling, which itself meticulously applied the approach first 
developed in the Portuguese Judges judgment. As such, the Court’s judgment in 
what is informally known as the Independence of ordinary courts case was neither 
unexpected, nor can it be considered as ground-breaking as the previously 
mentioned judgments from the perspective of Article 19(1) TEU. The ruling 
does however contain important confirmations and clarifications, especially with 
respect to the principle of irremovability of judges. 
Confirmations and clarifications
First, this is the second infringement action launched by the Commission on 
the basis of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU in conjunction with 
Article 47 of the Charter, and the second time the Court decided the case on the 
sole basis of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. 
185 Reasoned proposal in accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union regarding 
the rule of law in Poland, 2017/0360 (APP), 20 December 2017, recital 175. 
186 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women 
in matters of employment and occupation, OJ 2006 L 204.
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Second, the Court confirmed that Member States are bound by the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, which means that this Treaty provision can 
be relied upon by the Commission to challenge national measures which impair 
the judicial independence of any national court which may rule on questions 
relating to the application or interpretation of EU law. 
Third, the Court also confirmed that the guarantees of independence and 
impartiality established in EU law require ‘certain guarantees’ and ‘appropriate 
procedures’ so as to protect judges from removal from office or arbitrary 
dismissals in a situation where a judge is deemed unfit for the purposes of 
carrying out his/her duties on account of incapacity or a serious breach of 
professional obligations.187 Exceptions to the principle of irremovability, whose 
‘cardinal importance’ is reiterated, are only compatible with EU law if these 
exceptions are justified by a legitimate objective, are proportionate in light of the 
relevant objective and inasmuch as they are ‘not such as to raise reasonable doubt 
in the minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of the courts concerned to 
external factors and their neutrality with respect to the interests before them’.188 
Fourth, and more originally, the Court found that the conditions and the 
procedural rules adopted by Poland were deficient, with relevant criteria being 
found excessively ‘vague’ and ‘unverifiable’. The lack of any obligation to state 
reasons, the lack of any obligation for the Minister for Justice to decide within 
a specific timeframe and the possibility to challenge relevant decisions in court 
proceedings were also disapprovingly noted by the Court. Also noteworthy and 
welcome is the Court’s acceptance of the Commission’s reasoning, which rightly 
emphasised the need to look at the combination of relevant measures and not 
merely at each relevant measure separately when assessing a possible violation of 
the principle of irremovability. 
Fifth, and this is arguably the most significant aspect of the Court’s judgment, 
Poland is found to have once again violated the principle of irremovability, 
which is inherent in judicial independence. In this context, for the second time 
after Case C-619/18, the Court came close to explicitly stating that the Polish 
government has deliberately sought to mislead it regarding the true aims of yet 
another of its alleged ‘reforms’ when it stated that ‘the new system might actually 
have been intended to enable the Minister for Justice, acting in his discretion, to 
remove, once the newly set normal retirement age was reached, certain groups 
of judges’.189 
187 Case C-192/18, op. cit., paras 112–113.
188 Ibid., para. 115.
189 Ibid., para. 127.
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Lastly, when comparing the Court’s judgment to the Opinion of Advocate 
General,190 it is interesting to note that the Court did not follow or at least did 
not see the need to follow AG Tanchev’s analysis regarding the material scope 
of application of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. To summarise 
AG Tanchev’s position, one should be able to invoke a free-standing violation 
of EU law with respect to the irremovability and independence of judges on 
the basis of Article 19(1) TEU, independently of the Charter and in particular 
Article 47 CFR, only in situations where the legal challenge is directly aimed at 
a ‘structural infirmity in a given Member State’.191 This notion is understood by 
the AG as referring to national measures which undermine the ‘institutional or 
operational independence of judges’,192 and amount to ‘systemic or generalised 
deficiencies, which “compromise the essence” of the irremovability and 
independence of judges’, which was the case here ‘given that the laws challenged 
by the Commission impact across entire tiers of the judiciary’.193 By contrast, 
‘individual or particularised incidences of breach of the irremovability and 
independence of judges are to be dealt with under Article 47 of the Charter, 
and only in contexts in which Member States are implementing EU law under 
Article 51(1) of the Charter. In principle, a structural infirmity that additionally 
entails implementation of EU law by a Member State will fall to be determined 
by both provisions’.194 
Scope of application of Article 19(1) TEU
Without entering into a debate about the persuasive nature of this interpretation 
of the respective scope of application of Article 19(1) TEU, second paragraph, 
and Article 47 CFR, the Court did not endorse the AG’s interpretation, and its 
case law to date continues to apply a simpler and arguably better approach: the 
second paragraph of Article 19(1) TEU is to be used when the national measures 
in dispute do not entail implementation of EU law stricto sensu, but impact 
courts or judges as a group. In situations where the Court is faced with national 
measures entailing implementation of EU law, the disputed measures will be 
assessed on the sole basis of Article 47 CFR, with any additional assessment 
under the second paragraph of Article 19(1) TEU being considered unnecessary 
to the extent that it would lead to similar legal outcomes. 
190 Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev delivered on 20 June 2019 in Case C-192/18 
Commission v. Poland (Independence of Ordinary Courts), EU:C:2019:529. 
191 Case C-192/18, op. cit., para. 115.
192 Ibid., para. 103.
193 Ibid., para. 115.
194 Ibid., para. 116.
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Between arrogance and non-compliance
To conclude in respect of the Court’s ruling in the present case, the Polish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs issued a press release195 in which it stated that the 
Court of Justice wrongly found that Poland had infringed judicial independence. 
In this context, we should note that the Polish government had previously 
requested a reopening of the oral part of the procedure on the grounds that 
the AG would have incorrectly understood the Court’s case law, in particular 
the Portuguese Judges ruling.196 The Court naturally rejected this request as it is 
well-established that ‘a party’s disagreement with the Opinion of the Advocate 
General, irrespective of the questions that he examines in his Opinion, cannot 
in itself constitute grounds justifying the reopening of the oral part of the 
procedure’.197 
This episode does however suggest that the Polish government appears convinced 
it understands EU law better than the Commission, the Court of Justice and 
its Advocates-General combined. And while the Polish government expressly 
stated that Poland accepts its duty to comply with the Court of Justice’s rulings, 
as we saw in respect of the Court’s order in Case C-791/19 R Commission v. 
Poland (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), this 
undertaking now appears to have been implicitly withdrawn. Indeed, at the time 
of writing, the unlawfully composed ‘Constitutional Tribunal’ of Poland was 
expected to give carte blanche to Polish authorities to disregard both the Court 
of Justice’s orders and judgments regarding judicial independence matters.198
Finally, the present authors are not aware of any measures adopted by the Polish 
authorities to remedy the situation of the judges who were affected by the new 
and unlawful retirement regime and in particular, the situation of the judges 
who were refused an extension to the age of 70.199 We are similarly unaware 
of any thorough investigation by the Commission as to whether the Court of 
Justice’s ruling was in fact fully complied with by Polish authorities. The seeming 
lack of follow-up is not without precedent, with the Commission also failing 
195 Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Stanowisko Ministerstwa Spraw 
Zagranicznych RP w związku z wyrokiem TSUE w sprawie C-192/18 Komisja przeciwko 
Polsce, 5 November 2019: <https://twitter.com/MSZ_RP/status/1191645296188645376>
196 Case C-192/18, op. cit., para. 35.
197 Ibid., para. 37.
198 See M. Taborowski, ‘On the PM Morawiecki motion to the Constitutional Tribunal regarding 
EU Treaties conformity with the Polish Constitution (case K 3/21)’, Rule of Law in Poland, 27 
April 2021: <https://ruleoflaw.pl/on-the-pm-morawiecki-motion-to-the-constitutional-tribunal-
regarding-eu-treaties-conformity-with-the-polish-constitution-case-k-3-21/> 
199 The AG refers to a figure which ‘may be as high as 112 judges’, op. cit., para. 107. See also 
Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, ‘It starts with the personnel. Replacement of common 
court presidents and vice presidents from August 2017 to February 2018’, April 2018, p. 2: 
‘Information provided by the Ministry indicates that from 12 August 2017 to 28 February 2018 
a total of 219 judges filed requests to be allowed to continue serving. The Minister of Justice 
reviewed 130 requests and granted consent to 69 of them’.
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to investigate, to the best of our knowledge, whether the Court of Justice’s 
order in Commission v. Poland (Białowieża forest) was ever fully complied with 
notwithstanding evidence to the contrary.200 
3.2.3 Third ever violation of the second subparagraph of Article 
19(1) TEU: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) 
in Case C-791/19, Commission v. Poland (Disciplinary 
regime for judges)201
With this ruling, Poland became the first EU Member State to be found to have 
failed to fulfil its Treaty obligations under the second subparagraph of Article 
19(1) TEU thrice in a row with the Court of Justice finding in this instance 
Poland’s new disciplinary regime for Polish judges to be incompatible with EU 
law. The Court has also issued several judgments in answer to preliminary ruling 
requests from under siege Polish judges,202 with more than 20 pending references 
yet to be dealt with. If this was not complicated enough, the European Court 
of Human Rights has recently stepped into the fray with close to 40 rule of 
law related complaints mostly lodged by Polish judges communicated to Polish 
authorities by the Strasbourg Court. In its most recent judgment to date, 
the European Court of Human Rights found inter alia that the ‘Disciplinary 
Chamber’ does not constitute a tribunal established by law within the meaning 
of Article 6(1) ECHR.203 We will therefore refer to this judgment in our analysis 
of the Court of Justice’s judgment in Case C-791/19 as the same body was also 
one of the core problematical issues raised by the European Commission in its 
third infringement action relating to Poland’s rule of law crisis. 
At the time of finalising this study, both the judgment of the Court of Justice 
of 15 July 2021 in Case C-791/19 and the judgment of the European Court of 
Human Rights of 22 July 2021 in the Case of Reczkowicz v. Poland continue to 
be openly ignored by Polish authorities and Polish judges subject to arbitrary 
disciplinary proceedings when they attempt to implement them. As far as the 
EU is concerned, in an unprecedently prompt (and entirely warranted) reaction, 
the European Commission has sent a letter of formal notice to Polish authorities 
under Article 260(2) TFEU paving the way for the ECJ to eventually impose a 
lump sum and/or penalty payment on Polish authorities should they not take 
the necessary measures to comply fully with the Court of Justice’s judgment of 
15 July 2021.204  
200 See supra Section 3.1.1.
201 EU:C:2021:596. 
202 See Section 4 infra for an analysis of Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18 and 
Joined Cases C-558/18 and C-563/18 and Section 6 infra for an analysis of Case C-824/18.
203 See Judgment of 22 July 2021, Reczkowicz v. Poland, CE:ECHR:2021:0722JUD004344719.  
204 Independence of Polish judges: Commission asks European Court of Justice for financial 
penalties against Poland on the activity of the Disciplinary Chamber, IP/21/4587, 7 September 
2021: <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_4587>
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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)
15 July 2021
In Case C-791/19,
ACTION for failure to fulfil obligations under Article 258 TFEU
European Commission v. Poland (Disciplinary regime for judges)
[For ease of reading, references to previous cases have been omitted]
Excerpts:
62 Having regard to the foregoing, the national rules regarding disciplinary 
proceedings called into question by the Commission in the first four 
complaints are amenable to review in the light of the second subparagraph 
of Article 19(1) TEU and it is therefore necessary to examine whether the 
infringements of that provision alleged by that institution are established.
[…]
112 Having regard to all the considerations set out in paragraphs 89 to 110 
of the present judgment, it must be held that, taken together, the particular 
context and objective circumstances in which the Disciplinary Chamber 
was created, the characteristics of that chamber, and the way in which its 
members were appointed are such as to give rise to reasonable doubts in 
the minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of that body to external 
factors, in particular the direct or indirect influence of the Polish legislature 
and executive, and its neutrality with respect to the interests before it and, 
thus, are likely to lead to that body’s not being seen to be independent or 
impartial, which is likely to prejudice the trust which justice in a democratic 
society governed by the rule of law must inspire in those individuals. Such 
a development constitutes a reduction in the protection of the value of 
the rule of law for the purposes of the case-law of the Court referred to in 
paragraph 51 of the present judgment.
113 It follows, inter alia, that, by failing to guarantee the independence 
and impartiality of the Disciplinary Chamber which is called upon to rule, 
at first instance and at second instance, in disciplinary cases concerning 
judges of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) and, depending on the case, 
either at second instance or both at first instance and at second instance, in 
disciplinary cases concerning judges of the ordinary courts and by thereby 
undermining the independence of those judges at, what is more, the cost of 
a reduction in the protection of the value of the rule of law in that Member 
State for the purposes of the case-law of the Court referred to in paragraph 
51 of the present judgment, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its 
obligations under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU.
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[…]
155 Even though the Republic of Poland contends that the complaints 
made by the Disciplinary Officer in those cases do not concern obvious 
and gross violations of the law for the purposes of Article 107 § 1 of the 
Law on the ordinary courts, but the exceeding, by the judges concerned, 
of their jurisdiction or the bringing into disrepute by those judges of their 
judicial office, the fact remains that those complaints are directly related to 
the content of the judicial decisions taken by those judges.
156 The mere prospect of such disciplinary investigations being opened is, 
as such, liable to exert pressure on those who have the task of adjudicating 
in a dispute.
157 Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the Court considers 
it to be established that, in the particular context resulting from the recent 
reforms that have affected the Polish judiciary and the disciplinary regime 
applicable to judges of the ordinary courts, and in particular having regard 
to the fact that the independence and impartiality of the judicial body with 
jurisdiction to rule in disciplinary proceedings concerning those judges are 
not guaranteed, the definitions of disciplinary offence contained in Article 
107 § 1 of the Law on the ordinary courts and Article 97 §§ 1 and 3 of the 
new Law on the Supreme Court do not help to avoid that disciplinary regime 
being used in order to create, with regard to those judges who are called 
upon to interpret and apply EU law, pressure and a deterrent effect, which 
are likely to influence the content of their decisions. Those provisions thus 
undermine the independence of those judges and do so, what is more, at the 
cost of a reduction in the protection of the value of the rule of law in Poland 
within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 51 of the present 
judgment, in breach of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU.
[…]
172 In the present case, it should be observed that the provisions of 
national legislation challenged by the Commission in the context of the 
present complaint confer on the President of the Disciplinary Chamber the 
discretionary power to designate the disciplinary tribunal with territorial 
jurisdiction to hear a disciplinary case conducted in respect of a judge of 
the ordinary courts without the criteria to be fulfilled by such a designation 
having been specified in the applicable legislation.
173 As has been argued by the Commission, where no such criteria have 
been laid down, such a power could, inter alia, be used in order to direct 
certain cases to certain judges while avoiding assigning them to other judges, 
or in order to put pressure on the judges thus designated.
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174 In the present case, as has also been argued by the Commission, such 
a risk is increased by the fact that the person responsible for designating 
the disciplinary tribunal with territorial jurisdiction is none other than the 
President of the Disciplinary Chamber, namely the body called upon to hear, 
as the court of second instance, appeals brought against decisions issued by 
that disciplinary tribunal, a disciplinary chamber whose independence and 
impartiality are not guaranteed, as is apparent from paragraphs 80 to 113 of 
the present judgment.
[…]
176 It follows from all of the foregoing that Article 110 § 3 and Article 
114 § 7 of the Law on the ordinary courts, inasmuch as they confer on the 
President of the Disciplinary Chamber the discretionary power to designate 
the disciplinary tribunal with territorial jurisdiction to hear disciplinary 
proceedings in respect of judges of the ordinary courts, that is to say, judges 
who may be called upon to interpret and apply EU law, do not meet the 
requirement derived from the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU 
that such cases must be examined by a tribunal ‘established by law’.
[…]
213 National procedural rules, such as those covered by the second part 
of the present complaint, may, especially where, as in the present case, 
they are applied in the context of a disciplinary regime displaying the 
shortcomings referred to in paragraph 188 of the present judgment, prove 
to be such as to increase still further the risk of the disciplinary regime 
applicable to those whose task is to adjudicate being used as a system of 
political control of the content of judicial decisions. The judges concerned 
may be led to fear, if they rule in a particular way in the cases before them, 
that disciplinary proceedings will be brought against them which thus fail 
to provide guarantees capable of meeting the requirements of a fair trial 
and, in particular, the requirement relating to respect for the rights of the 
defence. In this way, the restrictions on the rights of the defence arising from 
those procedural rules undermine the independence of judges of the Polish 
ordinary courts and thus do not meet the requirements derived from the 
second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU.
214 In those circumstances, the second part of the fourth complaint must also 
be upheld and, accordingly, the fourth complaint must be upheld in its entirety.
[…]
229 In the present case, it must be borne in mind that it is already apparent 
from the examination which led the Court to uphold the first complaint 
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brought by the Commission that the definitions of the disciplinary offence 
contained in the provisions of Article 107 § 1 of the Law on the ordinary 
courts and Article 97 §§ 1 and 3 of the new Law on the Supreme Court do 
not meet the requirements derived from the second subparagraph of Article 
19(1) TEU, since they give rise to the risk that the disciplinary regime at 
issue might be used for the purpose of creating, in respect of judges of the 
Polish ordinary courts, pressure and a deterrent effect which are likely to 
influence the content of the judicial decisions which those judges are called 
upon to give.
233 It must be borne in mind, in that regard, first, that strict compliance 
with Member State obligations derived from Article 267 TFEU is required 
in respect of all State authorities and, therefore, in particular, in respect of 
a body which, like the Disciplinary Officer, is responsible for investigating, 
if necessary under the authority of the Minister for Justice, disciplinary 
proceedings that may be brought against judges. Second, as has been 
argued by both the Commission and the Member States intervening 
in support of the form of order sought by that institution, the mere fact 
that the Disciplinary Officer conducts investigations under the conditions 
referred to in paragraph 231 of the present judgment is sufficient to give 
concrete expression to the risk of forms of pressure and of a deterrent effect 
referred to in paragraph 229 of the present judgment and to undermine the 
independence of the judges who are the subject of those investigations.
234 It follows that the fifth complaint, alleging that the Republic of Poland 
has failed to fulfil its obligations under the second and third paragraphs of 
Article 267 TFEU by allowing the right of courts and tribunals to submit 
requests for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice to be restricted by 
the possibility of triggering disciplinary proceedings, must be upheld.
Analysis205
This new disciplinary regime for judges forms part of an autocratic agenda 
which, in manifest violation of EU law but also the Polish Constitution, 
endeavours to put an end to judicial independence and reinstates what amounts 
to a ‘Soviet-style justice system’.206 Unsurprisingly, the ECJ found each element 
 
205 The text below draws upon L. Pech, ‘Protecting Polish Judges from Political Control: A brief 
analysis of the ECJ’s infringement ruling in Case C-791/19 (disciplinary regime for judges) and 
order in Case C-204/21 R (muzzle law)’, VerfBlog, 20 July 2021: <https://verfassungsblog.de/
protecting-polish-judges-from-political-control> 
206 Batory Foundation and ESI, Poland’s deepening crisis. When the rule of law dies in Europe, 14 
December 2019, p. 3: ‘The Polish case has become a test whether it is possible to create a Soviet-
style justice system in an EU member state; a system where the control of courts, prosecutors 
and judges lies with the executive and a single party’.
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of this new regime submitted to its attention by the Commission, supported 
by the governments of 5 EU Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, 
Finland, Sweden), to be wholly incompatible with EU law:
(i) The Disciplinary Chamber is not compatible with the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU as it does not provide required 
guarantees of impartiality and independence; 
(ii) The new disciplinary regime is not compatible with the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU to the extent that it allows the 
content of judicial decisions to be classified as a disciplinary offence;
(iii) By failing to guarantee that disciplinary cases are examined by a 
tribunal established by law, the new disciplinary regime also violates 
the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU; 
(iv) Poland’s failure to guarantee that disciplinary cases brought against 
judges are examined within a reasonable time and guarantee respect 
for the rights of defence of accused judges amounts to an additional 
violation of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU;
(v) By exposing judges to disciplinary proceedings should they make 
a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice raising 
judicial independence issues, Poland has also violated Article 267 
TFEU.
Before doing so, the Court’s detailed judgment offered helpful summaries of the 
fundamental principles governing judicial independence, in particular, as further 
developed in two important cases decided a few weeks before and informally 
known as the Maltese judges207 and Romanian judges208 rulings. 
Fundamental guiding principles
With respect to the applicability and scope of the second subparagraph of Article 
19(1) TEU, the Court recalled that this provision requires all Member States to 
provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective judicial protection in the fields 
covered by EU law irrespective of whether the Member States are implementing 
 
207 Case C-896/19 Repubblika, EU:C:2021:311. For further analysis, see M. Leloup, D. Kochenov 
and A. Dimitrovs, ‘Non-Regression: Opening the Door to Solving the “Copenhagen Dilemma”? 
All Eyes on Case C-896/19 Repubblika v Il-Prim Ministru’ (2021) 46 European Law Review 687.
208 Joined Cases C-83/19, C-127/19, C-195/19, C-291/19, C-355/19 and C-397/19 Asociaţia 
‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’ and Others, EU:C:2021:393. For further analysis, see  
A. Dimitrovs and D. Kochenov, ‘Of Jupiters and Bulls: CVM as a Redundant Special Regime  
of the Rule of Law – Romanian Judges’, EU Law Live, 5 June 2021.
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Union law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, which means 
inter alia ensuring that the national bodies which may be called upon to rule on 
questions concerning the application or interpretation of EU law are and remain 
independent. The fact that the organisation of justice in the Member States falls 
within the competence of those Member States does not mean that national 
authorities, when exercising that competence, can disregard their obligations 
deriving from EU law and, in particular, from the second subparagraph of 
Article 19(1) TEU. As made clear in the Maltese judges ruling of 20 April 2021, 
EU Member States are furthermore subject to a non-regression obligation which 
means that national authorities cannot amend national laws ‘in such a way as 
to bring about a reduction in the protection of the value of the rule of law, 
a value which is given concrete expression by, inter alia, Article 19 TEU. The 
Member States are thus required to ensure that, in the light of that value, any 
regression of their laws on the organisation of justice is prevented, by refraining 
from adopting rules which would undermine the independence of judges.’209
As regards specifically the rules governing the disciplinary regime applicable 
to judges, the requirement of independence derived from EU law, and, in 
particular, from the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, means inter 
alia an obligation for Member States to make sure that the national disciplinary 
regime provides the necessary guarantees in order to prevent any risk of its 
being used as a system of political control of the content of judicial decisions. 
In more practical terms, this requires rules which clearly and precisely ‘define, 
in particular, both forms of conduct amounting to disciplinary offences and the 
penalties actually applicable, provide for the involvement of an independent 
body in accordance with a procedure which fully safeguards the rights enshrined 
in Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter, in particular the rights of the defence, 
and lay down the possibility of bringing legal proceedings challenging the 
disciplinary bodies’ decisions.’210 In this respect, the Court has emphasised that 
the mere ‘prospect of opening a disciplinary investigation is, as such, liable to 
exert pressure on those who have the task of adjudicating in a dispute’211 and as 
such, the disciplinary regime must guarantee that those conducting investigations 
and bring disciplinary proceedings act objectively and impartially free from any 
external influence. In short, any national disciplinary regime which is used as 
an instrument of pressure, intimidation or political control over, the judicial 
activity of judges as well as prosecutors, cannot be compatible with EU law. 
209 C-791/19, op. cit., para. 51. 
210 Joined Cases C-83/19 et al., op. cit., para. 198. 
211 Ibid., para. 199. 
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Application of these principles 
Before briefly outlining how the principles were applied by the Court in 
relation to Poland’s new disciplinary regime for judges, the Court’s adoption 
of a systemic framework of analysis in answer to a systemic attack on judicial 
independence must be noted. While this is not the first time the Court has 
done so,212 the Court’s systemic analysis is particularly thorough, and one must 
commend the Court for its contextual analysis which took account i.a. of the 
wider context of the changes made to the organisation of the judiciary (para. 88) 
and the particular context in which e.g. the Disciplinary Chamber was created 
(paras 112 and 157).
Among the most noteworthy aspects of the Court’s infringement judgment is the 
Court’s first direct answer to the question of whether the Disciplinary Chamber is 
compatible with EU law and the ‘new’ (unconstitutionally established) National 
Council of Judiciary (NCJ) sufficiently independent. For the Court, numerous 
factors highlighted in its judgment ‘are such as to give rise to legitimate doubts 
as to the independence’ of the NCJ (para. 108) and considering the important 
role of this body in appointing the members of the Disciplinary Chamber 
not to mention the characteristics of that chamber (e.g. its membership), it 
must be held that the Disciplinary Chamber does not provide the guarantees 
of impartiality and independence required under the second subparagraph of 
Article 19(1) TEU.
Simultaneously, and for the first time too, the Court has found a violation of 
the principle of non-regression in relation to the DC, taking into account i.a. 
the role played by the new NCJ in the appointment of the members of the DC. 
While one may regret the ECJ’s arguably excessively euphemistic language in 
this context to refer to the premature termination, in manifest violation of the 
Polish Constitution, of the term of office of the members which had, until that 
point, made up that body, the ECJ did stress the lack of independence of the 
NCJ before holding that the DC ‘constitutes a reduction in the protection of the 
value of the rule of law’ (paras 112–113). This is, in essence, the first violation of 
the EU non-regression principle first outlined as regards judicial independence 
in the Maltese Judges ruling of 20 April 2021.  
For the first time as well, the Court has directly and extensively dealt with the 
notion of deterrent effect (also known as chilling effect in ECHR law213) to 
establish a violation of the principle of judicial independence in an infringement 
case. In agreement with the Member States which intervened in support of 
212 See the Court’s judgment of 2 March 2021 in Case C-824/18 A.B. and Others (Appointment of 
judges to the Supreme Court – Actions), EU:C:2021:153 which is examined in Section 6 infra. 
213 L. Pech, The Concept of Chilling Effect: Its Untapped Potential to Better Protect Democracy, the Rule 
of Law, and Fundamental Rights in the EU, March 2021: <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.
org/publications/the-concept-of-chilling-effect> 
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the Commission, the Court indeed held that Polish authorities have created a 
disciplinary regime which is a ‘regime being used in order to create, with regard 
to those judges who are called upon to interpret and apply EU law, pressure and 
a deterrent effect [our emphasis], which are likely to influence the content of their 
decisions’ (para. 157). In this context, the Court, in yet another unprecedented 
feature, found a second violation of the principle of non-regression while also 
holding that the national measures relating to the disciplinary liability of judges, 
having regard to their wording alone, violate the requirements of clarity and 
precision previously outlined in the Romanian Judges ruling of 18 May 2021 in 
relation to national rules providing for the personal liability of judges.214
In another first, the Commission had positively requested to assess a specific 
aspect of the disciplinary regime in light of the right to a tribunal established 
by law. The Commission however did so in a very (arguably excessively) limited 
way. Indeed, it regrettably did not ask the ECJ to review ‘the conditions under 
which the Polish disciplinary courts are established or the judges which make 
up those courts are appointed, but the conditions under which the disciplinary 
court is designated which … will be called upon to rule in specific disciplinary 
proceedings conducted in respect of a judge’ (para. 170). A missed opportunity 
to tackle the issue of Poland’s fake judges in an infringement context. In any 
event, the ECJ, for the first time, found a violation of the established by law 
criterion in this context due to the arbitrary power conferred on the individual 
presiding the Disciplinary Chamber. 
In yet another unprecedented development, the Court held that relevant national 
procedural rules were designed in such a way as ‘to increase still further the risk 
of the disciplinary regime applicable to those whose task is to adjudicate being 
used as a system of political control of the content of judicial decisions’ with the 
Court noting explicitly that Polish judges are right ‘to fear [our emphasis], if they 
rule in a particular way in the cases before them, that disciplinary proceedings 
will be brought against them which thus fail to provide guarantees capable of 
meeting the requirements of a fair trial’ (para. 213). This naturally amounts to 
yet another violation of the requirements derived from the second subparagraph 
of Article 19(1) TEU.
Last but not least, in relation to Article 267 TFEU, the Court has essentially 
moved away from its previous unwise distinction between preliminary 
disciplinary investigations and formal opening of disciplinary investigations. 
Positively, the Court now fully accepts that the mere ‘opening of investigations 
concerning decisions whereby Polish ordinary courts have submitted requests 
for a preliminary ruling’ (para. 213) is not compatible with EU law. Again and 
fittingly, the Court relies i.a. on the concept of chilling effect in this context.
214 Joined Cases C-83/19 et al., op. cit., paras 234–235.
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One arguably very minor yet annoying aspect: the Court’s continuing use 
of ‘reforms’ to describe deliberate, sustained, unlawful attacks on judicial 
independence.
Strasbourg Court’s additional blow
A week following the Luxembourg Court’s judgment finding the core aspects 
of Poland’s new disciplinary regime for judges incompatible with EU law, the 
Strasbourg Court delivered a judgment which one may view as even more 
stunning if not damning than the Court of Justice’s. Indeed, while the Court 
of Justice focused on the lack of independence of the Disciplinary Chamber, 
the European Court of Human Rights found that this body is and never was a 
tribunal established by law due to ‘the irregularities in the appointment process’ 
which ‘compromised the legitimacy of the Disciplinary Chamber to the extent 
that, following an inherently deficient procedure for judicial appointments, it 
did lack and continues to lack the attributes of a “tribunal” which is “lawful” for 
the purposes of Article 6 § 1. The very essence of the right at issue has therefore 
been affected’.215 
Prior to this finding, the Strasbourg Court found that the NCJ no longer 
offered sufficient guarantees of independence from the legislature and the 
executive powers and the impugned appointment procedure of the members of 
the DC was ‘inherently tarnished’ by grave breaches of the domestic procedure 
for the appointment of judges which itself arose from non-compliance with the 
principle of the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary.216 
To put it differently, ‘the Strasbourg court found that the defects of the NCJ 
led to the Disciplinary Chamber, formed with its participation, to be effectively 
poisoned’.217 Since the same problem has affected multiple other appointments 
to other chambers of Poland’s Supreme Court, one may expect the Strasbourg 
Court to similarly find against other judgments issued by individuals who 
were appointed by Polish President Duda in a similarly ‘inherently deficient 
procedure’ which discloses i.a. an indue influence of the legislative and executive 
powers and a complete disregard for court orders.218 Be that as it may, the 
EU law aspects raised by the fundamental irregularities committed by Polish 
215 See judgment of 22 July 2021, Reczkowicz v. Poland, CE:ECHR:2021:0722JUD004344719, 
para. 280.
216 Ibid., para. 276. 
217 J. Jaraczewski, ‘Not a lawful tribunal at all – the ECtHR’s judgment in Reczkowicz v. Poland’, 
EU Law Live, 26 July 2021: <https://eulawlive.com/op-ed-not-a-lawful-tribunal-at-all-the-
ecthrs-judgment-in-reczkowicz-v-poland-by-jakub-jaraczewski/>  
218 In order to create faits accomplis, the Polish President deliberately violated several freezing 
orders adopted by Poland’s Supreme Administrative Court in relation to different resolutions 
of the new (unconstitutionally re-established) NCJ recommending multiple candidates to 
different chambers of the Supreme Court. See judgment of 22 July 2021, Reczkowicz v. Poland, 
CE:ECHR:2021:0722JUD004344719, paras 36–42 and paras 173–174 (offering excerpts from 
AG Tanchev Opinion in Case C-487/19).
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authorities in their ongoing attempt to capture Poland’s Supreme Court will 
be further discussed in Section 6. Before doing so, we will offer an analysis of 
two key preliminary ruling judgments which requested the Court of Justice to 
clarify its interpretation of the obligation to ensure that national courts meet 
the requirement of effective judicial protection. 
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4 Interpretation of the 
obligation to ensure that 
national courts meet the 
requirements of effective 
judicial protection
This section focuses on what we view as the two most important rulings 
to date issued by the Court of Justice in response to national requests for a 
preliminary ruling originating in both instances from Polish courts in relation 
to the requirements of judicial independence under Article 19(1) TEU, second 
paragraph, and/or Article 47 CFR: 
(i) Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, A.K. e.a. 
(Independence of the disciplinary chamber of the Supreme Court);219 and
(ii) Joined Cases C-558/18 and C-563/18 Miasto Łowicz and Prokurator 
Generalny.220 
A third significant preliminary ruling regarding the rule of law situation in 
Poland – Case C-824/18 A.B. et al. (Appointment of judges to the Supreme Court 
– Actions)221 – will be analysed infra in Section 6, as it primarily relates to the 
unprecedented and difficult issue of how to address grave irregularities which 
marred the appointment of multiple individuals to Poland’s Supreme Court. The 
extent to which EU law, and in particular the right to an independent tribunal 
established by law, can and has been relied upon in this context, will be examined 
then. The Court of Justice is furthermore bound to have to answer additional 
problems such as the lack of independence of the Poland’s new Chamber of 
Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs, as there are still a considerable number 
of pending preliminary ruling requests originating from Polish judges raising 
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Table 3   Requests for a preliminary ruling made by Polish courts 
raising rule of law issues
Requests for a preliminary ruling (Article 267 TFEU) 
made by Polish courts raising rule of law issues
 
(Total of 37 requests with 24 pending as of 8 July 2021)
Questions from 
POLISH SUPREME COURT (SC) 
(not yet captured chambers 
with the exception of C-132/20)
Case C-522/18 (lodged on 9 August 2018): Main 
issue was retroactive lowering of SC retirement 
age but case closed on 29 Jan 2020 due to entry 
into force of law adopted on 21 Nov 2018
Case C-537/18 (lodged on 17 Aug 2018): Main 
issue was lack of independence of the SC’s ‘Dis-
ciplinary chamber’ (DC) but case closed on on 3 
Feb 2020 due to ECJ ruling in C-585/18 et al
Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 & C-625/18 
(lodged on 29 Sept & 3 Oct 2018; AG Opinion on 
27 June 2019, ECJ ruling on 19 Nov 19): Referring 
court to confirm that the DC lacks independence 
which the referring court did (ECJ and national 
judgments systemically violated since)
Case C-668/18 (lodged on 26 Oct 2018; expedi-
ted procedure granted on 11 Dec 2018): same key 
issue as in C-522/18 but case closed on 3 Dec 
2019 following withdrawal of PR request
Case C-487/19 and Case C-508/19 (lodged on 
26 June and 3 July 2019 with AG opinions on 15 
April 2021):  For AG Tanchev, referring court to 
confirm the two new SC chambers do not comply 
with EU Law as their members were appointed in 
flagrant breach of relevant national rules
Case C-132/20 (lodged on 10 March 2020 by 
individual whose appointment to SC was marred 
by grave irregularities, AG Opinion on 8 July 2021): 
For AG Bobek, request is admissible as long as 
SC has not been hijacked 
Cases C-491/20 to 496/20, C-506/20, C-509/20 
and C-511/20 (total of 9 requests from Labour 
Chamber lodged on 24 Sept 2020): several ques-
tions raising i.a. issues of individuals unlawfully 




Joined Cases C-558/18 & C-563/18 
(Lodged on 3 and 5 Sept 2018; Hearing on 18 
June 2019; AG Opinion on 24 Sept 2019; ECJ 
judgment on 26 March 2020): 
Questions concerning new disciplinary regime for 
judges are inadmissible with ECJ however holding 
that the mere prospect of disciplinary proceedings 
against referring judges not compatible with EU 
law (principle systematically violated since)
Case C-623/18 (lodged on 3 Oct 2018; ECJ order 
on 6 Oct 2020):  Questions concerning new disci-
plinary regime for judges are inadmissible 
Cases C-748/19 to C-754/19 (Total of 7 requests 
lodged on 15 Oct 2019, AG Opinion on 20 May 
2021): For AG Bobek, Polish regime regarding 
‘seconded judges’ is not rule of law compliant and 
not compatible with EU law
Case C-615/20 (lodged on 18 Nov 2020) and 
Case C-671/20 (lodged on 9 Dec 2020): Ques-
tions by Judge Tuleya re his suspension & waiving 
of judicial immunity by ECJ-suspended DC and 
questions by another judge following reallocation 
of cases previously allocated to Judge Tuleya
Case C-181/21 (lodged on 23 March 2021) and 
C-269/21 (lodged on 27 April 2021): Questions by 
Judge Markiewicz and Judge Zurek re status of 
individuals appointed by the ‘new’ NCJ due i.a. to 





Case C-824/18 (lodged on 28 Dec 18; AG Opinion 
on 17 Dec 2020; Judgment on 2 March 2021): 
Referring court to confirm that Polish amend-
ments re NCJ violates Arts 4(3) TEU, 19(1) TEU 
and 267 TFEU & that the ‘new’ NCJ itself lacks 
independence 
Questions from
POLISH COURT OF APPEAL
(not yet captured) 
Cases C-763/19 to C-765/19 (lodged on 18 Oct 
2019; order of 7 May 2020): Questions withdrawn 
re status of individuals appointed to SC & status 
of rulings rendered by these individuals following 
resolution of  
Poland’s SC of 23 Jan 2020
Questions from 
Disciplinary Court of Bar Association 
(Warsaw) 
(not yet captured) 
Case C-55/20 (lodged on 31 Jan 2020, AG Opini-
on on 17 June 2021): For AG Bobek, EU Services 
Directive applies to disciplinary proceedings 
against lawyers
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Table 4   Preliminary ruling cases raising judicial independence 
issues decided by the Court of Justice since 1 January 
2021 and pending cases
POLAND  
Total of 37 PR requests with most recent ruling to date issued in 
Case C-824/18 on 2 March 2021: lack of effective judicial review 
not compatible with EU Law Includes total of 24 pending PR 
requests yet to be decided: C-487/19 and C-508/19; C-748/19 
to C-754/19; C-55/20; C-132/20; C-491/20 to 496/20, C-506/20, 
C-509/20 and C-511/20; C-615/20; C-671/20; C-181/21; C-269/21
HUNGARY 
C-564/19 
AG Opinion of 15 April 
2021: Disciplinary 
proceedings against 
referring judges and 
Hungarian law/decision of 
Hungary’s Supreme Court 




ECJ Judgment of 20 April 2021: EU Member States 
are subject to a non-regression obligation when it 
comes to the rule of law/organisation of justice 
ROMANIA 
C-83/19, C-127/19 and 
C-195/19;  C-291/19; 
C-355/19; C-397/19 
ECJ judgment on 18 May 
2021: special prosecution 
section to investigate judges/
prosecutors not compatible 
with EU law if i.a. used as 
instrument of pressure/
intimidation)
C-357/19 and C-547/19; 
C-379/19; C-811/19 and 
C-840/19 
AG opinion of 4 March 
2021: EU law precludes 
decision declaring unlawful 
composition of SC panels 
on account of lack of 
specialisation and disciplinary 
proceedings against national 
referring judges 
ECJ preliminary 
ruling (PR) cases 
decided since 1 January 
2021 & pending PR 
cases raising judicial 
independence issues 
as of 18 May 2021
Looking beyond Poland, we are observing a new trend in EU constitutionalism, 
where national courts are increasingly turning to the Court of Justice, essentially 
to ask for help in resisting national measures which seek to undermine their 
own independence. In addition to the many requests originating from Polish 
courts, we have seen an increasing number of requests for preliminary rulings 
raising fundamental judicial independence issues originating from courts located 
in other EU countries.
The unity of the EU judiciary and the direct access to the Court of Justice organised 
by Article 267 TFEU is thus mobilised to serve the ends of the protection and 
reinforcement of the rule of law. To put it more informally, national courts have 
been imploring the Court of Justice to come to their rescue while being subject to 
attacks of the executive against the independence of the judiciary as a whole, and 
in some instances, attacks targeting individual judges as well.222
222 Before Article 19(1) TEU emerged as a jurisdictional bridge, reliance on EU citizenship rights 
had been suggested to address democratic and rule of law backsliding at Member State level: 
A. von Bogdandy et al., ‘Reverse Solange – Protecting the Essence of Fundamental Rights 
against EU Member States’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 489; A. von Bogdandy et 
al., ‘Protecting EU Values, Reverse Solange and the Rule of Law Framework’, in A. Jakab and 
D. Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values (Oxford: OUP, 2017). But see J. 
Croon-Gestefeld, ‘Reverse Solange – Union Citizenship as a Detour on the Route to European 
Rights Protection against National Infringements’, in D. Kochenov (ed.), EU Citizenship and 
Federalism: The Role of Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2017).
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In essence, this development signals a new, arguably historically unexpected, 
employment of the preliminary ruling procedure which has been a key stepping 
stone in the development of the EU’s multi-layered constitutionalism almost 
since the inception of the European Communities.223 In a context where the 
Commission appears keen to use infringement actions in the most parsimonious 
possible way, Article 267 TFEU has emerged as a tool of self-defence for the 
national judges under attack and thus serves as an instrument of enforcement of 
the EU’s values of Article 2 TEU.224 The effectiveness of the preliminary ruling 
procedure in this context is however limited due to the problems which will be 
highlighted in this Section, and in particular, the more limited jurisdiction of 
the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU when compared to the Court’s 
jurisdiction under Article 258 TFEU. That said, the Court will soon be 
provided with more opportunities to defend judicial independence ‘negatively’ 
by eventually refusing to answer questions from compromised courts and/or 
individuals masquerading as judges.225 
Due to the already lengthy nature of the present study, we will not offer an 
overview of the increasing number of pending preliminary ruling requests 
originating from EU countries other than Poland, which in essence also are 
asking for the Court’s help to defend their judicial independence. The Court’s 
judgments in the Maltese Judges and Romanian Judges cases have however already 
been briefly addressed when analysing the Court’s infringement judgment 
regarding Poland’s new disciplinary regime for judges in Section 3 and will also 
be alluded to when considering the issue of Poland’s ‘fake judges’ in Section 
6. Suffice for now to stress that the Court’s preliminary judgments in Maltese 
Judges and Romanian Judges strongly reiterate that national authorities are under 
a positive obligation but also a negative obligation to respect EU requirements 
relating to judicial independence. This means inter alia an obligation to refrain 
from adopting legislative changes which undermine the rule of law, which is the 
case when, for instance, a new special prosecution section is established and is 
used as an instrument of pressure and intimidation with regard to judges.226 
223 See e.g. M. Broberg and N. Fenger, Preliminary References to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (2nd ed. Oxford: OUP, 2014).
224 See M. Broberg, ‘Preliminary References as a Means for Enforcing EU Law’ in A. Jakab and D. 
Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States’ Compliance 
(Oxford: OUP, 2017), 107.
225 See infra Section 6 which deals inter alia with the pending Case C-132/20, lodged with the 
Court on 10 March 2020 by an individual which we view as having been manifestly irregularly 
appointed to Poland’s Supreme Court. 
226 Joined Cases C-83/19, C-127/19, C-195/19, C-291/19, C-355/19 and C-397/19, Asociaţia 
‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’ et al., EU:C:2021:393.
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4.1 The beginning of the end for Poland’s ‘Disciplinary 
Chamber’ and neo-‘National Council for the Judiciary’: 
Joined cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18,  
A. K. e.a. (Independence of the disciplinary chamber of 
the Supreme Court)227
These joined cases provoked the ire of Polish authorities as soon as they were 
lodged with the Court of Justice. Indeed, they were concerned, not unjustifiably, 
that these preliminary requests would offer the Court the first opportunity to 
indicate the extent to which, if at all, two of its most emblematic mislabelled 
‘reforms’ were compatible with the principle of judicial independence. 
In his comprehensive Opinion delivered on 27 June 2019, AG Tanchev 
concluded inter alia that the newly-created ‘Disciplinary Chamber’ (hereinafter: 
DC), but also any chamber which would present the same features, does not 
satisfy the requirements of judicial independence.228 AG Tanchev furthermore 
clarified his view that the neo-National Council of the Judiciary (hereinafter: neo-
NCJ), which succeeded the previous one following a premature and manifestly 
unconstitutional termination of the four-year mandates229 is not guaranteed to be 
independent from the legislative and executive authorities. 
As will be shown below, the Court adopted the AG’s reasoning but left it to the 
referring court to decide both whether the new DC is independent and whether 
the involvement of Poland’s neo-NCJ (KRS in Polish which is the abbreviation 
used by the Court of Justice in its judgments) in this context can be a mitigating 
factor provided that this body may be regarded as being itself sufficiently 
independent of the legislature and the executive. Subsequently to this judgment, 
the Court of Justice adopted an interim order in Case C-791/19 R on 8 April 
2020 which also concerns the DC. As previously analysed, the Polish authorities 
not only failed fully to comply with this order, they also legislated to deny any 
legal force to the AK preliminary ruling outlined below. Subsequently, and to 
add insult to injury, the DC, unlawfully decided to void the AK preliminary 
227 EU:C:2019:982. For further analysis, see especially M. Leloup, ‘An Uncertain First Step in the 
Field of Judicial Self-Government’ (2020) 16 European Constitutional Law Review 1. 
228 EU:C:2019:551.
229 As noted by the European Commission in its Article 7(1) TEU reasoned proposal, ‘the 
premature termination also raises constitutionality concerns, as underlined in the opinion of 
the National Council for the Judiciary, of the Supreme Court and of the Ombudsman’, op. 
cit., recital 140. At the time of writing, Poland’s National Council for the Judiciary (KRS in 
Polish) is due to be expelled from the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ): 
see ENCJ, Draft Position Paper of the Executive Board of the ENCJ on the membership of the KRS 
(expulsion), 22 April 2020, at 5: ‘On the basis of both its actions and its responses the Executive 
Board concludes that the KRS is not independent of the Executive and the Legislature’. 
In relation to the issue of the disciplining of judges for referring preliminary questions to 
the Court of Justice, the report states at 6 that the neo-KRS has also violated EU law ‘by 
actively supporting the disciplinary prosecution of judges who decided in a judgement to ask 
preliminary questions to the CJEU’ and in doing so, ‘the KRS is in violation of the ENCJ duty 
to defend the Judiciary’.
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ruling by denying it any legal force within the Polish legal order.230 Considering 
the most recent order of the Court of Justice in Case C-204/21 R, suspending 
once again the DC, and the judgment of 22 July 2021 of the European Court of 
Human Rights in Reczkowicz v. Poland, both previously analysed, the DC can be 
considered a dead body walking. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)
19 November 2019
In Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18,
THREE REQUESTS for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU 
from the Supreme Court (Labour and Social Insurance Chamber), 
Poland), in the proceedings
A. K. v. Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (C-585/18),
and
CP (C-624/18), DO (C-625/18) v. Sąd Najwyższy
third party: Prokurator Generalny
[For ease of reading, references to previous cases have been omitted]
Excerpts:
131 In the present cases, the doubts expressed by the referring court 
concern, in essence, the question whether, in the light of the rules of national 
law relating to the creation of a specific court, such as the Disciplinary 
Chamber, and, in particular, pertaining to the jurisdiction granted to it, 
its composition and the circumstances and conditions surrounding the 
appointment of the judges called to sit on that court, the context of its 
creation and those appointments, such a court and the members sitting on 
it satisfy the requirements of independence and impartiality which must 
be met by a court under Article 47 of the Charter where that court has 
jurisdiction to rule on a case in which subjects of the law rely, as in the 
present cases, on an infringement of EU law that is to their detriment.
132 It is ultimately for the referring court to rule on that matter having 
made the relevant findings in that regard. It must be borne in mind that 
Article 267 TFEU does not empower the Court to apply rules of EU law to  
a particular case, but only to rule on the interpretation of the Treaties and 
230 On 23 September 2020, the DC formally but unlawfully denied the validity of the AK judgment 
in Poland. See Iustitia, ‘Disciplinary Chamber denies validity of CJEU Ruling’, 2 October 
2020: <https://www.iustitia.pl/en/disciplinary-proceedings/3980-disciplinary-chamber-denies-
validity-of-cjeu-ruling-and-intends-to-rule-in-the-case-of-waiving-igor-tuleya-s-immunity>. To 
the best of our knowledge, this manifestly unlawful decision of this body previously found not 
to constitute a court under Polish and EU law by the independent judges of Poland’s Supreme 
Court, has yet to be explicitly acknowledged by the Commission, let alone become the subject 
of an infringement procedure. 
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of acts adopted by the EU institutions. According to settled case-law, the 
Court may, however, in the framework of the judicial cooperation provided 
for by that article and on the basis of the material presented to it, provide 
the national court with an interpretation of EU law which may be useful to 
it in assessing the effects of one or other of its provisions.
133 In that regard, as far as concerns the circumstances in which the 
members of the Disciplinary Chamber were appointed, the Court 
points out, as a preliminary remark, that the mere fact that those judges 
were appointed by the President of the Republic does not give rise to a 
relationship of subordination of the former to the latter or to doubts as to 
the former’s impartiality, if, once appointed, they are free from influence or 
pressure when carrying out their role.
134 However, it is still necessary to ensure that the substantive conditions 
and detailed procedural rules governing the adoption of appointment 
decisions are such that they cannot give rise to reasonable doubts, in the 
minds of individuals, as to the imperviousness of the judges concerned to 
external factors and as to their neutrality with respect to the interests before 
them, once appointed as judges.
[…]
136 In the present cases, it should be made clear that Article 30 of the 
New Law on the Supreme Court sets out all the conditions which must be 
satisfied by an individual in order for that individual to be appointed as a 
judge of that court. Furthermore, under Article 179 of the Constitution 
and Article 29 of the New Law on the Supreme Court, the judges of the 
Disciplinary Chamber are, as is the case for judges who are to sit in the other 
chambers of the referring court, appointed by the President of the Republic 
on a proposal of the KRS, that is to say the body empowered under Article 
186 of the Constitution to ensure the independence of the courts and of 
the judiciary.
137 The participation of such a body, in the context of a process for the 
appointment of judges, may, in principle, be such as to contribute to making 
that process more objective. In particular, the fact of subjecting the very 
possibility for the President of the Republic to appoint a judge to the Sąd 
Najwyższy (Supreme Court) to the existence of a favourable opinion of the 
KRS is capable of objectively circumscribing the President of the Republic’s 
discretion in exercising the powers of his office.
138 However, that is only the case provided, inter alia, that that body is 
itself sufficiently independent of the legislature and executive and of the 
authority to which it is required to deliver such an appointment proposal.
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139 The degree of independence enjoyed by the KRS in respect of the 
legislature and the executive in exercising the responsibilities attributed to 
it under national legislation, as the body empowered, under Article 186 
of the Constitution, to ensure the independence of the courts and of the 
judiciary, may become relevant when ascertaining whether the judges which 
it selects will be capable of meeting the requirements of independence and 
impartiality arising from Article 47 of the Charter.
140 It is for the referring court to ascertain whether or not the KRS offers 
sufficient guarantees of independence in relation to the legislature and the 
executive, having regard to all of the relevant points of law and fact relating 
both to the circumstances in which the members of that body are appointed 
and the way in which that body actually exercises its role.
141 The referring court has pointed to a series of elements which, in its view, 
call into question the independence of the KRS.
142 In that regard, although one or other of the factors thus pointed to by 
the referring court may be such as to escape criticism per se and may fall, 
in that case, within the competence of, and choices made by, the Member 
States, when taken together, in addition to the circumstances in which those 
choices were made, they may, by contrast, throw doubt on the independence 
of a body involved in the procedure for the appointment of judges, despite 
the fact that, when those factors are taken individually, that conclusion is 
not inevitable.
143 Subject to those reservations, among the factors pointed to by the 
referring court which it shall be incumbent on that court, as necessary, to 
establish, the following circumstances may be relevant for the purposes of 
such an overall assessment: first, the KRS, as newly composed, was formed 
by reducing the ongoing four-year term in office of the members of that body 
at that time; second, whereas the 15 members of the KRS elected among 
members of the judiciary were previously elected by their peers, those judges 
are now elected by a branch of the legislature among candidates capable of 
being proposed inter alia by groups of 2 000 citizens or 25 judges, such a 
reform leading to appointments bringing the number of members of the 
KRS directly originating from or elected by the political authorities to 23 
of the 25 members of that body; third, the potential for irregularities which 
could adversely affect the process for the appointment of certain members 
of the newly formed KRS.
144 For the purposes of that overall assessment, the referring court is also 
justified in taking into account the way in which that body exercises its 
constitutional responsibilities of ensuring the independence of the courts 
and of the judiciary and its various powers, in particular if it does so in a way 
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which is capable of calling into question its independence in relation to the 
legislature and the executive.
[…]
146 Notwithstanding the assessment of the circumstances in which the 
new judges of the Disciplinary Chamber were appointed and the role 
of the KRS in that regard, the referring court may, for the purposes of 
ascertaining whether that chamber and its members meet the requirements 
of independence and impartiality arising from Article 47 of the Charter, 
also wish to take into consideration various other features that more directly 
characterise that chamber.
147 That applies, first, to the fact referred to by the referring court that this 
court has been granted exclusive jurisdiction, under Article 27(1) of the 
New Law on the Supreme Court, to rule on cases of the employment, social 
security and retirement of judges of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court), 
which previously fell within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.
148 Although that fact is not conclusive per se, it should, however, be borne 
in mind, as regards, in particular, cases relating to the retiring of judges of 
the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) such as those in the main proceedings, 
that the assignment of those cases to the Disciplinary Chamber took place in 
conjunction with the adoption, which was highly contentious, of the provisions 
of the New Law on the Supreme Court which lowered the retirement age of 
the judges of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court), applied that measure to 
judges currently serving in that court and empowered the President of the 
Republic with discretion to extend the exercise of active judicial service of the 
judges of the referring court beyond the new retirement age set by that law.
[…]
152 Although any one of the various facts referred to in paragraphs 147 to 
151 above is indeed not capable, per se and taken in isolation, of calling into 
question the independence of a chamber such as the Disciplinary Chamber, 
that may, by contrast, not be true once they are taken together, particularly 
if the abovementioned assessment as regards the KRS were to find that that 
body lacks independence in relation to the legislature and the executive.
153 Thus, the referring court will need to assess, in the light, where relevant, 
of the reasons and specific objectives alleged before it in order to justify 
certain of the measures in question, whether, taken together, the factors 
referred to in paragraphs 143 to 151 above and all the other relevant findings 
of fact which it will have made are capable of giving rise to legitimate 
doubts, in the minds of subjects of the law, as to the imperviousness of the 
102 Respect for the Rule of Law in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice SIEPS 2021:3
Disciplinary Chamber to external factors, and, in particular, to the direct or 
indirect influence of the legislature and the executive, and as to its neutrality 
with respect to the interests before it and, thus, whether they may lead 
to that chamber not being seen to be independent or impartial with the 
consequence of prejudicing the trust which justice in a democratic society 
must inspire in subjects of the law.
154 If the referring court were to conclude that that is the case, it would 
follow that such a court does not meet the requirements arising from Article 
47 of the Charter and from Article 9(1) of Directive 2000/78 on account of 
its not being an independent and impartial tribunal, within the meaning of 
the former provision.
155 If that is the case, the referring court also wishes to know whether the 
principle of the primacy of EU law requires it to disapply those provisions 
of national law which confer jurisdiction to rule on the cases in the main 
proceedings on that court.
[…]
165 A provision of national law which granted exclusive jurisdiction to hear 
and rule on a case in which an individual pleads, as in the present cases, an 
infringement of rights arising from rules of EU law in a particular court 
which does not meet the requirements of independence and impartiality 
arising from Article 47 of the Charter would deprive that individual of any 
effective remedy within the meaning of that article and of Article 9(1) of 
Directive 2000/78, and would fail to comply with the essential content of 
the right to an effective remedy enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter.
166 It follows that, where it appears that a provision of national law reserves 
jurisdiction to hear cases, such as those in the main proceedings, to a court 
which does not meet the requirements of independence or impartiality 
under EU law, in particular, those of Article 47 of the Charter, another court 
before which such a case is brought has the obligation, in order to ensure 
effective judicial protection, within the meaning of Article 47, in accordance 
with the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU, to 
disapply that provision of national law, so that that case may be determined 
by a court which meets those requirements and which, were it not for that 
provision, would have jurisdiction in the relevant field, namely, in general, 
the court which had jurisdiction, in accordance with the law then in force, 
before the entry into force of the amending legislation which conferred 
jurisdiction on the court which does not meet those requirements.
167 Furthermore, as regards Articles 2 and 19 TEU, provisions on which 
the referring court has also referred questions to the Court, it must be borne 
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in mind that Article 19 TEU, which gives concrete expression to the value 
of the rule of law affirmed in Article 2 TEU, entrusts the responsibility for 
ensuring the full application of EU law in all Member States and judicial 
protection of the rights of individuals under that law to national courts and 
tribunals and to the Court.
168 The principle of the effective judicial protection of individuals’ rights 
under EU law, referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, 
is a general principle of EU law which is now enshrined in Article 47 of the 
Charter, so that the former provision requires Member States to provide 
remedies that are sufficient to ensure effective legal protection, within the 
meaning in particular of the latter provision, in the fields covered by EU law.
169 In those circumstances, it does not appear necessary to conduct a 
distinct analysis of Article 2 and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) 
TEU, which can only reinforce the conclusion already set out in paragraphs 
153 and 154 above, for the purposes of answering the questions posed by 
the referring court and of disposing of the cases before it.
Analysis
Both the newly created DC and the newly recreated NCJ have been regularly 
and harshly criticised for their manifest rule of law deficiencies. According to 
the European Commission, for instance, the politicisation of the neo-NCJ has 
undermined ‘its role as an effective safeguard of judicial independence’ while ‘the 
new election regime of the judges-members of the [KRS] does not comply with 
European standards requiring that judges-members of Councils for the Judiciary 
are elected by their peers’.231 
As regards the DC as well as another chamber, created at the same time and 
known as the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs, the 
European Commission, in its Article 7(1) TEU reasoned proposal of December 
2017, stressed that ‘these two new largely autonomous chambers composed with 
new judges raise concerns as regards the separation of powers […] in practice they 
are above all other chambers, creating a risk that the whole judicial system will be 
dominated by these chambers which are composed of new judges elected with 
a decisive influence of the ruling majority’.232 We could add that the Council of 
Europe standards on this matter are well-established and a self-governance body 
of the judiciary needs to be composed of a majority of judges chosen by their 
231 European Commission contribution for the hearing of Poland on 26 June 2018, Council 
document no 10351/18, 21 June 2018, at 7.
232 Reasoned proposal, op. cit., recital 135.
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peers rather than handpicked by the executive.233 One may note in this respect 
that according to the 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard, Poland is now the only EU 
country where judges-members of the neo-NCJ are not proposed exclusively by 
judges and are appointed by the Parliament.234 
AG Opinion and Polish authorities’ reactions
In his Opinion delivered on 27 June 2019, AG Tanchev essentially agreed 
with the Commission’s diagnosis and submitted that the DC does not meet 
the requirements of independence under EU law. He further opined that the 
intervention of the neo-NCJ in the selection process cannot be viewed as a 
mitigating factor but rather an aggravating one, due to a number of facts and 
factors which cast doubt on its independence from the legislative and executive 
authorities doubtful. Looking beyond the issues raised by the referring court, 
the AG also concluded that the ‘situation arising in the main proceedings is one 
in which a Member State is implementing Article 47 of the Charter within the 
meaning of Article 51(1) thereof. Therefore, strictly speaking, it is not necessary 
for the Court to decide whether there has also been a breach more broadly of 
the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU’.235 Indeed, ‘in the framework 
of Article 47 of the Charter, as well as the second subparagraph of Article 
19(1) TEU, the Court is engaging in a substantive assessment as to whether, in 
particular, the measure in question impairs judicial independence according to 
the requirements laid down by those provisions’.236 
The reaction of Polish authorities to the Opinion of AG Tanchev was particularly 
unhinged. To offer but two edifying examples: the Polish Minister of Justice 
accused AG Tanchev of defending ‘pathology in the Polish judiciary’ (whatever 
this may mean), while the neo-NCJ, in a typically confused tirade, accused 
inter alia the AG of having produced a ‘one-sided’ opinion not meeting the 
‘standards of legal opinion’ and fabricating legal standards just for the purposes 
of the then pending cases, while also accusing the AG of lacking independence.237 
This behaviour was not entirely surprising in light of the neo-NCJ’s previous 
assertions during the proceedings that the AG’s Opinion was ‘based on false 
premises’.238 Not to be outdone, the Polish government also claimed that the 
Opinion contained ‘certain contradictions’ and ‘an erroneous interpretation 
233 See ECtHR Denisov v. Ukraine, CE:ECHR:2018:0925JUD007663911; Oleksandr Volkov 
v. Ukraine, CE:ECHR:2013:0109JUD002172211. For further analysis, see D. Kosař (ed.), 
‘Judicial Self-Government in Europe’ (2018) 19 German Law Journal (special issue).
234 European Commission, 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 54.
235 AG Opinion in Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, EU:C:2019:551, para. 77.
236 Ibid., para. 113.
237 A. Wojcik, ‘Atak na rzecznika generalnego TSUE po miażdżącej ocenie “reform” sądownictwa 
PiS’, Oko.press, 30 June 2019: <https://oko.press/atak-na-rzecznika-generalnego-tsue-po-
miazdzacej-ocenie-reformy-sadownictwa-pis/>. 
238 Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, op. cit., para. 58
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of the past case-law of the Court’.239 The unhinged behaviour of the neo-NCJ 
prompted the Court to reproach it in an unusual paragraph where the Court 
recalled that it was asked to submit observations within a specific timeframe 
but ‘deliberately refrained’ from doing so.240 We should furthermore note the 
unprecedented nature of the Polish General Prosecutor’s recusal request directed 
at the President of the Court, Judge Koen Lenaerts,241 seemingly because President 
Lenaerts publicly stressed the importance and the need to respect the rule of law 
at conferences in Poland. This crass request was unsurprisingly refused by the 
Court, then presided over by the Vice-President. 
The Court’s exclusive reliance on Article 47 CFR 
Leaving aside what may be construed as unprecedented attempts to pressure 
both the AG and the Court, the preliminary ruling in A.K. (also known as 
Independence of the disciplinary chamber of the Supreme Court case) follows the 
AG’s reasoning to a large extent. To begin with, in agreement with the AG, the 
Court held that both Article 47 CFR and the second paragraph of Article 19(1) 
TEU were applicable. However, considering its findings on the basis of Article 
47 CFR, the Court decided not to conduct an additional analysis based on the 
second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. Interestingly, the Court noted that 
any assessment on this basis would only reinforce the analysis it had previously 
adopted as to the imperviousness of the DC to external factors. 
The Court also adopted the AG’s reasoning in respect of the DC, assessed in light 
of Article 47 CFR with however one major difference: while the AG suggested 
that the Court should directly rule that the requirements of judicial independence 
laid down in Article 47 CFR should be interpreted as meaning that a body such 
as a DC composed of judges selected by a body such as the neo-NCJ  does not 
satisfy those requirements, the Court decided to comprehensively outline the 
specific factors which the referring court will have to take into account when 
assessing the DC’s compliance with the requirements of judicial independence. 
How could one explain this difference in approach? As the Court outlined in 
paragraph 132 of its ruling cited above, its jurisdiction within the framework 
of Article 267 TFEU is different from its jurisdiction within the framework of 
Article 258 TFEU. When answering preliminary ruling questions, the Court 
cannot directly apply rules of EU law to a particular case.
That said, the Court’s interpretation of the law, in particular Article 47 CFR, 
building numerous connections with the dense case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights242 and its meticulously detailed explanations regarding 
239 Ibid., para. 59.
240 Ibid., para. 65.
241 AG Opinion, op cit., para. 49. 
242 For further analysis and references, see L. Pech, ‘Article 47(2)’, in S. Peers et al. (eds), The EU Charter  
of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (2nd ed. Oxford: Hart Publishing, forthcoming in 2021).
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the factors and relevant findings of fact that the referring court may take into 
account, could lead to only one but inescapable conclusion: the DC is not a 
court due to manifest shortcomings of judicial independence, while the neo-
NCJ itself cannot be said to offer sufficient independence from the executive and 
legislative authorities.243 It therefore came as no surprise to see the referring court 
conclude accordingly in its rulings of 5 December 2019 and 15 January 2020.244 
These two rulings are summarised in the Court’s interim relief order issued 
in Case C-791/19 R.245 This unusual summary of two national rulings in the 
context of an application for interim measures can be explained by the fact that 
Polish authorities and the DC itself have refused to comply with both. They 
also similarly defied a solemn resolution adopted on 23 January 2020 by the 
three (then still independent) chambers of Poland’s Supreme Court, which 
held that the DC does not constitute a court under EU and Polish Law. This 
led the Supreme Court to find that the DC’s past and future decisions ‘deserve 
no protection’.246 As regards the neo-NCJ, the resolution is similarly scathing 
and concludes inter alia that it is ‘structurally no longer independent’, with any 
ruling issued by a bench composed of a ‘judge’ appointed or promoted by the 
neo-NCJ open to legal challenge post 23 January 2020 on Articles 47 CFR and 
6 ECHR grounds.247
Unlawfully composed ‘Constitutional Tribunal’ and unconstitutional ‘Disciplinary 
Chamber’ to the rescue
In the immediate aftermath of the adoption of this resolution, the Polish 
government indicated that it would ignore it, with one deputy minister publicly 
declaring: ‘I don’t give a damn about these 60 professors, because I’m with the 
Polish People’.248 In order to enable the DC to disobey the Supreme Court’s 
binding resolution and ‘save’ the neo-NCJ and the ‘judges’ it appointed or 
promoted from the consequences of this resolution, the unlawfully composed 
Constitutional Tribunal (‘CT’) got involved. 
243 For the whole story, see A. Śledzińska-Simon, ‘The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Government in 
Poland: On Judicial Reform Reversing Democratic Transition’ (2018) 19 German Law Journal 
1839.
244 Case III PO 7/18 and Cases III PO 8/18 and 9/18.  
245 Op. cit., paras 19–21, analysed supra in Section 2.3. 
246 Resolution of the formation of the combined Civil Chamber, Criminal Chamber, and Labour 
Law and Social Security Chamber, Case BSA I-4110-1/20, para. 55.
247 Ibid., para. 40.
248 J. Cienski and Z. Wanat, ‘Legal chaos descends on Poland’, Politico, 24 January 2020: <https://
www.politico.eu/article/poland-legal-chaos-supreme-court-ruling/>.
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As expected, the CT duly did what Poland’s ruling party expected it to: it 
unlawfully249 suspended the resolution of the Supreme Court on 23 January 
2020, formally at the request of the Marshal of the Sejm (a member of the ruling 
party) before holding, in manifest breach of the Polish Constitution and EU 
law, that the resolution applying inter alia the ECJ’s AK ruling was contrary to 
EU law.250 On these occasions, the CT was presided by its unlawfully appointed 
President with a bench which included three individuals masquerading as CT 
judges.251 This shows, in passing, how bodies irregularly constituted attempt to 
bolster one another’s legitimacy by providing a veneer of legality to what amount 
to obvious violations of EU law, including obvious defiance of the Court of 
Justice’s rulings or orders.
The substantive violations of EU primary law committed by the captured CT 
are so many and so obvious that it is enough to stress that as a matter of EU 
law, this amounts to a grotesque usurpation of the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the European Court of Justice by a body – notwithstanding the CT’s lack of 
competence to review the Supreme Court’s resolution to begin with – which 
is no longer a court due to its irregular composition and lack of independence. 
This view was formally adopted by the Commission in its Article 7(1) reasoned 
proposal of December 2017 and importantly, reaffirmed in January 2020 by the 
Commission spokesman who publicly stated that the CT ‘is no longer able to 
provide an effective constitutional review’.252 
In these circumstances, the DC’s decision – by then a body masquerading as 
a court whose decisions have no legal value and whose disciplinary functions 
had been suspended by the ECJ – to involve the CT and ask it to review the 
‘constitutionality’ of the Court’s interim order in Case C-791/19 R253 should 
be understood as a serious and deliberate act of defiance which is expected to 
culminate in a Polexit from the Treaty provision providing that the Court of 
Justice ‘may in any cases before it prescribe any necessary interim measures’. 
249 See the Open letter by 22 former members of the CT, ‘“Constitutional Tribunal has virtually 
been abolished,” announce retired judges’, Rule of Law in Poland, 11 February 2020: <https://
ruleoflaw.pl/constitutional-tribunal-has-virtually-been-abolished-announce-retired-judges/>.
250 See M. Wilczek, ‘Constitutional Tribunal rules in favour of Polish government against Supreme 
Court on judicial reform’, NFP, 21 April 2020: <https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/04/21/
constitutional-tribunal-rules-in-favour-of-polish-government-against-supreme-court-on-judicial-
reform/>.
251 See e.g. European Commission, Article 7(1) TEU reasoned proposal, op. cit., para. 57: ‘The 
unlawful appointment of the President of the Constitutional Tribunal, the admission of the 
three judges nominated by the 8th term of the Sejm without a valid legal basis, the fact that 
one of these judges has been appointed as Vice-President of the Tribunal, the fact that the three 
judges that were lawfully nominated in October 2015 by the previous legislature have not been 
able to take up their function of judge in the Tribunal, as well as the subsequent developments 
within the Tribunal described above have de facto led to a complete recomposition of the 
Tribunal outside the normal constitutional process for the appointment of judges’. 
252 J. Cienski and Z. Wanat, ‘Legal chaos’, op. cit. A diagnosis shared by 22 former members of the 
CT: see open letter cited supra. 
253 See press release of 10 April 2020 issued by the DC, no I DO 16/19.
108 Respect for the Rule of Law in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice SIEPS 2021:3
But as noted above, this was not the first time unlawful, captured bodies are 
seeking to help one another to pre-empt EU action or organise non-compliance 
with the Court of Justice’s rulings. With respect of AK, the neo-NCJ sought 
to pre-empt it by previously and unlawfully involving the unlawfully composed 
‘CT’ which, in a ‘judgment’ of 25 March 2019 gave it a constitutional seal 
of approval as expected. However, and in line with well-established principles 
of EU law, the Court of Justice implicitly confirmed its agreement with the 
Commission’s argument that the CT’s decision of 25 March 2019 ‘is irrelevant 
for assessing the independence of the Disciplinary Chamber under EU law’.254 
As previously observed by the AG, the CT’s decision – even assuming that the 
CT was and is a proper lawfully composed court which it no longer is – does 
not indeed ‘contain material relevant to the requirements of independence of 
the Disciplinary Chamber under EU law and, in any event, does not by itself 
remove all of the circumstances contributing to the impairment of the NCJ’s 
independence’.255 
Generally speaking, the Polish authorities’ shenanigans to pre-empt and disobey 
AK offer a good insight in their modus operandi. As aptly summarised by Adam 
Bodnar, then Polish Commissioner for Human Rights, there is
an established pattern of legitimising one flawed authority by another flawed 
authority. The procedure for the review of constitutionality does not – today 
– serve to protect the Constitution, but to preserve measures that deny it […] 
comprehensive changes in the Polish judicial system have led to the exclusion of all 
safeguards designed to limit abusive or arbitrary action taken by the executive 
and/or legislative branches. To put matters more bluntly: an alternative legal 
space has been created under which the ruling majority can enact unconstitutional 
laws, unlawfully appoint members of the Constitutional Tribunal, the National 
Council of the Judiciary, the Supreme Court, or discipline and prosecute at will 
those who articulate positions that do not meet its expectations.256 
The missing requirement: ‘Established by law’
One key aspect, which AK did not unfortunately examine, concerns the 
‘established by law’ requirement. This is arguably the key shortcoming of the 
Court of Justice’s ruling.257 The Court could also have sought to take inspiration 
from the non-regression argument raised by the EFTA Surveillance Authority, 
which intervened in AK to argue that the DC is not an independent court 
within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU. Among other arguments, the EFTA 
254 AG Opinion, para. 72. 
255 Ibid., para. 136.
256 Written comments of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Republic of Poland in the 
case of Jan Grzęda against Poland (application no. 43572/18, case pending), 20 March 2021, 
paras 38 and 49.
257 For further discussion of this aspect, see infra Section 5.6 and Section 6. 
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Surveillance Authority interestingly asserted that not only must EU and EEA 
member states ‘organise their judicial systems in conformity with EU and EEA 
law’, with any changes they make to their judicial systems, ‘account should [also] 
be taken of a principle of non-regression of judicial independence’.258 According 
to the EFTA Surveillance Authority, this principle of non-regression of judicial 
independence can be derived from Articles 2, 7 and 49 TEU, Article 53 CFR 
and the Council of Europe’s European Charter on the statute of judges.259 We 
concur and it was therefore good to see the Court of Justice fully embrace the 
principle of non-regression when it comes to the rule of law in April 2021 in its 
Maltese Judges ruling.260 
More minor shortcomings can also be noted, such as the Court’s continuing use 
of the word ‘reform’ which, in the context of Poland’s so-called ‘judicial reforms’ 
is akin to describing waterboarding as a spa treatment. This is obviously a minor 
and non-legal point, but the positive connation of the word ‘reform’ to describe 
legal changes which blatantly violate the Polish Constitution, some of which have 
already been found to be in breach of the principles of judicial independence 
and of the irremovability of judges, is irksome as well as seriously misguided.261 
The Court could have also made better use of the Commission’s findings in its 
Article 7(1) TEU reasoned proposal and the European Network of Councils for 
the Judiciary (ENCJ)’s findings in relation to its suspension of neo-NCJ.262 
These issues are not, however, anywhere near as crucial as the issue of whether 
the DC was established by law as a matter of EU law, and indirectly the issue of 
whether the members of the DC (and other individuals appointed on the basis 
of manifestly irregular procedures to the Supreme Court) are, in fact, judges tout 
court. From a matter of ECHR law, one should however note that the European 
Court of Human Rights has, at last, found in Reczkowicz v. Poland that the 
procedure for appointing ‘judges’ to the DC had been unduly influenced by the 
legislative and executive powers, a fundamental irregularity which compromised 
258 AG Opinion, para. 69. 
259 8–10 July 1998, DAJ/DOC (98)23, point 1.1: ‘The statute for judges aims at ensuring the 
competence, independence and impartiality which every individual legitimately expects from the 
courts of law and from every judge to whom is entrusted the protection of his or her rights. It 
excludes every provision and every procedure liable to impair confidence in such competence, such 
independence and such impartiality. The present Charter is composed hereafter of the provisions 
which are best able to guarantee the achievement of those objectives. Its provisions aim at raising 
the level of guarantees in the various European States. They cannot justify modifications in national 
statutes tending to decrease the level of guarantees already achieved in the countries concerned.’
260 The Court’s judgment of 20 April 2021 in Case C-896/19 is briefly analysed supra in Section 
3.2.3 and infra in Section 6.
261 It was therefore good to see AG Tanchev Opinion not using the word ‘reform’ once – with the 
more neutral word ‘change’ used instead – in his Opinion delivered on 6 May 2021 in Case 
C-791/19, EU:C:2021:366. 
262 he ENCJ has convened an extraordinary general assembly on 28–29 October 2021 to vote on the 
expulsion of Poland’s neo-NCJ due to the lack of ‘improvements in the way the KRS fulfils its 
duty to guarantee the independence of the judiciary’: ‘ENCJ convenes an extraordinary general 
assembly to vote on KRS expulsion’, 17 September 2021: <https://www.encj.eu/node/603>
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the legitimacy of this body which lacked and continues to lack the attributes of 
a tribunal which is lawful.263 We will return to the growing problem of Poland’s 
‘fake judges’ in Section 6 of this casebook. Before doing so, the crucial issue 
of disciplinary proceedings targeting referring judges will be examined via an 
analysis of yet another important preliminary ruling, originating from two brave 
and independent Polish judges who had to face disciplinary investigations on 
account of their requests for a preliminary ruling: a then new and major threat to 
the functioning of the EU legal order which, as will be shown below, the Court 
could arguably have addressed more decisively, which the Court however did in 
its (infringement) judgment of 15 July 2021 in Case C-791/19 analysed supra 
in Section 3.2. 
4.2 First warning not to harass Polish judges for submitting 
questions to the Court of Justice: Joined Cases 
C-558/18 and C-563/18 Miasto Łowicz and Prokurator 
Generalny 264
These two cases originate from two Polish district courts. Possibly for the first 
time ever, these two national requests for a preliminary ruling were, in part, 
motivated by the referring judges’ ‘fear of retribution if they do not adjudicate in 
favour of the State, an apprehension which stems from abuse of the disciplinary 
process under the new regime’.265 And indeed, in yet another unprecedented 
and sinister development, the two referring judges ‘were called to account for 
their decisions to submit the present requests for a preliminary ruling by way 
of investigation procedures which were initiated after those requests were made, 
even though disciplinary proceedings against those judges were not formally 
commenced’.266 
While the Court of Justice ultimately found both requests inadmissible, the 
Court’s reasoning is particularly instructive, with the ruling itself containing 
the strongest and clearest warning to date that Polish authorities must cease 
to threaten or expose national judges to disciplinary proceedings as a result of 
the fact that they submitted a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling. 
As of today, this warning has remained unheeded by Polish authorities which 
subsequently rushed a piece of legislation known informally as the ‘muzzle law’, 
which prevents Polish courts from, inter alia, requesting preliminary rulings 
from the Court of Justice when the disputes before them concern judicial 
independence matters.267 
263 J. Jaraczewski, ‘Not a lawful tribunal at all – the ECtHR’s judgment in Reczkowicz v. Poland’, 
EU Law Live, 26 July 2021: <https://eulawlive.com/op-ed-not-a-lawful-tribunal-at-all-the-
ecthrs-judgment-in-reczkowicz-v-poland-by-jakub-jaraczewski/>  
264 EU:C:2020:234.
265 Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev delivered on 24 September 2019, EU:C:2019:775, para. 3.
266 Ibid.
267 European Commission, Rule of Law: European Commission launches infringement procedure to 
safeguard the independence of judges in Poland, Press release IP/20/772, 29 April 2020.
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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)
26 March 2020
In Joined Cases C-558/18 and C-563/18,
TWO REQUESTS for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU 
from the Sąd Okręgowy w Łodzi (Regional Court, Łódz, Poland) (C-
558/18) and from the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Regional Court, 
Warsaw, Poland) (C-563/18), made by decisions of 31 August 2018 
and 4 September 2018, received at the Court on 3 September 2018 and 
5 September 2018 respectively, in the proceedings
Miasto Łowicz v. Skarb Państwa – Wojewoda Łódzki,
intervening parties:
Prokurator Generalny, Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich (C-558/18),
and
Prokurator Generalny v. VX, WW, XV (C-563/18)
[For ease of reading, references to previous cases have been omitted]
Excerpts:
15 According to those courts, it follows from all of the foregoing that, as 
regards the court decision which each of them is required to make in the 
dispute before them in the main proceedings, it is necessary to determine, 
first of all, whether the abovementioned national rules on the disciplinary 
regime for judges undermines the independence of those judges by 
depriving the litigants concerned of their right to an effective judicial 
remedy guaranteed by the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. That 
provision, read in conjunction with Article 2 and Article 4(3) TEU, requires 
the Member States to ensure that bodies, like the referring courts, which are 
empowered to rule on questions relating to the application or interpretation 
of EU law, satisfy the requirements inherent in the right to effective judicial 
protection; those requirements include the independence of those bodies 
which is of essential importance.
[…]
47 In that context, the task of the Court must be distinguished according 
to whether it is requested to give a preliminary ruling or to rule on an 
action for failure to fulfil obligations. Whereas, in an action for failure to 
fulfil obligations, the Court must ascertain whether the national measure 
or practice challenged by the Commission or another Member State, 
contravenes EU law in general, without there being any need for there to 
be a relevant dispute before the national courts, the Court’s function in 
proceedings for a preliminary ruling is, by contrast, to help the referring 
court to resolve the specific dispute pending before that court.
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48 In such proceedings, there must therefore be a connecting factor between 
that dispute and the provisions of EU law whose interpretation is sought, by 
virtue of which that interpretation is objectively required for the decision to 
be taken by the referring court.
[…]
52 In those circumstances, it is not apparent from the orders for reference 
that there is a connecting factor between the provision of EU law to which 
the questions referred for a preliminary ruling relate and the disputes in the 
main proceedings, and which makes it necessary to have the interpretation 
sought so that the referring courts may, by applying the guidance provided 
by such an interpretation, make the decisions needed to rule on those 
disputes.
53 Those questions do not therefore concern an interpretation of EU law 
which meets an objective need for the resolution of those disputes, but are 
of a general nature.
[…]
54 As regards the circumstance, mentioned by the national courts […], in 
which the two judges who made the present requests for a preliminary ruling 
were, as a result of those requests, the subject of an investigation prior to the 
initiation of potential disciplinary proceedings against them, it should be 
noted that the disputes in the main proceedings in respect of which the 
Court is requested to provide a preliminary ruling in the present joined 
cases do not relate to that circumstance. Moreover, it should be noted, as 
the Polish Government stated in its written observations and at the hearing 
before the Court, that those investigation proceedings have since been 
closed on the ground that no disciplinary misconduct, involving a failure to 
respect the dignity of their office as a result of making those requests for a 
preliminary ruling, had been established.
55 In that context, it is important to note, as is clear from the Court’s settled 
case-law, that the keystone of the judicial system established by the Treaties 
is the preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU, 
which, by setting up a dialogue between one court and another, between 
the Court of Justice and the courts and tribunals of the Member States, has 
the object of securing uniformity in the interpretation of EU law, thereby 
serving to ensure its consistency, its full effect and its autonomy as well as, 
ultimately, the particular nature of the law established by the Treaties.
[…]
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58 Provisions of national law which expose national judges to disciplinary 
proceedings as a result of the fact that they submitted a reference to the 
Court for a preliminary ruling cannot therefore be permitted. Indeed, 
the mere prospect, as the case may be, of being the subject of disciplinary 
proceedings as a result of making such a reference or deciding to maintain 
that reference after it was made is likely to undermine the effective exercise 
by the national judges concerned of the discretion and the functions referred 
to in the preceding paragraph.
59 For those judges, not being exposed to disciplinary proceedings or 
measures for having exercised such a discretion to bring a matter before 
the Court, which is exclusively within their jurisdiction, also constitutes a 
guarantee that is essential to judicial independence, which independence 
is, in particular, essential to the proper working of the judicial cooperation 
system embodied by the preliminary ruling mechanism under Article 267 
TFEU.
Analysis
This judgment does not add anything new as regards the Court’s jurisdiction 
and the scope of application of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. 
Faced with the claim repeated ad nauseam by Polish authorities that national 
provisions relating to the organisation of national courts and disciplinary 
measures relating to judges cannot be reviewed under EU law, the Court was 
however forced to reiterate that the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU 
‘is intended inter alia to apply to any national body which can rule, as a court 
or tribunal, on questions concerning the application or interpretation of EU 
law and which therefore fall within the fields covered by that law’.268 The two 
referring courts were therefore unsurprisingly found to come under the Polish 
judicial system in the ‘fields covered by Union law’, within the meaning of 
the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. As such, the referring courts 
must meet the requirements of effective judicial protection, which includes an 
obligation for the Polish authorities to respect and maintain their independence.
Admissibility issues
This judgment is however particularly noteworthy insofar as admissibility 
issues are concerned. The main problem the referring courts faced concerned 
the absence of any obvious connecting factor between the disputes before 
them (which concerned matters relating to public expenditure and criminal 
law), and the provisions of EU law whose interpretation was sought. In other 
words, the referring courts were not able to convince the Court of Justice that 
268 Joined Cases C-558/18 and C-563/18, EU:C:2020:234, para. 34.
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the disputes before them were substantively connected to EU law, in particular 
to the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. The Court furthermore 
noted that the referring courts did not ask questions on the interpretation of 
procedural provisions of EU law which the referring courts would be required 
to apply in order to deliver their judgments. Lastly, the Court observed that any 
eventual answer to the questions asked would not ‘appear capable of providing 
the referring courts with an interpretation of EU law which would allow them 
to resolve procedural questions of national law before being able to rule on the 
substance of the disputes before them’.269 The two requests for a preliminary 
ruling were therefore declared inadmissible.
This is a complex area of EU law. As observed by Professor Platon and one of the 
present authors at the time of the Portuguese Judges ruling,
national measures which may undermine the independence of a court may also 
be challenged indirectly through a national litigation which is not connected 
with EU law. In such a case, a party could claim that, due to a national measure 
allegedly affecting the judiciary, the national court having jurisdiction is not 
independent. If such a matter were to be brought to the ECJ, what would it do? 
Would it require that the main case itself falls within the scope of EU law? Or 
would the Court accept its own jurisdiction as long as the national measure that is 
challenged incidentally is likely to affect the independence of a court which ‘may’ 
rule on EU law, even if the main case is not itself connected with EU law?270
The Court’s judgment in the present instance has at least clarified that if the 
dispute before the referring court does not fall within the scope of EU law, and in 
the absence of any apparent connecting factor between the second subparagraph 
of Article 19(1) TEU and the dispute, ‘the referring court must explain clearly 
in the order for reference how the interpretation of the Court as to whether a 
national measure affects the independence of national courts is relevant for the 
main case, and in particular how this interpretation may affect the outcome of 
the main case’.271 In other words, the referring court must explain the extent 
to which a question relating to judicial independence is objectively relevant to 
solving the dispute at hand. 
This is not an easy requirement to satisfy unless the parties themselves are 
challenging: (i) national measures which directly bring judicial independence 
matters to the fore and/or (ii) the independence of the referring court itself 
(or one or more of its judges) and/or (iii) the independence of other courts 
whose rulings may be of relevance to solving the dispute at hand, as the Court 
proved unwilling even to consider the activation of a preliminary disciplinary 
269 Ibid., para. 51.
270 Pech and Platon, op. cit., at 1842. 
271 Ibid., at 1842–1843. 
115SIEPS 2021:3 Respect for the Rule of Law in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice
investigation against the referring judges for a possible abuse of the Article 267 
TFEU procedure as a connecting factor in this context. This suggests that the only 
possible avenue for judges who are subject to arbitrary disciplinary investigation 
and other measures amounting to intimidation and harassment would be to 
challenge these measures before the relevant national court. The national court 
could then be requested to refer the matter to the Court of Justice. This however 
may be criticised for imposing an ‘unnecessary detour upon affected judges’,272 
while also assuming there are independent courts left to hear the actions to begin 
with.
Abandoning referring judges to their fates?
Viewed in this light, the Court’s judgment may be understood as abandoning the 
referring judges to their fates, by deciding that ‘not every judge in every procedure 
is in the position to remedy potential violations of judicial independence with a 
reference to Luxembourg’.273 And this is indeed seemingly why this outcome in 
these two joined cases was vocally welcomed by Polish authorities, with the Polish 
Minister of Justice speaking for instance of ‘a very good decision’.274 However, 
this reaction seems to derive from only a cursory or possibly no reading at all of 
the Court’s judgment. Indeed, not only did the judgment confirm the Court’s 
jurisdiction to review Poland’s ruling coalition’s so-called ‘judicial reforms’, the 
judgment also contained the starkest warning to date regarding the obvious 
attempts by the Polish authorities to intimidate Polish judges so as to create a 
chilling effect which would dissuade any judge from sending any questions to 
Luxembourg. 
The Court’s order of 12 February 2019 in RH is also worth noting in this 
respect. There the Court held that ‘not being exposed to disciplinary sanctions 
for exercising a choice, such as sending a request for a preliminary ruling to the 
Court or choosing to wait for the reply to such a request before adjudicating 
on the substance of a dispute before them, which is exclusively within their 
jurisdiction, constitutes a guarantee essential to judicial independence’.275 In this 
instance, a Bulgarian judge was under the threat of disciplinary proceedings for 
not complying with the mandatory instructions of a higher court in relation 
to a national law which obliged national courts – unlawfully, as the Court of 
Justice clarified – to adjudicate on the legality of a pre-trial detention decision 
without the opportunity to make a request for a preliminary ruling or even wait 
for the Court of Justice’s reply. Unsurprisingly, the Court of Justice found this 
Bulgarian legislation incompatible with Article 267 TFEU and Article 47 CFR. 
272 L.D. Spieker, ‘The Court gives with one hand and takes away with the other: The CJEU’s 




275 Case C-8/19 PPU, EU:C:2019:110, para. 47.
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We should note in passing that it is surprising to say the least that this legislation 
was not subject to any infringement action by the Commission. After all, its 
own communication published in 2017 in which the Commission professed its 
intention to make strategic use of Article 258 TFEU, explicitly stated that the 
Commission would 
give high priority to infringements that reveal systemic weaknesses which 
undermine the functioning of the EU’s institutional framework. This applies in 
particular to infringements which affect the capacity of national judicial systems to 
contribute to the effective enforcement of EU law. The Commission will therefore 
pursue rigorously all cases of national rules or general practices which impede the 
procedure for preliminary rulings by the Court of Justice, or where national law 
prevents the national courts from acknowledging the primacy of EU law.276
As previously noted, the reality of the Commission’s enforcement record is 
difficult to reconcile with the above statement, which has, for instance, resulted 
in less than one infringement action per year aiming at protecting judicial 
independence since the activation of the rule of law framework in January 2016 
in relation to Poland, and none since the activation of Article 7(1) TEU in 
relation to Hungary. The notion of ‘high priority’ seems therefore to be differently 
understood by the Commission presided over by Ursula von der Leyen.277
Be that as it may, the two judges who submitted questions to the Court of Justice 
in the present two cases were themselves brought for questioning for ‘a possible 
exceeding of jurisdiction’ following their use of Article 267 TFEU.278 The Court 
here first took note that the investigation proceedings were ‘closed on the ground 
that no disciplinary misconduct, involving a failure to respect the dignity of 
their office as a result of making those requests for a preliminary ruling, had 
been established’.279 The Court did not however stop there. On the contrary, the 
Court took full account of the chilling effect of these proceedings, whose mere 
initiation violated Article 267 TFEU. Indeed, the Court makes subsequently 
clear when it explicitly held – arguably the key aspect of its ruling – that EU law 
precludes any legislation, measures or actions ‘which expose national judges to 
disciplinary proceedings as a result of the fact that they submitted a reference to 
the Court for a preliminary ruling’.280 As if to avoid any doubt, the Court added 
 
 
276 European Commission communication, EU law: Better results through better application, 
2017/C 18/02, p. 14. 
277 L. Pech, K.L. Scheppele, W. Sadurski, ‘Before It’s Too Late’, VerfBlog, 28 September 2020: 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/before-its-too-late/>
278 L. Pech, P. Wachowiec, ‘1095 Days Later: From Bad to Worse Regarding the Rule of Law in 
Poland (Part II)’, VerfBlog, 17 January 2019: <https://verfassungsblog.de/1095-days-later-from-
bad-to-worse-regarding-the-rule-of-law-in-poland-part-ii/>
279 Joined Cases C-558/18 and C-563/18, op. cit., para. 54.
280 Ibid., para. 58.
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that ‘the mere prospect […] of being the subject of disciplinary proceedings’ 
as a result of making or maintaining references for a preliminary request is not 
acceptable. Most recently and positively, in the Romanian Judges case, the Court 
explicitly relied on the concept of chilling effect to make clear that national 
authorities must provide guarantees designed to avoid any risk of external 
pressure on the content of judicial decisions when adopting new rules regarding 
the personal liability of judges.281 Any national rule, mechanism or procedure 
which is used as (or may be converted into) an instrument of pressure on judicial 
activity is not compatible with Article 2 and the second subparagraph of Article 
19(1) TEU. 
The judgment’s main shortcomings
In our view, the main shortcoming of this judgment is that the Court failed to 
state explicitly that EU law covers and precludes disciplinary investigations of this 
kind so as to prevent the authoritarian tactic of leaving judges in limbo during 
investigation proceedings which are never formalised. On this point, the AG’s 
assessment was seriously flawed in suggesting that disciplinary investigations, 
because they had yet to take the form of formal disciplinary proceedings, meant 
that the ‘referring courts have merely a subjective fear which has not crystallised 
into disciplinary proceedings and remains hypothetical’.282 It is indeed difficult to 
see how we could conclude that a judge being subject to a disciplinary summons 
for ‘a possible exceeding of jurisdiction’, before being deliberately left in limbo 
while being subject to Kafkaesque investigative activities, should be considered 
an experience of only ‘subjective fear’. 
On this issue, both the AG and the Court may be criticised for failing to 
appreciate the reality of working as a judge in an authoritarian regime in the 
making, where sham disciplinary but also grotesque criminal charges have 
become routine. Sadly, in a more recent opinion, this time from AG Pikamäe 
in relation to Hungary, this absurd approach where referring judges can be 
arbitrarily subjected to disciplinary proceeding as long as they are ended prior to 
281 Joined Cases C-83/19, C-127/19, C-195/19, C-291/19, C-355/19 and C-397/19, Asociaţia 
‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’ et al., EU:C:2021:393, para. 236.
282 AG Opinion, para. 118. See also P. Marcisz, ‘Creating a Safe Venue of Judicial Review: AG 
Tanchev on the Admissibility of Preliminary References re Polish Disciplinary Proceedings’, 
VerfBlog 11 October 2019: <https://verfassungsblog.de/creating-a-safe-venue-of-judicial-
review/> (‘it is rather rich to observe that any fears by the referring judges were hypothetical, 
only to notice a few lines below that indeed there were preliminary disciplinary proceedings 
launched against them after they made the preliminary references’).
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the Court of Justice deciding the national request, continues to be espoused.283 
The chilling effect of such proceedings is ignored, with mostly euphemistic 
language being used instead of more explicit and forceful criticism. One may 
however expect the Court to be more forceful and soon move away from this soft 
approach of tolerating disciplinary proceedings against referring judges as long 
as they are withdrawn during the course of a case. Indeed, this soft approach has 
only encouraged autocratic authorities to intimidate referring judges at an early 
stage in a more tactical manner with the view of dissuading most judges from 
using Article 267 TFEU at all when it comes to judicial independence issues. 
To build on Petra Bárd’s analysis, these patently abusive disciplinary investigations/
proceedings come close to constituting the disciplinary equivalent for judges of 
the vexatious SLAPP (strategic litigation against public participation) suits used 
to bully critics into silence.284 It is to be hoped that the Court will therefore come 
down hard on these attempts to bully judges into not making use of Article 
267 TFEU. In this respect, we can but only commend AG Tanchev’s change 
of position within the framework of the currently pending third infringement 
action targeting Poland’s new disciplinary regime of judges, which essentially 
adopts the framework of analysis advocated by one of the present authors:285 
The examples invoked by the Commission attest to disciplinary proceedings or 
measures taken against judges on account of decisions they issued in connection 
with the changes to the Polish justice system and the independence of Polish 
283 Opinion of AG Pikamäe delivered on 15 April 2021 in Case C-564/19, EU:C:2021:92, para. 
97: ‘In that respect, it should be noted that the main proceedings in the context of which 
the Court has been requested to provide a preliminary ruling do not concern the bringing 
of disciplinary proceedings against the referring judge, nor do they concern the status of the 
judiciary and provisions concerning the disciplinary regime for judges. Furthermore, it is 
common ground that the decision initiating the disciplinary proceedings was withdrawn and 
those proceedings terminated. In that context, the fifth question referred to the Court does 
not concern an interpretation of EU law which meets a need inherent in the determination of 
the main case, and an answer to that question would result in the Court delivering an advisory 
opinion on general or hypothetical questions, such as the possible psychological reaction of 
Hungarian judges to the disciplinary proceedings brought on the basis of the Kúria’s judgment 
in terms of the future referral of questions for a preliminary ruling. The fifth question must 
therefore be declared inadmissible.’ Were the Court to find the question admissible, the AG 
then suggests repeating the Court’s warning in Miasto Łowicz, which we find however excessively 
‘diplomatic’ considering the deliberate and increasingly frequent attempts to undermine the 
functioning of the preliminary ruling procedure via sham disciplinary proceedings. 
284 P. Bárd, ‘Jeopardizing Judicial Dialogue is Contrary to EU Law: The AG Opinion in the IS case’, 
VerfBlog, 20 April 2021: <https://verfassungsblog.de/jeopardizing-judicial-dialogue-is-contrary-
to-eu-law>
285 L. Pech, The Concept of Chilling Effect: Its Untapped Potential to Better Protect Democracy, the Rule 
of Law, and Fundamental Rights in the EU, March 2021: <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.
org/publications/the-concept-of-chilling-effect>. See also L. Pech, P. Wachowiec and D. Mazur, 
‘Poland’s Rule of Law Breakdown: A Five-Year Assessment of EU’s (In)Action’ (2021) 13 
Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 1, 35–36 (the Court ought to ‘make clear that disciplinary 
investigations also violate EU law when they aim to dissuade judges from applying EU law’ 
as the Court’s current position ‘has led authoritarian-minded authorities to deliberately leave 
targeted judges in limbo by delaying the formal initiation of disciplinary proceedings’).
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judges. The fact that the investigations did not lead to disciplinary charges against 
the judges concerned or that the disciplinary officer’s assessment is not binding on 
disciplinary courts is irrelevant, as such measures are liable to exert pressure on judges 
[our emphasis]. The mere possibility that disciplinary proceedings or measures 
could be taken against judges on account of the content of their judicial decisions 
undoubtedly creates a ‘chilling effect’ not only on those judges, but also on other 
judges in the future, which is incompatible with judicial independence.286
In light of this new, more forceful and entirely warranted approach, one 
expected the Court to adjust its previous stance in Miasto Łowicz which it did in 
its infringement judgment of 15 July 2021 in Case C-791/19 regarding Poland’s 
new disciplinary regime for judges.287 
Speaking of infringement action, there is another paragraph in Miasto Łowicz 
which is worth stressing. It may indeed be understood as a not so subliminal 
message to the Commission to do its duty as Guardian of the Treaties by 
more promptly initiating infringement proceedings, of adequate scope, so as 
to protect national judges from systemic attacks by those keen on annihilating 
judicial independence. This is indeed the second time after the AK ruling, where 
the Court has taken the time explicitly to stress how its task under Article 267 
TFEU must be distinguished from its task under Article 258 TFEU. In the 
words of the Court, 
Whereas, in an action for failure to fulfil obligations, the Court must ascertain 
whether the national measure or practice challenged by the Commission or 
another Member State, contravenes EU law in general, without there being any 
need for there to be a relevant dispute before the national courts, the Court’s 
function in proceedings for a preliminary ruling is, by contrast, to help the 
referring court to resolve the specific dispute pending before that court.
At the time of writing, it would appear that the Commission presided over by 
Ursula von der Leyen has yet to hear or understand this message. 
286 Opinion of AG Tanchev delivered on 6 May 2021 in Case C-791/19, EU:C:2021:366, para. 84. 
287 See supra 3.2.3. 
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5 The Court of Justice’s 
recalibration of its case 
law beyond effective 
judicial protection
The rule of law crisis has had a significant albeit often implicit impact on the 
Court’s case law with the Court arguably recalibrating its interpretation and 
approaches in relation to several fundamental concepts in EU law, primarily in 
light of the situation in Poland.
This impact can be first evidenced in the stricter interpretation of the meaning 
of ‘court or tribunal’ in the sense of Article 267 TFEU used in Case C-274/14 
Banco de Santander SA. A similar tightening of the concept of ‘issuing judicial 
authority’ within the meaning of the European arrest warrant (EAW) can be 
detected in Joined Cases C-508/18 OG (Public Prosecutor’s Office of Lübeck) 
and C-82/19 PPU PI (Public Prosecutor’s Office of Zwickau), as well as in Case 
C-509/18 PF (Prosecutor General of Lithuania). 
Yet another significant development, likely to have been brought about, at 
least in part, in reaction to Poland’s rule of law breakdown, can be found in 
Case C-284/14 Commission v. France, where the Court offered a long-awaited 
recalibration of CILFIT. The Court also pushed for a stricter defence of the 
jurisdiction of the national courts to ensure full effectiveness of EU law in 
Case C-284/16 Achmea, a stricter defence which however threatens to leave 
investors formerly covered by intra-EU bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
without any effective judicial protection in countries experiencing rule of law 
backsliding. 
The Court of Justice also enabled, at least theoretically, the stricter scrutiny by 
judicial authorities called upon to execute EAWs of mutual trust obligations, 
on the basis of systemic deficiencies which may affect the independence of a 
national judiciary in a backsliding Member State in Case C-216/18 PPU LM 
(Celmer). This recalibration may however be viewed as patently insufficient 
considering the systemic nature of Poland’s rule of law breakdown. 
Finally, the Court adopted a demanding interpretation of the term ‘established 
by law’ to comprehensively review an EU judicial appointment procedure in its 
Grand Chamber judgment of 26 March 2020 in Simpson and HG. While this 
judgment did not concern a national judicial appointment procedure, it was 
not too difficult to see how the Court’s reasoning could be easily extrapolated to 
121SIEPS 2021:3 Respect for the Rule of Law in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice
the situation in Poland where manifest irregularities have repeatedly affected the 
appointments of multiple individuals in particular to the Supreme Court. 
A mixed picture emerges through these developments. On the one hand, the 
principle of the rule of law in Europe is seemingly much reinforced and also 
boasts much better articulated components, including in particular the EU 
requirements relating to judicial independence as well as the autonomy and 
supremacy of EU law. On the other hand, overreliance on national courts in 
situations where their independence may come under systemic threat, combined 
with hesitance, on the part of the Court of Justice, to tolerate any dispute 
resolution not overseen from the Kirchberg plateau, may regrettably result in 
less effective judicial protection in practice.288 When one adds to this the Court’s 
test in relation to EAWs issued from judicial authorities located in backsliding 
countries, which is virtually unworkable in practice for the judicial authorities 
called upon to execute these EAWs, the troubled reality shaped by some of the 
latest case law vividly comes to light. 
Be that as it may, let us now examine each of the significant judgments issued by 
the Court of Justice since Portuguese judges which seek, explicitly or implicitly, 
to adjust traditional EU law concepts, principles or exceptions in the light of the 
rule of law crisis experienced first and foremost in Poland: (1) Case C-274/14 
Banco de Santander SA, which offers a stricter interpretation of the idea of ‘court 
or tribunal of a Member State’ for the purposes of Article 267 TFEU; (2) Joined 
Cases C-508/18, OG (Public Prosecutor’s office of Lübeck) C-82/19 PPU, PI 
(Public Prosecutor’s office of Zwickau) and Case C-509/18, PF (Prosecutor General 
of Lithuania) which offer a stricter interpretation of the concept of ‘issuing 
judicial authority’ within the meaning of the EAW Framework Decision; (3) 
Case C-416/17, Commission v. France, which offers a stricter interpretation of 
the obligation to refer for courts of last resort under Article 267 TFEU; (4) 
Case C-284/16, Achmea which offers a stricter defence of the jurisdiction of 
national courts to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law; (5) Case C-216/18 
PPU, LM (Celmer), which provides a stricter defence, at least theoretically, of the 
right to an independent tribunal in a situation of systemic or general deficiencies 
regarding the rule of law via a new judicial test in relation to EAWs issued from 
authorities located in backsliding states; and finally (6), Joined Cases C-542/18 
RX-II Simpson and C-543/18 RX-II HG, in which the Court adopted a stricter 
interpretation of the right to a tribunal established by law.
288 One of the present authors, writing with Professor Lavranos, has given clear examples from 
the Hungarian legal order of how this happens in practice: See D. Kochenov and N. Lavranos, 
‘Achmea versus the Rule of Law: CJEU’s Dogmatic Dismissal of Investors’ Rights in Backsliding 
Member States of the European Union’ (2021) 13 The Hague Journal of the Rule of Law (early 
view): <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-021-00153-7>
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5.1 Stricter interpretation of ‘court’ for the purposes of Article 
267 TFEU: Case C-274/14 Banco de Santander SA289
In this case, the Court reversed its previous rather lax case law on the 
independence of the Spanish tax tribunals (TEAs), finding that they do not meet 
the requirements of independence. They cannot therefore submit questions to 
the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU as they are not ‘courts or tribunals’ 
within the meaning of EU law, an outcome which is undeniably the result 
of the Court’s stricter defence of the principle of judicial independence since 
its Portuguese Judges ruling. Furthermore, and most importantly, the Court 
underlined that even if a body is not sufficiently independent to refer preliminary 
questions, this fact does not in any way release it from a strict obligation to 
correctly apply EU law.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)
21 January 2020
In Case C-274/14,
REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the 
Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Central (Central Tax Tribunal, 
Spain), made by decision of 2 April 2014, received at the Court on 5 
June 2014, in the proceedings
Banco de Santander SA
[For ease of reading, references to previous cases have been omitted]
Excerpts:
59 The principle of irremovability, the cardinal importance of which is to be 
emphasised, requires, in particular, that judges may remain in post provided 
that they have not reached the obligatory retirement age or until the expiry 
of their mandate, where that mandate is for a fixed term. While it is not 
wholly absolute, there can be no exceptions to that principle unless they are 
warranted by legitimate and compelling grounds, subject to the principle 
of proportionality. Thus it is widely accepted that judges may be dismissed 
if they are deemed unfit for the purposes of carrying out their duties on 
account of incapacity or a serious breach of their obligations, provided the 
appropriate procedures are followed.
60 The guarantee of irremovability of the members of a court or tribunal thus 
requires that dismissals of members of that body should be determined by 
specific rules, by means of express legislative provisions offering safeguards 
that go beyond those provided for by the general rules of administrative law 
and employment law which apply in the event of an unlawful dismissal.
289 EU:C:2020:17.
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[…]
66 Whilst, it is true, the applicable national legislation lays down rules 
governing, inter alia, abstention and recusal of the President and other 
members of the TEAC or, in the case of the President of the TEAC, rules 
on conflicts of interest, disqualification and duties of transparency, it is 
common ground that the arrangements for removal of the President and 
other members of the TEAC are not determined by specific rules, by means 
of express legislative provisions, such as those applicable to members of the 
judiciary. The members of the TEAC are covered solely, in that respect, 
by the general rules of administrative law and, in particular, by the basic 
regulations relating to civil servants, as the Spanish Government confirmed 
during the hearing before the Court. That finding also applies in relation to 
the members of the regional and local TEAs.
67 Consequently, the removal of the President and the other members of 
the TEAC and of the members of the other TEAs is not limited, as required 
by the principle of irremovability recalled in paragraph 59 of the present 
judgment, to certain exceptional cases reflecting legitimate and compelling 
grounds that warrant the adoption of such a measure, subject to the principle 
of proportionality and to the appropriate procedures being followed, such 
as cases of incapacity or of a serious breach of obligations rendering the 
individuals concerned unfit for the purposes of carrying out their duties.
68 It follows that the applicable national legislation does not ensure that 
the President and the other members of the TEAC are protected against 
direct or indirect external pressures that are liable to cast doubt on their 
independence.
[…]
72 As regards, secondly, the requirement of independence in its second, 
internal, aspect, […] it must be noted that there is indeed a separation of 
functions within the Ministry of the Economy and Finance between, on the 
one hand, the departments of the tax authority responsible for management, 
clearance and recovery of tax and, on the other hand, the TEAs which rule 
on complaints lodged against the decisions of those departments.
73 Nevertheless, as the Advocate General also noted in points 31 and 40 of 
his Opinion, certain characteristics of the extraordinary appeal procedure 
before the Sala Especial para la Unificación de Doctrina (Special Chamber 
for the Unification of Precedent, Spain), a procedure governed by Article 
243 of the LGT, are such as to cast doubt on the fact that the TEAC acts as 
a ‘third party’ with respect to the interests before it.
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74 Only the Director-General of Taxation of the Ministry of the Economy 
and Finance may lodge such an extraordinary appeal against decisions of the 
TEAC with which he or she disagrees. However, that Director-General will 
automatically be part of the eight-person panel that is to hear that appeal, 
along with the Director-General or the Director of the department of the State 
Tax Administration Agency to which the body that issued the act referred to 
in the decision that is the object of that extraordinary appeal belongs. Thus, 
both the Director-General of Taxation of the Ministry of the Economy and 
Finance, who lodged the extraordinary appeal against a decision of the TEAC, 
and the Director-General or the Director of the department of the State Tax 
Administration Agency which adopted the act referred to in that decision, 
will sit as part of the Special Chamber of the TEAC hearing that appeal. The 
roles of party to the extraordinary appeal procedure and that of member of the 
body that is to hear such an appeal are thus conflated.
[…]
76 Thus, those characteristics of the extraordinary appeal for the unification 
of precedent which may be brought against decisions of the TEAC 
demonstrate the organisational and functional links that exist between 
that body and the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, in particular the 
Director-General of Taxation of that ministry and the Director-General of 
the department which adopts the decisions contested before the TEAC. The 
existence of such links makes it impossible to regard the TEAC as a third 
party in relation to that administration.
77 Consequently, the TEAC does not satisfy the internal aspect of the 
requirement of independence that is characteristic of a court or tribunal.
78 It must be added that the fact that the TEAs do not constitute ‘courts or 
tribunals’ for the purposes of Article 267 TFEU does not relieve them of the 
obligation to ensure that EU law is applied when adopting their decisions 
and to disapply, if necessary, national provisions which appear to be contrary 
to provisions of EU law that have direct effect, since these are obligations that 
fall on all competent national authorities, not only on judicial authorities.
Analysis
Banco de Santander SA is a reversal of the previous case law on the independence 
of special Spanish tax tribunals: the Court had until then considered such 
tribunals sufficiently independent to send preliminary references, confirming 
this as recently as in 2000.290 Crucially for our purposes, this reversal, which 
290 Joined Cases C-110/98 to C-147/98 Gabalfrisa and Others, EU:C:2000:145.
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produced a much stricter standard of independence for a court or tribunal in 
the context of the European judiciary in the sense of the second subparagraph of 
Article 19(1)TEU, has significantly broader implications, setting a new standard 
for all the bodies willing to make use of the preliminary ruling procedure. 
The deficiencies of the Court’s previous relatively lax approach to independence 
have long been understood and critically analysed by several scholars and 
Advocates General.291 Indeed, the criterion of independence was such that even 
bodies not recognised as courts and inserted within the administrative structures 
of the Member States were found eligible to make preliminary references.292 The 
reversal is thus neither entirely unexpected, nor unwarranted. We are witnessing 
instead a recalibration of the case law, which is fully in line with the previously 
not followed Opinions of AG Saggio and AG Ruiz Jarabo-Colomer in Gabalfrisa 
and Others and De Coster. The latter bemoaned the ‘relaxation of the requirement 
of independence’293 – which has now been reversed, the criterion of independence 
tightened, and its significance restored.294
Tightening of the independence criterion post Portuguese Judges
Importantly, the reversal of earlier case law happened as a direct consequence of 
the Court’s increased attention to the substantive elements of the requirement of 
the rule of law of Article 2 TEU directly implied in the second subparagraph of 
Article 19(1)TEU, as we have seen in Portuguese Judges.295 In doing so, the Court 
followed the reasoning of AG Hogan who emphasised the Court’s development 
of ‘an impressive line of case-law addressing the requirements of judicial 
independence since the Court first tackled in a judgment of 21 March 2000 
the issue of whether Spanish special tax tribunals are sufficiently independent to 
qualify as a ‘court or tribunal’ in the sense of Article 267 TFEU.296 
The Court is also explicit about the reinforced importance of the principle of 
the rule of law in the context of contemporary EU law. It made for instance a 
reference to the recent case law building on all the provisions listed by the AG, 
explaining that the reassessment of independence ‘must be re-examined notably 
in the light of the most recent case-law of the Court concerning, in particular, 
291 See e.g. M. Broberg, ‘Preliminary References by Public Administrative Bodies’ (2009) 15 
European Public Law 221; T. Tridimas, ‘Knocking on Heaven’s Door: Fragmentation, Efficiency 
and Defiance in the Preliminary Reference Procedure’ (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 30.
292 Broberg, ‘Preliminary References by Public Administrative Bodies’, op. cit.
293 Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-17/00 de Coster, EU:2001:366, para. 26.
294 See L. Pech, ‘Article 47(2)’, in S. Peers et al. (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A 
Commentary (2nd ed. Oxford: Hart Publishing, forthcoming in 2021).
295 See supra Section 2. 
296 Opinion of AG Hogan delivered on 1 October 2019, EU:C:2019:802, para. 5. In Joined 
Cases C-110/98 to C-147/98, Gabalfrisa and Others, EU:C:2000:145, the Court held that the 
Regional Tax Tribunal of Catalonia must be regarded as a court or tribunal within the meaning 
of what is now Article 267 TFEU.
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the criterion of independence which any national body must meet in order to be 
categorised as a ‘court or tribunal’ for the purposes of Article 267 TFEU’.297 In 
other words, rather than adding a new criterion for a national body to meet in 
order to fall within the scope of Article 267 TFEU, on top of what has already 
been established case law since the very beginning of the EU legal order,298 the 
Court has instead tightened the idea of independence. 
The Court agreed with the AG following extensive references to its most recent 
case law ‘concerning, in particular, the criterion of independence which any 
national body must meet in order to be categorised as a ‘court or tribunal’ for the 
purposes of Article 267 TFEU’.299 For the Court, ‘the removal of the President 
and the other members of the TEAC and of the members of the other TEAs is not 
limited, as required by the principle of irremovability […] to certain exceptional 
cases reflecting legitimate and compelling ground.’300 Furthermore, ‘certain 
characteristics of the extraordinary appeal procedure before the Special Chamber 
for the Unification of Precedent in Spain’301 were found equally troublesome by 
the Court. The TEAC was therefore held to be governed by rules not compatible 
with the principle of irremovability and due to the organisational and functional 
links that exist between that body and the Spanish Ministry of the Economy and 
Finance, it did not in addition satisfy the internal aspect of the requirement of 
independence that is characteristic of a court or tribunal. As astutely noted by 
R. García Antón, 
Article 267 TFEU goes beyond a mere procedure to ask for clarifications on 
how to interpret EU law to directly embrace the core goal of protecting the 
fundamental rights granted by EU law to European citizens against national 
interferences […] What is revolutionary and derived from the current threats to 
the rule of law in several Member States is that the national bodies requesting 
questions for preliminary rulings have to be independent from adverse national 
interferences to ensure the protection of rights granted by EU law to European 
citizens. The circle is now closed and completely aligned with the goal allocated 
to Article 267 TFEU.302
This tightening happened through the introduction of a requirement to 
reassess the independence of the referring body after revisiting the idea directly 
following Portuguese Judges, including the ‘external’ and the ‘internal’ aspects 
297 Judgment in C-274/14, para. 55.
298 Case 61/65 Vaassen-Göbbels, EU:C:1966:39.
299 Judgment in C-274/14, para. 55.
300 Ibid., para. 67.
301 Ibid., para. 73.
302 R. García Antón, ‘Can the Spanish Central Tax Tribunal make a preliminary reference under 
Article 267 TFEU?’, EU Law Live, 22 January 2020: <https://eulawlive.com/op-ed-can-the-
spanish-central-tax-tribunal-make-a-preliminary-reference-under-article-267-tfeu-a-final-
tribute-to-advocate-general-saggio-and-ruiz-jarabo-colomer/>.
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of independence, both of which must be considered.303 The special tax tribunal 
making a reference in Banco de Santander SA notably failed both prongs of this 
stricter test. 
The external part of the test ensures that the referring body should not be subject 
to any hierarchical constraints in coming to its decision and should function 
wholly autonomously. A special emphasis is made on the requirement of 
irremovability of the judges, a criterion of independence mentioned in Wilson 
and further developed in Commission v. Poland (Independence of the Supreme 
Court).304
The internal aspect of independence in the reading provided by the Court must 
ensure that the court or tribunal is a genuine ‘third party’ vis-à-vis the interests 
in dispute in front of it. Indeed, while the Court found the breach, the AG was 
more vocal in coming to the same conclusion: AG Hogan considered that it was 
clear from the legal framework of the Spanish body in question that its design 
and functioning was ‘contrary to the maxim nemo judex in causa sua and, by 
definition, contrary to the fundamental principle laid down in Article 47(2) of 
the Charter requiring an independent and impartial tribunal’.305
Implicit warning to Poland’s ‘fake judges’?
Independence plays a fundamental role – as also explained by AG Stix-Hackl 
in Wilson and repeated by AG Hogan in Banco de Santander SA – in making 
the distinction between national courts and administrative authorities. It should 
be clarified that the inability to make a preliminary reference due to the lack 
of independence does not mean that the body in question becomes exempt 
from ensuring full effectiveness and timely application of EU law – including, 
crucially, the principle of supremacy of EU law and the possible disapplication 
of national norms in contradiction with it. The Court referred, inter alia, to 
Costanzo,306 making one last vital point which deserves to be underlined here: 
being an authority which does not meet the criteria of ‘court of tribunal of a 
Member State’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU does not mean that 
such an authority is not bound by the requirement of implementing EU law 
correctly and in full. This is no doubt an implicit warning addressed primarily to 
Polish authorities, the judicial bodies they have captured and the new allegedly 
judicial bodies they have set up these past few years.
303 See also Case C-503/15 Margarit Panicello, EU:C:2017:126, paras 37–38.
304 Case C-506/04 Wilson, EU:C:2006:587, para. 51; Case C-619/18 Commission v. Poland 
(Independence of the Supreme Court), EU:C:2019:531.
305 AG Opinion in C-274/14, para. 31. 
306 Case 103/88 Costanzo, EU:C:1989:256, paras 30–33.
128 Respect for the Rule of Law in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice SIEPS 2021:3
Banco de Santander SA is a great reminder that some rulings not seemingly 
connected with the rule of law crisis may nevertheless be understood as not so 
subliminal warnings to the national authorities engaged or tempted to engage 
in rule of law backsliding. Be that as it may, the key message we should draw 
from this judgment is that judicial dialogue between the numerous elements of 
the complex and multi-layered system of the EU judiciary is impossible unless 
all the participating bodies are fully independent: that is, are genuine courts 
rather than bodies masquerading as courts. The evolutionary analyses of the case 
law available on this aspect – including the one recently authored by President 
Lenaerts – are undoubtedly convincing.307
Yet, one of the crucial implications of Banco de Santander SA in the context 
of a continuing and seriously deteriorating situation in EU countries such as 
Poland and Hungary is truly far-reaching and represents a difficult dilemma 
of vital importance: as fewer national courts qualify as ‘courts or tribunals’ 
within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU due to systemic attacks on judicial 
independence organised by national authorities and the appointment of ‘fake 
judges’ to gangrene them from within, the proper courts/chambers left standing, 
and which remain unafraid of making use of the preliminary ruling mechanism 
to safeguard their independence, might face mounting difficulties in meeting the 
more stringent independence test. Remaining independent in a system which, as 
a whole, has been compromised or is under enormous pressure is possible, but 
obviously extremely difficult. Without any doubt, plenty of individual judges will 
strive to safeguard judicial independence even in a situation where the national 
judiciary is being or has been compromised from a systemic point of view. The 
Court of Justice will be offered a first opportunity to tackle these difficult issues 
in pending case C-132/20, a national request for a preliminary ruling which 
originates from an individual who was appointed to Poland’s Supreme Court on 
the back of a procedure manifestly marred by grave irregularities.308
5.2 Stricter interpretation of the obligation to refer for 
national courts of last resort under Article 267 TFEU: 
Case C-416/17, Commission v. France (Advance 
Payment)309
In this infringement judgment informally known as Advance Payment, the Court 
of Justice held that a failure by a national court of last instance to refer a question 
of interpretation of EU law to the Court of Justice amounts to a violation of EU 
law, fully justifying the Commission’s infringement action brought on such a basis 
and thus significantly reinforcing the vertical dimension of the EU’s judiciary in 
the sense of Article 19 TEU. The case equally underlines, however, the extent to 
307 K. Lenaerts, ‘Our Judicial Independence and the Quest for National, Supranational and 
Transnational Justice’, in G. Sevik et al. (eds), The Art of Judicial Reasoning: Festschrift in Honour 
of Carl Baudenbacher (Berlin: Springer, 2019), 155.
308 See infra Section 6 for further analysis. 
309 EU:C:2018:811. 
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which the famed dialogue between the national judges and the Court of Justice 
is not a dialogue of equals.310 A failure to engage in an interpretation dialogue 
with the Court of Justice, especially when done in bad faith, will no longer be 
tolerated. This judgment thus amounts in essence to a significant ‘redesign’ of 
the practice of the preliminary reference procedure which should reinforce the 
unity of European judiciary at the expense of the room for manoeuvre which the 
highest courts of the Member States have enjoyed so far. 
Two fundamental considerations immediately need to be underlined. First, 
the vertical unity of the European judiciary that this judgment seems to be 
reaffirming is only a fiction in a situation where many of the highest courts of 
the Member States do not in fact use the preliminary ruling procedure at all. It 
remains to be seen how far the Court of Justice will be successful in narrowing 
down the CILFIT case law, which essentially allowed it to save face and avoid 
confronting the reality of non-referrals by explaining – in arguable deviation 
from the text of Article 267 TFEU – that such referrals by the highest courts 
were not always required.311
 
Secondly, once we turn to the particular context of rule of law backsliding, this 
judgment can be viewed as the latest episode in a saga which started with Costa 
v. ENEL, where the Italian government unsuccessfully tried to prevent the local 
judge from sending a reference to the Court of Justice and the Court found the 
position of the Italian authorities unsustainable.312 
Only the picture today is much more complex than what it was when supremacy 
of EU law was first set out, because the highest ‘courts’ in the backsliding Member 
States – some no longer courts tout court – besides not referring questions 
themselves, are increasingly complicit in the intimidation and unlawful tactics 
used to bully ordinary judges into not using the Article 267 TFEU procedure. In 
Hungary, Kúria – Orbán’s Supreme Court – can deem a reference to the Court of 
Justice sent from a lower Hungarian court unnecessary upon request of Orbán’s 
‘Prosecutor General’, resulting in disciplinary proceedings against the judge if the 
reference is not recalled.313 In Poland the situation is even more dramatic, with 
310 For further analysis, see M. Dawson, ‘Constitutional Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures 
in the European Union’ (2013) 19 European Public Law 369.
311 See most recently the Opinion of AG Bobek delivered on 13 April 2021 in Case C-561/19 
Consorzio Italian Management, EU:C:2021:291 in which the AG recommends to the Court to 
revisit the CILFIT criteria with respect to the duty of national courts of last instance to request a 
preliminary ruling when three cumulative conditions are met: (i) a general issue of interpretation 
of EU law; (ii) to which there is objectively more than one reasonably possible interpretation; 
(iii) for which the answer cannot be inferred from the existing case-law of the Court.
312 See, for a detailed analysis, A. Arena, ‘From an Unpaid Electricity Bill to the Primacy of EU 
Law; Gian Galeazzo Stendardi and the Making of Costa v. ENEL’ (2019) 30 European Journal of 
International Law 1017.
313 P. Bárd, ‘Jeopardizing Judicial Dialogue is Contrary to EU Law: The AG Opinion in the IS case’, 
VerfBlog, 20 April 2021: <https://verfassungsblog.de/jeopardizing-judicial-dialogue-is-contrary-
to-eu-law>
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an unconstitutional legislative prohibition on preliminary rulings which raise 
judicial independence questions and, most recently, criminal charges brought 
against critical judges with the aim of giving the ECJ-suspended ‘Disciplinary 
Chamber’ an opportunity to arbitrarily waive their judicial immunity pour 
décourager les autres.314 
As we have observed both in Hungary and in Poland, the fish of judicial 
independence, as always, rots from the head down. Defending a strict and 
enforceable obligation to refer to the highest courts could then, theoretically 
at least, help defend the rule of law indirectly. Viewed in this light, the Court 
of Justice’s judgment in Advance Payment may be understood both as an 
implicit warning to the captured courts of last resort in backsliding countries, 
unsurprisingly unheeded to this date, not to interfere with the functioning of the 
preliminary ruling procedure, and an implicit invitation for the Commission, 
sadly so far unheeded, to more strictly enforce this obligation. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fifth Chamber)
4 October 2018
Case C-416/17
ACTION under Article 258 TFEU for failure to fulfil obligations
European Commission v. French Republic (Advance Payment)
[for ease of reading, references to previous cases have been omitted]
Excerpts:
106 […] it should be noted, first, that the obligation of the Member States 
to comply with the provisions of the FEU Treaty is binding on all their 
authorities, including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts.
107 Thus, a Member State’s failure to fulfil obligations may, in principle, 
be established under Article 258 TFEU whatever the agency of that State 
whose action or inaction is the cause of the failure to fulfil its obligations, 
even in the case of a constitutionally independent institution.
108 Second, it must also be noted that, where there is no judicial remedy 
against the decision of a national court, that court is in principle obliged to 
make a reference to the Court within the meaning of the third paragraph of  
 
314 L. Pech, ‘Protecting Polish judges from Poland’s Disciplinary “Star Chamber”’ (2021) 58 
Common Market Law Review 137. See also the Court’s order in C-204/21 R, EU:C:2021:593, 
para. 119 which mentions more than 40 requests to lift the immunity of ordinary but also 
Supreme Court judges, including the President of the Labour Chamber and three judges of the 
Criminal Chamber. 
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Article 267 TFEU where a question of the interpretation of the FEU Treaty 
is raised before it.
109 Moreover, the obligation to make a reference laid down in that provision 
is intended in particular to prevent a body of national case-law that is not 
in accordance with the rules of EU law from being established in any of the 
Member States.
[…]
113 Consequently, there is no need to examine the other arguments put 
forward by the Commission in the context of the present complaint and 
it must be held that it was for the Conseil d’État (Council of State), as a 
court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under 
national law, to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice on 
the basis of the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU in order to avert the 
risk of an incorrect interpretation of EU law.
114 Consequently, since the Conseil d’État (Council of State) failed to make 
a reference to the Court, in accordance with the procedure provided for in 
the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, in order to determine whether it 
was necessary to refuse to take into account, for the purpose of calculating 
the reimbursement of the advance payment made by a resident company 
in respect of the distribution of dividends paid by a non-resident company 
via a non-resident subsidiary, the tax incurred by that second company on 
the profits underlying those dividends, even though its interpretation of the 
provisions of EU law in the judgments of 10 December 2012, Rhodia, and 
of 10 December 2012, Accor, was not so obvious as to leave no scope for 
doubt, the fourth complaint must be upheld.
Analysis
AG Wathelet rightly underlined the importance of this case by stressing in his 
Opinion that ‘this is the first time that the Court has been called upon to rule 
on a complaint of this kind in the context of an action for the failure to fulfil 
obligations. However, the theoretical possibility of a State failing to fulfil its 
obligations on the basis of an infringement of the third paragraph of Article 
267 TFEU appears to me to be certain’.315 Indeed, this theoretical possibility 
had been abundantly discussed in EU law textbooks since the founding of 
what is now the EU. Advance Payment was arguably worth the wait. Indeed, 
and to follow Professor Sarmiento, the Court’s judgment represents a ground-
breaking development which represents ‘a tremendous step forward in the 
315 Opinion delivered on 25 July 2018 in Case C-416/17, EU:C:2018:626, para. 87.
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development of a coherent system of remedies’, which will help inter alia 
overcome arbitrary decisions of supreme courts.316 This is therefore a particularly 
significant development which offers the Commission a clear new pathway 
to bring infringement actions, especially as regards captured supreme or 
constitutional courts. That said, we have known all along that breaches of the 
Treaties by independent authorities, including national courts, can obviously be 
the subject of infringement actions by the Commission but also the Member 
States themselves.317 Moreover, and this point is equally underlined by AG 
Wathelet, we have known all along that the difficulty of remedying breaches by 
independent national institutions is not an argument that could convince the 
Court.318 The Court has indeed already established – albeit clothing its reasoning 
in a very careful wording underlining the importance of the ongoing dialogue 
with the national-level judiciary – that infringement actions can be launched in 
respect of the rulings of national courts when these rulings themselves violate 
EU law.319 The Court, however, until Advance Payment, had been very careful not 
to place the blame on national courts but on the legislator. Never before had the 
sole failure to refer per se triggered the launch of a successful Article 258 TFEU 
procedure by the Commission.
The vital importance for national courts against whose decisions no further 
appeal is possible to comply with their EU law obligation to make a reference 
had previously been perfectly explained by AG Bot, whose views were repeated 
by AG Wathelet: 
non-compliance on the part of national courts and tribunals against whose 
decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law with their obligation to 
make a reference has the effect of depriving the Court of the fundamental task 
assigned to it by the first subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, namely to ensure 
that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed.320
316 D. Sarmiento, ‘Judicial Infringements at the Court of Justice’, Despite Our Differences Blog, 
9 October 2018: <https://despiteourdifferencesblog.wordpress.com/2018/10/09/judicial-
infringements-at-the-court-of-justice-a-brief-comment-on-the-phenomenal-commission-
france-c-416-17/>.
317 See e.g. Case 77/69 Commission v. Belgium, EU:C:1970:34. This essentially means that the 
Member States can also initiate Article 259 TFEU actions based on such breaches, even though 
there have regrettably been no examples to date: D. Kochenov, ‘Biting Intergovernmentalism: 
The Case for the Reinvention of Article 259 TFEU to Make It a Viable Rule of Law 
Enforcement Tool’ (2015) 7 The Hague Journal of the Rule of Law 153.
318 See e.g. Case C-154/08 Commission v. Spain, EU:C:2009:695 and the annotation by M. Lopez 
Escudero (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 227.
319 Case C-129/00 Commission v. Italy, EU:C:2003:656 and the annotation by L. Rossi and G. Di 
Frederico (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 829.
320 Opinion of AG Bot in Case C-160/14 Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, EU:C:2015:390, 
para. 102, cited in Opinion of AG Wathelet in Case C-416/17, EU:C:2018:626, para. 90. 
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The nature of the dialogue between national courts and the Court of Justice 
is not altered by this case but it is made more explicit. Indeed, as Gareth 
Davies rightly underlined, while Europe may be pluralist and its courts may 
have different opinions on the same matter, the supranational Court of Justice 
is where the decisions happen to be taken321 – a possibly harsh but necessary 
reality which the Court has reiterated with authority in Advance Payment. The 
prior leeway – which essentially granted national courts a licence to do as they 
pleased and which initially seemed quite broad thanks to the CILFIT doctrine 
interpreted most permissively by the judiciaries of the Member States – has been 
narrowed down significantly. Advance Payment builds on Ferreira da Silva in this 
respect,322 where the Court clarified that acte clair is not a carte blanche. Indeed, 
to follow Sarmiento’s analysis, ‘CILFIT has fully sharpened its teeth and the 
Court is willing to bite with it’.323
Need to better prevent misbehaviour and bad faith refusals to refer  
Advance Payment may therefore be understood as representing a radical yet 
logical and much needed development as it clearly empowers the Commission 
to go after misbehaving national courts of last instance. Potential complications 
arise no doubt, out of the fact that some of these institutions have actually ceased 
to be courts sensu stricto. A good example of such an unlawfully composed body 
of the last instance is the Poland’s so-called ‘Constitutional Tribunal’ which 
deliberately refused to refer questions to the Court of Justice so that it could 
attempt to neutralize, if not de facto nullify, the Court of Justice’s AK judgment 
in the name of upholding EU law.324 Advance Payment empowers and should be 
understood as a message of encouragement directed at the Commission regarding 
the highest, now captured, ‘courts’ of Poland and Hungary. The long-term 
implications for the balance of judicial power as well as the possible protection of 
EU law rights of the individual litigants and the uniform application of EU law 
could be significant: the Court of Justice may well end up becoming a de facto 
Court of appeal against any national judgment with EU implications where no 
reference has been made, subject only to the Commission’s willingness to bring 
the matter to Court: the tables are about to be turned in the realm of judicial 
power in Europe.
321 G. Davies, ‘Constitutional Disagreement in Europe and the Search for Pluralism’ (2010) Eric 
Stein Working Paper 1/2010.
322 Case C-160/14 Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others, EU:C:2015:390.
323 Sarmiento, ‘Judicial Infringements at the Court of Justice’, op. cit.
324 A. Bień-Kacała, ‘Polexit is Coming or is it Already Here? Comments on the Judicial 
Independence Decisions of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal’, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, 28 
April 2020: <http://www.iconnectblog.com/2020/04/polexit-is-coming-or-is-it-already-here-
comments-on-the-judicial-independence-decisions-of-the-polish-constitutional-tribunal>
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Interesting questions arise in relation to the eligibility of the ‘fake judges’ sitting 
on the captured courts in the backsliding Member States to refer questions 
to the Court of Justice, which opens additional possibilities for the Court 
to encourage the intensification of dialogues with the rest of the judiciary in 
those states, including on the issue of the safeguarding of those courts’ own 
independence, thus actively side-lining ‘fake benches’. Moreover, such active 
side-lining of bodies masquerading as courts has the potential to be turned into 
a binding constitutional requirement following Advance Payment, including the 
potential active enforcement by the European Commission of any failure to 
refer preliminary questions to the Court. In doing so, the Commission would 
also offer the Court of Justice the opportunity to decide whether courts of last 
resort located in backsliding countries actually still deserve to be called courts, 
considering their lack of independence and/or their unlawful composition. 
The Commission’s abysmal infringement record to date in relation to backsliding 
countries however suggests that the Guardian of the Treaties did not get the 
Court’s message in Advance Payment. Instead, the Commission seems deliberately 
more interested in writing reports about threats and violations of the Treaties 
than actually guarding the Treaties against these threats and violations. Examples 
of the Commission’s failure to guard the Treaties are numerous: from its framing 
of the regular rule of law reporting on the basis of the assumption that Poland 
and Hungary do not need to be singled out as special cases,325 to the lowered 
intensity of Article 258 TFEU actions, combined with the willingness to tolerate 
the most egregious violations of EU law by allegedly suspended bodies such as 
Poland’s Disciplinary Chamber, or Poland’s unlawfully composed ‘Constitutional 
Tribunal’.326 Most recently, with increasing threats of imprisonment levelled 
against dozens of them for the ‘crime’ of upholding the rule of law and applying 
EU law, Polish judges have ‘begged’ the Commission to act and yet what we 
continue to see is many more reports than legal actions and financial situations 
as the situation warrants.327 As the saying goes, you can lead a horse to water but 
you cannot make it drink. Similarly, there is only so much the Court of Justice 
can say or can do to get the Commission to fulfil its Treaty obligations and use 
its enforcement powers. 
325 See D. Kochenov, ‘Elephants in the Room: The European Commission’s 2019 Communication 
on the Rule of Law’ (2019) 11 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 423; B. Grabowska-Moroz and 
D. Kochenov, ‘EU Rule of Law: The State of Play Following the Debate Surrounding the 2019 
Commission’s Communication’, in G. Amato and B. Barbisan (eds), Rule of Law vs Majoritarian 
Democracy (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2021).
326 See L. Pech, P. Wachowiec and D. Mazur, ‘Poland’s Rule of Law Breakdown: A Five-Year 
Assessment of EU’s (In)Action’ (2021) 13 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 1.
327 ‘Counsels of vocal judges urge EU official to take further actions to defend the rule of law’, Rule 
of Law in Poland, 10 May 2021, <https://ruleoflaw.pl/counsels-of-vocal-judges-urge-eu-official-
to-take-further-actions-to-defend-the-rule-of-law/> 
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A crucial upgrade of the EU’s system of remedies
The previous doctrine the Court tried to deploy to ensure full respect of Article 
267(3) TFEU was Köbler,328 but starting a new procedure before the national 
courts for a failure to refer is quite cumbersome and not truly effective, as the story 
of Professor Köbler himself clearly demonstrates. Furthermore, Köbler offers no 
effective avenue in a situation where a national judiciary has been hijacked and 
the rule of law has been systematically undermined – precisely the situation when 
the effective and prompt enforcement of EU law becomes all but impossible.329 
Relying on the Commission’s direct actions emerges as a viable – and unique 
alternative in such a context. In this respect, Advance Payment provides a crucial 
upgrade of the EU’s system of remedies, presuming that the Commission is 
willing and capable to act, which also requires EU national governments to put 
their money where their mouth is by providing the Commission with the staff it 
needs to handle the number of enforcement actions the current process of rule 
of law backsliding demands. Be that as it may, one may note that the Court of 
Justice dismissed the French government’s vision of the procedural rights of the 
parties before national courts against whose decisions no further national appeal 
is possible and who fail to respect EU law fully. The government’s position was 
that it is not for the parties to decide whether a reference should be made. And 
while this is unquestionably correct, Advance Payment protects the parties in 
the cases where EU law is disregarded by making clear that the Commission 
may launch infringement actions in such situations. As astutely observed by 
Professor Sarmiento, ‘we are on the road towards a system in which national 
judicial decisions can be subject to review, in a direct and transparent way, by 
the Court’.330
 
The Court’s reasoning in Commission v. France is moreover in line with the 
requirements of Article 6(1) ECHR flowing from the jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg Court, which requires EU Member State courts against whose 
decisions no further national appeal is possible to give clear reasons for non-
referral to the Luxembourg Court when questions of EU law arise. Ironically, 
the Strasbourg case law has been criticised, unconvincingly in our view, as an 
‘interference’ in the dialogue between the national judges and the Luxembourg 
Court, while admitting that this ‘interference’ increases the level of judicial 
328 Case C-224/01 Köbler, EU:C:2003:513 and for further analysis, see P. Wattel, ‘Köbler, CILFIT 
and Weltgrove: We Can’t Go on Meeting Like This’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 177.
329 D. Kochenov, ‘On Policing Article 2 TEU Compliance – Reverse Solange and Systemic 
Infringements Analyzed’ (2013) XXXIII Polish Yearbook of International Law 145.
330 Sarmiento, ‘Judicial Infringements at the Court of Justice’, op. cit.
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protection in the European legal space.331 In any event, the case law as it stands 
today does not allow EU national courts of last resort to fail to explain why no 
reference to the Court of Justice has been sought if this issue has been raised.332 
All in all, as Araceli Turmo rightly emphasised, Advance Payment reinforces the 
idea of a dialogue between the Court of Justice and the national judiciaries. Yet, 
it is not a Köbler-style dialogue, where the partners at least pretend to be equal. 
This is however the crude reality of the uncompromising obligation to refer laid 
down in Article 267(3) TFEU: ‘a dialogue, yes, but between unequal partners, 
when matters of EU law interpretation are concerned’.333 The shift in the ideas 
underpinning the reading of a non-referral under Article 267(3) TFEU in the 
eyes of EU law seems to be clear in this regard. As observed by Araceli Turmo:
However, one important statement does indicate a shift in thinking. In Köbler, 
the fact that the appropriate interpretation of Union law remained unclear 
seemed to constitute a mitigating factor in evaluating the gravity of the violation 
of substantive law, although a violation of Article 267(3) had been established. 
Here, the very fact that there were doubts and the Conseil did not refer a second 
question was enough to constitute an infringement under Article 258 TFEU.334
To conclude, while Advance Payment offers a significantly improved approach to 
rethinking the effectiveness of the preliminary ruling procedure when compared 
with the earlier Köbler take on the same problem, the effectiveness of this new 
approach as regards national judiciaries in backsliding Member States remains 
entirely dependent on the Guardian of the Treaties doing its job promptly and 
implacably, rather than seeking refuge in annual reports. Until the Commission 
stops considering enforcement as a last resort solution in this context, the 
promises of Advance Payment will continue to remain unfulfilled. 
331 C. Lacchi, ‘The ECrtHR’s Interference in the Dialogue between National Courts and the Court 
of Justice of the EU: Implications for the Preliminary Reference Procedure’ (2015) 8 Review 
of European Administrative Law 95. For a criticism of the Strasbourg Court case law on the 
ground that it would lack predictability and consistency, see J. Kromendijk, ‘Tell me More, 
Tell me More: The Obligation for National Courts to Reason Their Refusals to Refer to the 
CJEU in Sanofi Pasteur’, Strasbourg Observers, 20 February 2020: <https://strasbourgobservers.
com/2020/02/20/tell-me-more-tell-me-more-the-obligation-for-national-courts-to-reason-their-
refusals-to-refer-to-the-cjeu-in-sanofi-pasteur>  
332 Sanofi Pasteur v. France, App. no. 25137/16, 13 February 2020; Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek 
v. Belgium, Apps nos 3989/07 and 38353/07, 20 September 2011. For further analysis, see J. 
Kromendijk, ‘“Open Sesame!”: Improving Access to the ECJ by Obliging National Courts to 
Reason Their Refusals to Refer’ (2017) 42 European Law Review 46.
333 A. Turmo, ‘A Dialogue of Unequals – The European Court of Justice Reasserts National Courts’ 
Obligations under Article 267(3) TFEU’ (2019) 15 European Constitutional Law Review 340, 341.
334 Ibid., at 351–352 (footnotes omitted).
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5.3 Stricter defence of the jurisdiction of national courts to 
ensure the full effectiveness of EU law: Case C-284/16 
Achmea335
In Achmea the Court of Justice de facto outlawed intra-EU bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) and the arbitration tribunals they had established. The agreement 
for the termination of BITs, which the absolute majority of the Member States 
had joined, followed in 2020.336 These developments are undoubtedly part of 
a general push by the Court of Justice to unify the vertical organisation of the 
EU judiciary.337 As a result of the successful attempts to abolish any alternative 
to the (unlawfully composed) national courts the Court of Justice, instead of 
consolidating its power, is putting all the eggs in one basket.338 It draws heavily 
on Opinion 2/13 and strives, rhetorically, to defend the unity of EU law and the 
jurisdiction of the courts meeting the conditions of Article 267 TFEU. This all 
sounds positive and commendable in theory, as the Union is acquiring a more 
centralised judiciary squarely bound by the principles and values of Article 2 
and 19 TEU, thus supposedly increasing the level of judicial protection in the 
Union. In practice, however, Achmea does not sufficiently take into account two 
things. Firstly, the reality of rule of law backsliding as it has materialised in several 
Member States. On this count it appears to be a move in the opposite direction 
compared with the case law discussed above. Secondly, it is the potential of the 
BITs to ensure additional safeguards of rights as AG Wathelet explained in his 
Opinion in the case, which we discuss in detail below. 
While arguably laudably motivated by an underlying aim to give a stronger 
voice to the Member States courts, Achmea does so however precisely at the 
moment where those courts might be becoming incapable of delivering justice 
or sanctioning violations of EU law. Consequently, while striving to build a 
better EU judiciary, Achmea may be viewed as achieving the opposite: it reduces 
the prior level of protection of rights without solving any outstanding problems. 
By pushing foreign investors to use the local court system in what may be a 
captured (illiberal) Member State where the output of the judicial system can be 
interfered with at will, the Court may have mistakenly undermined the rule of 
law and judicial protection in Europe. 
335 EU:C:2018:158. 
336 Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of 
the European Union, OJ L 169/1. E. Stoppioni, ‘Disentangling Clashes of Paradigms: Member 
States Reinstate EU Law Philosophy Terminating BITs in the Internal Market’, EU Law Live, 
7 May 2020: <https://eulawlive.com/op-ed-disentangling-clashes-of-paradigms-member-states-
reinstate-eu-law-philosophy-terminating-isds-in-the-internal-market-by-edoardo-stoppioni>
337 W. Sadowski, ‘Protection of the Rule of Law in the European Union through Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: Is Judicial Monopolism the Right Response to Illiberal Tendencies in Europe?’ 
(2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 1025.
338 Ibid.; D. Kochenov and N. Lavranos, ‘Achmea versus the Rule of Law: CJEU’s Dogmatic 
Dismissal of Investors’ Rights in Backsliding Member States of the European Union’ (2021) 13 
The Hague Journal of the Rule of Law (Online first).
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As the saying goes, the best is sometimes the enemy of the good. Autocrats 
have already started exploiting this, with evidence of arbitrary expropriations 
of EU investments slowly emerging.339 In Orbán’s Hungary for instance, we 
have seen on a number of occasions Achmea being used as an argument to 
dismiss the jurisdiction of the tribunals protecting investors against unlawful 
expropriations.340 The arbitral tribunals, not bound by the Court of Justice’s view 
of their own jurisdiction, have however refused to let autocrats have the upper 
hand.341 In agreement with Wojciech Sadowski, it is submitted that ‘investment 
treaty arbitration is not a real threat to the integrity of the European Union 
and the autonomy of EU law. Non-democratic governments in Warsaw and 
Budapest and their assaults on national judicial systems are’.342 The case is thus a 
significant example of trying to achieve the right thing at wrong time, without 
full consideration of the judicial reality in backsliding countries.  
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)
6 March 2018
Case C-284/16,
REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the 
Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, Germany)
Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV
[for ease of reading, the references to previous cases have been omitted]
Excerpts:
32 In order to answer those questions, it should be recalled that, according 
to settled case-law of the Court, an international agreement cannot 
affect the allocation of powers fixed by the Treaties or, consequently, the 
autonomy of the EU legal system, observance of which is ensured by the 
Court. That principle is enshrined in particular in Article 344 TFEU, under 
which the Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement 
other than those provided for in the Treaties.
339 Kochenov and Lavranos, op. cit.
340 See e.g. Magyar Farming Company Ltd, Kintyre Kft and Inicia Zrt v. Hungary, (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/17/27), Award 13 November 2019: https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw10914.pdf; UP and C.D Holding Internationale v. Hungary, (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/13/35), Award, 9 October 2018: < https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw10075.pdf >.
341 For further analysis, see Kochenov and Lavranos, op. cit.
342 W. Sadowski, ‘Protection of the Rule of Law in the European Union through Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: Is Judicial Monopolism the Right Response to Illiberal Tendencies in Europe?’ 
(2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 1025, at 1058.
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33 Also according to settled case-law of the Court, the autonomy of EU 
law with respect both to the law of the Member States and to international 
law is justified by the essential characteristics of the EU and its law, relating 
in particular to the constitutional structure of the EU and the very nature 
of that law. EU law is characterised by the fact that it stems from an 
independent source of law, the Treaties, by its primacy over the laws of the 
Member States, and by the direct effect of a whole series of provisions which 
are applicable to their nationals and to the Member States themselves. 
Those characteristics have given rise to a structured network of principles, 
rules and mutually interdependent legal relations binding the EU and its 
Member States reciprocally and binding its Member States to each other.
34 EU law is thus based on the fundamental premise that each Member 
State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that they share 
with it, a set of common values on which the EU is founded, as stated in 
Article 2 TEU. That premise implies and justifies the existence of mutual 
trust between the Member States that those values will be recognised, and 
therefore that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected. 
It is precisely in that context that the Member States are obliged, by 
reason inter alia of the principle of sincere cooperation set out in the first 
subparagraph of Article 4(3) TEU, to ensure in their respective territories 
the application of and respect for EU law, and to take for those purposes any 
appropriate measure, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of 
the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the 
institutions of the EU.
35 In order to ensure that the specific characteristics and the autonomy 
of the EU legal order are preserved, the Treaties have established a judicial 
system intended to ensure consistency and uniformity in the interpretation 
of EU law.
36 In that context, in accordance with Article 19 TEU, it is for the national 
courts and tribunals and the Court of Justice to ensure the full application 
of EU law in all Member States and to ensure judicial protection of the 
rights of individuals under that law.
37 In particular, the judicial system as thus conceived has as its keystone the 
preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU, which, by 
setting up a dialogue between one court and another, specifically between 
the Court of Justice and the courts and tribunals of the Member States, has 
the object of securing uniform interpretation of EU law, thereby serving to 
ensure its consistency, its full effect and its autonomy as well as, ultimately, 
the particular nature of the law established by the Treaties.
[…]
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42 It follows that on that twofold basis the arbitral tribunal referred to in 
Article 8 of the BIT may be called on to interpret or indeed to apply EU law, 
particularly the provisions concerning the fundamental freedoms, including 
freedom of establishment and free movement of capital.
43 It must therefore be ascertained, secondly, whether an arbitral tribunal 
such as that referred to in Article 8 of the BIT is situated within the judicial 
system of the EU, and in particular whether it can be regarded as a court or 
tribunal of a Member State within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU. The 
consequence of a tribunal set up by Member States being situated within the 
EU judicial system is that its decisions are subject to mechanisms capable of 
ensuring the full effectiveness of the rules of the EU.
[…]
45 In the case in the main proceedings, the arbitral tribunal is not part of 
the judicial system of the Netherlands or Slovakia. Indeed, it is precisely the 
exceptional nature of the tribunal’s jurisdiction compared with that of the 
courts of those two Member States that is one of the principal reasons for 
the existence of Article 8 of the BIT.
46 That characteristic of the arbitral tribunal at issue in the main proceedings 
means that it cannot in any event be classified as a court or tribunal ‘of a 
Member State’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.
[…]
50 In those circumstances, it remains to be ascertained, thirdly, whether 
an arbitral award made by such a tribunal is, in accordance with Article 19 
TEU in particular, subject to review by a court of a Member State, ensuring 
that the questions of EU law which the tribunal may have to address can 
be submitted to the Court by means of a reference for a preliminary ruling.
[…]
56 Consequently, having regard to all the characteristics of the arbitral 
tribunal mentioned in Article 8 of the BIT and set out in paragraphs 39 to 
55 above, it must be considered that, by concluding the BIT, the Member 
States parties to it established a mechanism for settling disputes between 
an investor and a Member State which could prevent those disputes from 
being resolved in a manner that ensures the full effectiveness of EU law, even 
though they might concern the interpretation or application of that law.
[…]
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58 In the present case, however, apart from the fact that the disputes falling 
within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal referred to in Article 8 of the 
BIT may relate to the interpretation both of that agreement and of EU law, 
the possibility of submitting those disputes to a body which is not part of 
the judicial system of the EU is provided for by an agreement which was 
concluded not by the EU but by Member States. Article 8 of the BIT is 
such as to call into question not only the principle of mutual trust between 
the Member States but also the preservation of the particular nature of the 
law established by the Treaties, ensured by the preliminary ruling procedure 
provided for in Article 267 TFEU, and is not therefore compatible with the 
principle of sincere cooperation referred to in paragraph 34 above.
Analysis 
Achmea is an attempt to do the right thing and may be understood as another 
chapter in the Court’s ongoing attempt to better protect the rule of law and the 
EU’s system of remedies so as to guarantee a properly functioning European legal 
order which effectively protects the values, principles and rights laid down in the 
Treaties. Consequently, the Court ruled that Article 19(1) TEU and Articles 
344 and 267 TFEU preclude reciprocal investment protection via the arbitral 
tribunals established under the BIT concluded between the Netherlands and the 
Slovak Republic. Member States and investors have therefore no choice but to 
rely on the domestic courts of the Member States instead.343 For the Court, the 
autonomy of EU law is undermined when there is the slightest risk of any court 
or tribunal not falling within the scope of Article 19(1) TEU applying EU law 
– consider the Spanish tax tribunals in Banco de Santander SA.344 Moreover, the 
very existence of any alternatives to national courts falling ‘within the judicial 
system of the EU’,345 is viewed by the Court of Justice as potentially undermining 
mutual trust between the Member States.
Defending the role of national courts while ignoring the reality of rule of law 
backsliding
This context is clear-cut and convincing, but the implications the Court draws 
from it are less so. In fact, the case could have a negative effect on the level 
of judicial protection in Europe, especially the protection of the rights of 
investors which used to be covered by intra-EU bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) between the Member States, as well as the implications for the successful 
343 M. Fanou, ‘Intra-European Union Investor–State Arbitration Post-Achmea: RIP?’ (2019) 26 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 316, at 322 et seq.
344 M. Andenæs and C. Contartese, ‘EU Autonomy and Investor-State Dispute Settlement under 
inter se Agreements between EU Member States: Achmea’ (2019) 56 Common Market Law 
Review 157, at 170.
345 Ibid., 174.
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operation of the internal market.346 The reasons essentially come down to one 
only: the Court decided to give strong preference to the forceful proclamation 
of mutual trust while displaying distrust towards international law rights 
guarantees and ignoring the procedural and substantive problems investors 
will face in backsliding, not to say autocratising, countries such as Poland and 
Hungary. In other words, Achmea would probably hold (although not quite, 
as we show below) in a world where the judiciaries of all the Member States 
are fully independent and provide effective judicial protection, but this is 
absolutely not the reality observable in the EU today. Our analysis should not, 
however, be perceived as potential advocacy for a principle of ‘mistrust’ in EU 
law. This is, of course, not the case but as the facts in Achmea make clear, BIT 
tribunals are not incompatible with EU law. One may refer in this respect to 
the analysis of AG Wathelet. In addition, one must stress that the rights that 
the BITs protect are not flowing from / do not find direct expression in the EU 
Treaties. In other words, while the attack on BIT’s was absolutely unnecessary 
from the point of view of the uniform application of EU law, it predictably 
resulted not only in the complete disapplication of the said law where it was 
previously protected, but also in a situation of dubious legality, given that the 
ECJ’s Opinion about the BITs obviously does not bind the BIT Tribunals, as 
follows from their consistent practice, while making the protection of rights in 
the EU more difficult. 
The fact remains that not only EU law fails to protect the rights guaranteed 
for investors under the BITs, which the EU itself forced on the Central and 
Eastern European countries in the context of the pre-accession, but also that 
the judiciary in the EU as a whole fails to ensure effective judicial protection as 
such. Achmea ignored both crucial aspects of EU legal reality and resulted in a 
situation where BIT tribunals ended up sidelined by the Court of Justice in the 
name of protecting the integrity of the vertically integrated independent EU 
judiciary, which, however, does not exist in all places, besides, materially, unable 
to protect the rights guaranteed under the BITs. If anything, the situation is 
worse than ever in the history of the EU, with the EU now including, for the 
first time, a country which is no longer a democracy (i.e. Hungary), while a 
second one (i.e. Poland) has organised its de facto exit from the EU legal order 
as far as EU rule of law requirements are concerned. Worse still, EU law does 
not necessarily protect all the rights offered in BITs,347 as the arbitration tribunal 
346 In addition to Sadowski, op. cit., see also C.I. Nagy, ‘Intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and EU Law after Achmea: “Know Well What Leads You Forward and What Holds You Back”’ 
(2018) 19 German Law Journal 981; S. Gáspár-Szilágyi, ‘It Is Not Just about Investor-State 
Arbitration: A Look at Case C-284/16, Achmea BV’ (2018) 3(1) European Papers 357.
347 Nagy, ibid., at 984.
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had no difficulty to establish in Achmea.348 This means that even if Polish and 
Hungarian courts were fully independent and effective, Achmea would still mean 
a decrease in the level of rights protection. Add to this the internal market angle, 
where it is generally agreed that the BITs do matter when investment decisions 
are taken,349 and the negative impact of Achmea would seem difficult to deny.
In a context of the serious and apparently spreading rule of law backsliding, the 
Court could be expected to do a better job when it comes to re-establishing the 
principle of mutual trust. It may seem unwise in such a context to disregard 
the additional layer of protection which could come from other legal orders, 
even if not integrated through Article 19(1) TEU, given the annihilation of 
judicial independence and the complete dismantling of all checks and balances 
we are witnessing in Poland and Hungary respectively. The very essence of 
the principle of autonomy of EU law seems to be approached by the Court 
in Achmea through the lens of EU law’s deeply antagonistic relationship with 
other legal orders – as we have already seen in Opinion 2/13.350 As pointed out 
by Panos Koutrakos:
The judgment in Achmea, therefore, put forward a richer and broader concept 
of autonomy than the previous case-law had suggested. Viewed from this angle, 
autonomy becomes, in essence, about conflict. The main features of the principle 
as they emerge in the judgment (the low threshold of tolerance for arbitration 
tribunals dealing with EU law issues, the broad language of the judgment, the 
purported need of domestic courts to have their EU law role protected in any 
theoretical set of circumstances) enable the Court to construe the relationship 
between EU law and international investment law as an antagonistic one.351
It is quite clear that countless other, more fruitful and mutually enriching modes 
of engagement were possible, as was underlined in the academic literature and AG 
Wathelet’s Opinion in this case.352 Mutual engagement and cooperation between 
the legal orders in the face of rule of law backsliding could be a particularly 
fruitful way forward. Moreover, in dismissing the alternatives, a ‘detailed analysis 
348 Achmea BV v. Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case NO. 2008-13 (formerly Eureco B.V. v. 
Slovak Republic), Award of Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, 26 October 2010, para. 
262: ‘Thus EU law does not provide substantive rights for investors that extend as far as those 
provided by the BIT. There are rights that may be asserted under the BIT that are not secured by 
EU law.’ 
349 C. Brower, S. Blanchard, ‘What’s in a Meme? The Truth about Investor-State Arbitration: 
“Why It Should Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States”’ (2014) 52 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 704.
350 D. Kochenov, De Facto Power Grab in Context: Upgrading Rule of Law in Europe in Populist 
Times’ (2021) XL Polish Yearbook of International Law 197.
351 P. Koutrakos, ‘The Autonomy of EU Law and International Investment Arbitration’ (2019) 
Nordic Journal of International Law 41, at 56.
352 See e.g. E. Sipiorski, ‘Conflicting Conceptions of Constitutionalism: Investment Protection 
from the European Union and International Perspectives’ (2019) 66 Netherlands International 
Law Review 219.
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– comparable to the one in Opinion 2/13 – of how the [tribunal] meets [the 
outlined] conditions is lacking’.353 In essence, the Court, having engaged with 
none of the arguments to be found in the outstanding Opinion of AG Wathelet, 
proceeded to deploy procedural considerations related to the nature of the EU 
legal order as reformulated in Opinion 2/13 and, importantly, Portuguese Judges, 
in order to outlaw BITs between the Member States. 
Using a sledgehammer to crack a nut
While the official reason behind Achmea is to protect the Member States’ courts 
acting in their EU capacity and the proper functioning of EU law, including 
the principle of mutual trust, which – as the Court outlines in its judgment 
– are both called into question by intra-EU BITs, the actual results achieved 
are radically different at least at two levels. Moreover, they were also entirely 
unnecessary for the goals that the ECJ seemingly sought to achieve in Achmea. 
Indeed, investors have been successful in only ten cases over several decades out 
of 62 brought based on intra-EU BITs by the moment Achmea was heard.354 
To put it differently, Achmea is like using a sledgehammer to crack a nut, in 
this instance, a meagre total of ten cases of potential fragmentation of EU law. 
Meanwhile, the Commission has yet to launch an infringement action directly 
targeting the hundreds of Polish ‘judges’ appointed or promoted on the basis of 
manifestly tainted procedures involving an unconstitutional body lacking any 
independence, with the result that thousands of judgments may well have been 
issued by ‘courts’ which lack the required independence and may well indeed not 
even be considered to be ‘established by law’.355 
At the most practical level, there is already a handful examples of cases where 
the arbitrators hearing cases based on intra-EU BITs have refused to accept 
Achmea-based objections brought by respondent states. This is an outcome that 
the Court of Justice could very well have predicted given that the arbitrators are 
not at all bound by its idea of the scope of EU law and conflict of laws rules,356 let 
alone the fact that EU law is immune to the protection of the many substantive 
investor rights guaranteed by BITs – precisely the rights the investment tribunals 
353 Gáspár-Szilágyi, op. cit., at 363.
354 Opinion of AG Wathelet, EU:C:2017:699, para. 44: ‘The systemic risk which, according to 
the Commission, intra-EU BITs represent to the uniformity and effectiveness of EU law is 
greatly exaggerated’. See contra M. Szpunar, ‘Is the Court of Justice Afraid of International 
Jurisdictions?’ (2017) XXXVII Polish Yearbook of International Law 125.
355 For further analysis, see infra Section 6.
356 I. Damjanović and O. Quirico, ‘Intra-EU Investment Dispute Settlement under the Energy 
Charter Treaty in Light of Achmea and Vattenfall: A Matter of Priority’, (2019) 26 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 102, at 123, 124 and 128, 129; S.V. Đajić, ‘The Achmea Cases – Story 
on Treaty Interpretation, Forum Competition and International Law Fragmentation’ (2018) 52 
Zbornik radova 491.
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are convened to protect and uphold.357 Problems can arise, of course, at the level 
of enforcement, especially given the stance the Commission takes on this count, 
as in Micula, where the treatment of the enforcement of the award as state aid 
by the Commission put the losing Member State in a difficult position, only to 
see the same enforcement proceedings pop up in the US.358 More of this type of 
proceedings are likely to occur closer to home after Brexit. As long as the sunset 
clauses of the terminated BITs are in operation, Achmea’s success in achieving its 
stated goals is not obvious.359
Achmea’s ‘dark side’
The result of the Court’s attempts to create an integrated EU judiciary under the 
guiding star of Article 19 TEU may therefore be viewed as counterproductive: 
Achmea enforces the proclamation of trust and does nothing to help achieve 
high levels of protection across the Member States to ensure that the thinking 
underpinning the trust proclaimed actually reflects the reality on the ground. 
It could thus help autocrats by supplying yet another rhetorical pirouette for 
the justification of rule of law backsliding: Polish and Hungarian governments 
always list Achmea when appearing before arbitral tribunals in an attempt to 
dismiss the actions brought against their rule of law violations in the absence 
of EU law to guarantee a comparable level of protection.360 Given that the BITs 
are precisely designed to offer protection in the new Member States of Central 
and Eastern Europe, this amounts to buying the autocrats more time to rig their 
justice systems even more to their advantage without any pressure the other way, 
be it costs in terms of money, or costs in terms of prestige from losing cases 
before the investment arbitration tribunals. Achmea therefore has a ‘dark side’ 
to the extent that it can help undermine the level of the rule of law protection 
in the EU, thus indirectly breaking the promise of Article 2 TEU without, as 
AG Wathelet compellingly showed, any need for doing so. The Court does this 
with reference to Article 2 TEU and Article 19(1) TEU, which however aim to 
protect rather than undermine the rule of law. 
The Court of Justice’s sweeping statement that the very conclusion of BITs 
somehow undermines mutual trust would appear to condemn any alternative 
dispute resolution systems bypassing the Courts in the sense of Article 19(1) 
TEU.361 This happens of course in a situation where Article 7(1) TEU has been 
activated against not one but two Member States, for inter alia seriously and 
proactively undermining the independence of their judiciaries. Let us recall here 
357 A. Uzelac, ‘Why Europe Should Reconsider Its Anti-Arbitration Policy in Investment Disputes’ 
(2019) Access to Justice in Eastern Europe 6, at 14–16; Nagy, op. cit.; Damjanović and Quirico, 
op cit., at 136–154.
358 For the whole story, see Nagy, op. cit., note 14, at 985; Đajić, op. cit., at 504 and 505.
359 Nagy, op. cit.
360 Kochenov and Lavranos, op. cit., including the two detailed case-studies the authors provide.
361 Fanou, op. cit., at 329.
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that if BITs do not rely on trust, this is precisely why the European Commission 
required that they be concluded by all the new Member States-to-be prior to the 
EU’s enlargement as a condition of accession. Considering these developments, 
it seems that the very idea of ‘mutual trust’ has dramatically altered over the 
course of the last decade: from a substantive principle, it has become a procedural 
point, thus demonstrating a line of development opposite to the evolution of the 
principle of judicial independence over the same period. This problematic issue 
will be further analysed when reviewing the Court’s judgment in LM (Celmer).  
As clearly emerges from the above, Achmea ironically imported the ‘Copenhagen 
dilemma’ (i.e. the EU’s inability to protect fundamental rights in the sphere of 
national competence of the Member States after their accession to the EU362) 
into the sphere of rights’ protection, which was not suffering from it, since all 
the BITs concluded as part of the pre-accession exercise remained in force and 
operated precisely to protect the rights of investors after the accession of Central 
and Eastern European Member States to the European Union. The Treaties of 
Accession, silent on the matter, made it clear – as AG Wathelet rightly underlined 
in his Opinion in Achmea – that the BITs were not concluded for the pre-
accession period alone, which was the unconvincing argument the Commission 
made: not a single clause in the Accession Treaty packages demanded the BITs’ 
renunciation.363 Indeed, the goal of the BITs was to promote the rule of law in 
the region by making sure that the deficiencies of the local justice systems would 
not impair investments in the enlarged internal market made both before and 
after their accession, thus compensating for the EU’s potential post-accession 
inability to intervene, which is tackled on the EU side only now, almost 20 years 
after accession.364 Achmea, which targets such protections came about precisely 
when the deficiencies in the context of judicial independence and the rule of law 
in some of the new Member States became crystal clear. 
Worse still, it directly builds on Portuguese Judges, the case which allowed the 
Court to start pushing back against such deficiencies which are poisoning EU 
values, with the sole difference that in Achmea, the Court uses Portuguese Judges 
to the opposite effect: in the fight for the rule of law, the Court of Justice does not 
need international allies. This De Wittean selfishness of the Court thus trumps 
362 For more on this issue and the Court’s attempts to solve the dilemma, see, e.g. M. Leloup, D. 
Kochenov and A. Dimitrovs, ‘Non-Regression: Opening the Door to Solving the “Copenhagen 
Dilemma”? All Eyes on Case C-896/19 Repubblika v Il-Prim Ministru’ (2021) 46 European Law 
Review 687.
363 EU:C:2017:699, para. 41: ‘if those BITs were justified only during the association period and 
each party was aware that they would become incompatible with the EU and FEU Treaties as 
soon as the third State concerned had become a member of the Union, why did the accession 
treaties not provide for the termination of those agreements, thus leaving them in uncertainty 
which has lasted more than 30 years in the case of some Member States and 13 years in the case 
of many others?’
364 M. Leloup, D. Kochenov and A. Dimitrovs, ‘Non-Regression: Opening the Door to Solving the 
“Copenhagen Dilemma”? All Eyes on Case C-896/19 Repubblika v Il-Prim Ministru’ (2021) 46 
European Law Review 687.
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all other considerations:365 the autonomy of EU law is proclaimed at the expense 
of all other interests involved, creating an unnecessary conflict with international 
law, stripping investors of protection and introducing the Copenhagen dilemma 
into a field of law where it had not been observed, by giving strong preference to 
ideological proclamations over the steady development and coherent functioning 
of the rule of law. One cannot be surprised therefore that the tribunals established 
under the BITs have ignored Achmea en masse, churning out awards, which 
protect investors against, most importantly, the lawless behaviour of the illiberal 
regimes, UP (formerly Le Chéque Déjeuner) and C.D. Holding Internationale v. 
Hungary as well as Magyar Farming Kft providing cases in point in the context of 
Orbán-instigated expropriations.366
An alternative to the Achmea collision course that has deprived plenty of 
investors of any protection in the captured ‘illiberal’ Member States of Central 
Europe was available: allowing the tribunals under the BITs to refer preliminary 
questions.367 This road has not been taken, which may leave some investors facing 
a situation where no effective judicial remedy is available to them at least in the 
two EU countries recently identified by democracy experts as the world’s top two 
autocratising countries.368 
5.4 Stricter interpretation of the concept of ‘issuing judicial 
authority’ within the meaning of the EAW Framework 
Decision:369 Joined Cases C-508/18, OG (Public 
Prosecutor’s office of Lübeck) and C-82/19, PPU PI 
(Public Prosecutor’s office of Zwickau);370 and Case 
C-509/18, PF (Prosecutor General of Lithuania)371
In a set of cases which will be collectively referred to below as the Prosecutors’ 
Cases, the Court has adopted a stricter interpretation of the concept of ‘judicial 
authority’ for the purpose of issuing European Arrest Warrants (EAW). Any 
prosecutor who can by law be subjected to the instructions of superiors or the 
ministry in issuing an EAW does not meet the basic criterion of independence 
365 B. de Witte, ‘A Selfish Court? The Court of Justice and the Design of International Dispute 
Settlement beyond the European Union’, in M. Cremona and A. Thies (eds), The European 
Court of Justice and External Relations Law: Constitutional Challenges (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2014), 33.
366 UP (formerly Le Chéque Déjeuner) and C.D. Holding Internationale v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/13/35 (9 October 2018), para. 253; Magyar Farming Company Ltd, Kintyre Kft and Inicia 
Zrt v. Hungary, (ICSID Case No. ARB/17/27), Award 13 November 2019, https://www.italaw.
com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw10914.pdf. See also Kochenov and Lavranos, op. cit.
367 E.g. K. von Papp, ‘Clash of “autonomous Legal Orders”: Can EU Member State Courts Bridge 
the Jurisdictional Divide between Investment Tribunals and the ECJ? A Plea for Direct Referral 
from Investment Tribunals to the ECJ’ (2013) Common Market Law Review 1039.
368 See V-Dem Institute, Autocratization Turns Viral. Democracy Report 2021, March 2021, p. 38.
369 Council Framework Decision 2002/584 of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and 
the surrender procedures between Member States, OJ L 190 45/1. 
370 EU:C:2019:456. 
371 EU:C:2019:457.
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according to the Court. Importantly, whether such instructions are indeed issued 
or not in practice is irrelevant in the context of the test employed by the Court: 
only structurally independent bodies, where this independence is established by 
law, could qualify as ‘judicial authority’. 
The cases discussed below are telling examples picked from a much larger and 
growing line of cases, making the basic rule above not merely a persuasive 
authority, but crystal clear binding law.372 The implications of the heightened 
scrutiny of the structural independence of the ‘judicial authorities’ in the context 
of the EAW has direct and significant implications for the operation of mutual 
trust between the Member States experiencing rule of law backsliding and the 
rest of the Union, potentially making it easier to set aside requests coming from 
such countries on the grounds of structural independence, instead of going 
down the rabbit-hole of the LM test, which is discussed infra in Section 5.5. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)
27 May 2019
In Joined Cases C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU,
REQUESTS for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the 
Supreme Court (Ireland), made by decision of 31 July 2018, received 
at the Court on 6 August 2018, and from the High Court (Ireland), 
made by decision of 4 February 2019, received at the Court on 5 
February 2019, in proceedings relating to the execution of European 
arrest warrants issued in respect of
OG (Public Prosecutor’s office of Lübeck) (C-508/18)
PI (Public Prosecutor’s office of Zwickau) (C-82/19 PPU)
[For ease of reading, references to previous cases have been omitted]
Excerpts:
49 That term [‘judicial authority’] requires, throughout the European 
Union, an autonomous and uniform interpretation, which, in accordance 
with the settled case-law of the Court, must take into account the wording 
of Article 6(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584, its legislative scheme and 
the objective of that framework decision.
372 See L. Baudrihaye-Gérard, ‘Can Belgian, French and Swedish prosecutors issue European Arrest 
Warrants? The CJEU clarifies the requirement for independent public prosecutors’, EU Law 
Analysis, 2 January 2020: <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2020/01/can-belgian-french-and-
swedish.html> (‘The CJEU adopts, in these judgments, a formalistic approach towards the concept 
of independence […] However, the CJEU does not seek to enquire into the practice or other 
potential forms of influence of the executive over prosecutors. The scope of the CJEU’s assessment 
of the independence of prosecutors is moreover limited to decisions to issue EAWs, and not to the 
exercise of prosecutorial powers more broadly, which is beyond the scope of EU law’).
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[…]
67 The European arrest warrant system therefore entails a dual level of 
protection of procedural rights and fundamental rights which must be 
enjoyed by the requested person, since, in addition to the judicial protection 
provided at the first level, at which a national decision, such as a national 
arrest warrant, is adopted, there is the protection that must be afforded at 
the second level, at which a European arrest warrant is issued, which may 
occur, depending on the circumstances, shortly after the adoption of the 
national judicial decision.
[…]
70 Where those requirements are met, the executing judicial authority may 
therefore be satisfied that the decision to issue a European arrest warrant 
for the purpose of criminal prosecution is based on a national procedure 
that is subject to review by a court and that the person in respect of whom 
that national arrest warrant was issued has had the benefit of all safeguards 
appropriate to the adoption of that type of decision, inter alia those derived 
from the fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles referred to in 
Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584.
71 The second level of protection of the rights of the person concerned, 
referred to in paragraph 67 of the present judgment, means that the judicial 
authority competent to issue a European arrest warrant by virtue of domestic 
law must review, in particular, observance of the conditions necessary for the 
issuing of the European arrest warrant and examine whether, in the light of the 
particular circumstances of each case, it is proportionate to issue that warrant.
72 It is for the ‘issuing judicial authority’, referred to in Article 6(1) of 
Framework Decision 2002/584, namely the entity which, ultimately, takes 
the decision to issue the European arrest warrant, to ensure that second level 
of protection, even where the European arrest warrant is based on a national 
decision delivered by a judge or a court.
73 Thus, the ‘issuing judicial authority’, within the meaning of Article 
6(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584, must be capable of exercising 
its responsibilities objectively, taking into account all incriminatory and 
exculpatory evidence, without being exposed to the risk that its decision-
making power be subject to external directions or instructions, in particular 
from the executive, such that it is beyond doubt that the decision to issue 
a European arrest warrant lies with that authority and not, ultimately, with 
the executive.
[…]
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87 Although the effect of that legal remedy is to ensure that the exercise of 
the responsibilities of a public prosecutor’s office is subject to the possibility 
of review by a court a posteriori, any instruction in a specific case from the 
minister for justice to the public prosecutors’ offices concerning the issuing 
of a European arrest warrant remains nevertheless, in any event, permitted 
by the German legislation.
[…]
90 In the light of all the foregoing, the answer to the questions referred 
is that the concept of an ‘issuing judicial authority’, within the meaning 
of Article 6(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584, must be interpreted 
as not including public prosecutors’ offices of a Member State which are 
exposed to the risk of being subject, directly or indirectly, to directions or 
instructions in a specific case from the executive, such as a Minister for 
Justice, in connection with the adoption of a decision to issue a European 
arrest warrant.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)
27 May 2019
Case C-509/18
REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the 
Supreme Court (Ireland), made by decision of 31 July 2018, received at 
the Court on 6 August 2018, in proceedings relating to the execution 
of a European arrest warrant issued in respect of
PF (Prosecutor General of Lithuania)
[For ease of reading, references to previous cases have been omitted]
Excerpts:
29 In the first place, in that regard, it should be noted that the Court 
has previously held that the words ‘judicial authority’, contained in that 
provision, are not limited to designating only the judges or the courts of 
a Member State, but must be construed as designating, more broadly, the 
authorities participating in the administration of criminal justice in that 
Member State, as distinct from, inter alia ministries or police services which 
are part of the executive.
[…]
37 The issuing of a European arrest warrant may thus have two distinct 
aims, as laid down in Article 1(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584. It may 
be issued either for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution in the 
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issuing Member State or for the purposes of executing a custodial sentence 
or detention order in that Member State.
38 Therefore, in so far as the European arrest warrant facilitates free 
movement of judicial decisions, prior to judgment, in relation to conducting 
a criminal prosecution, it must be held that those authorities which, under 
national law, are competent to adopt such decisions are capable of falling 
within the scope of the framework decision.
[…]
47 It follows that, where the law of the issuing Member State confers the 
competence to issue a European arrest warrant on an authority which, 
whilst participating in the administration of justice in that Member State, 
is not a judge or a court, the national judicial decision, such as a national 
arrest warrant, on which the European arrest warrant is based, must, itself, 
meet those requirements.
48 Where those requirements are met, the executing judicial authority may 
therefore be satisfied that the decision to issue a European arrest warrant 
for the purpose of criminal prosecution is based on a national procedure 
that is subject to review by a court and that the person in respect of whom 
that national arrest warrant was issued has had the benefit of all safeguards 
appropriate to the adoption of that type of decision, inter alia those derived 
from the fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles referred to in 
Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584.
[…]
54 In the present case, it is clear from the written observations of the 
Lithuanian Government that in Lithuania the responsibility for the issuing 
of European arrest warrants ultimately lies with the Prosecutor General of 
Lithuania who acts on a request from the specific public prosecutor dealing 
with the case in connection with which the surrender of the person concerned 
is sought. In exercising the powers conferred on him, the Prosecutor General 
of Lithuania must satisfy himself that the requirements necessary in order to 
issue a European arrest warrant are met, in particular that a judicial decision 
having the immediate effect of remanding that person in custody has been 
made and that, in accordance with Lithuanian law, that decision has been 
made by a judge or a pre-trial investigation court.
55 The Lithuanian Government also stated in its written observations 
that, in exercising their functions, Lithuanian public prosecutors enjoy the 
benefit of independence conferred by the Constitution of the Republic of 
Lithuania, in particular in the third paragraph of Article 118 thereof, and 
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by the provisions of the Lietuvos Respublikos prokuratūros įstatymas (Law 
on the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Lithuania). Since the 
Prosecutor General of Lithuania is a public prosecutor, he has the benefit of 
that independence, which allows him to act free of any external influence, 
inter alia from the executive, in exercising his functions, in particular when 
he is to decide, as in the case in the main proceedings, whether to issue a 
European arrest warrant for the purposes of prosecution. In that capacity, 
the Prosecutor General of Lithuania is also required to ensure respect for the 
rights of the persons concerned.
56 In the light of those factors, it is apparent that the Prosecutor General of 
Lithuania may be considered to be an ‘issuing judicial authority’, within the 
meaning of Article 6(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584, in so far as, in 
addition to the findings in paragraph 42 of the present judgment, his legal 
position in that Member State safeguards not only the objectivity of his 
role, but also affords him a guarantee of independence from the executive 
in connection with the issuing of a European arrest warrant. Nevertheless, 
it cannot be ascertained from the information in the case file before the 
Court whether a decision of the Prosecutor General of Lithuania to issue 
a European arrest warrant may be the subject of court proceedings which 
meet in full the requirements inherent in effective judicial protection, which 
it is for the referring court to determine.
Analysis
The Prosecutors’ cases significantly tighten the interpretation of the requirement 
of independence as applied to the concept of ‘issuing judicial authority’ within 
the meaning of Article 6(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584.373 As made clear 
by the Court, contrary to the position of AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona, who 
suggested that public prosecutors should not be covered by the notion of ‘issuing 
judicial authority’, this idea of ‘judicial authority’ is not necessarily limited to a 
Member State court. As long as the authority in question is fully and structurally 
independent from the executive – itself a demanding threshold – it can qualify 
as a ‘judicial authority’. 
373 A.H. Ochnio, ‘Why Is a Redefinition of the Autonomous Concept of an “Issuing Judicial 
Authority” in European Arrest Warrant Proceedings Needed?’ (2020) 5(3) European Papers 
1305; M. Böse, ‘The European Arrest Warrant and the Independence of Public Prosecutors: 
OG & PI, PF, JR & YC’ (2020) 57 Common Market Law Review 1259; C. Heimrich, ‘European 
Arrest Warrants and the Independence of the Issuing Judicial Authority – How Much 
Independence Is Required?’ (2019) 10 New Journal of European Criminal Law 389; K. Ambos, 
‘The German Public Prosecutor as (No) Judicial Authority within the Meaning of the European 
Arrest Warrant’ (2019) 10 New Journal of European Criminal Law 399.
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The parallelism of the general lines of case law on the requirement of independence 
developed in the context of the EAW Framework Decision and in the context 
of the preliminary reference procedure emerges in full clarity. The Court is 
consistent in its reasoning across different fields of EU law. The requirement 
of independence of judicial authorities engaging in dialogue with the Court 
of Justice under Article 267 TFEU, just as the requirement of independence 
for judicial authorities acting under the Framework Decision, is thus steadily 
reinforced. Contrary to some criticism according to which higher thresholds 
of independence required from ‘judicial authorities’ in the EAW context 
undermines mutual trust,374 we submit that the opposite is true: mutual trust 
is only possible between fully independent authorities engaged in cooperation 
and dialogue without any fear of undue interference from executive bodies. The 
issue of independence becomes particularly acute in a context of sustained and 
spreading rule of law backsliding in the EU.  
The test embraced by the Court of Justice in the Prosecutors’ Cases is almost 
deceptively simple. Any formal possibility in law – even if never used in practice 
– to receive instructions from the executive in the exercise of one’s functions 
instantly disqualifies a body from issuing EAWs. The distinction between the 
case involving the Lithuanian Prosecutor General, who is fully independent 
in accordance with the constitution of that Member State, and the German 
prosecutors, who may well enjoy a higher level of independence in practice 
than the Lithuanian colleague but who are, at least theoretically, not absolutely 
shielded by the law from possible instructions from the Minister, is crucial. The 
basic framework of absolute independence in law, and not merely in fact, is a 
crucial factor from an EU law perspective.
Implications of the Court’s strict approach
The implications of such a strict approach for EAWs from authorities located 
in backsliding Member States is difficult to underappreciate: independence 
is crucially reliant on the absolute impossibility in law of outside interference 
with the functioning of the ‘issuing judicial authority’. In practice, this means 
that any institution – be it a prosecutor or a court – which is not impeccably 
independent not only in fact but also in law – Banco de Santander SA sends a 
similar warning – will not be regarded benevolently in the context of EU law. It 
follows in this context that any practice that would amount to undermining the 
independence of the judicial authority as guaranteed by law would, in addition 
to amounting to a breach of the law, equally disqualify the judicial authority 
from EAW cooperation.
374 See e.g. A. Klip, ‘Eroding Mutual Trust in an European Criminal Justice Area without Added 
Value’ (2020) 28 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 109.
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The Prosecutors’ cases clearly reinforce the significance of the idea of independence 
in the context of EU law. In addition, they reinforce the idea that ‘issuing judicial 
authority’ – similarly to a ‘court or tribunal of a Member State’ in the sense of 
Art 267 TFEU – is unquestionably an autonomous concept of EU law. It is 
therefore for the Court of Justice to have the final say when it comes to defining 
and interpreting this concept. 
The cases do not go as far enough, however, in establishing the level of the 
threshold of judicial independence required – especially if we recall what the 
learned AG proposed. In this sense, again drawing some parallels with Banco de 
Santander SA, we can clearly see that a further tightening of the independence 
of the ‘issuing judicial authority’ criterion is possible and, moreover, likely. We 
could refer in this respect to AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona, who went further 
than the Court in scrutinising the essence of the notion of ‘independence’ in 
the context of the Prosecutors’ Cases. The key question the AG sought to answer 
in this respect concerns the objective of independence of a particular authority, 
which would clearly have implications for the threshold required. As the AG 
states in PF:
24. A judge exercising jurisdiction does not have any interest other than ensuring 
the integrity of the legal system. In order to safeguard that interest, he is granted 
independence which ensures that he is subject only to the law; that is to say, it 
ensures that he is not bound by any other particular interest, including other 
public interests such as facilitating the prosecution of crimes.
25. Authorities which, like the Public Prosecutor’s Office, perform public 
functions within the legal system, rely on the judicial branch to ensure the integrity 
of that system. It is precisely because of that reliance that those authorities are 
able to devote themselves to pursuing the specific interests corresponding to their 
functions.375
Although the Court did not pick up on this point, this vision is bound to 
resurface in the future conversation between national courts and the Court of 
Justice concerning the meaning of the concept of ‘issuing judicial authority’. The 
question ‘independence for what?’, highlighting the purpose of independence, 
remains a fundamental one. 
This same question has essentially been raised by Professor Kosař and other 
critics of the pre-accession promotion of strong judicial self-governance by the 
European Commission in the Member States-to-be of Central and Eastern 
375 Opinion of AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered on 30 April 2019 in Case C-509/18, 
EU:C:2019:338. 
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Europe.376 The goal of independence of the judicial corpus, reinforced by the 
establishment of a self-governance body, can obviously also cause problems, as 
opposed to only generating gains. When applied to public prosecutors, the aims 
of independence, as explained by AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona, are radically 
different from those pursued by installing robust safeguards to the independence 
of the judiciary, and the Court is bound to return to this point sooner or later.
Raising the bar
Such possible criticism of the case law notwithstanding, the general vector 
of development of EU law with regard to the understanding of the role that 
independence plays in the context of framing the EU-law concept of ‘issuing 
judicial authority’ is commendable. The overall direction is unquestionably one 
of raising the bar, so to speak. This direction is the same as what we saw in Banco 
de Santander SA and forms a clear trend which can be discerned in EU law 
across the board. Independence as a core element of the rule of law has gained 
prominence and is reshaping the fundamental approaches to the judiciary and 
the bodies potentially endowed with judicial functions in the context of the EU 
law-based EAW system.
As regards the Prosecutors’ Cases, they establish a much more stringent requirement 
of independence than the one implied in the LM test which will be critically 
analysed below. In a nutshell, the LM test is a two-pronged test to be applied in a 
situation where a judicial authority is called upon to execute a EAW originating 
from a rule of law backsliding country: systemic or generalised deficiencies liable 
to affect the independence of the national judiciary as a whole must then be 
tested alongside the independence of the specific judge in the specific case before 
the execution of a EAW may be refused. As we see from the Prosecutors’ Cases, the 
second prong of the LM test becomes redundant once the independence of the 
‘judicial authority’ in the context of EAW is at issue. To follow Martin Böse, ‘the 
mere (abstract) possibility that the decision to issue a European arrest warrant 
may be subject to political interference would disqualify the court as an issuing 
judicial authority’.377
This is very significant in the context of defending the rule of law in the 
backsliding Member States for two reasons. The first is flexibility. Given that, 
as we explained above, individual judges may still be able to act independently 
 
376 D. Kosař, ‘Beyond Judicial Councils: Forms, Rationales and Impact of Judicial Self-Governance 
in Europe’ (2018) 19 German Law Journal 1567 (and the literature cited therein). See also 
for the argument that the issue of the independence of the judiciary should not only be about 
the institutions but also about judicial mentality and self-image, to avoid empty institutional 
mimicry, M. Bobek, ‘The Fortress of Judicial Independence and the Mental Transitions of the 
Central European Judiciaries’ (2008) 14(1) European Public Law 99.
377 M. Böse, ‘The European Arrest Warrant and the Independence of Public Prosecutors: OG & PI, 
PF, JR & YC’ (2020) 57 Common Market Law Review 1259, at 1279.
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even in a broader context of the executive’s attacks on judicial independence, it 
seems appropriate to differently assess the independence of prosecutors’ offices as 
opposed to the independence of individual judges/courts. Applying the current 
Prosecutors’ Cases test of independence to the Polish judiciary could deprive 
independent Polish judges fighting for their own independence of the possibility 
to refer questions to the Court of Justice, which many of them have done even 
though it has meant, sadly, seriously imperilling their professional career not to 
mention their personal and family life in the process.378 
The second is the expectation of coherence: deploying two tests of independence 
side-by-side, regardless whether this is intended, naturally creates tensions 
between them. Given that the stricter test would presumably be preferred, the 
LM test, which has been rightly criticised as unworkable in practice, as will be 
shown below, will have to be adapted in the light of Court’s renewed emphasis 
on the structural legal guarantees of independence established in the Prosecutors’ 
Cases. This opens additional possibilities for the improved protection of human 
rights in Europe, but also requires careful manoeuvring by the Court of Justice 
in order not to throw the baby out with the bathwater: depriving individual 
still-independent judges of the possibility of asking the Court of Justice to come 
to their rescue via the EU preliminary ruling procedure. In an EAW context, 
however, as will be discussed further below, the fact that Poland still has many 
independent, brave judges is no ground to disregard the structural violation of 
the fundamental right to a fair trial considering the current reality of a hijacked 
judiciary in a country whose current authorities and satellite bodies have legalised 
the systemic violation of EU judicial independence requirements in addition to 
nullifying the Court of Justice’s ruling in AK.379 
Looking beyond the EAW framework and as regards national prosecution 
services, one may finally note that that the Court has already addressed the issue 
of when these are being used to undermine judicial independence via special 
units targeting judges and prosecutors,380 with the Court also due to soon address 
the issue of the corrupting practice of ‘seconded judges’ whose secondment may 
be terminated at any moment at the discretion of the Polish Minister of Justice 
378 At the same time, one must be aware of ongoing attempts by individuals irregularly appointed 
to Poland’s Supreme Court following an inherently deficient appointment procedure to 
legitimise themselves by seeking to get the Court to accept their requests for a preliminary 
ruling. If not addressed, this could also tempt autocratic authorities to asphyxiate the Court or 
bring it into disrepute with bad faith requests. See L. Pech, ‘Polish ruling party’s “fake judges” 
before the European Court of Justice: Some comments on (decided) Case C-824/18 AB 
and (pending) Case C-132/20 Getin Noble Bank’, EU Law Analysis, 7 March 2021: <http://
eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2021/03/polish-ruling-partys-fake-judges-before.html> 
379 For a comprehensive and recent account, see L. Pech, P. Wachowiec and D. Mazur, ‘Poland’s 
Rule of Law Breakdown: A Five-Year Assessment of EU’s (In)Action’ (2021) 13 Hague Journal 
on the Rule of Law 1.
380 Joined Cases C-83/19, C-127/19, C-195/19, C-291/19, C-355/19 and C-397/19, Asociaţia 
‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’ et al., EU:C:2021:393. 
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who is simultaneously the General Prosecutor381 following the adoption of a law 
described as ‘unacceptable in a state governed by the rule of law’ by the Venice 
Commission.382  
5.5 Stricter defence of the right to an independent tribunal in 
a situation of systemic or general deficiencies as regards 
the rule of law: C-216/18 PPU LM383
In LM (also informally known as Celmer), the Court of Justice was presented 
with its first opportunity to address a crucial issue: can an executing judicial 
authority refuse to execute an EAW when there is ample evidence that the 
independence of the authority which issued the EAW is located in a country 
where judicial independence has been structurally compromised and the ‘very 
core of the principle of the presumption of innocence is undermined when one 
and the same person – the Minister for Justice/General Prosecutor – may, in 
criminal cases, exert influence on both the prosecutors and certain judges on 
the bench’?384 In this judgment the Court adopted for the very first time a new, 
two-pronged rule of law test which may however be viewed as self-contradictory 
and unworkable in practice, in addition to being difficult to reconcile with the 
Court of Justice’s own case law on judicial independence. To put it differently, 
the Court sought both to preserve mutual trust in the Area of Freedom, Security, 
and Justice and defend judicial independence. The end result was however an 
unworkable test which preserved mutual trust at the cost of the individual 
fundamental right to a fair trial, while doing nothing to dissuade the Polish 
authorities from further attacking their courts and independent judges. 
Notwithstanding this criticism and the seemingly inexorable move towards an 
effective Polexit from the EU legal order,385 the Court of Justice has so far refused 
to adapt its EAW test to the unforgiving reality of rule of law backsliding as it 
is unfolding in Poland. Indeed, in a subsequent preliminary case originating 
from the Netherlands decided on 17 December 2020, the Court continued 
to hold that the existence of evidence of systemic or generalised deficiencies 
concerning judicial independence in Poland, or even an increase in those 
deficiencies, does not in itself justify the judicial authorities of other Member 
381 Opinion of AG Bobek delivered on 20 May 2021 in Joined Cases C-748/19 to C-754/19, 
EU:C:2021:403 (EU law precludes the Polish practice of secondment of judges to higher courts 
that may be terminated at any moment at the discretion of the Minister of Justice, who is 
simultaneously the General Prosecutor).
382 Opinion on the Act on the Public Prosecutor’s Office as amended, Opinion 892/2017, para. 97 
(2016 Polish Act has created a system with ‘wide and unchecked powers’ which ‘is unacceptable 
in a state governed by the rule of law as it could open the door to arbitrariness’).
383 EU:C:2018:586. 
384 Opinion of AG Bobek delivered on 20 May 2021 in Joined Cases C-748/19 to C-754/19, 
Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim et al., EU:C:2021:403, para. 197. 
385 M. Taborowski, ‘On the PM Morawiecki motion to the Constitutional Tribunal regarding EU 
Treaties conformity with the Polish Constitution (case K 3/21)’, Rule of Law in Poland, 27 April 
2021: <https://ruleoflaw.pl/on-the-pm-morawiecki-motion-to-the-constitutional-tribunal-
regarding-eu-treaties-conformity-with-the-polish-constitution-case-k-3-21/> 
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States refusing to execute an European Arrest Warrant issued by a Polish judicial 
authority.386 Shortly after this judgment of the Court of Justice, it was revealed 
that the independent judges of Poland’s Supreme Court, including its criminal 
chamber, are likely to be subject to bogus criminal charges on the basis of which 
the ruling party’s ‘disciplinary chamber’ may then in turn waive their judicial 
immunity and suspend them.387 The situation is now so out of control that a 
Polish judge unlawfully suspended by a body itself suspended by the Court of 
Justice (the ‘Disciplinary Chamber’) for seeking to apply the Court’s ruling in 
AK (itself unlawfully nullified by the same ‘Disciplinary Chamber’) has been to 
date unable to get reinstated, even after a Polish court held his suspension to be 
unlawful.388 Meanwhile, mutual trust is supposed to remain the principle and 
a refusal to execute an EAW from authorities located in Poland the exception.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)
25 July 2018
Case C-216/18 PPU
REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the 
High Court (Ireland), made by decision of 23 March 2018, received at 
the Court on 27 March 2018,
in proceedings relating to the execution of European arrest warrants 
issued against
LM
[For ease of reading, references to previous cases have been omitted]
Excerpts:
34 Thus, by its two questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, 
the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 1(3) of Framework 
Decision 2002/584 must be interpreted as meaning that, where the executing 
judicial authority, called upon to decide whether a person in respect of whom 
a European arrest warrant has been issued for the purposes of conducting 
a criminal prosecution is to be surrendered, has material, such as that set 
out in a reasoned proposal of the Commission adopted pursuant to Article 
7(1) TEU, indicating that there is a real risk of breach of the fundamental 
right to a fair trial guaranteed by the second paragraph of Article 47 of the 
Charter, on account of systemic or generalised deficiencies so far as concerns 
the independence of the issuing Member State’s judiciary, that authority must 
386 Joined Cases C-354/20 PPU, L and C-412/20 PPU, P, EU:C:2020:1033.
387 M. Jałoszewski, ‘National Prosecutor’s Office to raid the Supreme Court’, Rule of Law in Poland, 
22 March 2021: <https://ruleoflaw.pl/national-prosecutors-office-to-raid-the-supreme-court> 
388 I. Görke, ‘Judge suspended for implementing a CJEU ruling won a case that lets him return 
to the bench. His superior refuses to comply’, Wyborcza.pl, 26 April 2021: < https://wyborcza.
pl/7,173236,27022183,head-of-local-court-refuses-to-comply-with-decision-allowing.html> 
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determine, specifically and precisely, whether there are substantial grounds for 
believing that the individual concerned will run such a risk if he is surrendered 
to that State. If the answer is in the affirmative, the referring court asks the 
Court of Justice to specify the conditions which such a check must satisfy.
[…]
36 Both the principle of mutual trust between the Member States and the 
principle of mutual recognition, which is itself based on the mutual trust 
between the latter, are, in EU law, of fundamental importance given that 
they allow an area without internal borders to be created and maintained. 
More specifically, the principle of mutual trust requires, particularly as 
regards the area of freedom, security and justice, each of those States, save 
in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to 
be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights 
recognised by EU law.
37 Thus, when implementing EU law, the Member States may, under EU 
law, be required to presume that fundamental rights have been observed by 
the other Member States, so that not only may they not demand a higher 
level of national protection of fundamental rights from another Member 
State than that provided by EU law, but also, save in exceptional cases, they 
may not check whether that other Member State has actually, in a specific 
case, observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by the European Union.
[…]
46 In the present instance, the person concerned, relying upon the reasoned 
proposal and the documents to which it refers, has opposed his surrender to 
the Polish judicial authorities, submitting, in particular, that his surrender 
would expose him to a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice on account of 
the lack of independence of the courts of the issuing Member State resulting 
from implementation of the recent legislative reforms of the system of 
justice in that Member State.
47 It should thus, first of all, be determined whether, like a real risk of 
breach of Article 4 of the Charter, a real risk of breach of the fundamental 
right of the individual concerned to an independent tribunal and, therefore, 
of his fundamental right to a fair trial as laid down in the second paragraph 
of Article 47 of the Charter is capable of permitting the executing judicial 
authority to refrain, by way of exception, from giving effect to a European 
arrest warrant, on the basis of Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584.
48 In that regard, it must be pointed out that the requirement of judicial 
independence forms part of the essence of the fundamental right to a fair 
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trial, a right which is of cardinal importance as a guarantee that all the rights 
which individuals derive from EU law will be protected and that the values 
common to the Member States set out in Article 2 TEU, in particular the 
value of the rule of law, will be safeguarded.
[…]
60 Thus, where, as in the main proceedings, the person in respect of whom 
a European arrest warrant has been issued, pleads, in order to oppose his 
surrender to the issuing judicial authority, that there are systemic deficiencies, 
or, at all events, generalised deficiencies, which, according to him, are liable 
to affect the independence of the judiciary in the issuing Member State and 
thus to compromise the essence of his fundamental right to a fair trial, the 
executing judicial authority is required to assess whether there is a real risk 
that the individual concerned will suffer a breach of that fundamental right, 
when it is called upon to decide on his surrender to the authorities of the 
issuing Member State.
61 To that end, the executing judicial authority must, as a first step, assess, on 
the basis of material that is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated 
concerning the operation of the system of justice in the issuing Member 
State, whether there is a real risk, connected with a lack of independence 
of the courts of that Member State on account of systemic or generalised 
deficiencies there, of the fundamental right to a fair trial being breached. 
Information in a reasoned proposal recently addressed by the Commission 
to the Council on the basis of Article 7(1) TEU is particularly relevant for 
the purposes of that assessment.
62 Such an assessment must be carried out having regard to the standard 
of protection of the fundamental right that is guaranteed by the second 
paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter.
63 As regards the requirement that courts be independent which forms part 
of the essence of that right, it should be pointed out that that requirement 
is inherent in the task of adjudication and has two aspects. The first aspect, 
which is external in nature, presupposes that the court concerned exercises 
its functions wholly autonomously, without being subject to any hierarchical 
constraint or subordinated to any other body and without taking orders 
or instructions from any source whatsoever, thus being protected against 
external interventions or pressure liable to impair the independent judgment 
of its members and to influence their decisions.
64 That essential freedom from such external factors requires certain 
guarantees appropriate for protecting the person of those who have the task 
of adjudicating in a dispute, such as guarantees against removal from office. 
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Their receipt of a level of remuneration commensurate with the importance 
of the functions that they carry out also constitutes a guarantee essential to 
judicial independence.
65 The second aspect, which is internal in nature, is linked to impartiality 
and seeks to ensure that an equal distance is maintained from the parties 
to the proceedings and their respective interests with regard to the subject 
matter of those proceedings. That aspect requires objectivity and the 
absence of any interest in the outcome of the proceedings apart from the 
strict application of the rule of law.
66 Those guarantees of independence and impartiality require rules, 
particularly as regards the composition of the body and the appointment, 
length of service and grounds for abstention, rejection and dismissal of its 
members, in order to dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals 
as to the imperviousness of that body to external factors and its neutrality 
with respect to the interests before it. In order to consider the condition 
regarding the independence of the body concerned as met, the case-law 
requires, inter alia, that dismissals of its members should be determined by 
express legislative provisions.
67 The requirement of independence also means that the disciplinary regime 
governing those who have the task of adjudicating in a dispute must display 
the necessary guarantees in order to prevent any risk of its being used as a 
system of political control of the content of judicial decisions. Rules which 
define, in particular, both conduct amounting to disciplinary offences and 
the penalties actually applicable, which provide for the involvement of an 
independent body in accordance with a procedure which fully safeguards 
the rights enshrined in Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter, in particular the 
rights of the defence, and which lay down the possibility of bringing legal 
proceedings challenging the disciplinary bodies’ decisions constitute a set 
of guarantees that are essential for safeguarding the independence of the 
judiciary.
68 If, having regard to the requirements noted in paragraphs 62 to 67 of 
the present judgment, the executing judicial authority finds that there is, 
in the issuing Member State, a real risk of breach of the essence of the 
fundamental right to a fair trial on account of systemic or generalised 
deficiencies concerning the judiciary of that Member State, such as to 
compromise the independence of that State’s courts, that authority must, 
as a second step, assess specifically and precisely whether, in the particular 
circumstances of the case, there are substantial grounds for believing that, 
following his surrender to the issuing Member State, the requested person 
will run that risk.
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69 That specific assessment is also necessary where, as in the present instance, 
(i) the issuing Member State has been the subject of a reasoned proposal 
adopted by the Commission pursuant to Article 7(1) TEU in order for the 
Council to determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by that 
Member State of the values referred to in Article 2 TEU, such as that of the 
rule of law, on account, in particular, of actions impairing the independence 
of the national courts, and (ii) the executing judicial authority considers 
that it possesses, on the basis, in particular, of such a proposal, material 
showing that there are systemic deficiencies, in the light of those values, at 
the level of that Member State’s judiciary.
70 It is apparent from recital 10 of Framework Decision 2002/584 that 
implementation of the European arrest warrant mechanism may be 
suspended only in the event of a serious and persistent breach by one of the 
Member States of the principles set out in Article 2 TEU, determined by the 
European Council pursuant to Article 7(2) TEU, with the consequences set 
out in Article 7(3) TEU. 
71 It thus follows from the very wording of that recital that it is for the 
European Council to determine a breach in the issuing Member State of the 
principles set out in Article 2 TEU, including the principle of the rule of 
law, with a view to application of the European arrest warrant mechanism 
being suspended in respect of that Member State.
72 Therefore, it is only if the European Council were to adopt a decision 
determining, as provided for in Article 7(2) TEU, that there is a serious 
and persistent breach in the issuing Member State of the principles set 
out in Article 2 TEU, such as those inherent in the rule of law, and the 
Council were then to suspend Framework Decision 2002/584 in respect of 
that Member State that the executing judicial authority would be required 
to refuse automatically to execute any European arrest warrant issued by 
it, without having to carry out any specific assessment of whether the 
individual concerned runs a real risk that the essence of his fundamental 
right to a fair trial will be affected.
73 Accordingly, as long as such a decision has not been adopted by the 
European Council, the executing judicial authority may refrain, on the 
basis of Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584, to give effect to a 
European arrest warrant issued by a Member State which is the subject of 
a reasoned proposal as referred to in Article 7(1) TEU only in exceptional 
circumstances where that authority finds, after carrying out a specific and 
precise assessment of the particular case, that there are substantial grounds 
for believing that the person in respect of whom that European arrest warrant 
has been issued will, following his surrender to the issuing judicial authority,  
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run a real risk of breach of his fundamental right to an independent tribunal 
and, therefore, of the essence of his fundamental right to a fair trial.
74 In the course of such an assessment, the executing judicial authority must, 
in particular, examine to what extent the systemic or generalised deficiencies, 
as regards the independence of the issuing Member State’s courts, to which 
the material available to it attests are liable to have an impact at the level 
of that State’s courts with jurisdiction over the proceedings to which the 
requested person will be subject.
75 If that examination shows that those deficiencies are liable to affect those 
courts, the executing judicial authority must also assess, in the light of the 
specific concerns expressed by the individual concerned and any information 
provided by him, whether there are substantial grounds for believing that 
he will run a real risk of breach of his fundamental right to an independent 
tribunal and, therefore, of the essence of his fundamental right to a fair trial, 
having regard to his personal situation, as well as to the nature of the offence 
for which he is being prosecuted and the factual context that form the basis 
of the European arrest warrant.
76 Furthermore, the executing judicial authority must, pursuant to Article 
15(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584, request from the issuing judicial 
authority any supplementary information that it considers necessary for 
assessing whether there is such a risk.
[…]
79 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions 
referred is that Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584 must 
be interpreted as meaning that, where the executing judicial authority, 
called upon to decide whether a person in respect of whom a European 
arrest warrant has been issued for the purposes of conducting a criminal 
prosecution is to be surrendered, has material, such as that set out in a 
reasoned proposal of the Commission adopted pursuant to Article 7(1) 
TEU, indicating that there is a real risk of breach of the fundamental 
right to a fair trial guaranteed by the second paragraph of Article 47 of 
the Charter, on account of systemic or generalised deficiencies so far as 
concerns the independence of the issuing Member State’s judiciary, that 
authority must determine, specifically and precisely, whether, having regard 
to his personal situation, as well as to the nature of the offence for which 
he is being prosecuted and the factual context that form the basis of the 
European arrest warrant, and in the light of the information provided by the 
issuing Member State pursuant to Article 15(2) of the framework decision, 
there are substantial grounds for believing that that person will run such a 
risk if he is surrendered to that State.
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Analysis
In a situation where the separation of powers is being destroyed in plain sight, and 
the independence of the courts has been methodically undermined with the top 
criminal court itself the subject of the most serious and unlawful interferences,389 
it would appear most reasonable to consider that expecting justice in individual 
cases from such a judiciary is by definition not possible.390 This is the position 
adopted by the Court of Justice in Prosecutors’ Cases: no structural independence 
means no independence, as previously discussed. Similar assumptions guided 
the Irish judge drafting the preliminary questions in LM (or Celmer, before the 
Irish courts). Many hopes among prominent commentators concerned the idea 
that the Court of Justice would come up with a direct and clear assessment of 
the concrete threats to the judiciary of the Member State in question;391 that 
the Court would build on Portuguese Judges and rule on the basis of giving 
clear priority to the importance of both the safeguarding of the rule of law and 
the protection of fundamental rights of the individuals concerned.392 Indeed, 
when the judicial branch as a whole is structurally compromised, it would seem 
difficult to contend that a fair trial can be obtained as one should not have to 
 
389 See most recently, M. Jałoszewski, ‘After Tuleya, Disciplinary Chamber is taking on Prof. 
Wróbel from the Supreme Court’, 29 April 2021: <https://ruleoflaw.pl/after-tuleya-the-
disciplinary-chamber-is-taking-on-prof-wrobel-from-the-supreme-court/> (‘In addition to 
Professor Włodzimierz Wróbel, the prosecutor’s office also wants the immunity of two other 
judges from the Criminal Chamber to be lifted’ in order to bring manifestly spurious criminal 
charges against them. The DC’s panel of usurpers in this case has for rapporteur the individual 
who unlawfully suspended Judge Juszczyszyn when he attempted to apply the Court of Justice’s 
ruling in AK).
390 See however T. Konstadinides, ‘Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law in the Context of 
Non-execution of a European Arrest Warrant: LM’ (2019) 56 Common Market Law Review 
743, at 755: ‘As such, executing judges need to be careful in their individual assessment not to 
be prejudiced against Poland in all situations.’ For an opposing view, see L. Pech, P. Wachowiec 
and D. Mazur, ‘Poland’s Rule of Law Breakdown: A Five-Year Assessment of EU’s (In)Action’ 
(2021) 13 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 1, pp. 37–38: ‘the right to a fair trial in Poland can 
be said to be systematically violated following the adoption of the muzzle law in a situation 
where the ECJ order of 8 April 2020 is furthermore openly violated and the ECJ judgment of 
19 November 2019 formally recognised as lacking legal effect in Poland, and where disciplinary 
proceedings are initiated against all judges who try to execute this judgment […] Polish courts 
can no longer be considered “judicial authorities” notwithstanding the continuing bravery of 
so many individual judges. We cannot however leave the right to a fair trial at the mercy of 
individual judges’ bravery in a situation where each Polish judge may be subject to arbitrary 
disciplinary sanctions for applying EU judicial independence requirements’.
391 For further analysis, see P. Bárd and W. van Ballegooij, ‘Judicial Independence as a Pre-
Condition for Mutual Trust? The ECJ in Minister for Justice and Equality v. LM’ (2018) 9 New 
Journal of European Criminal Law 353; C. Rizcallah, ‘Arrêt “LM”: un risque de violation du 
droit fondamental à un tribunal indépendant s’oppose-t-il à l’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt 
européen?’ (2018) Journal de droit européen 348; M. Wendel, ‘Mutual Trust, Essence and 
Federalism – Between Consolidating and Fragmenting the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
after LM’ (2019) 15 European Constitutional Law Review 17.
392 The difference in approach exhibited by the Court in these two cases is underlined by M. 
Krajewski, ‘Who Is Afraid of the European Council? The Court of Justice’s Cautious Approach 
to the Independence of Domestic Judges’ (2018) 14 European Constitutional Law Review 792, 
793–794.
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expect a brave judge simply to be subject to fair and independent proceedings. 
In LM, the Court of Justice was thus presented with an ideal opportunity to 
clarify the relationship between the principle of mutual trust as a key principle 
of EU law underlying the EAW system and always presumed, and the imperative 
to safeguard the fundamental right to a fair trial before an independent and 
impartial court established by law.
Ill-advised test
The systemic nature of the attacks against courts and the principle of judicial 
independence in Poland, outlined very well by the referring court, offered 
the Court of Justice an opportunity to go deeper into the meaning of judicial 
independence under EU law than what has been done of previous occasions. 
LM raised big expectations, the absolute majority of which, however, did not 
materialise. This is partly due to the fact that the Court failed to do the work 
itself, in contrast to what it did in Portuguese Judges, and delegated the actual act 
of assessment to the referring national judge instead. Problematically, however, 
the Court provided the referring judge with an unworkable and largely illogical 
two-pronged test, which has continued to puzzle national judges ever since. 
Moreover, the Court also obliged the judges handling EAW requests to engage 
in a kind of ‘dialogue’ with potentially non-independent and sometimes outright 
phony and unlawfully appointed ‘colleagues’ in the judiciaries of the Member 
States experiencing attacks on the rule of law, ‘presupposing an unlikely scenario 
that a captured court will admit that it was captured’.393 The questionable nature 
of this premise, which underlies the new test, has recently been highlighted by 
an Oberlandesgericht in Karlsruhe which, having sent a number of questions to 
a Polish court, decided against honouring the EAW request without waiting for 
the answers to come back.394
The test introduced by the Court in LM is based – ill-advisedly we would add 
– on the earlier case of Aranyosi and Căldăraru, which however had nothing to 
do with judicial independence.395 This was bound to produce the wrong test 
from the start, as you cannot reasonably compare a situation where the rule 
of law is deliberately and systemically undermined by national authorities 
to a case where extremely poor conditions of detention are primarily due to 
393 D. Kochenov and P. Bárd, ‘The Last Soldier Standing? Courts versus Politicians and the Rule of 
Law Crisis in the New Member States of the EU’ (2019) 1 European Yearbook of Constitutional 
Law 243, 274.
394 P. Bárd and J. Morijn, ‘Domestic Courts Pushing for a Workable Test to Protect the Rule of Law 
in the EU’, VerfBlog 19 April 2020: <https://verfassungsblog.de/domestic-courts-pushing-for-a-
workable-test-to-protect-the-rule-of-law-in-the-eu/>.
395 Case C-404 and 659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru [2016] EU:C:2016:198. For further 
analysis, see G. Anagnostaras, ‘Mutual Confidence Is Not Blind Trust! Fundamental Rights 
Protection and the Execution of the European Arrest Warrant: Aranyosi and Căldăraru’ (2016) 
53 Common Market Law Review 1683; C. Rizcallah, ‘Le principe de confiance mutuelle: une 
utopie malheureuse?’ (2019) 118 Revue trimestrielle de droits de l’homme 297.
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state’s underinvestment in its prison system. To put it differently, one cannot 
address the structural curtailment of judicial independence on the basis of a test 
devised to assess the conditions of detention for individual prisoners. Be that 
as it may, the LM test represents an improvement on the ‘general and systemic 
deficiencies’396 test in the field of human rights protection/prison conditions. The 
test consists of two successive prongs:
(i) The executing judicial authority must first establish the existence of 
systemic generalised deficiencies affecting the system of justice of the 
issuing Member State on the basis of ‘objective, reliable, specific and 
properly updated’397 information, the activation of Article 7(1) TEU 
being highlighted as a particularly relevant factor in this respect;
(ii) The executing judicial authority must then establish the risk of a 
possible breach of fair trial standards in the particular circumstances 
of the concrete case at hand and in particular, establish whether the 
systemic deficiencies affect specifically the court with jurisdiction 
over the suspect should the surrender be granted.
According to the Court, EAW requests cannot therefore be suspended en masse 
even in a situation where the Article 7(1) TEU procedure has been started against 
the relevant Member State. A specific assessment in every case at both general and 
individual level is required.398 
Misreading the EAW Framework Decision
The reason behind the Court being so strict about defending mutual trust when 
it ought to arguably to be stricter about the protection of the fundamental right 
to a fair trial, was, apparently, in-built – so the Court saw it – at least in part, 
into the EAW Decision, since it expressly allows for the general suspension of 
trust between the judicial authorities of the Member States seemingly only in 
cases when the European Council has ruled on the existence of the breach of 
the values the Union is built on – the values of Article 2 TEU, on the basis of 
the Article 7(2) and (3) TEU procedure. Given the high thresholds required 





396 See A. von Bogdandy and M. Ioannidis, ‘Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of Law: What It Is, 
What Has Been Done, What Can Be Done’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 59.
397 LM judgment, para. 61.
398 D. Kochenov and P. Bárd, ‘The Last Soldier Standing? Courts versus Politicians and the Rule of 
Law Crisis in the New Member States of the EU’ (2019) 1 European Yearbook of Constitutional 
Law 243.
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European Council, it is most unlikely that this procedure – which has been 
called a ‘nuclear option’399 in reference to the exceptional nature of the situations 
it is designed to prevent and/or sanction – will be ever put to use.400 
This reading of the Framework Decision is however arguably factually incorrect. 
Why? Because it reflects a failure to read a piece of EU secondary legislation in 
light of the EU primary law as it stood on the day of the ruling, while justifying 
this failure on grounds of an out-of-date, non-binding recital which simply 
failed to take into account the current Article 7(1) TEU, though only because 
this provision did not exist when the Framework Decision on the EAW was 
adopted. As Petra Bárd and Wouter van Ballegooij explain:
This understanding is based on a reading which disregards the historical evolution 
of Article 7 TEU. The reason Recital 10 is silent about current Article 7(1) TEU 
is that it did not exist at the time the Framework Decision had been drafted. 
Since a preventive arm has been added in the meantime, one could argue that the 
drafters of the Framework Decision intended to refer to Article 7 as such, and the 
preventive arm should also be read into Recital 10. Such an interpretation would 
have been preferable in light of the inherent asymmetry between the individual 
and the state, especially in the area of criminal law.401
The trouble with LM was of course that the reference ended up before the Court 
following the ‘mere’ activation of the preventive arm of Article 7 TEU (i.e. 
Article 7(1) TEU) against Poland, which only allows the European Council to 
state the risk of a breach and would thus be not enough, even if this procedure 
were concluded (still pending at the time of writing), to justify the ‘wholesale’ 
suspension of all EAWs issued by Polish judicial authorities. The Court’s 
maximalist interpretation of the EU Framework Decision also means that ‘even 
if Poland were to become a formal dictatorship and no unanimous agreement 
was found to sanction Poland under Article 7(2) and (3) TEU [the sanctioning 
arm of Article 7 TEU], national courts from other EU countries would still need 
to assess each EAW on a case-by-case basis’.402
399 See D. Kochenov, ‘Article 7: A Commentary on a Much Talked-About “Dead” Provision’ (2018) 
38 Polish Yearbook of International Law 166; L. Pech, ‘From “Nuclear Option” to Damp Squib? 
A Critical Assessment of the Four Article 7(1) TEU Hearings to Date’, VerfBlog, 13 November 
2019: <https://verfassungsblog.de/from-nuclear-option-to-damp-squib/>.
400 D. Kochenov, ‘Article 7’, in M. Kellerbauer, M. Klamert and J. Tomkin (eds), The Treaties 
and the Charter of Fundamental Rights – A Commentary (Oxford: OUP, 2019), 88; G. Wilms, 
Protecting Fundamental Values in the European Union through the Rule of Law (Florence: EUI, 
2017); D. Kochenov, ‘On Barks, Bites, and Promises’, in U. Belavusau and A. Gliszczyńska-
Grabias (eds), European Constitutionalism (Oxford: OUP, 2020).
401 P. Bárd and W. van Ballegooij, ‘The CJEU in the Celmer case: One step forward, two steps back 
for upholding the rule of law within the EU’, VerfBlog, 29 July 2018: <https://verfassungsblog.
de/the-cjeu-in-the-celmer-case-one-step-forward-two-steps-back-for-upholding-the-rule-of-law-
within-the-eu/>
402 Pech, Wachowiec and Mazur, ‘Poland’s Rule of Law Breakdown’, op. cit. 
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Unworkable second prong 
In practice and leaving aside the historically flawed interpretation of Article 7, 
the second prong of the LM test ‘makes the suspension of surrender almost 
impossible. It seems to be a disproportionate burden on the individual to show 
how a systemic breach of the rule of law affects his or her case individually’.403 
Addressing the failures of the rule of law through the prism of the violation of 
an individual fundamental right is clearly a problematic approach to the issue 
at hand, which could hardly bear fruit. It is unquestionable that the norms 
enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter and Article 19(1) TEU fundamentally 
differ in nature.404 The LM Court thus seems to pretend not to take proper notice 
of this fundamental difference: a right is not a principle and vice versa.405
This mistake will not appear new to the careful observers of the rule of law-related 
case law of the Court of Justice. This is exactly what occurred in Commission v. 
Hungary (judicial retirement age),406 where the Court did not adopt a rule of law 
framework of analysis applying instead a non-discrimination on the basis of age 
framework of analysis as suggested by the Commission. This led the Commission 
to win a Pyrrhic victory while the integrity of the Hungarian judiciary was (and 
continues to be) undermined. It took a few more years before the Court gave 
its full force to Article 19(1) TEU in the Portuguese Judges case, which in turn 
convinced the Commission to rely finally and directly on the principle of judicial 
independence to defend judicial independence.407 
Reasoning by analogy, we might hope to see at some point a 2.0 version of the 
LM test where the Court finally accepts that honouring an EAW issued by a 
judicial body which is an integral part of a structurally compromised judicial 
system cannot be acceptable. It is just not good enough to force the surrender of 
suspects to a country on the ground that one can still potentially secure a fair trial 
on a few scattered islands of independence in an ocean increasingly polluted by 
authoritarianism. This is why the LM test can be viewed as a missed opportunity 
in addition to being seriously misguided. Indeed, as one of the present authors 
argued with Patryk Wachowiec,
403 D. Kochenov and P. Bárd, ‘The Last Soldier Standing? Courts versus Politicians and the Rule of 
Law Crisis in the New Member States of the EU’ (2019) 1 European Yearbook of Constitutional 
Law 243, 274.
404 See also M. Leloup, ‘An Uncertain First Step in the Field of Judicial Self-Government’ (2020) 16 
European Constitutional Law Review 1, 19.
405 T. Lock, ‘Rights and Principles in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2019) 56 Common 
Market Law Review 1201.
406 Case C-286/12 Commission v. Hungary, EU:C:2012:687 (compulsory retirement of judges).  
For further analysis, see the annotation of U. Belavusau in (2013) 50 Common Market Law 
Review 1145.
407 See supra Sections 2 and 3.
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in a situation of systemic attacks targeting the whole judicial system, there is, 
by definition, already a “real risk” of a breach of the fundamental rights to an 
independent tribunal and to a fair trial in every single case. One may view as 
particularly unworkable any requirement imposing on a national court acting as 
executing judicial authority the need to examine the extent to which systemic 
attacks on the rule of law are liable to have an impact at the level of the courts with 
jurisdiction over the requested person’s case ... we also find absurd to demand that 
such a national court request from the issuing judicial authority any information 
that it considers necessary for assessing whether there is such a risk. This is akin 
to asking a potentially compromised court to confirm that it is not (or not yet) 
compromised in a context where judges can be subject to kangaroo disciplinary 
proceedings just for daring sending questions to the ECJ under Article 267 
TFEU.408
Undermining mutual trust and the rule of law in the name of saving both
The Court, we submit, in trying to save both mutual trust and judicial 
independence, paradoxically ended up undermining both. We also respectfully 
submit that this end result was unlikely to have arisen had the Court looked 
more carefully at the history of the Framework Decision. In any event, one 
cannot prioritise an arguably wrong reading of a piece of secondary legislation to 
undermine some of the most fundamental principles underlying the whole legal 
order. Indeed, it would seem that answering the question ‘Who is the guardian 
of judicial independence in Europe?’409 based on Recital 10 of the EAW Decision, 
which gives absolute priority to Article 7(2) TEU as a possible justification 
for the non-execution of EAWs, is absolutely unacceptable in the context of 
the towering importance of the principle of the rule of law in Article 2 TEU. 
This is particularly true, given the emerging clarity regarding the substantive 
understanding of the meaning of judicial independence as a vital part of the 
rule of law. It is required by both Articles 19(1) and 267 TFEU, as we have 
also seen in Banco de Santander SA and the Prosecutors’ Cases, among countless 
other examples, and thus supplies a vital element for the whole edifice of the 
European legal order. The Court’s misstep in answering this crucial question in 
LM, based on secondary legislation, will hopefully be corrected as the case law 
develops. Moreover, one must take account of the problems stemming from LM. 
As any other impossible test, the LM approach results in excessively prolonged 
proceedings and undermines legal certainty, while helping no one. Indeed, 
 
 
408 L. Pech and P. Wachowiec, ‘1095 Days Later: From Bad to Worse Regarding the Rule of Law in 
Poland (Part II)’, VerfBlog, 17 January 2019: <https://verfassungsblog.de/1095-days-later-from-
bad-to-worse-regarding-the-rule-of-law-in-poland-part-ii/>.
409 M. Krajewski, ‘Who Is Afraid of the European Council? The Court of Justice’s Cautious 
Approach to the Independence of Domestic Judges’ (2018) 14 European Constitutional Law 
Review 792, 804.
170 Respect for the Rule of Law in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice SIEPS 2021:3
mutual trust, when based on nothing, is bound to fail as a persuasive element of 
the law, even in the conditions where it is rigorously enforced.410
In making it extremely difficult if not impossible to ignore EAW requests 
originating from rule of law backsliding countries, the Court has partly followed 
the Opinion of AG Tanchev, who argued for the adoption of an even more 
stringent test relying on the concept of ‘flagrant denial of justice’.411 This 
concept, borrowed from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, is 
however entirely unsuitable to addressing the deliberate, sustained and structural 
curtailment of judicial independence. Can we seriously expect a national court 
only to refuse to honour an EAW in a Guantanamo Bay situation?412 This stance 
threatens the very legal order it aims to preserve by driving courts concerned 
by the standard of the rule of law in a state to disregard case law which is 
wrongly more concerned with preserving mutual trust than preserving judicial 
independence and the right to a fair trial of those subject to EAWs issued by 
authorities located in autocratising countries. However critical we might be of 
LM, which offered a doubly unworkable test unable to protect the rights of the 
accused in full, it is welcome to see that the Court focused on the ‘real risk of 
breach of fundamental rights’ as its benchmark, rather than the ‘Guantanamo 
Bay test’ suggested by AG Tanchev. We need to be particularly careful with the 
‘essence of rights’ train of thought, however, as Mattias Wendel rightly warns:413 
searching for the ‘essence’ can cause us to ignore the actual right.
To conclude, LM embraced a flawed test which suffers from major weaknesses, 
both from a theoretical and practical perspective.414 The Court may have been 
worried that a finding that the Polish judicial system is compromised as a whole 
could prevent individual Polish judges to continue submitting references to it, 
but this is arguably misguided. The Court could have held – without depriving 
410 Armin von Bogdandy is absolutely right to underline that trust is first and foremost a 
phenomenon which is not legal in nature: A. von Bogdandy, ‘Beyond the Rechtsgemeinschaft, 
with Trust – Reframing the Concept of European Rule of Law’ (2018) MPIL Research Paper 
2/2018, 13.
411 EU:C:2018:517, para. 85.
412 Ibid., para. 92.
413 M. Wendel, ‘Mutual Trust, Essence and Federalism – Between Consolidating and Fragmenting 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice after LM’ (2019) 15 European Constitutional Law 
Review 17.
414 P. Bárd and J. Morijn, ‘Luxembourg’s Unworkable Test to Protect the Rule of Law in the EU 
(Part I)’, VerfBlog, 18 April 2020: <https://verfassungsblog.de/luxembourgs-unworkable-test-
to-protect-the-rule-of-law-in-the-eu/>; P. Bárd and J. Morijn, ‘Domestic Courts Pushing for a 
Workable Test to Protect the Rule of Law in the EU (Part II)’, VerfBlog 19 April 2020: <https://
verfassungsblog.de/domestic-courts-pushing-for-a-workable-test-to-protect-the-rule-of-law-in-
the-eu/>.
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Polish judges of the possibility of referring questions415 – that the right to a fair 
trial is systemically compromised in a system where the judges of the top criminal 
court of last resort are themselves the subject of sham criminal charges416 and the 
‘very core of the principle of the presumption of innocence is undermined when 
one and the same person – the Minister for Justice/General Prosecutor – may, 
in criminal cases, exert influence on both the prosecutors and certain judges 
on the bench’.417 In any event and at the very least, the Court ought to shift 
the burden of proof onto the authorities located in a Member State identified 
as experiencing an autocratising process, especially in a situation where Article 
7(1) TEU has been activated.418 Moreover, to agree with Petra Bárd and John 
Morijn, the two-pronged test is unsound: ‘if there is a systematic problem, by 
definition there is an individual problem too. Protecting minimum standards 
cannot be squared with mutual trust that, based on the Court’s own Polish 
judicial independence case-law, is currently unwarranted, whatever the political 
and practical ramifications’.419 Worse, the premise that the imposition of mutual 
trust as opposed to carefully growing and reinforcing it could be a successful way 
forward for the safeguarding of the rule of law in the EU is clearly erroneous. Lastly, 
this decentralisation of the assessment of judicial independence to a multitude 
of national courts is bound to produce a multitude of potentially contradictory 
voices, thus undermining rather than reinforcing mutual trust even further. It 
was therefore unsurprising to see the Irish Supreme Court recently requesting 
the Court of Justice to once again reconsider its approach regarding EAW 
surrenders to Poland considering Poland’s systemic rule of law deficiencies which 
‘are now even more troubling and of deeper concern following the introduction’ 
415 One may note in this context the analysis of AG Bobek according to which Article 19(1) TEU, 
Article 47 of the Charter, and Article 267 TFEU have the same content but a different purpose. 
In other words, a ‘slightly different type of examination must be carried out under each of the 
three provisions’. As far the concept of ‘court or tribunal’ under Article 267 TFEU, the Court’s 
analysis tends to focus ‘on a structural issue, at a rather general level: the position of that body 
within the institutional framework of the Member States. The intensity of the Court’s review 
with regard to the independence of the body is, within that context, not that intensive’. Opinion 
of AG Bobek delivered on 20 May 2021 in Joined Cases C-748/19 to C-754/19, Prokuratura 
Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim et al., EU:C:2021:403, paras 163 and 166.
416 See most recently, M. Jaloszewski, ‘After Tuleya, Disciplinary Chamber is taking on Prof. Wróbel 
from the Supreme Court’, 29 April 2021: <https://ruleoflaw.pl/after-tuleya-the-disciplinary-
chamber-is-taking-on-prof-wrobel-from-the-supreme-court/> (‘In addition to Professor 
Włodzimierz Wróbel, the prosecutor’s office also wants the immunity of two other judges from 
the Criminal Chamber to be lifted’)
417 Ibid., para. 197. At the very least, this must imply that no surrender can be granted in a 
situation where a ‘seconded judge’ is or may be involved. 
418 For a proposal to make the LM test more workable and the argument that the real risk of 
violation of the fundamental right to an independent tribunal in the issuing backsliding 
state requires a moderate level of danger and should not be mistaken for near certainty, see L. 
Mancano, ‘You’ll never work alone: A systemic assessment of the European Arrest Warrant and 
Judicial Independence’ (2021) 58 Common Market Law Review 683. 
419 Bárd and Morijn, ‘Domestic Courts Pushing for a Workable Test’, ibid.
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of new laws since the ECJ first established a new rule of law test in the LM case.420 
Indeed, according to the Court of Justice’s own Advocate General Bobek, in a 
context where the Minister for Justice is the chief prosecutorial body whereas 
these two institutions should normally function separately, ‘the minimum 
guarantees necessary to ensure the indispensable separation of powers between 
the executive and the judiciary are no longer present’ in Poland.421 It follows inter 
alia that the very core of the principle of the presumption of innocence can no 
longer be guaranteed in criminal cases according to AG Bobek.422 Since then, the 
situation has further deteriorated and reached a possible point of no return with 
Polish authorities publicly and repeatedly stated that ‘there is no possibility’ of 
implementing the Court’s order in C-204/21 R (Poland’s muzzle law) and the 
Court’s ruling in C-791/19 (Poland’s new disciplinary regime for judges)423 on 
account of their alleged unconstitutionality. 
5.6 Stricter interpretation of the right to a tribunal 
established by law: Joined Cases C-542/18 RX-II 
Simpson and C-543/18 RX-II HG 424
The Grand Chamber judgment in Simpson and HG is connected to the far-
reaching and arguably ill-advised changes made in relation to the General Court 
of the EU, which resulted in the number of General Court (‘GC’) judges being 
doubled and the Civil Service Tribunal (‘CST’) being closed in September 
2016.425 Before it became known that the CST would be closed, a public call for 
applications was published in December 2013 in respect of two judicial posts with 
a starting date of 1 October 2014. For reasons which need not be summarised 
here, the Council proved unable to fill those two posts while the term of office 
of a third CST judge expired on 31 August 2015. In a Decision adopted on 22 
March 2016, the Council decided to appoint three rather than two judges from 
the list of candidates established following the call for applications of 2013. The 
Council justified this manifestly irregular course of action ‘for reasons of timing’ 
due to the then near closure of the CST on 1 September 2016. 
420 Judgment of 23 July 2021 in Orlowski, S:AP:IE:2021:000018 and Lyszkiewicz, 
S:AP:IE:2021:000020, para. 55. The Irish Supreme Court also observed at para. 59 that the 
‘changes that have occurred in Poland concerning the rule of law are, as previously observed, 
even more troubling and grave than they were at the time when LM was decided by the CJEU. 
It now appears that there are significant issues with regard to the validity of the appointment 
process for judges in Poland’.
421 Opinion of EU Advocate General Bobek delivered on 20 May 2021 in Joined Cases C-748/19 
to C-754/19, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim et al., EU:C:2021:403, para. 195. 
422 Ibid, para. 197.
423 ‘Polish justice minister says Warsaw cannot comply with EU’s court ruling’, Euractiv.com, 22 
July 2021.  
424 EU:C:2020:232.
425 For further analysis and references, see A. Alemanno and L. Pech, ‘Thinking Justice Outside the 
Docket: A Critical Assessment of the Reform of the EU’s Court System’ (2017) 54 Common 
Market Law Review 129.
173SIEPS 2021:3 Respect for the Rule of Law in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice
In three rulings, two of which are the subject of the Court’s Grand Chamber 
judgment of 26 March 2020, the General Court set aside the orders of the CST 
on the main ground that one of the members of the panel of CST judges had 
been irregularly appointed in violation of Article 47 CFR and in particular, 
the principle of the ‘lawful judge’, to borrow the unusual phrasing used by the 
General Court which appeared to be inspired from German law.426 The Court of 
Justice, exercising its review jurisdiction and in line with the reasoning suggested 
by Advocate General Sharpston, found that the General Court correctly held that 
the Council had erred in law by using the list of candidates drawn up as a result 
of the 2013 call for applications to fill the third post while the public call had 
only provided for two posts. However, the Court of Justice found no violation of 
the ‘fundamental rules’ governing the procedure for the appointment of judges 
to the EU CST. This led the Court to rule that the applicants did not suffer 
from a violation of their right to a tribunal established by law notwithstanding 
the Council’s manifest disregard of the 2013 call for applications. It followed 
that the Court did not have to deal with the issue of whether the principle of 
legal certainty should preclude judgments which had been delivered by or which 
involved a judge irregularly appointed from being set aside automatically as a 
consequence. 
Be that as it may, this Grand Chamber judgment is particularly noteworthy 
as it prefigured a stricter enforcement against backsliding authorities and their 
‘fake judges’ (especially those of Poland) of the requirement that a tribunal must 
be established by law, and by confirming inter alia that everyone must be able 
to invoke before any court an infringement of this requirement in relation to 
possible irregularities vitiating any judicial appointment procedure.427 
426 The principle of the lawful judge appears to originate from German law. See Opinion of 
Advocate General Sharpston delivered on 12 September 2019, EU:C:2019:977, para. 101: 
In Germany, the Federal Administrative Court ‘has had occasion to make the point that, 
notwithstanding its fundamental importance to litigants, the right to a “lawful judge” 
as provided for in the German Constitution aims in principle only to prevent the risk of 
manipulation of judicial institutions’.
427 The specific situation of the multiple manifestly unlawful judicial appointments made by Polish 
authorities is examined infra in Section 6. 
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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)
26 March 2020
In Joined Cases C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II,
REVIEW, pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 256(2) 
TFEU, of the judgments of the General Court of the European Union 
(Appeal Chamber) of 19 July 2018, Simpson v. Council (T-646/16 P), 
and HG v. Commission (T-693/16 P), delivered in the proceedings
Simpson v. Council of the European Union (C-542/18 RX-II),
and
HG v. European Commission (C-543/18 RX-II)
[For ease of reading, references to previous case law were omitted]
Excerpts: 
50 As regards the answer to the question to be reviewed in this case, it is 
necessary to begin by examining whether, having regard, in particular, to 
the general principle of legal certainty, the General Court erred in law by 
setting aside the contested decisions on the ground that the composition 
of the panel of judges of the Civil Service Tribunal which had delivered 
those decisions had been irregular because of an irregularity affecting the 
procedure for the appointment of one of the members of that panel of 
judges, leading to a breach of the principle of the lawful judge, laid down 
in the first sentence of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter.
[…]
55 However, it follows from the fundamental right to an effective remedy 
before an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law, 
guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter, that everyone must, in principle, 
have the possibility of invoking an infringement of that right. Accordingly 
the Courts of the European Union must be able to check whether an 
irregularity vitiating the appointment procedure at issue could lead to an 
infringement of that fundamental right.
56 It is also necessary to examine whether the fact that none of the parties 
in the present cases had taken issue with the regularity of the panel of judges 
that had adopted the contested decisions precluded the General Court from 
examining that issue of regularity of its own motion.
57 In that regard, it must be emphasised that the guarantees of access to 
an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law, and 
in particular those which determine what constitutes a tribunal and how 
it is composed, represent the cornerstone of the right to a fair trial. That 
right means that every court is obliged to check whether, as composed, it 
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constitutes such a tribunal where a serious doubt arises on that point. That 
check is necessary for the confidence which the courts in a democratic 
society must inspire in those subject to their jurisdiction. In that respect, 
such a check is an essential procedural requirement, compliance with 
which is a matter of public policy and must be verified of the court’s own 
motion.
58 Consequently, the General Court did not err in deciding, in the 
judgments under review, to examine of its own motion the regularity of 
the composition of the panel of judges that had delivered the contested 
decisions in so far as the irregularity of that panel of judges had been 
established in the judgment of 23 January 2018, FV v. Council (T639/16 
P, EU:T:2018:22).
59 In the judgments under review, the General Court […], concluded that 
the Council had failed to comply with the legal framework imposed by 
the public call for applications of 3 December 2013 by using the list of 
candidates drawn up as a result of that call for applications to fill the third 
post.
60 There is no error of law in that conclusion.
[…]
68 It follows from the foregoing considerations that the irregularity in the 
appointment procedure at issue resulted exclusively from the Council’s 
disregard for the public call for applications of 3 December 2013 and not 
from an infringement of the requirements under the fourth paragraph of 
Article 257 TFEU or Article 3 of Annex I to the Statute of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union.
 
[…]
71 In that regard, this Court has held that the requirements that courts be 
independent and impartial form part of the essence of the right to effective 
judicial protection and the fundamental right to a fair trial, which is of 
cardinal importance as a guarantee that all the rights which individuals 
derive from EU law will be protected and that the values common to the 
Member States set out in Article 2 TEU, in particular the value of the rule 
of law, will be safeguarded. Those requirements require rules, particularly 
as regards the composition of the body and the appointment, length of 
service and grounds for abstention, rejection and dismissal of its members, 
in order to dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to 
the imperviousness of that body to external factors and its neutrality 
with respect to the interests before it. As regards appointment decisions 
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specifically, it is in particular necessary for the substantive conditions and 
detailed procedural rules governing the adoption of those decisions to be 
such that they cannot give rise to such reasonable doubts with respect to the 
judges appointed.
[…]
75 It follows from the case-law […] that an irregularity committed during 
the appointment of judges within the judicial system concerned entails an 
infringement of the first sentence of the second paragraph of Article 47 
of the Charter, particularly when that irregularity is of such a kind and 
of such gravity as to create a real risk that other branches of the State, in 
particular the executive, could exercise undue discretion undermining the 
integrity of the outcome of the appointment process and thus give rise to a 
reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the independence and the 
impartiality of the judge or judges concerned, which is the case when what is 
at issue are fundamental rules forming an integral part of the establishment 
and functioning of that judicial system.
76 It is in the light of those principles that the Court must examine whether 
the irregularity committed in the appointment procedure at issue resulted 
in this instance in an infringement of the parties’ right to a hearing by a 
tribunal previously established by law, as guaranteed by the first sentence of 
the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter.
77 It must be recalled in that regard that, as has been noted in paragraph 
68 of the present judgment, that irregularity resulted exclusively from the 
Council’s disregard for the public call for applications of 3 December 2013.
78 It must also be held that the appointment of a judge to the third post 
complied with the fundamental rules for the appointment of judges to the 
Civil Service Tribunal contained in the fourth paragraph of Article 257 
TFEU and Article 3 of Annex I to the Statute of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union.
79 In that context, the mere fact that the Council used the list drawn up 
following the public call for applications of 3 December 2013 to fill the third 
post is not sufficient to establish an infringement of a fundamental rule of 
the procedure for appointing judges to the Civil Service Tribunal that is of 
such a kind and of such gravity as to create a real risk that the Council made 
unjustified use of its powers, undermining the integrity of the outcome of 
the appointment process and thus giving rise to a reasonable doubt in the 
minds of individuals as to the independence and the impartiality of the 
judge appointed to the third post, or of the Chamber to which that judge 
was assigned.
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80 In that respect, the irregularity in the appointment procedure at issue 
is distinguishable from that at issue in the decision of the EFTA Court of 
14 February 2017, Pascal Nobile v. DAS Rechtsschutz-Versicherungs […]. 
The latter irregularity consisted in the appointment of a judge to the EFTA 
Court for, exceptionally, a three-year term of office instead of a six-year term, 
and thus concerned, unlike the irregularity examined in the present cases, 
the infringement of a fundamental rule in relation to the duration of judges’ 
mandates at that court which was intended to protect their independence.
81 It follows from the foregoing that the Council’s disregard for the public 
call for applications of 3 December 2013 does not constitute an infringement 
of the fundamental rules of EU law applicable to the appointment of judges 
to the Civil Service Tribunal that entailed an infringement of the applicants’ 
right to a tribunal established by law, as guaranteed by the first sentence of 
the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter.
 
Analysis428
This Court’s Grand Chamber judgment offers several remarkable aspects. First, 
both the Advocate General and the Grand Chamber referred to the right to a 
tribunal established by law rather than the principle of the lawful judge invoked by 
the General Court. As noted by AG Sharpston, ‘the former is the wording used 
not only in the first sentence of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter 
and Article 6(1) of the ECHR but also in the relevant case-law of the European 
Court of Human Rights’.429
Second, both the AG and the Grand Chamber carefully considered the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the concept of ‘established by 
law’ as it stood at the time. The Court of Justice recalled that this concept ensures 
that ‘the organisation of the judicial system does not depend on the discretion 
of the executive’ and ‘covers not only the legal basis for the very existence of 
a tribunal, but also the composition of the bench in each case and any other 
provision of domestic law which, if breached, would render the participation of 
one or more judges in the examination of a case irregular, including, in particular, 
provisions concerning the independence and impartiality of the members of the 
court concerned’.430 Also worth noting is the Court of Justice’s reference to the 
important ruling issued by the second section of European Court of Human 
428 This analysis was authored by Laurent Pech and borrows from his paper entitled ‘Dealing with 
‘fake judges’ under EU Law: Poland as a Case Study in light of the Court of Justice’s ruling of 
26 March 2020 in Simpson and HG’ (2020) RECONNECT Working Paper 8: <https://www.
reconnect-europe.eu/publications/working-papers>  
429 Ibid., para. 39. 
430 Joined Cases C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, op. cit., para. 73.
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Rights in the case of the ‘Icelandic Judges’.431 This ruling issued on 12 March 2019 
can be viewed as the equivalent of the Court of Justice’s Portuguese Judges ruling, 
to the extent that it ‘held that where a judge had been nominated to a court in 
breach of the national rules governing the judicial appointment procedure, the 
participation of that judge in a panel which had found the applicant guilty of 
criminal offences constituted in itself [our emphasis] a violation of Article 6(1) 
of the ECHR’.432 
Subsequent to the Court of Justice’s ruling, on 1 December 2020, the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights largely upheld the ‘logic 
and the general substance of the test’ introduced by the chamber ruling of 12 
March 2019 while adjusting and reformulated it in the form of ‘threshold test’.433 
According to this revised threshold test, designed to help national courts decide 
(assuming there are independent courts left) when irregularities in a judicial 
appointment procedure were of such gravity as to entail a violation of the right 
to a tribunal established by law, three steps must be distinguished: was there 
(1) a manifest breach (2) of any fundamental rule of the judicial appointment 
procedure, and (3) were the alleged violations of the right to a tribunal 
established by law effectively reviewed and remedied by the domestic courts in a 
Convention-compliant manner?434 We must note that the Strasbourg Court also 
held that the 
absence of a manifest breach of the domestic rules on judicial appointments 
does not as such rule out the possibility of a violation of the right to a tribunal 
established by law. There may indeed be circumstances where a judicial 
appointment procedure that is seemingly in compliance with the relevant 
domestic rules nevertheless produces results that are incompatible with the object 
and purpose of that Convention right.435
By solemnly confirming that that the concept of ‘established by law’ encompasses 
by its very nature the process of appointing judges, ECHR judges have not 
only sent an unmistakable but implicit warning to Polish authorities,436 but 
also decisively encouraged ECJ judges to follow suit, starting judiciously with a 
case where irregularities were raised in relation to an EU judicial appointment 
procedure rather than a national one. 
431 ECtHR, Ástráðsson v. Iceland, CE:ECHR:2019:0312JUD002637418.
432 AG Opinion in C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, op. cit., para. 70. 
433 ECtHR, Ástráðsson v. Iceland, CE:ECHR:2020:1201JUD002637418, para. 242.
434 Ibid, para. 243–252. 
435 Ibid., para. 245.  
436 H. P. Graver, ‘A New Nail in the Coffin for the 2017 Polish Judicial Reform: On the ECtHR 
judgment in the case of Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland (Application no. 26374/18)’, 
Verfblog, 2 December 2020: <https://verfassungsblog.de/a-new-nail-in-the-coffin-for-the-2017-
polish-judicial-reform/> 
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Indeed, and this the third key aspect of Simpson and HG, the Court of Justice, 
for the first time, comprehensively addressed the issue of when an irregularity 
committed in a judicial appointment procedure is such as to entail a violation of 
Article 47(2) CFR which it interpreted as follows: 
[I]t follows from the fundamental right to an effective remedy before an 
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law, guaranteed by 
Article 47 of the Charter, that everyone must, in principle, have the possibility of 
invoking an infringement of that right. Accordingly the Courts of the European 
Union must be able to check whether an irregularity vitiating the appointment 
procedure at issue could lead to an infringement of that fundamental right.437 
This can be understood as the Court effectively providing ‘a new remedy’ on the 
basis of Article 47 CFR and, in doing so, the Court may be said to have finally 
‘unveiled the true implications’ of the Egenberger judgment,438 in which it held 
that Article 47 CFR ‘is sufficient in itself and does not need to be made more 
specific by provisions of EU or national law to confer on individuals a right which 
they may rely on as such’.439 And since national courts are required to ensure 
within their jurisdiction the judicial protection for individuals which flows from 
Article 47 CFR, the Court’s ruling in Simpson and HG ought to be understood 
as providing national courts, and particularly the Polish courts which remain 
independent, with an unambiguous legal mandate to review any irregularity 
in relation to national judicial appointment procedures in light of Article 47 
CFR in disputes falling within the scope of EU law. In such a situation, as well-
established in the Court’s case law, national courts may disapply if need be, any 
contrary provision of national law which undermines the full effectiveness of 
Article 47 CFR. As perceptively observed by Janek Nowak, ‘Simpson and HG 
thus puts further flesh on the bones of the second paragraph of Article 19(1) 
TEU and should therefore be read together’440 with the Portuguese Judges ruling. 
The fourth key, if not ground-breaking, aspect of the Court’s judgment in 
Simpson and HG concerns the issue of whether a court is under an obligation to 
investigate the lawfulness of judicial appointments. For the Court of Justice, the 
General Court did not commit an error when it decided to examine of its own 
motion the regularity of the panel of CST judges that had adopted the contested 
decisions in light of the irregularity affecting the judicial appointments to the 
CST made by the Council. For the Court, 
437 Joined Cases C-542/18, RX-II and C-543/18, RX-II, op. cit., para. 55.
438 J.T. Nowak, ‘The staff case that you will never forget! The review judgment of the Court in 
Simpson and HG’, EU Law Live, 30 March 2020: <https://eulawlive.com/op-ed-the-staff-case-
that-you-will-never-forget-the-review-judgment-of-the-court-in-simpson-and-hg-by-janek-
nowak/>.
439 Case C-414/16 Egenberger, EU:C:2018:257, para. 78.
440 Op. cit. 
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the guarantees of access to an independent and impartial tribunal previously 
established by law, and in particular those which determine what constitutes 
a tribunal and how it is composed, represent the cornerstone of the right to a fair 
trial (our emphasis). That right means that every court is obliged (our emphasis) to 
check whether, as composed, it constitutes such a tribunal where a serious doubt 
arises on that point. That check is necessary for the confidence which the courts 
in a democratic society must inspire in those subject to their jurisdiction. In that 
respect, such a check is an essential procedural requirement, compliance with 
which is a matter of public policy and must be verified of the court’s own motion.441
This is yet another crucial development, as this interpretation also undoubtedly 
‘creates obligations for national courts, both at first instance and on appeal’.442 
Any national legislation such as Poland’s muzzle law, which prevents the ‘check’ 
described above from being performed, would be in obvious breach of Article 
47 CFR. 
Finally, the Court dealt with the issue of irregularity in the appointment 
procedure at issue and its effect on the parties’ right to a tribunal previously 
established by law. Following a summary of its well-established principles, 
which establish inter alia that the requirements that courts be independent 
and impartial also require rules to protect the independence of judges in their 
appointment, the composition of the relevant body, their duration of service, the 
grounds for abstention, rejection and dismissal, the Court addressed the issue of 
decisions appointing judges as follows:
it is in particular necessary for the substantive conditions and detailed procedural 
rules governing the adoption of those decisions to be such that they cannot give 
rise to such reasonable doubts with respect to the judges appointed.443
And when summarising both its own case law and the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, the Grand Chamber provided additional details on 
how to establish a violation of the right to a tribunal established by law in a 
situation where an irregularity has been established:
[i]t follows from the case-law […] that an irregularity committed during 
the appointment of judges within the judicial system concerned entails an 
infringement of the first sentence of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the 
Charter, particularly (our emphasis) when that irregularity is of such a kind and of 
such gravity as to create a real risk that other branches of the State, in particular 
the executive, could exercise undue discretion undermining the integrity of the 
outcome of the appointment process and thus give rise to a reasonable doubt in 
441 Joined Cases C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, op. cit., para. 57.
442 J.T. Nowak, op. cit. 
443 Joined Cases C-542/18, RX-II and C-543/18, RX-II, op. cit., para. 71.
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the minds of individuals as to the independence and the impartiality of the judge 
or judges concerned, which is the case (our emphasis) when what is at issue are 
fundamental rules (our emphasis) forming an integral part of the establishment 
and functioning of that judicial system.444
The Court of Justice’s phrasing could have been clearer. Indeed, the Court first 
holds that ‘an irregularity committed during the appointment of judges’ entails 
an infringement of the right to a tribunal established by law. This could be 
misunderstood as meaning that every irregularity in this context automatically 
entails a violation of the first sentence of Article 47(2) CFR, which is not 
the case. The Court is instead concerned here with one type of irregularity (‘of 
such a kind and of such gravity […]’) – but not necessarily the only type (see 
the use of ‘particularly’) – and makes explicit that it is one type of situation in 
which a violation of the first sentence of Article 47(2) CFR may be presumed. 
Therefore, to establish a possible violation of this right, as far as irregular judicial 
appointment procedures are concerned, we understand the Court’s approach as 
requiring the application of the following test on a case-by-case basis: 
[d]oes the irregularity concern fundamental rules forming an integral part of 
the establishment and functioning of that judicial system such as for instance, 
any fundamental rules applicable to the appointment of relevant judges or any 
fundamental rules in relation to the duration of judges’ mandates? 
If so, the right to a hearing by a tribunal previously established by law under EU 
law will be violated because in such a situation, the irregularity can be presumed 
to be of such a kind and of such gravity as to create a real risk that other branches 
of the state, in particular the executive, may have exercised undue discretion, 
undermining the integrity of the outcome of the appointment process. 
A case-by-case assessment, which presumes that there remain independent courts 
to undertake it, is therefore required. In the two present cases, the Court of Justice 
found that the irregularity committed by the Council resulted exclusively from 
its disregard of the legal framework imposed by the public call for applications 
of 3 December 2013. For the Court, this does not amount to a violation of any 
‘fundamental rule of the procedure for appointing’ EU judges – in the present 
instances, that CST judges were appointed on the basis of a violation of an 
applicable rule – ‘that is of such a kind and of such gravity as to create a real risk 
that the Council made unjustified use of its powers, undermining the integrity 
of the outcome of the appointment process’, which could then give ‘rise to a 
reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the independence and the 
impartiality of the judge appointed to the third post, or of the Chamber to 
which that judge was assigned’.445 
444 Ibid., para. 75.
445 Joined Cases C-542/18 RX-II and C-543/18 RX-II, op. cit., para. 79. 
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The situation in Poland’s irregularly appointed ‘judges’ will now be examined 
in light of the Polish Supreme Court’s resolution of 23 January 2020 and the 
guiding principles established in the case law of both the European Court of 
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, with respect to both the right 
to a tribunal previously established by law and the requirements that courts be 
independent and impartial. 
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6 The Court of Justice’s 
latest challenge: Dealing 
with irregularly appointed 
‘judges’ 
Case C-824/18 A.B. and Others (Appointment of judges to the 
Supreme Court – Actions)
While there is ample case law concerning the requirements that courts must 
be independent and impartial, the Court of Justice had not interpreted and 
applied the term ‘established by law’ to review a judicial appointment procedure 
comprehensively until its Grand Chamber judgment of 26 March 2020 in 
Simpson and HG.446 While the Court’s ruling did not address a national judicial 
appointment procedure but rather an irregularity affecting the procedure for 
the appointment of a judge to the former EU Civil Service Tribunal, it was only 
a matter of time before the Court of Justice’s reasoning was extrapolated to a 
situation where manifest and grave irregularities had affected national judicial 
appointment procedures, which has been noticeably the case in Poland. 
For ease of understanding, it may be helpful briefly to summarise the current 
situation in Poland447 prior to examining the Court’s judgment of 2 March 
2021 in AB et al. (Appointment of judges to the Supreme Court – Actions)448 
– arguably the most important judgment issued by the Court of Justice to 
date regarding the extent to which EU law can be used to review national 
judicial appointment procedures and connected judicial review rules – and 
the two crucial, at the time of finalising this study, pending preliminary cases 
directly raising questions of whether several individuals appointed by the 
Polish President to the Supreme Court are proper judges/courts established 
by law. A recent judgment of the European Court of Human Rights strongly 
suggests otherwise as the Strasbourg Court spoke of ‘an inherently deficient 
procedure for judicial appointments’ as far as the membership of the 
infamous Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court is concerned with the 
 
 
446 Joined Cases C-542/18 RX-II Simpson v. Council and C-543/18 RX-II HG v. Commission, 
EU:C:2020:232.
447 For a detailed overview, see L. Pech, ‘Dealing with ‘fake judges’ under EU Law: Poland as a 
Case Study in light of the Court of Justice’s ruling of 26 March 2020 in Simpson and HG’ (2020) 
RECONNECT Working Paper 8: <https://www.reconnect-europe.eu/publications/working-papers>
448 Case C-824/18, EU:C:2021:153.
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consequence that this body lacked and continues to lack the attributes of a 
‘tribunal’ which is ‘lawful’ for the purposes of Article 6 § 1.449
As previously highlighted, Poland has been ranked the world’s top autocratising 
country for the period 2010–2020 by democracy experts, primarily due to 
the sustained and systemic undermining of judicial independence.450 In more 
practical terms, and to put it briefly, having unconstitutionally captured the 
now unlawfully composed ‘Constitutional Tribunal’ (hereinafter: CT), the 
current Polish authorities then unconstitutionally prematurely ended the term 
of office of the existing National Council for the Judiciary (‘NCJ’ in English, 
‘KRS’ in Polish) in order to re-establish a new, captured one which could then 
be used to give a veneer of legality to judicial nominations/appointments and 
promotions, no matter how manifestly legally defective these nominations/
appointments and promotions were. To shield this system from legal challenge, 
the so-called ‘muzzle law’ was adopted with the view inter alia of prohibiting 
Polish (real) judges from reviewing any eventual violation of the fundamental 
rules applicable to judicial appointments in an obvious breach of EU Law but 
also ECHR Law.451 
All of these aspects are methodically detailed in the resolution of Poland’s Supreme 
Court of 23 January 2020, in particular the manifestly irregular appointments 
made to it by Polish President Duda,452 with the independent chambers of the 
Supreme Court holding inter alia that the CECPA ‘is comprised entirely of 
defectively appointed judges’453 while the members of the DC do not belong 
to a duly appointed court in any way.454 The following diagram should help 
one quickly understand the extent to which Poland’s Supreme Court has been 




449 See judgment of 22 July 2021, Reczkowicz v. Poland, CE:ECHR:2021:0722JUD004344719.
450 See V-Dem Institute, Autocratization Turns Viral. Democracy Report 2021, March 2021.  
451 Adding insult to injury, the same law ‘makes any examination of complaints relating to the lack 
of independence of a judge or court subject to the exclusive jurisdiction’ of the Extraordinary 
Control and Public Affairs Chamber of the Supreme Court (‘CECPA’). This is however a body 
which suffers from the same flaws as the Disciplinary Chamber (‘DC’) and whose members were 
themselves manifestly appointed on the back of an inherently deficient procedure to use the 
Strasbourg Court’s phrasing. In other words, ‘unlawful judges’ are supposed to review whether 
the right to an independent tribunal established by law has been complied with. On 14 July 
2021, the Court of Justice ordered the suspension of the provisions of national law which gave 
exclusive jurisdiction to the CECPA. See Case C-204/21 R examined supra in Section 3.1.3.   
452 Supreme Court Resolution of the formation of the combined Civil Chamber, Criminal 
Chamber, and Labour Law and Social Security Chamber, Case BSA I-4110-1/20. English 
translation available at <https://www.iustitia.pl/en/activity/informations/3708-resolution-of-
the-formation-of-the-combined-civil-chamber-criminal-chamber-and-labour-law-and-social-
security-chamber>.
453 Supreme Court Resolution, op. cit., para. 45.
454 Ibid.
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grave breaches of the fundamental rules governing judicial appointments; the 
creation of two chambers masquerading as courts (the CECPA and the DC) and 
the irregular appointment of an ‘unlawful judge’455 as its current ‘First President’.
Table 5   Lawful judges and unlawful ‘judges’ of Poland’s Supreme 
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Source: Wolne Sądy, 2000 Days of Lawlessness, June 2021, p. 30: <https://wolnesady.org/
files/2000_days_of_Lawlessness_FreeCourts_Report.pdf>
455 M. Krajewski and M. Ziółkowski, ‘Can an Unlawful Judge be the First President of the Supreme 
Court?’, VerfBlog, 26 May 2020: <https://verfassungsblog.de/can-an-unlawful-judge-be-the-first-
president-of-the-supreme-court/>
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Unsurprisingly, and in line with an extensive track record of openly violating 
inconvenient rulings, Polish authorities have ignored this resolution of 23 January 
2020 hiding behind a ‘ruling’ of the unlawfully composed ‘Constitutional 
Tribunal’ whose interpretation in this instance has been described as arbitrary by 
the European Court of Human Rights: 
261. […] the Court is not persuaded that the Constitutional Court’s judgment 
relied on by the Government deprived the Supreme Court’s resolution of its 
meaning or effects for the purposes of this Court’s ruling as to whether there has 
been a “manifest breach of the domestic law” in terms of Article 6 § 1. […] The 
Constitutional Court, while formally relying on the constitutional principles of 
the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary, refrained from any 
meaningful analysis [our emphasis] of the Supreme Court’s resolution in the light 
of these principles.
The same is true in respect of the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the 
standards of independence and impartiality of a court under Article 6 § 1 of the 
Convention that led it to the conclusion that the Supreme Court’s interpretative 
resolution was incompatible with that provision. […]
The Court sees no conceivable basis in its case-law for such a conclusion [our 
emphasis]. […]
262. Considering the apparent absence of a comprehensive, balanced and objective 
analysis of the circumstances before it in Convention terms [our emphasis], the Court 
finds that the Constitutional Court’s evaluation must be regarded as arbitrary and 
as such cannot carry any weight [our emphasis] in the Court’s conclusion as to 
whether there was a manifest breach, objectively and genuinely identifiable as 
such, of the domestic law involved in the procedure for judicial appointments to 
the Disciplinary Chamber […].456
Moving beyond this unprecedented but entirely warranted obliteration of the 
unlawfully composed ‘Constitutional Tribunal’s ‘evaluation’ (in the absence of any 
reasoning) by the European Court of Human Rights, the end result of many years 
of legal hooliganism is the consolidation of ‘an alternative legal space […] under 
which the ruling majority can enact unconstitutional laws, unlawfully appoint 
members of the Constitutional Tribunal, the National Council of the Judiciary, 
the Supreme Court, or discipline and prosecute at will those who articulate 
positions that do not meet its expectations’.457 Let us now see how the Court of 
Justice has begun to rise to this existential challenge to the EU legal order. 
456 Reczkowicz v. Poland, CE:ECHR:2021:0722JUD004344719.
457 Commissioner for Human Rights A. Bodnar, Written comments of the Commissioner for 
Human Rights of the Republic of Poland in the case of Jan Grzęda against Poland (application 
no. 43572/18, pending at the time of writing), para. 49. 
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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)
2 March 2021
Case C-824/18,
REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from 
the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Supreme Administrative Court, 
Poland), made by decision of 21 November 2018, received at the Court 
on 28 December 2018, and which was supplemented by decision of 26 











[For ease of reading, references to previous cases have been omitted]
2 The requests have been made in proceedings between A.B., C.D., E.F., 
G.H. and I.J., and the Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (National Council of 
the Judiciary, Poland) (‘the KRS’) concerning resolutions by which the latter 
decided not to propose to the President of the Republic of Poland (‘the 
President of the Republic’) the appointment of the persons concerned to 
positions as judges at the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland) and to 
propose the appointment of other candidates to those positions.
[…]
52 In response to a request for additional information sent by the Court 
to the referring court, the latter stated, in a letter of 14 February 2019, 
that, although the suspension of execution of the resolutions at issue in the 
main proceedings had thus been ordered, on 10 October 2018 the President 
of the Republic had nonetheless appointed to judicial posts at the Sąd 
Najwyższy (Supreme Court) eight new judges who had been put forward 
by the KRS in those resolutions. Those eight new judges were not, however, 
actually assigned to the chambers concerned of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme 
Court), since the presidents of those chambers, in the light of the doubts 
surrounding the lawfulness of the appointment of the persons concerned 
and on grounds of legal certainty, suspended their assignment pending the 
judgments to be delivered by the referring court in the disputes in the main 
proceedings.
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[…]
95 Consequently, while it is in principle permissible for a Member State, 
for example, to amend its domestic rules conferring jurisdiction, with the 
possible consequence that the legislative basis on which the jurisdiction of 
a national court which has made a reference for a preliminary ruling has 
been established will disappear, or to adopt substantive rules that have the 
incidental consequence of rendering the case in which such a reference was 
made devoid of purpose, a Member State cannot, however, without infringing 
Article 267 TFEU, read in conjunction with the third subparagraph of 
Article 4(3) TEU, make amendments to its national legislation the specific 
effects of which are to prevent requests for a preliminary ruling addressed 
to the Court from being maintained after they have been made, and thus to 
prevent the latter from giving judgment on such requests, and to preclude 
any possibility of a national court repeating similar requests in the future.
96 It is ultimately for the referring court to rule whether that is the case 
here. It must be borne in mind that Article 267 TFEU does not empower 
the Court to apply rules of EU law to a particular case, but only to rule on 
the interpretation of the Treaties and of acts adopted by the EU institutions. 
According to settled case-law, the Court may, however, in the framework of 
the judicial cooperation provided for by that article and on the basis of the 
material presented to it, provide the national court with an interpretation 
of EU law which may be useful to it in assessing the effects of one or other 
of its provisions.
[…]
100 Secondly, it is apparent from the information available to the Court that 
the Polish authorities have recently stepped up initiatives to curb references 
to the Court for a preliminary ruling on the question of the independence 
of the courts in Poland or to call into question the decisions of the Polish 
courts which have made such references.
[…]
106 The factors and considerations thus mentioned in paragraphs 99 to 
105 of this judgment may prove to be indicia which, by reason of their 
convergence and, therefore, their systematic nature, seem capable of 
clarifying the context in which the Polish legislature adopted the Law of 26 
April 2019. As was observed in paragraph 96 of this judgment, since in the 
context of the preliminary ruling dialogue the final assessment of the facts 
falls solely to the referring court, it is for that court to assess definitively 
whether those matters and all other relevant matters of which it may have 
become aware in that regard support the view that the adoption of that 
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law has had the specific effects of preventing the referring court from 
maintaining, after they have been made, requests for a preliminary ruling 
such as that which was initially referred in this case to the Court and thus 
of preventing the latter from ruling on such requests, and of precluding 
any possibility of a national court repeating in the future questions for 
preliminary rulings similar to those contained in the initial request for a 
preliminary ruling in the present case.
107 If that court were to reach to such a conclusion, it would then be necessary 
to find that such legislation is detrimental not only to the prerogatives 
granted to national courts and tribunals in Article 267 TFEU and to the 
effectiveness of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts 
and tribunals established by the preliminary ruling mechanism, but also, 
and more generally, to the task with which the Court is entrusted under the 
first subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and which consists in ensuring that 
in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed, as 
well as to the third subparagraph of Article 4(3) TEU.
[…]
129 Thus, while the fact that it may not be possible to exercise a legal 
remedy in the context of a process of appointment to judicial positions of a 
national supreme court may, in certain cases, not prove to be problematic in 
the light of the requirements arising from EU law, in particular the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, the situation is different in circumstances 
in which all the relevant factors characterising such a process in a specific 
national legal and factual context, and in particular the circumstances in 
which possibilities for obtaining judicial remedies which previously existed 
are suddenly eliminated, are such as to give rise to systemic doubts in the 
minds of individuals as to the independence and impartiality of the judges 
appointed at the end of that process.
[…]
131 In paragraphs 143 and 144 of the judgment A. K. and Others, the 
Court thus already identified, from among the relevant factors to be taken 
into account for the purposes of assessing the requirement of independence 
which must be satisfied by a body such as the KRS, first, the fact that the 
KRS, as newly composed, was formed by reducing the ongoing four-year 
term in office of the members of that body at that time, second, the fact 
that, whereas the 15 members of the KRS elected among members of the 
judiciary were previously elected by their peers, those judges are now elected 
by a branch of the Polish legislature, third, the potential for irregularities 
which could adversely affect the process for the appointment of certain 
members of the newly formed KRS, and, fourth, the way in which that body 
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exercises its constitutional responsibilities of ensuring the independence of 
the courts and of the judiciary and its various powers. In such a context, 
the possible existence of special relationships between the members of the 
KRS thus established and the Polish executive, such as those referred to by 
the referring court and mentioned in paragraph 44 of this judgment, may 
similarly be taken into account for the purposes of that assessment.
132 In addition, in the present case, account should also be taken of other 
relevant contextual factors which may also contribute to doubts being cast 
on the independence of the KRS and its role in appointment processes 
such as those at issue in the main proceedings, and, consequently, on the 
independence of the judges appointed at the end of such a process.
[…]
136 If the referring court were to conclude that the KRS does not offer 
sufficient guarantees of independence, the existence of a judicial remedy 
available to unsuccessful candidates, albeit restricted to what was noted 
in paragraph 128 of this judgment, would be necessary in order to help 
safeguard the process of appointing the judges concerned from direct or 
indirect influence and, ultimately, to prevent legitimate doubts from arising, 
in the minds of individuals, as to the independence of the judges appointed 
at the end of that process.
137 The provisions of the Law of 26 April 2019 (i) declared that there 
was no need to adjudicate in pending disputes such as those in the main 
proceedings in which candidates for judicial positions at the Sąd Najwyższy 
(Supreme Court) had, on the basis of the law then in force, lodged appeals 
challenging resolutions by which the KRS had decided not to put them 
forward for appointment to those positions, but to put forward other 
candidates, and (ii) removed any possibility of exercising legal remedies of 
that kind in the future.
138 It must be observed that such legislative amendments, particularly 
when viewed in conjunction with all the contextual factors mentioned in 
paragraphs 99 to 105 and 130 to 135 of this judgment, are such as to suggest 
that, in this case, the Polish legislature has acted with the specific intention of 
preventing any possibility of exercising judicial review of the appointments 
made on the basis of those resolutions of the KRS and likewise, moreover, of 
all other appointments made in the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) since 
the establishment of the KRS in its new composition.
139 In the light of what was observed in paragraph 96 of this judgment, it will 
be for the national court to make a final assessment on the basis of the guidance 
provided by this judgment and any other relevant circumstances of which it may 
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become aware, taking account, where appropriate, of the reasons and specific 
objectives alleged before it in order to justify the measures concerned, whether 
the fact of having declared, by the Law of 26 April 2019, that there is no need 
to rule on appeals such as those in the main proceedings and the concomitant 
removal of any possibility of lodging such appeals in the future, is such as to 
give rise to legitimate doubts, in the minds of subjects of the law, as to the 
imperviousness of the judges appointed on the basis of the KRS resolutions at 
issue in the main proceedings to external factors and, in particular, to the direct 
or indirect influence of the Polish legislature and executive, and to lead to those 
judges not being seen to be independent or impartial with the consequence of 
prejudicing the trust which justice in a democratic society governed by the rule 
of law must inspire in subjects of the law.
[…]
166 Furthermore, if the referring court reaches the conclusion that the 
retrograde impact of those national provisions on the effectiveness of the 
judicial remedy available against the resolutions of the KRS proposing the 
appointment of judges in the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) infringes the 
second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, it will be for that court, for the 
same reasons as those set out in paragraphs 142 to 149 of this judgment, 
to disapply those provisions and to apply instead the national provisions 




AB et al., issued on 2 March 2021, is the Court of Justice’s third judgment 
in a preliminary ruling case originating from a Polish court and raising issues 
connected to Poland’s rule of law breakdown, out of a total of 37 (and counting) 
rule of law related national requests for a preliminary ruling submitted by Polish 
courts, compared to a total of four infringement actions lodged with the Court 
by the Commission to date. 
This Grand Chamber judgment is particularly noteworthy for making it 
unequivocally clear that the Polish authorities violated EU law when they changed 
458 This analysis borrows from L. Pech, ‘Polish ruling party’s “fake judges” before the European 
Court of Justice: Some comments on (decided) Case C-824/18 AB and (pending) Case 
C-132/20 Getin Noble Bank’, EU Law Analysis, 7 March 2021: <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.
com/2021/03/polish-ruling-partys-fake-judges-before.html>. See also L.D. Spieker, ‘“The 
importance of being earnest”: On frank words and missed opportunities in the CJEU’s A.B. 
judgment’ (2021) XLI (no. 2) Quaderni costituzionali 435.  
192 Respect for the Rule of Law in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice SIEPS 2021:3
Polish law to prevent an effective judicial review of the judicial appointment 
decisions made by Poland’s neo-NCJ in relation to candidates for the office of 
judge at the Supreme Court. While this is, formally speaking, a matter for the 
referring court to establish on the basis of the Court of Justice’s interpretation 
of EU law, AB leaves no doubt that the relevant provisions in dispute flagrantly 
violate EU law. We could however expect the Court of Justice’s judgment in 
AB to meet the same fate as the Court’s judgment in AK, which was the first 
judgment adopted in response to a national request for a preliminary ruling 
originating from a Polish court. As previously analysed, AK was subsequently 
unlawfully nullified de facto and de jure by the unlawfully composed CT and the 
unconstitutional DC. AB can be expected to suffer the same unlawful fate as the 
Polish authorities are now openly claiming that the ECJ would have acted ultra 
vires,459 and that the EU would lack the competence to define and enforce the EU 
rule of law requirements against Member States violating those requirements,460 
a claim which fundamentally violates Poland’s undertakings when it applied for 
EU membership. 
The judgment’s novel aspects
The Court of Justice’s judgment in AB is both rich and significant, which 
makes a brief analysis challenging. That caveat aside, the AB judgment’s most 
important contribution to the defence of the rule of law in the EU is arguably 
the confirmation that Member States must respect EU requirements relating 
to judicial independence when they decide to change the rules governing the 
process of appointing judges and connected rules governing the judicial review 
of judicial appointment decisions. National authorities cannot therefore seek 
to hide behind the national constitution to justify the adoption of arbitrary 
substantive conditions or procedural rules in respect of judicial appointments; 
deprive a national court of its previous jurisdiction; force the discontinuation 
of ongoing appeals and/or prevent national courts from referring questions on 
judicial appointments to the Court of Justice. 
Another important aspect of the Court’s judgment is its finding – implying a 
manifest breach of the EU principle of sincere cooperation – that the Polish 
legislature adopted the amendments in dispute with the specific intention of 
preventing any possibility of judicial review of all the appointments made to 
the SC since the neo-NCJ was established. The Court similarly but implicitly 
finds that Polish authorities acted in a manner which violates the principle of 
sincere cooperation by deliberately seeking to undermine the functioning of the 
preliminary ruling procedure by stepping up ‘initiatives to curb references to the 
Court for a preliminary ruling on the question of the independence of the courts 
459 See in particular Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów, Wniosek do Trybunału Konstytucyjnego w 
zakresie nadrzędności Konstytucji RP nad prawem europejskim, 3 March 2021. 
460 See Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów, Skarga do Trybunału Sprawiedliwości UE, 11 March 2021. 
193SIEPS 2021:3 Respect for the Rule of Law in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice
in Poland’ or calling ‘into question the decisions of the Polish courts which have 
made such references’.461
In this context, and for the first time, the Court of Justice denounced the 
‘retrograde impact’ of the legislative amendments in dispute, as well as the 
unlawful behaviour of the Polish President. As regards this later aspect, which is 
also at the heart of pending Cases C-487/19 and C-508/19 examined below, 
the Court emphasises that the Polish President blatantly ignored a freezing 
order from Poland’s Supreme Administrative Court when he appointed eight 
individuals to Poland’s Supreme Court. Another new and noteworthy aspect 
of AB is the mention of the possibility for the referring court to consider inter 
alia the existence of special relationships between the members of the neo-NCJ 
and the Polish executive when assessing the independence (or rather, the lack 
thereof ) of the individuals appointed to the Supreme Court in open violation of 
the Supreme Administrative Court’s freezing order. The existence of this ‘special 
relationship’ has already been solidly established.462
The Court’s AB judgment does arguably suffer from some weaknesses. First, it 
fails to emphasise that Poland’s ‘CT’ is no longer a court as it is unlawfully 
composed (the former president of the German FCC accurately described it 
as a ‘puppet’).463 The European Court of Human Rights has since confirmed 
the unlawful composition of Poland’s ‘CT’ in Xero Flor so it would be good 
for the Court of Justice to at least refer to this (sad) state of affairs.464 Perhaps 
more surprisingly, the Court of Justice also fails to explicitly address the violation 
of its own judgment in AK by the same ‘CT’ in April 2020 in an unlawful 
composition and what’s more, in the name of EU law while openly violating EU 
law in the process...465 Furthermore, the Court of Justice did not tackle the issue 
461 Case C-824/18, EU:C:2021:153, para. 100.
462 See e.g. M. Pankowska, ‘European judges favour expelling the neo-NCJ from the European Network 
of Councils for the Judiciary’, Rule of Law in Poland, 6 May 2020: <https://ruleoflaw.pl/european-
judges-favour-expelling-the-neo-ncj-from-the-european-network-of-councils-for-the-judiciary/> 
463 See A. Wądołowska, ‘Poland’s constitutional court is a “puppet”, says Germany’s top judge, 
prompting angry response’, Notes from Poland, 14 May 2020: <https://notesfrompoland.
com/2020/05/14/germanys-constitutional-court-president-calls-polish-counterpart-a-puppet-
prompting-angry-response>. 
464 See judgment of 7 May 2021, Xero Flor w Polsce sp. z o.o. v. Poland, CE:ECHR:2021: 
0507JUD000490718. In response, in another unlawfully composed formation, the CT decided 
to defiantly declare that the Xero Flor judgment ‘non-existent’… For further analysis, see  
M. Leloup, ‘The ECtHR Steps into the Ring: The Xero Flor ruling as the ECtHR’s first step in 
fighting rule of law backsliding’, VerfBlog, 10 May 2021, <https://verfassungsblog.de/the-ecthr-
steps-into-the-ring>; R. Lawson, “Non-Existent”: The Polish Constitutional Tribunal in a state 
of denial of the ECtHR Xero Flor judgment, VerfBlog, 18 June 2021: <https://verfassungsblog.
de/non-existent/>; B. Grabowska-Moroz, ‘Strasbourg Court Entered the Rule of Law 
Battlefield’, Strasbourg Observers, 13 September 2021.
465 On 20 April 2020, in an unlawful composition as per the Xero Flor judgment, Poland’s 
‘Constitutional Court’ issued a judgment declaring that the Supreme Court’s resolution of  
23 January 2020 was (allegedly) incompatible with several provisions of the Polish Constitution 
as well as Articles 2 and 4(3) TEU and Article 6 § 1 ECHR… See summary offered in 
Reczkowicz v. Poland, CE:ECHR:2021:0722JUD004344719, paras 115–117.
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of these manifestly irregular judicial appointments made by Polish President 
Duda in open violation of several freezing orders by directly relying on the 
right to a tribunal established by law, which would arguably have made it even 
clearer that we are not dealing with proper judges and proper courts. This later 
dimension will however be directly tackled in the Court’s forthcoming judgment 
in the currently pending Cases C-487/19 and C-508/19, which is possibly why 
the Court did not deem it necessary to emphasise what EU law demands from 
the ‘established by law’ requirement. Before explaining the importance of these 
two pending cases, the implementation of the Court of Justice’s judgment by 
Poland’s Supreme Administrative Court deserves to be briefly outlined.  
Supreme Administrative Court’s implementation of Court of Justice’s judgment
As previously noted, in response to several appeals against resolutions adopted by 
the neo-NCJ recommending multiple individuals for appointment to different 
chambers of the Supreme Court (Civil Chamber; Criminal Chamber and 
CECPA), Poland’s Supreme Administrative Court (hereinafter: SAC) stayed the 
execution of several ones of them in October 2018. These orders were deliberately 
ignored by the Polish President following which the SAC made a request for a 
preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice whose judgment of 2 March 2021 was 
analysed above. On 6 May 2021, the SAC applied this judgment in five cases466 
and quashed two resolutions regarding appointments to the Criminal and Civil 
Chambers. Most crucially, the SAC established that (i) the neo-NCJ does not 
offer any guarantees of independence from the legislative and executive powers 
in the process of appointment of judges and must instead be regarded as strictly 
and institutionally subordinate to the executive represented by the Minister of 
Justice; (ii) the neo-NCJ intentionally and directly aimed to make it impossible 
for the SAC to carry out a judicial review of the relevant resolution and (iii) 
President Duda’s announcement of vacancies at the Supreme Court was invalid 
as it lacked the required countersignature of the Prime Minister which means 
that this announcement was contrary to the Polish Constitution and had resulted 
in a deficient procedure for judicial appointments.467 
According to the head of Iustitia, the largest association of judges in Poland, 
‘This means that the acts of appointment of these Supreme Court judges [by the 
president] are illegal and have no legal effect. They were issued as a consequence 
of an invalid recruitment, which was a breach of the law from the outset. The 




466 II GOK 2/18, II GOK 3/18, II GOK 5/18, II GOK 6/18 and II GOK 7/18.
467 See summary offered in Reczkowicz v. Poland, CE:ECHR:2021:0722JUD004344719, paras 
39–45 and paras 122–125.
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and Social Insurance Chamber of the Supreme Court to rule that the new 
Supreme Court judges are not judges.’468
Unsurprisingly, Polish authorities have refused to draw any consequences 
whatsoever from the SAC’s judgments applying the Court of Justice’s 
interpretation (showing in passing why it is so crucial for the Commission to 
launch infringement actions to make non-compliance more difficult and costly). 
Their main (ludicrous) argument is that any eventual, even manifest and grave 
defects in the appointments would be ‘eliminated at the time of signature of 
the nominations by President Duda’469 who, like a modern Sun King, by his 
mere intervention would allegedly be able to cure any prior illegality. To quote 
Krystian Markiewicz again, the President of Iustitia, ‘the concept that the 
president’s decision is sacrosanct is false’, he cannot, like a modern day Emperor 
Caligula, ‘appoint a horse to the office of a judge and say that his decision is 
unquestionable’.470 An additional no less absurd argument has been promoted 
to justify non-compliance: As the appointment decisions of the Polish President 
cannot be directly subject to judicial review and formally annulled, they would 
still allegedly continue to produce legal effects. However, as rightly pointed out 
by one of the lawyers of the plaintiffs, the SAC 
repealed the resolutions of the neo-NCJ to the extent to which it requested the 
president to appoint judges of the Supreme Court. This means that the legal 
basis for such an appointment has been cancelled and therefore the judicial 
nominations are invalid, while the people selected by the neo-NCJ are not judges 
of the Supreme Court. Because two elements together are needed for a valid 
nomination: a correct motion of the NCJ, which was not there and a presidential 
nomination.471
The European Court of Human Rights has already adopted a similar reasoning by 
holding that the process of judicial appointments to the Disciplinary Chamber 
(the same process was followed for other appointments to other chambers made 
by Polish President Duda) was marred by a breach of domestic law which 
inherently tarnished the impugned appointment procedure since, as a consequence 
of that breach, the recommendation of candidates for judicial appointment to 
the Disciplinary Chamber – a condition sine qua non for appointment by the 
President of Poland – was entrusted to the NCJ, a body that lacked sufficient 
guarantees of independence from the legislature and the executive. A procedure 
468 M. Jałoszewski, ‘After the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court. The nominations 
for the new Supreme Court judges, including President Manowska, are invalid’, Rule of Law in 
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for appointing judges which, as in the present case, discloses an undue influence 
of the legislative and executive powers on the appointment of judges is per se 
incompatible with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.472
In this respect, it is worth noting that one of the individuals concerned 
by the quashed neo-NCJ resolutions is the current ‘First President’ of the 
Supreme Court (a former deputy of the Minister of Justice before her irregular 
appointment) who recently refused to comply with the Court of Justice’s order of 
14 July 2021 in C-204/21 R and judgment of 15 July in C-791/19, on account 
of their alleged unconstitutionality and the fact that they would allegedly be only 
addressed to Polish authorities, the Supreme Court apparently not being such 
an authority...473 
Dealing with usurpers directly for the first time
The two defendants in the preliminary cases C-487/19 and C-508/19 are 
individuals who were never judges before being appointed on the basis of 
manifestly irregular procedures to two new bodies of Poland’s Supreme Court 
manifestly lacking any independence: the DC474 and the CECPA. By contrast, 
the two plaintiffs in these cases are proper judges, with WŻ a member and 
spokesperson of the former NCJ475 and MF a member of Iustitia and a vocal 
critic of the ruling coalition’s ‘reforms’, which led her to be subject to multiple 
blatantly arbitrary disciplinary proceedings. Should the Court of Justice follow 
the suggestions of AG Tanchev, significant consequences (from an EU law 
perspective at least) would follow.476 
To begin with, regarding the scope of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) 
TEU, AG Tanchev argues that not only is this Treaty provision directly effective 
but that any national judge, when acting as a plaintiff seeking to protect his 
 
472 Reczkowicz v. Poland, CE:ECHR:2021:0722JUD004344719, para. 276. 
473 According to an association of Polish judges, her refusal ‘constitutes a direct violation of 
the CJEU rulings of 14 and 15 July 2021 and, as such, not only deserves to be absolutely 
condemned, but should also become the basis for disciplinary and possibly criminal liability’. 
See Position of the Board of ‘Themis’ of 19 July 2921 – appeal regarding actions openly heading 
towards PolExit: <http://themis-sedziowie.eu/materials-in-english/position-of-the-board-of-
themis-of-19-july-2021-appeal-regarding-actions-openly-heading-towards-polexit/> 
474 See supra Section 3.1.3.
475 The plaintiff in Case C-487/19 has also lodged a complaint with the European Court of 
Human Rights in relation to the premature termination of his mandate as a member of the 
NCJ, his dismissal as spokesperson from that body, and the ensuing campaign to silence 
him: Żurek v. Poland, application no. 39650/18 (pending at the time of writing). One of the 
present authors submitted a joint third party intervention in this case: See Judges for Judges, 
Third Party Intervention in Strasbourg Case Żurek v. Poland, 26 October 2020, <https://www.
rechtersvoorrechters.nl/third-party-intervention-in-strasbourg-case-zurek-v-poland/> 
476 Opinions of AG Tanchev delivered on 15 April 2021 in Case C-487/19 W.Ż., EU:C:2021:289 
and Case C-508/19, M.F., EU:C:2021:290. The Court is expected to deliver its judgment in 
Case C-487/19 on 6 October 2021.
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professional status, has a right to be judged by an independent and impartial 
court established by law. In such a situation, any national judge is automatically 
covered by Article 19(1) TEU. This means that a preliminary ruling question 
about the status of a potentially fake national judge is always admissible when 
the national challenge, which becomes the subject of preliminary ruling request, 
is about any decision adopted by a potentially fake judge and/or a national 
court which may fail to fulfil the requirements of an independent and impartial 
court, or the requirements of a tribunal previously established by law. To put it 
differently, any question relating to a national dispute concerning the status of 
a judge is admissible. In this respect, and again compellingly in our view, AG 
Tanchev submits that Article 19(1) can be relied upon by a judge acting as a 
plaintiff to challenge a court transfer when this amounts to a disguised demotion 
or a decision to appoint a disciplinary tribunal, especially when this decision is 
made ‘by a judge whose own appointment breached the very same provision of 
EU law’.477
As regards the DC and the CECPA, AG Tanchev essentially clarifies that these 
two newly created chambers are not proper judicial bodies as their members 
were appointed in flagrant breach of the national law applicable to judicial 
appointments. This is both unsurprising and warranted. What is more decisive 
and innovative is AG Tanchev’s first detailed analysis of the irregular nature 
of the two specific SC appointments in dispute. In this respect, AG Tanchev’s 
assessment is particularly but rightly scathing and reads like a quasi-impeachment 
case against Polish President Duda, who is found to have manifestly but also 
deliberately violated a freezing order of the Polish Supreme Administrative 
Court.478 AG Tanchev in particular emphasises that the individual in charge 
of examining WŻ’s appeal to CECPA was appointed by Duda ‘despite’ an 
appeal brought before the Supreme Administrative Court suspending these 
appointments. For the AG, this behaviour amounts to a twofold violation of 
the Polish Constitution and has demonstrated a ‘lack of respect for the principle 
of the rule of law’ which ‘constitutes per se an infringement by the executive 
branch of “fundamental rules forming an integral part of the establishment and 
functioning of that judicial system”’.479 One may note in this respect that Duda’s 
additional and deliberate violations of the Polish Constitution to enable the 
capture of the CT have also been authoritatively established by the European 
 
477 AG Opinion in Case C-487/19, para. 22. 
478 See e.g. AG Opinion in Case C-487/19, para. 85: ‘to my mind the referring court will be able 
to conclude that the act of appointment was adopted in deliberate breach of that order.’ (our 
emphasis)
479 Ibid, para. 65. See also para. 87: ‘The manifest and deliberate character of the violation of the 
order of the Supreme Administrative Court staying the execution of KRS Resolution No 
331/2018, committed by such an important State authority as the President of the Republic, 
empowered to deliver the act of appointment to the post of judge of the Supreme Court, is 
indicative of a flagrant breach of the rules of national law governing the appointment procedure 
for judges’.
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Court of Human Rights in its judgment of 7 May 2021 regarding the unlawful 
composition of the current CT.480 
The conclusions to be drawn from the two Opinions of AG Tanchev leave no 
room for ambiguity: the individual who heard the action in Case C-487/19 
cannot satisfy the requirements relating to the right of a tribunal established by 
law and may well be not a (lawful) judge at all, but the dispute does not require 
to decide whether his act of appointment is invalid per se as long as his decision 
can be set aside (although the Opinion leaves little doubt on this front); by 
contrast, the dispute in Case C-508/19 requires a direct answer on this aspect 
and for the AG, the answer must be that the individual’s appointment to the 
infamous DC of the SC does ‘not exist in law’, which is however a finding for the 
referring court to make ‘even where national law does not authorise to do so’,481 
an implicit condemnation of the muzzle law here. It is worth stressing in this 
respect the AG’s answer to the Polish authorities’ claim that this would threaten 
the principle of the irremovability of judges: 
national authorities may not take refuge behind arguments based on legal certainty 
and irremovability of judges. Those arguments are just a smokescreen and do not 
detract from the intention to disregard or breach the principles of the rule of law. 
It must be recalled that law does not arise from injustice (ex iniuria ius non oritur). 
If a person was appointed to such an important, institution in the legal system of a 
Member State as is the Supreme Court of that State in a procedure which violated 
the principle of effective judicial protection, then he or she cannot be protected by 
the principles of legal certainty and irremovability of judges.482
Last but not least, these two EU cases are worth noting for their potential ECHR 
dimension. Indeed, were the Court of Justice to confirm in one way or another 
that the judicial appointment irregularities are more serious than the ones at 
480 See Xero Flor w Polsce sp. z o.o. v. Poland, CE:ECHR:2021:0507JUD000490718, paras 270, 
279, 280 and 282: ‘In the light of the two Constitutional Court judgments of December 
2015, the Court finds that those acts and omissions of the President of the Republic should 
be regarded as a contravention of the domestic law in respect of the election process for 
Constitutional Court judges […] the precipitate actions of the eighth-term Sejm and the 
President of the Republic, who were aware of the imminent decision of the Constitutional 
Court, raise doubts about irregular interference by those authorities in the election process for 
constitutional judges […] The Court considers that the breaches of the fundamental rule were 
further compounded by two elements. Firstly, the eighth-term Sejm and the President of the 
Republic persisted in defying the finding initially made in the Constitutional Court’s judgment 
of 3 December 2015 and later confirmed in the subsequent rulings […] In the present case, 
the legislative and executive authorities failed to respect their duty to comply with the relevant 
judgments of the Constitutional Court, which determined the controversy relating to the 
election of judges of the Constitutional Court, and thus their actions were incompatible with 
the rule of law. Their failure in this respect further demonstrates their disregard for the principle 
of legality’. 
481 AG Opinion in Case C-508/19, para. 53. 
482 Ibid., para. 54. 
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issue in Ástráðsson v. Iceland, as suggested by AG Tanchev,483 then hundreds 
of decisions issued or adopted with the participation of any of the individuals 
irregularly appointed to the SC could be challenged in Strasbourg. As a matter of 
fact, this may well become possible as soon as the Strasbourg Court’s judgment 
in Reczkowicz v. Poland of 22 July 2021 becomes final. Indeed, due to the 
European Court of Human Rights’ finding that the new NCJ, as re-established 
under the Amending Act on the NCJ of 8 December 2017, did not and still 
does not provide sufficient guarantees of independence from the legislative or 
executive powers, and the ensuing undue influence exercised by the legislative 
and executive powers regarding all judicial appointments since then, 
the legal status of a large group of judges in Poland is now disputed […] Formally, the 
Reczkowicz judgment concerns only the Disciplinary Chamber, and not all judges 
appointed upon the nomination of the reorganised NCJ. Moreover, the situation 
of all these judges is not identical. […] It seems, however, that argumentation 
presented by the Court in the Reczkowicz judgment leaves little space for such 
differentiation. The ECtHR clearly linked the violation of the right to a tribunal 
established by law with the fact of appointment of judges upon the nomination of 
the reorganised NCJ. It even explicitly held that it was not necessary to examine 
other alleged irregularity invoked by the applicant. Therefore, if the mere fact that 
the judge was appointed upon the motion of the reorganised NCJ is sufficient to 
establish a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, it may be argued that the same 
violation occurs in the case of all other judges appointed in this way.484
Considering the number of increasing number of pending applications raising 
similar issues (Reczkowicz is one of a current total of 38 applications lodged 
against Poland in 2018–2021 concerning various aspects of the reorganisation 
of the Polish judicial system initiated in 2017), one may expect legal chaos in 
Poland to continue to increase, especially if Polish authorities continue to refuse 
to promptly and fully comply with the rulings of both the Court of Justice and 
the European Court of Human Rights. 
Failing Guardian
The Court’s judgment in AB and the pending cases of WŻ and MF indirectly 
demonstrate the Commission’s failure to do its job as Guardian of the Treaties. 
In addition to acting in a too little and too late fashion,485 the Commission 
appears to have decided to adopt the most narrow interpretation of the scope 
of application of the principle of judicial independence possible in rule of law-
related preliminary ruling cases. 
483 AG Opinion in Case C-487/19, para. 88. 
484 M. Szwed, ‘Hundreds of judges appointed in violation of the ECHR? The ECtHR’s Reczkowicz 
v. Poland ruling and its consequences’, VerfBlog, 29 July 2021: <https://verfassungsblog.de/
hundreds-of-judges-appointed-in-violation-of-the-echr/> 
485 Pech, Wachowiec and Mazur, ‘Poland’s Rule of Law Breakdown’, op. cit. 
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In Case C-824/18, the Commission had essentially argued the opposite of what 
the Court of Justice eventually decided, by claiming inter alia that neither Article 
19(1) TEU nor Article 267 TFEU would preclude the legislative amendments 
in dispute. For the Commission, EU law would only be violated in a situation 
where there is a ‘structural rupture in the [judicial] appointment process’.486 
Similarly, in the pending cases of WŻ and MF, AG Tanchev was forced to 
criticise the ‘specious’ assessment of the Commission, which was oblivious to 
the ‘general context’ as regards the rule of law in Poland, and the total lack 
of effectiveness of the judicial remedy available to the plaintiffs.487 Indeed, the 
Commission went as far as to claim that the ‘right to a court established by 
law, under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the 
Charter, does not [our emphasis] require that there always must be legal remedies 
against acts of judicial appointment and other acts adopted in procedures for the 
appointment of judges to Supreme Courts’.488 Viewed as a whole, it is difficult 
not to conclude that the Commission has decided to only offer service minimum 
when it comes to defending judicial independence.
This means inter alia avoiding difficult problems by pretending that they are not 
serious enough to warrant action or that they do not exist as the Commission 
did in another potentially significant pending case, Case C-132/20. This is a 
less well-known case which however deserves to be more widely known. Indeed, 
and to the best of our knowledge, this is the first ever national request for a 
preliminary ruling submitted by an individual appointed to the Supreme Court 
on the basis of an inherently deficient procedure as previously outlined. 
Rather than mounting a strong defence of the view that the reference submitted 
by this individual is inadmissible, the Commission has failed to take a clear 
stance regarding the lack of independence of the referring individual, ignoring 
that his appointment was made inter alia in open disregard of a supreme court’s 
interim order. Similarly, the Commission did not raise any objection with 
respect to the ‘established by law’ criterion suggesting instead that the reference 
came from Poland’s Supreme Court and could therefore be presumed to come 
from a proper court. 
This flawed logic must have delighted Poland’s autocratic government. Not 
only would this approach allow the current ruling party to ignore the case law 
of the ECJ regarding the review of judicial appointments marred by manifest 
procedural irregularities, it would also mean that individuals whose nominations 
to Poland’s SC were held to be invalid by Poland’s SAC could then seek to 
legitimise themselves by sending requests for a preliminary ruling heard and 
decided by the Court of Justice. 
486 AG Opinion in Case C-824/18, EU:C:2020:1053, para. 40. 
487 AG Opinion in Case C-487/19, para. 52 and Case C-508/19, para. 28.
488 AG Opinion in Case C-508/19, para. 27.
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The depressing picture which emerges from the above is that we are currently 
in the worst of all possible worlds. First, the Commission continues to act in 
a too little too late fashion when it comes to defending judicial independence, 
with Case C-824/18 being a striking example of the measures the Commission 
ought to have targeted but did not. Second, the Commission appears keen to 
undermine national requests raising judicial independence issues submitted by 
independent judges under siege, by refusing to adopt a rule of law-enhancing 
interpretation of EU law and its scope, Case C-824/18 being a case in point. 
Third, the Commission has now refused to challenge robustly the admissibility 
of a preliminary ruling request submitted by one of the Polish ruling party’s fake 
judges, who are now openly and actively colluding with the PiS-led executive to 
finish off judicial independence once and for all.489 
In this respect, the proposal of AG Bobek in Case C-132/20490 would only make 
the situation worse in our opinion.491 To put it briefly, based on the starting 
premise that the Article 267 procedure would establish judicial cooperation 
between courts and not between individual judges, benches or even chambers 
within national courts, AG Bobek suggests the following approach: (i) the ECJ 
should assess admissibility in light of the nature, position and functioning of 
the overall national referring court; (ii) a ‘decoupling’ when it comes to the 
application of the notions which Article 267 TFEU and Articles 19(1) TEU/47 
CFR have in common, resulting e.g. in a different application of the concept of 
‘tribunal established by law’ in situations governed by Article 267 TFEU from 
situations where Article 47 CFR applies as in ‘the latter case, the examination of 
the lawfulness of the composition of the bench must naturally reach the level of 
individual cases’; (iii) provided that the overall court from which the preliminary 
ruling request originates has not been ‘hijacked’, the Court of Justice should find 
the request admissible. 
Why is this, with respect, a flawed approach? In a nutshell, it would lead to 
situations where the Court of Justice would accept to answer questions from 
national referring bodies, which the ECJ would find ‘established by law’ for 
the purpose of Article 267 TFEU but whose judgments could subsequently be 
challenged on the ground inter alia that they were issued by a ‘judge’ or a bench 
irregularly composed in breach of the established by law requirement guaranteed 
under Article 47(2) CFR/Article 19(1) TEU (and Article 6(1) ECHR in any 
subsequent eventual complaint to Strasbourg). In other words, you could end 
 
489 See most recently ‘First President Of The Supreme Court Tries To Remove Judges Who 
Approached the CJEU’, Rule of Law in Poland, 15 February 2021: <https://ruleoflaw.pl/the-
amendment-to-the-act-on-the-supreme-court-contains-dangerous-solutions/> 
490 Opinion of AG Bobek delivered on 8 July 2021, EU:C:2021:557.
491 This analysis is based on L. Pech and S. Platon, ‘How not to deal with Poland’s fake judges’ 
requests for a preliminary ruling: A critical analysis of AG Bobek’s proposal in Case C-132/20’, 
Verfblog, 28 July 2021: <https://verfassungsblog.de/how-not-to-deal-with-polands-fake-judges-
requests-for-a-preliminary-ruling/> 
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up with a body which is held by the ECJ to be enough of a ‘court’ to submit 
questions to it but not enough of a ‘court’ (due to e.g. not being established 
by law) to issue proper judgments as a matter of EU law and in particular, the 
principle of effective judicial protection. In addition, while AG Bobek argues 
that his approach would not lead to different meanings of the same principles 
such as established by law, in practice, we would end up with several definitions 
of the same principles rather than merely different types of examination or 
levels of scrutiny from the Court depending on the Treaty provision at play. 
With respect to his proposed new hijacking test, AG Bobek suggests looking 
at the accumulation of issues such as ‘appointments to that (formally judicial) 
institution, the political influence being exercised over its decision-making’ 
which ‘reveal a pattern in which there is no longer any independent court worth 
the name’. In doing so, AG Bobek reintroduces the issue of problematic judicial 
appointment into the mix. While this is an extremely complex area with no 
perfect solution available to the Court of Justice, it seems preferable to adopt a 
narrower and more pragmatic approach, i.e., to reject every preliminary ruling 
request originating from any of the individuals (some of whom were never 
judges to begin with) appointed in breach of the SAC’s freezing orders of 2018 
previously described and whose nominations have already been found invalid 
by the same SAC in May 2021 on the ground that these individuals cannot be 
considered a tribunal established by law.
Non-regression principle
Most recently, the Court issued yet another seminal judgment. While formally 
about national judicial appointments in force in Malta, it cannot but be 
understood as a message to both the Commission and the Polish authorities.492 
To put it briefly, the Court for the first time explicitly drew from a joint reading 
of Articles 2 and 49 TEU a principle of non-regression,493 a step previously 
suggested to the Court by the EFTA Surveillance Authority in AK494 and a 
principle which implicitly guided the Court’s whole reasoning in AB:
 
63 It follows that compliance by a Member State with the values enshrined in 
Article 2 TEU is a condition for the enjoyment of all of the rights deriving from 
the application of the Treaties to that Member State. A Member State cannot 
therefore amend its legislation in such a way as to bring about a reduction [our 
emphasis] in the protection of the value of the rule of law, a value which is given 
492 Case C-896/19, Repubblika v. Il-Prim Ministru, EU:C:2021:31. For further analysis, see M. 
Leloup, D. Kochenov and A. Dimitrovs, ‘Non-Regression: Opening the Door to Solving the 
“Copenhagen Dilemma”? All Eyes on the Case C-896/19 Repubblika v. Il-Prim Ministru’ (2021) 
46 European Law Review 687.
493 The non-regression principle is however not new in constitutional law, environmental law or 
international human rights law. See also the non-regression clauses in the EU–UK Trade and 
Cooperation Agreement (e.g. Article 6.2: ‘non-regression from levels of protection’). 
494 See supra 4.1. 
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concrete expression by, inter alia, Article 19 TEU (see, to that effect, judgment 
of 2 March 2021, A.B. and Others (Appointment of judges to the Supreme Court – 
Actions), C-824/18, EU:C:2021:153, paragraph 108).
64 The Member States are thus required to ensure that, in the light of that 
value, any regression [our emphasis] of their laws on the organisation of justice 
is prevented, by refraining from adopting rules which would undermine the 
independence of the judiciary (see, by analogy, judgment of 17 December 2020, 
Openbaar Ministerie (Independence of the issuing judicial authority), C-354/20 PPU  
and C-412/20 PPU, EU:C:2020:1033, paragraph 40).
65 In that context, the Court has already held, in essence, that the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU must be interpreted as precluding national 
provisions relating to the organisation of justice which are such as to constitute a 
reduction [our emphasis], in the Member State concerned, in the protection of the 
value of the rule of law, in particular the guarantees of judicial independence (see, 
to that effect, judgments of 19 November 2019, A.K. and Others (Independence 
of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), C-585/18, C-624/18 and 
C-625/18, EU:C:2019:982, and of 2 March 2021, A.B. and Others (Appointment 
of judges to the Supreme Court – Actions), C-824/18, EU:C:2021:153).
To put it differently, to respond to rule of law backsliding, the Court of Justice 
has explicitly established a non-backsliding principle which the Commission 
could rely upon to sue relevant backsliding national authorities. This will help 
inter alia address the autocrats’ reliance on the Frankenstate-abusive comparative 
law argument,495 one of the favourite tactics for instance of the current Polish 
authorities. From now on, the Polish authorities will no longer be able to hide 
behind the argument that ‘this and that legislation exists in another country’ to 
which the Commission could then answer, ‘it might well be the case but in your 
case it is a regression compared to the previous state of the legislation’.496 
The significance and relevance of Repubblika to address the sustained attacks on 
judicial independence we have seen in Poland is therefore obvious and cannot 
indeed be overemphasised. A different outcome than the one in Repubblika could 
also be expected as in this instance, the Court was dealing inter alia with a situation 
where the guarantee of judicial independence had been reinforced in Malta, at 
least on paper, via the introduction of an independent Judicial Appointments 
Committee, while additional legal requirements further constrained the Prime 
Minister’s judicial appointment power. By contrast, in AB the Court emphasised 
495 K.L. Scheppele, ‘The Rule of Law and the Frankenstate: Why Governance Checklists Do Not 
Work’ (2013) 26(4) Governance 559–562 (according to Professor Scheppele, Frankenstate is 
composed from various perfectly reasonable pieces drawn from different foreign legal systems, 
and its monstrous quality comes from the horrible way that those pieces interact when stitched 
together by autocrats). 
496 We are grateful to Professor Platon for drawing our attention to this aspect of the Court’s ruling. 
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for instance the fact that the ‘possibilities for obtaining judicial remedies which 
previously existed [were] suddenly eliminated’.497 This in our view amounts to a 
straightforward violation of the non-regression principle. The same can be said 
about the changes made to the composition and involvement of the NCJ, to 
the structure of the Supreme Court, to the rules governing the elections of the 
Supreme Court’s First President etc. 
It is to be hoped that the Commission will get the message and act before it is too 
late, failing which the EU will end up not with merely one but two consolidated 
authoritarian regimes in its midst.498 
497 Case C-824/18, para. 129.
498 V-Dem Institute, Autocratization Surges – Resistance Grows. Democracy Report 2020, March 
2020, p. 13: ‘The EU now has its first non-democratic Member State: Hungary is an electoral 
authoritarian regime and is the most extreme recent case of autocratization’.
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7 Concluding overview: 
Completing the circle
The far-reaching developments in the area of the rule of law, which this 
casebook-style study has documented in detail, touch upon the very essence of 
EU constitutionalism and range from the renewed understanding of the role of 
the foundational values in the edifice of EU law to the further concretisation 
of the meaning of the rule of law and, specifically, of judicial independence, its 
scope of application and its enforcement at both national and EU levels. The 
multifaceted line of case law, which was prefigured by the Court’s interim order 
in Białowieża Forest499 before being fully exposed in the Court’s judgment in 
Portuguese Judges,500 has thus led to a deep renewal of the most essential features 
of EU’s constitutionalism.
This renewal occurred through the articulation of a more substantive idea of 
the rule of law at the supranational level backed by the judicial ‘activation’ of 
the until then untapped potential of Article 19(1) TEU – an operationalisation 
of the EU principle of effective judicial protection fully justified and grounded 
in the Treaties – for the Court of Justice to intervene in defence of one of the 
core and well-established components of the rule of law: the principle of judicial 
independence. In addition to the emergence of fast-evolving clear standards of 
judicial independence binding on the Member States, these developments have 
resulted in upgrading the very nature of the judicial dialogue between the Court 
of Justice and the national courts.501 
The commonality of values and principles between the two levels of European 
judiciary is now not merely solemnly proclaimed, as it had been before.502 In 
other words, the rule of law and its core components have become an enforceable 
part of EU law, paving the way to the progressive ‘unification’ of European 
judicial power on the basis of core justiciable principles binding and enforceable 
at both national and EU levels. This development, which was anticipated by 
499 Case C-441/17 R Commission v. Poland (Białowieża Forest), EU:C:2017:877.
500 Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, EU:C:2018:117.
501 M. Dawson, ‘Constitutional Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures in the European Union’ 
(2013) 19 EPL, 369; A. Arnull, ‘Judicial Dialogue in the European Union’, in J. Dickson and 
P. Eleftheriadis (eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 
109; T. Tridimas, ‘The ECJ and the National Courts: Dialogue, Cooperation, and Instability’, in 
A. Arnull and D. Chalmers (eds), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (Oxford: OUP, 
2017), 403.
502 D. Kochenov, ‘The EU and the Rule of Law – Naïveté or a Grand Design?’ in M. Adams, E. 
Hirsch Ballin, A. Meuwese (eds), Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law. Bridging Idealism and 
Realism (Cambridge: CUP, 2017), 425.
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Judge Pescatore almost five decades ago,503 has thus become a lived reality of 
EU law at the theoretical and now also at the practical level. The same values 
and principles now directly guide not only the law (including both EU and 
national law) applied by the courts across the EU, but also constrain national 
authorities if they seek to ‘reform’ – read undermine – the fundamental elements 
underlying the organisation of national judiciaries, which earlier principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness did not tackle. The build-up and organisation of 
the national judicial systems is no longer immune to the substantive reach of EU 
legal principles and standards, thus turning the rule of law and related values 
into crucial parts of the acquis.504 The mere proclamation of compliance is thus 
no longer sufficient: the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU have thus acquired 
clear and enforceable legal value which can be used to challenge national and 
supranational measures.505
The circle of protection which the Court first started in Portuguese Judges has 
been completed in the recent Repubblika case.506 In what is yet another seminal 
judgment, the Court has made explicit the previously implied principle of non-
regression. In doing so, the Court has further opened up the possibilities of 
supranational review of the Member State-level compliance with values which 
had previously commonly been regarded as largely non-justiciable, especially 
in relation to the national regulatory realm. While non-regression is for now 
only connected to the foundational value of the rule of law, this approach could 
and should also cover the other values laid down in Article 2 TEU, including 
the plenitude of its elements beyond rule of law as such,507 thus broadening the 
reach of EU law to a significant degree. Indeed, the focus on non-regression 
could be very effective in allowing for a move beyond judicial independence to 
help countering rule of law and democracy backsliding in EU Member States 




503 Editorial Comments, ‘EU Law between Common Values and Collective Feelings’ (2018) 
55 Common Market Law Review 1329, at 1332. See also P. Pescatore, The Law of Integration: 
Emergence of a New Phenomenon in International Relations, Based on the Experience of the 
European Communities (Sijthoff, 1974), 100.
504 D. Kochenov, ‘The Acquis and Its Principles: The Enforcement of ‘Law’ versus the Enforcement 
of ‘Values’ in the European Union’, in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU 
Law and Values (Oxford: OUP, 2017), 8.
505 L.S. Rossi, ‘La valeur juridique des valeurs: L’article 2 TEU’ (2020) 3 Revue trimestrielle de 
droit européen; T. von Danwitz, ‘Values and the Rule of Law: Foundations of the European 
Union – An Inside Perspective from the ECJ’ (2018) 21 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 2; 
Kochenov, ‘The Acquis and Its Principles’, op. cit.
506 Case C-896/19 Repubblika, EU:C:2021:311.
507 M. Klamert and D. Kochenov, ‘Article 2 TEU’, in M. Kellerbauer, M. Klamert and J. Tomkin 
(eds), The Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights – A Commentary (Oxford: OUP, 2019), 
22. The inability of the Portuguese Judges case-law to reach beyond a particular set of sub-
elements of the rule of law has been criticised: K.L. Scheppele, D. Kochenov and B. Grabowska-
Moroz, ‘EU Values Are Law, after All’ (2020) 39 Yearbook of European Law 3.
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principle of non-regression to more effectively prevent any kind of regression in 
terms of Article 2 TEU standards in any Member State.508
Building upon the largely chronological overview of the crucial case law 
reshaping the meaning, reach and functions of the principle of the rule of law in 
the EU and national legal systems, in this conclusion we prioritise the focus on 
three core implications of the Court’s contribution to the fight against rule of 
law backsliding. We thus offer a transversal look at the case law that has initiated 
a far-reaching strengthening of EU constitutionalism. The triad we focus on 
includes the following building blocks: (1) the most significant components 
of the deep transformation triggered by the Court and which paved the way 
towards the ongoing transformation of the role played by the rule of law and, 
in particular, by the principle of judicial independence in the context of EU 
constitutionalism; (2) the most significant blind spots identifiable in the Court’s 
rule of law case law to date; and (3) placing the Court’s case law in the context of 
the politics of backsliding and regime change, connecting our legal analysis with 
socio-legal perspectives on populism and autocratic legalism.509
In discussing these issues, it is important to realise that the difficulties in tackling 
the rule of law and democracy backsliding problems in multi-level systems of 
governance is not a phenomenon which is specific to the EU, as Daniel Kelemen 
has demonstrated using the US as an example. The EU is therefore not unique 
in this respect.510 While the Court, through the multiple judgments and orders 
reviewed in this study, has made a crucial contribution to the defence of judicial 
independence against authoritarian authorities, the ability of the supranational 
judiciary to emerge as an actor of true change in backsliding countries remains 
as uncertain as ever. Consequently, it is apparent that the fact that the Court 
has joined other international and supranational bodies around the world in 
co-shaping of national-level judiciaries511 does not necessarily mean per se that 
rule of law backsliding will be quickly and easily brought under control. Indeed, 
we need to remain mindful of the limitations of the effectiveness of judicial 
interventions in the context of autocratic legalism and rule of law backsliding.512
508 M. Leloup, D. Kochenov and A. Dimitrovs, ‘Non-Regression: Opening the Door to Solving the 
“Copenhagen Dilemma”? All Eyes on Case C-896/19 Repubblika v Il-Prim Ministru’ (2021) 46 
European Law Review 687.
509 P. Blokker, ‘Building Democracy by Legal Means? The Contestation of Human Rights and 
Constitutionalism in East-Central Europe’ (2020) Journal of Modern European History; D. 
Adamski, ‘The Social Contract of Democratic Backsliding in the “New EU” Countries’ 
(2019) 56 Common Market Law Review 623; P. Blokker, ‘Populist Counter-Constitutionalism, 
Conservatism, and Legal Fundamentalism’ (2019) 15 European Constitutional Law Review 518; 
K.L. Scheppele, ‘Autocratic Legalism’ (2018) 85 University of Chicago Law Review 545.
510 R.D. Kelemen, ‘Europe’s Other Democratic Deficit: National Authoritarianism in Europe’s 
Democratic Union’ (2017) 52 Government and Opposition 211.
511 D. Kosař and L. Lixinski, ‘Domestic Judicial Design by International Human Rights Courts’ 
(2015) 109(4) American Journal of International Law 714.
512 Scheppele, ‘Autocratic Legalism’ op. cit.
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The whole palette of legal developments presented in this casebook study, 
including the Court’s many achievements, should thus be viewed cum grano salis: 
the ability of the law and of the judicial power to change the situation on the 
ground in a radical fashion appears to be limited where populism reigns.513 It is 
thus indispensable to realise that changes on the ground in Poland and Hungary 
should not and could not be the only measures of success of the recent case law. 
Indeed, the legal transformations, which we have witnessed since the Portuguese 
Judges case, are crucially meaningful of themselves, in terms of strengthening the 
system of EU constitutionalism and making clear that the rule of law constrains 
national authorities even in areas where EU harmonisation is precluded. In doing 
so, the Court of Justice has positively reinforced the ‘values dimension’ of the EU, 
which now complements the internal market dimension of the EU construct.514 
The recent developments in the rule of law and judicial independence case law 
and the recalibration of the division of powers stemming from the new reading 
of Article 19(1) TEU will remain, independently of whether the post-Portuguese 
judges case law will enable the successful taming of the autocratisation process 
which first started in Hungary as far as the EU is concerned. And the long-term 
implications of these developments in recalibrating EU constitutionalism should 
prove as significant, if not more so, than their short-term impact.515
7.1 Key features of the Court of Justice’s rule of law 
enhancing line of case-law
The case law of the last three years has offered a crucially important bridge 
between reality and earlier expectations. The Court of Justice has successfully 
solved at least four very complex problems by turning the proclamation-based 
rule of law as a presumed foundational and shared value into an enforceable 
substantive principle of law, spanning both the EU and national legal orders. 
Although adherence to the rule of law has always been identified if not loudly 
praised as an essential feature of EU constitutionalism – of the EU’s DNA, to 
borrow from Frans Timmermans516 – the Union possessed, so it seemed, no legal 
basis to directly sue a Member State on this ground in a situation where serious 
rule of law backsliding was occurring post accession.517 And of course, there is 
nothing like the US National Guard in the EU to enforce the rule of law in 
513 N. Lacey, ‘Populism and the Rule of Law’ (2019) 15 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 
79.
514 For more on the role of values in the structuring of EU federalism, see D. Kochenov (ed.), EU 
Citizenship and Federalism (Cambridge University Press, 2017).
515 D. Kochenov, ‘De Facto Power Grab in Context: Upgrading Rule of Law in Europe in Populist 
Times’ (2021) XL Polish Yearbook of International Law 197.
516 ‘The rule of law is part of Europe’s DNA, it’s part of where we come from and where we need 
to go. It makes us what we are.’ F. Timmermans, ‘The European Union and the Rule of Law’, 
Keynote speech at Conference on the Rule of Law, Tilburg University, 1 September 2015 (on 
file with the authors).
517 See however C. Closa, D. Kochenov and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Reinforcing the Rule of Law Oversight 
in the European Union’ (2014) EUI RSCAS Research Paper 2014/25.
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recalcitrant Member States.518 To avoid any possible confusion, it is necessary to 
clarify that the much-quoted Article 7 TEU does not provide for an ordinary legal 
way to routinely address issues related to values backsliding, but it is supposed to 
be an exceptional tool unlikely ever to result in actual sanctions. Indeed, what is 
the likelihood of any meaningful politico-legal sanctions being levelled against a 
particular Member State, however actively it transforms itself into a kleptocratic 
autocracy in the context of the EU’s internal market, where any adverse economic 
effects of such sanctions would likely be felt across the Union?519 We shall soon 
see if the EU’s new conditionality rule of law regulation will fare differently. Be 
that as it may, the purely legal articulation of Article 2 TEU values as actionable 
tools for safeguarding democracy and the rule of law in troubled Member States 
was equally unclear: the acquis has traditionally presumed the adherence of all 
the Member States to the values, rather than concern itself with ways to ensure 
prompt and effective compliance in situations of backsliding or regression, to use 
the Court of Justice’s preferred expression.520
This is the context where the Court stepped in: it operationalised existing Treaty 
provisions such as Article 19(1) TEU to solve a previously unthinkable problem 
such as a rule of law backsliding and make it more difficult for the European 
Commission and the Council of Europe to stop fulfilling their Treaty mandate 
to uphold and promote the EU’s foundational values by pretending that they 
lacked the authority and/or tools to do so.521 The rule of law crisis has to some 
extent precipitated a development that was bound to happen. In other words, 
the jurisdiction lacuna preventing the judicial deployment of values upon which 
the Union is said to be built had to be filled sooner or later, allowing the EU 
to graduate into a true constitutional system which can and does stand by 
its principles.522 The case law beginning with the Portuguese Judges ruling has 
precisely allowed for this kind of much-awaited transformation.
The Court has managed, firstly, to turn the presumption of compliance with 
the rule of law into an enforceable promise backed by the necessary jurisdiction 
to intervene by tapping into the hitherto dormant potential of Article 19(1) 
518 M. Tushnet, ‘Enforcement of National Law against Sub-National Units in the United States’, 
in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Methods against 
Defiance (Oxford: OUP, 2017).
519 D. Kochenov, ‘Article 7: A Commentary on a Much Talked-About “Dead” Provision’ (2018) 
38 Polish Yearbook of International Law 166; L. Pech, ‘From “Nuclear Option” to Damp Squib? 
A Critical Assessment of the Four Article 7(1) TEU Hearings to Date’, VerfBlog, 13 November 
2019, https://verfassungsblog.de/from-nuclear-option-to-damp-squib/.
520 D. Kochenov, ‘The Acquis and Its Principles: The Enforcement of ‘Law’ versus the Enforcement 
of ‘Values’ in the European Union’, in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds) The Enforcement of EU 
Law and Values (Oxford: OUP, 2017), 8.
521 For an introduction to this debate, see the special issue edited by D. Kochenov, A. Magen and 
L. Pech (eds), ‘The Great Rule of Law Debate in the EU’ (2016) 54 Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 1043–1259. 
522 A. Williams, ‘Taking Values Seriously: Towards a Philosophy of EU Law’ (2009) 29 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 549.
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TEU.523 Secondly, the Court of Justice has also articulated the core substantive 
elements of the supranational rule of law,524 which it had the competence to 
enforce, going beyond the circularity of the definition offered in Les Verts. In 
addition to establishing that the rule of law is acting in compliance with the law, 
it outlined the substantive core of the concept, starting with the importance of 
the independence of the judiciary.525 The Court has moved on, thirdly, to ensure 
that this newly-found substance for the rule of law which cuts across legal orders 
and is thus equally applicable at the supranational and at the national level, 
is effectively enforceable and that this enforcement includes ample possibilities 
for interim relief, including the interventions to reverse the structural changes 
made by the Member States in their systems of the judiciary and, crucially, the 
empowerment of the national courts of the Member States, with the help of EU 
law, to do the same.526 The Court’s rule of law enhancing and most welcome case 
law, which has endowed the rule of law with substance and enforceability, has 
suffered, however, from a narrow approach to the core of the concept in question: 
indeed, the rule of law is so much more that judicial independence!527 While the 
substantive limitations of the case law reviewed in detail above can be easily 
explained by the competence trigger used by the Court – Article 19(1) TEU 
– the latest Repubblika case gives rise to expectations that the ‘non-regression 
principle’ made explicit in that case, may lead the Court to consolidate a more 
all-encompassing definition of the rule of law.
7.1.1 Jurisdiction
To enable the direct enforcement of the obligation to respect and maintain 
EU requirements relating to judicial independence in a national context, the 
Court of Justice needed a jurisdictional trigger. Article 19(1) TEU provided it 
by offering a bridge between national measures destroying the rule of law and 
the scope of application of EU law. First used in the Portuguese Judges case and 
further relied upon in the subsequent line of cases raising judicial independence 
issues, Article 19(1) TEU has enabled a swift evolution of EU legal federalism. 
Indeed, once it was made clear that all national measures targeting any national 
court fall within the broad purview of Article 19(1) TEU, quite a different 
picture of EU constitutionalism emerges, compared with the pre-2018 reality.
523 Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, EU:C:2018:117.
524 See L. Pech, ‘The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of the European Union’ (2009) 
Jean Monnet Working Paper Series No. 4/2009 and more recently, R. Janse, De renaissance van de 
Rechtsstaat (Open Universiteit, 2018).
525 K. Lenaerts, ‘New Horizons for the Rule of Law within the EU’ (2020) 21 German Law Journal 29.
526 P. Wennerås, ‘Saving a forest and the rule of law: Commission v. Poland. Case C-441/17 R, 
Commission v. Poland, Order of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 20 November 2017’ (2019) 56 
Common Market Law Review 541.
527 K.L. Scheppele, D. Kochenov and B. Grabowska-Moroz, ‘EU Values Are Law, after All’ (2020) 
39 Yearbook of European Law 3.
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The Portuguese Judges case allowed for a new way of approaching the Union: 
from a ‘declaratory’ rule of law system528 – where the adherence of the national 
authorities to this principle is merely a presumption and where potential rule of 
law conflict is centred on the supranational level, as seen, for instance, in Les Verts 
– the Union has evolved into a constitutional system where this presumption 
is gradually being replaced with a justiciable requirement for full adherence to 
this statement as a matter of fact. This brings with it the possibility to check 
whether the presumption held true combined with a possibility to police serious 
deviations both in the political and the legal context. Leaving aside the political 
context of Article 7 TEU, which has been analysed in the literature in detail, we 
focused on what has been the most important set of developments in EU law over 
the last several years: the articulation of the rule of law as an enforceable principle 
across the legal orders in the EU. Indeed, if only an actual – as opposed to a 
declaratory – rule of law system can lend its ‘constitutional’ characterisation some 
truth, the EU is only now becoming a constitutional rule of law-based system.
Portuguese Judges allowed the Court to kill two birds with one stone. First, the 
Court gave clear EU law substance to the value of the rule of law in Article 2 
TEU, thus elevating the independence of the judiciary to a new level both in 
theory and in practice. Second, the Court found a way to articulate the EU law 
jurisdiction in the cases involving threats to judicial independence at the national 
level, de facto broadening the material scope of EU law to a significant extent. 
It goes without saying that such broadening, predicted, as we have shown, by 
eminent scholars of the past, from Judge Kakouris to John Usher,529 is rock-solid 
in terms of its legal grounding in the texts and the spirit of the Treaties.
7.1.2 Focus on judicial independence
Appealing to the independence of the judiciary, which is one of the least 
questioned crucial elements of the rule of law, to accomplish the transition 
from restating presumptions to ensuring compliance is a move of towering 
importance, especially considering its simplicity. As explained by President 
 
528 D. Kochenov, ‘Declaratory Rule of Law: Self-Constitution through Unenforceable Promises’, in 
J. Přibáň (ed.), The Self-Constitution of European Society beyond EU Politics, Law and Governance 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 159.
529 J.A. Usher, ‘How limited is the jurisdiction of European Court of Justice?’, in J. Dine, S. 
Douglas-Scott, I. Persaud (eds), Procedure and the European Court (London: Chancery Law 
Publishing 1991), 77; J.A. Usher, ‘General Course: The Continuing Development of Law and 
Institutions’, in F. Emmert, Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law (1991) European 
Community Law. Vol II, Book 1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 122; C.N. 
Kakouris, ‘La Cour de Justice des Communautés européennes comme cour constitutionnelle: 
trois observations’, in O. Due, M. Lutter, J. Schwarze (eds), Festschrift für Ulrich Everling 
(Baden Baden: Nomos, 1995), 629; C.N. Kakouris, ‘La Mission de la Cour de Justice des 
Communautés Européennes et l’ethos du Juge’ (1994) 4 Revue des affaires européennes 35. See 
also K. Lenaerts, ‘The Rule of Law and the Coherence of the Judicial System of the European 
Union’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 1625; C. Closa, D. Kochenov and J.H.H. 
Weiler, ‘Reinforcing the Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union’, EUI RSCAS Working 
Paper No. 2014/25.
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Lenaerts: ‘It follows that national courts or tribunals, within the meaning of 
Article 267 TFEU, are, first and foremost, called upon to protect effectively 
the rights that EU law confers on individuals, thereby providing them with 
“supranational justice” and upholding the rule of law within the EU’.530
The crucially important case law thus brought about seemingly nothing new. 
Indeed, all the elements it draws upon have been with us all along – from the 
ongoing dialogue between the national courts acting in their EU law capacity 
and the Court of Justice, to the need to ensure that individuals can fully draw 
on their ‘legal heritage’531 of rights articulated at the supranational level. The 
same applies to the requirements of independence for any court or tribunal 
established by law, which had to be met since the days when the preliminary 
ruling procedure first started operating.532 Indeed, and also in the light of Article 
47 CFR as well as 6 ECHR: who would ever doubt the fundamental role of 
judicial independence in this context, apart from the current governments of 
Hungary and Poland?
It is their reshuffling, and further elaboration and concretisation in the light of 
the new interpretation of the requirements of Article 19(1) TEU, that played 
the crucial role here. Once the material scope of this provision was (rightly) 
interpreted as covering all national bodies which, as ‘courts or tribunals’ within 
the meaning of EU law, come within its judicial system in the fields covered by 
EU law and which, therefore, are liable to rule, in that capacity, on the application 
or interpretation of EU law, a whole new environment was created for the Court 
to participate in shaping the supranational substance of the meaning of ‘judicial 
independence’ as well as promote adherence to it.
In practice, this took the form of both direct interventions – as in Commission v. 
Poland (The Independence of Supreme Court) where a complete restoration of the 
status quo ante was commendably requested by the Commission and ordered by 
the Court – and indirect interventions – as in AK where the Court instructed 
the Polish referring court to apply its judicial independence test to the body in 
dispute. This combination of the possibility of direct and indirect intervention, 
combined with the perception that testing the independence of a national court 
alongside general adherence to the letter and the spirit of Article 19(1) TEU is 
‘nothing new’, is precisely the appeal and the strength of the remarkable case law 
the Court has carefully built on the back of its seminal ruling in Portuguese Judges.
530 K. Lenaerts, ‘Our Judicial Independence and the Quest for National, Supranational and 
Transnational Justice’, in G. Sevik, M.-J. Clifton, T. Haas, L. Lourenço and K. Schwiesow 
(eds), The Art of Judicial Reasoning: Festschrift in Honour of Carl Baudenbacher (Berlin: Springer, 
2019), 155, at 158.
531 Case 26/62 van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1.
532 M. Broberg and N. Fenger, Preliminary References to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(2nd ed. Oxford: OUP, 2014).
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7.1.3 Enforcement and interim relief
Having seemingly learnt from previous failures to prevent the successful purge of 
the senior echelons of the Hungarian judiciary,533 the Commission and the Court 
of Justice finally and effectively used interim measures to prevent a purge of the 
Polish Supreme Court, which prevented irreparable damage before a ‘victory’ 
on the merits. As with many other cases of relevance, the starting point of the 
interim relief case law analysed above was seemingly disconnected from rule of 
law backsliding issues as such and concerned environmental protection. Yet rule 
of law scholars immediately understood the potential significant implications 
of an interim order which aimed to save a UNESCO-protected forest from the 
spruce beetle.534 Most importantly, the case law on interim relief can be viewed as 
an example to follow for the national courts when it comes to enforcing EU law. 
Indeed, they are empowered to grant interim relief to ensure that EU law rights 
are preserved and irreparable damage prevented, as President Lenaerts has also 
underlined in his extra-judicial writings.535
The Court’s new case law has therefore significantly reinforced interim relief in 
reaction to the attacks to the whole system of institutions as it brought about 
the requirement of status quo ante restoration: the reversal of the results of the 
prior attack on judicial independence. Such developments, combined with 
the traditional possibility to request the Court of Justice to impose financial 
sanctions under Article 260 TFEU to sanction sustained and deliberate failures 
to comply with previous judgments as we have seen in the Białowieża Forest 
case, have brought the system of remedies in EU law to a new level in terms of 
guaranteeing effective compliance with the principle of the rule of law. However, 
this revamped system of remedies remains at the mercy, sorry, of the discretion 
of a Commission which takes its role of Guardian of the Treaties seriously. Sadly, 
not only has the Commission persistently failed to promptly bring applications 
for interim measures, it has also ignored repeated violations of the Court of 
Justice’s order regarding Poland’s ‘Disciplinary Chamber’ after lodging such a 
533 Case C-286/12 Commission v. Hungary (Judicial Retirement Age), EU:C:2012:687. For further 
analysis, see D. Kochenov and P. Bárd, ‘The Last Soldier Standing? Courts versus Politicians and 
the Rule of Law Crisis in the New Member States of the EU’ (2019) 1 European Yearbook of 
Constitutional Law 243.
534 P. Wennerås, ‘Saving a forest and the rule of law: Commission v. Poland. Case C-441/17 R, 
Commission v. Poland, Order of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 20 November 2017’ (2019) 56 
Common Market Law Review 541.
535 K. Lenaerts, ‘Our Judicial Independence and the Quest for National, Supranational and 
Transnational Justice’, in G. Sevik, M.-J. Clifton, T. Haas, L. Lourenço and K. Schwiesow 
(eds), The Art of Judicial Reasoning: Festschrift in Honour of Carl Baudenbacher (Berlin: Springer, 
2019), 155, at 157 and the references cited therein.
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request for interim measures with the Court of Justice.536 As noted by several 
professors,
When it comes to the deliberate and systemic dismantling of checks and balances 
in a Member State’s constitutional order, time is absolutely of the essence. Autocrats 
always move in quickly to change the facts on the ground so as to present 
the EU with faits accomplis such as the unlawful appointment of individuals 
masquerading as judges and establishment of new bodies masquerading as courts. 
Unless the Commission is prepared to seek the removal of sitting “judges,” require 
the rehiring of suspended and fired formerly independent judges and demand the 
dismantling of existing “judicial” institutions, it must act before these changes 
become entrenched and before the Member State has the chance to complete 
its thorough destruction of the rule of law. Following the belated but positive 
decision of your Commission in finally applying for interim measures in respect of 
the ‘Disciplinary Chamber’, we had assumed the lesson has been learned that it 
is important to stop unlawful changes before they occur. It would seem we were 
wrong.537 
All in all, the Court of Justice has helpfully made clear that interim measures can 
be decisively used to stop rule of law rot, but as always, there is nothing the Court 
can do if the Commission does not first request interim measures promptly but 
also of the appropriate scope. What is for instance the point of stopping a purge 
of a national supreme court if you do not put a provisional stop to what amounts 
to flagrantly unlawful appointments to the same court? The developments from 
Białowieża Forest to the most recent Court orders in relation to the ‘disciplinary 
chamber’ have been very swift. So swift, that the Commission appears to have 
had trouble digesting the relevant case law and its implications, considering its 
persistent failure to act promptly, meaningfully and in a systemic manner in the 
face of swift, radical and systemic attacks on judicial independence as we have 
seen in Poland. The Court’s case law now provides the Commission with all it 
needs for it to act decisively to defend judicial independence via infringement 
actions. Whether the Commission has the will to act is not sadly something the 
Court can however help with: the Court cannot seize itself.
536 See the letter to the President of the European Commission by four European association 
of judges (AEAJ; MEDEL; EAJ; Judges for Judges) dated 30 September 2020: ‘in complete 
disregard of ECJ solid jurisprudence and circumventing the interim order by pointing to 
an alleged loophole, the Disciplinary Chamber continues its activities … the European 
Commission must act in a decisive way, in order to prevent the violation of ECJ orders and 
guarantee that the EU legal order is respected’. Letter available at <https://www.iaj-uim.org/iuw/
wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Statement-4-European-Associations-Sept-2020.pdf>.
537 L. Pech, K.L. Scheppele and W. Sadurski, ‘Open Letter to the President of the European 
Commission regarding Poland’s “Muzzle Law”’, VerfBlog, 9 March 2020: <https://
verfassungsblog.de/open-letter-to-the-president-of-the-european-commission-regarding-
polands-muzzle-law>. 
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7.1.4 Non-regression
Moving beyond the slow implementation of the full palette of the new legal 
opportunities to intervene in the interest of the rule of law in the backsliding 
Member States, the central drawback of the three core developments described 
above was the relatively narrow focus on judicial independence, resulting in a 
markedly narrow understanding of the rule of law in the context of EU law – to 
say nothing of other values.538 Perusal of any foundational text on the rule of 
law leaves no doubt at all about the fact that rule of law encompasses other core 
components beyond the principle of judicial independence: it is an idea which 
is infinitely broader and more multifaceted. The reasons behind the markedly 
narrow reading of the rule of law adopted by the Court of Justice in pretty much 
all the case law discussed throughout this work are very clear. Once Article 19(1) 
TEU had been relied upon as a jurisdiction trigger, focusing on aspects of the 
rule of law (as well as on other values of Article 2 TEU) unrelated to the issues 
falling within the ambit of Article 19(1) TEU became exceedingly difficult. This 
created a risk of focusing almost exclusively on judicial independence at the 
expense of the bigger picture and leaving unsanctioned other systemic violations 
of Article 2 TEU values. 
This problem could soon be one of the past. In Repubblika, which concerned 
the constitutional appointment procedures of the Maltese judiciary, the Court 
has opened the door to defending EU values using of the principle of non-
regression, a principle previously reserved to areas such as environmental law 
and international human rights law. This new principle appears destined to 
play a crucial role in the future to address values backsliding at the national 
level. In a nutshell, ‘non-regression’ consists in the blanket prohibition of any 
national rules, including constitutional provisions, which could ‘constitute a 
reduction, in the state concerned, in the protection of the value of the rule of 
law, in particular the guarantees of judicial independence’.539 The ‘non-regression’ 
principle is a new important direction in the notable fight for the EU rule of law 
which started with the operationalisation of Article 19(1) TEU in Portuguese 
Judges. Although formally connected with Article 19(1) TEU in Repubblika, it 
may be argued that the core rationale underlying it is not Article 19(1) TEU 
per se, which is of crucial importance and of a huge added value with an eye, 
precisely, to superseding Article 19(1) TEU’s naturally in-built limitations in the 
defence of EU values. Non-regression builds on the provision mandating that 
any Member State joining the EU is bound to safeguard fully the values of the 
Union as expressed in Article 2. Non-regression may then be understood as the 
obligation not to fall below the Article 49 TEU threshold post-EU accession.540 
538 K.L. Scheppele, D. Kochenov and B. Grabowska-Moroz, ‘EU Values Are Law, after All’ (2020) 
39 Yearbook of European Law 3.
539 Case C-896/19 Repubblika, EU:C:2021:311, para. 65.
540 M. Leloup, D. Kochenov and A. Dimitrovs, ‘Non-Regression: Opening the Door to Solving the 
“Copenhagen Dilemma”? All Eyes on Case C-896/19 Repubblika v Il-Prim Ministru’ (2021) 46 
European Law Review 687.
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Not connecting non-regression exclusively with Article 19(1) is thus the crucial 
added value of Repubblika: what has been done by the Court of Justice under the 
banner of Article 19(1) TEU is but a micro-share of the potential of Article 49 
TEU, as a marker of the starting standard, since Article 49 is not issue-specific 
and demands only one thing: full adherence to the values of Article 2 TEU at 
the moment of accession. Non-regression is thus the last promising chapter in 
the ongoing construction of a revamped values-based EU constitutional system.
7.2 Blind spots
The fundamental developments described above have however simultaneously 
led to the emergence of a number of blind spots. These blind spots have to 
some extent undermined the Court’s commendable efforts to protect judicial 
independence in the face of deliberate and sustained attacks by autocratically 
minded national authorities. At least four such blind spots can be outlined: (1) 
the failure to ensure coherence by applying the same rule of law standards across 
different sub-fields of law; (2) the lack of attention paid to the fundamental 
requirement that a court must be ‘established by law’; (3) the lack of results-
oriented thinking in the application of the Charter; and (4) finally, the necessity 
to apply the same strict standards of judicial independence at the national and 
supranational levels.
7.2.1 Conflicting assessments across different sub-fields of law
The first issue in need of attention is the arguable lack of consistency across 
different sub-fields of law, generating potential tensions, if not incoherent 
outcomes. This problem is most visible in the case law related to the 
implementation of the EAWs issued by potentially non-independent judicial 
authorities in the Member States where whole judiciaries are under sustained 
attack and the highest courts already captured. The Court then most counter-
intuitively assumes that a national judge can still operate fully independently 
in a system which is already systemically corrupted and structurally captured.541 
Moreover, the two-pronged rule of law test which flows from the LM case law 
is difficult to justify in the context of the much simpler and possibly more 
cogent approach taken by the Court of Justice in the Prosecutors’ cases, where 
any systemic hint at the potential intervention of the executive disqualifies the 
national prosecutor acting in the capacity of the ‘issuing judicial authority’ 
for the purposes of the EAW outright, without any room for the individual 
assessment of the particular prosecutor involved to test independence.542 The 
main assumption behind the LM test, that there should be a presumption 
that the issuing judicial authority is independent unless proven otherwise, in 
 
 
541 See Section 5.5 supra and the analysis offered in relation to Case C-216/18 LM.
542 See Section 5.4 supra and the analysis offered in relation to Joined Cases C-508/18 OG (Public 
Prosecutor’s office of Lübeck) and C-82/19 PPU PI (Public Prosecutor’s office of Zwickau) and Case 
C-509/18 PF (Prosecutor General of Lithuania).
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the context of a captured judicial system, thus does not find any parallel in the 
Prosecutors’ cases, where a finding of a lack of structural independence within 
the system makes the issue of whether the concrete prosecutor is independent 
redundant. Importantly, the same approach is embraced by the Court in Banco 
de Santander SA:543 the test of judicial independence in the context of submitting 
preliminary references under Article 267 TFEU is thus potentially more rigorous 
than in the cases where the fundamental rights of EAW suspects are directly in 
question, as we have seen in LM. This difference in the level of independence 
required, especially in the context of the all-encompassing significance of Article 
19(1) TEU for all the judiciaries of the Union, is extremely difficult to grasp or 
justify. What makes the LM test unusable if not absurd is that the EAW-issuing 
judicial authority located as part of a structurally compromised judiciary is also 
expected to confirm its independence in the context of the dialogue with the 
executing judicial authority that the Court of Justice has mandated.544 Moreover, 
as we have seen in the case of Poland, any judge confirming that he or she is 
no longer able to operate independently in this context will put his or her 
professional career at risk. In agreement with Renata Uitz, one cannot dialogue 
a way out of rule of law backsliding,545 and making the fundamental right to a 
fair trial directly dependent on the outcome of a dialogue between the captured 
judge and a judicial authority in a different Member State seems particularly 
flawed and contrary to what EU primary law demands.
The reason behind the choice of such a counterproductive approach seems to 
primarily derive from the Court’s unwillingness to accept that mutual trust 
cannot coexist with systemic deficiencies in the rule of law and more generally, to 
depart from its traditional approach – which has consisted in enforcing mutual 
trust between the Member States backed by the presumption of compliance of all 
the Member States with the values on which the EU is founded – and moving 
on to the fullest possible extent to questioning this presumption in the name of 
the enforcement of the rule of law principle. To quote Armin von Bogdandy, 
‘analysing the current Union in terms of trust is unsettling, as it fortifies the 
impression of a deep crisis with no evident solution’.546 The Court’s rethinking of 
the role of Article 19(1) TEU in this context, coupled with the potentially more 
far-reaching and effective non-regression principle introduced in Repubblika, 
offers a radically new framing for the transition from trust to substantive rule of 
law. This transition should obviously concern all fields of law, not only judicial 
 
543 See Section 5.1 supra.
544 P. Bárd and J. Morijn, ‘Domestic Courts Pushing for a Workable Test to Protect the Rule of Law 
in the EU’, VerfBlog, 19 April 2020: <https://verfassungsblog.de/domestic-courts-pushing-for-a-
workable-test-to-protect-the-rule-of-law-in-the-eu/>.
545 R. Uitz, ‘Guest Editorial: The Perils of Defending the Rule of Law through Dialogue’ (2019) 15 
European Constitutional Law Review 1. 
546 A. von Bogdandy, ‘Ways to Frame the European Rule of Law’ (2018) 14 European Constitutional 
Law Review 675, 695.
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independence sensu stricto. Unless this becomes the case, establishing effective 
compliance with the rule of law in the EU will remain exceedingly difficult.547
The Achmea case and the Court’s fight against intra-EU BITs548 demonstrates the 
strength of the rhetorical desire in Kirchberg to promote and defend the judicial 
dialogue (which the tribunals under the BITs were deemed incapable of ). This, 
in practice, has resulted in lower levels of protection for investors everywhere 
in the EU and no protection at all in the countries where tribunals invalidated 
by the Court of Justice are the only guarantors of justice in a context where 
the judiciary has been captured and the rule of law destroyed. While the Court 
clearly sees the problem of the attacks on the independence of the judiciary in 
some Member States with clarity in the context of its rule of law case law, it has 
consistently failed to transfer its knowledge of the systemic deficiencies in the 
rule of law in countries such as Poland to other fields of law, especially when a 
potential solidification of its own position vis-à-vis other judicial actors was at 
stake.549
To avoid more Achmea and LM-like cases, the Court needs to adopt a more 
systemic approach and avoid sub-field-specific interpretations and solutions 
which do not take full account of the Court’s findings in its main judicial 
independence line of cases. Should this not be done, the whole edifice of 
enforceable rule of law may come under threat: both Achmea and LM fail in this 
respect to meaningfully protect the rule of law notwithstanding proclamations to 
the contrary, by failing to take the autocratic reality on the ground into account 
and ending up sacrificing this principle in the name of the already departed 
‘mutual trust’ and the supremacy of EU law.550 ‘Smokescreen’ comes to mind 
here, since without the rule of law there is no supremacy of EU law to talk about, 
as investors in Hungary and Poland have been quick to discover. All in all, the EU 
is going through a deep process of rethinking the idea of judicial independence 
and this rethinking does not only concern the Member States experiencing rule 
of law or democratic backsliding. Instead, judicial independence emerges as a 
general principle applying equally throughout the EU.
547 D. Kochenov, ‘The Acquis and Its Principles: The Enforcement of ‘Law’ versus the Enforcement 
of ‘Values’ in the European Union’, in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU 
Law and Values (Oxford: OUP, 2017), 8.
548 See Section 5.3 supra and the analysis offered in relation to Case C-284/16 Achmea.
549 D. Kochenov, ‘De Facto Power Grab in Context: Upgrading Rule of Law in Europe in Populist 
Times’ (2021) XL Polish Yearbook of European Law 197.
550 For further discussion, D. Kochenov, ‘The EU and the Rule of Law – Naïveté or a Grand 
Design?’, in M. Adams, A. Meuwese and E. Hirsch Ballin (eds), Constitutionalism and the Rule 
of Law: Bridging Idealism and Realism (Cambridge: CUP, 2017), 419.
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7.2.2 Lack of sufficient attention paid to the ‘established by law’ 
requirement
A second shortcoming of the Court’s rule of law case law to date, due in part 
to the Commission’s failure to challenge on this ground the captured or fake 
judicial courts illegally established in Poland,551 is the insufficient attention paid 
to the crucially important requirement of ‘established by law’, which all courts 
in rule of law-based democracies ought to be expected to meet.552 Not addressing 
the issue of whether a court is composed, fully or in part, of manifestly illegally 
appointed members, to exclusively focus instead on judicial independence and 
impartiality, may unnecessarily complicate matters and allow for the internal 
gangrening of national judicial systems and the proliferation of what may be 
informally labelled ‘fake judges’, who in turn, are bound to seek to increasingly 
corrupt the EU system via the preliminary ruling mechanism.
Paying more attention to the fundamental right to a tribunal established by law, 
arguably the most basic requirement flowing from the principle of the rule 
of law, could supply an additional pillar to the EU’s substantive approach to 
the rule of law, which is currently articulated mostly through the principles 
of judicial independence and the irremovability of judges. Such an approach 
would also add coherence to the case law on the tightening of the criterion of 
the independence of the bodies to be regarded as courts in the context of Article 
267 TFEU.553 Indeed, ‘established by law’ should emerge as the starting point 
of any assessment of the Member States’ judiciaries when it comes to assessing 
their compliance with the rule of law. This observation is of crucial relevance in 
the context of the totality of EU law and should thus apply to all institutions. 
The Commission must urgently do better in this respect as it is for now not 
even legally responding to the de facto or de jure nullification of ECJ rulings by 
unlawfully composed ‘not established by law’ bodies masquerading as courts. 
551 The European Court of Human Rights has at last stepped in to make this clear in relation to the 
unlawfully composed ‘Constitutional Tribunal’ of Poland: See judgment of 7 May 2021, Xero 
Flor w Polsce sp. z o.o. v. Poland, CE:ECHR:2021:0507JUD000490718: The bench which heard 
the case regarding the applicant included an individual unlawfully elected to the Constitutional 
Tribunal on the back of repeated illegal actions by the Polish President and the then Polish 
Prime Minister. As a result, the bench which tried this case was not a tribunal established by law 
and thus in violation of Article 6(1) ECHR. One may expect the Strasbourg Court to rule in a 
similar fashion in relation to the ‘Supreme Court’ of Poland which has also become unlawfully 
composed: See pending case of Advance Pharma sp. z o.o. v. Poland (no. 1469/20). For further 
analysis, see M. Szwed, ‘What Should and What Will Happen After Xero Flor: The judgement 
of the ECtHR on the composition of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal’, VerfBlog, 9 May 2021, 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/what-should-and-what-will-happen-after-xero-flor>; M. Leloup, 
‘The ECtHR Steps into the Ring: The Xero Flor ruling as the ECtHR’s first step in fighting rule 
of law backsliding’, VerfBlog, 10 May 2021, <https://verfassungsblog.de/the-ecthr-steps-into-the-
ring>; B. Grabowska-Moroz, ‘Strasbourg Court Entered the Rule of Law Battlefield’, Strasbourg 
Observers, 13 September 2021. For the unlawful response from the unlawfully composed 
Constitutional Tribunal, see R. Lawson, ‘“Non-Existent”: The Polish Constitutional Tribunal 
in a state of denial of the ECtHR Xero Flor judgment’, VerfBlog, 18 June 2021: <https://
verfassungsblog.de/non-existent/>
552 See Section 6 supra.
553 See Section 5.1 supra.
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This is as dangerous as it is irresponsible as these kangaroo courts and their fake 
judges are not only used to end judicial independence once and for all in a 
specific country, they also directly threaten the whole EU legal order. Months 
and months of inaction in the face of institutionalised harassment of Polish 
judges by the so-called ‘Disciplinary Chamber’ of the Supreme Court, which 
has been repeatedly found not to constitute even a court within the meaning of 
both Polish and EU law, is a particularly depressing saga of repeated dereliction 
of duties from the Guardian of the Treaties.
It is to be hoped that the European Commission will in particular wake up and 
act against the unlawfully composed ‘Constitutional Tribunal’ of Poland now 
that the European Court of Human Rights has formally confirmed this illegal 
composition on the back of the manifestly irregular appointments made to it by 
the current Polish authorities. We should stress in this respect that the European 
Court of Human Rights did so with reference to the European Commission’s 
own assessment in its Article 7(1) TEU proposal which was however and 
incomprehensibly not followed through with a single infringement action 
targeting the unlawfully composed ‘Constitutional Tribunal’:
A number of other international bodies, among them the Human Rights 
Committee, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges 
and Lawyers, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Commission, 
also urged the Polish authorities to fully implement the Constitutional Court’s 
judgments regarding the election of constitutional judges, in particular those 
of 3 and 9 December 2015. In this connection, the European Commission 
noted in its Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with Article 7 § 1 of the TEU 
that the three judges who had been lawfully nominated in October 2015 by the 
previous legislature had still not been able to take up their judicial duties at the 
Constitutional Court, while the three judges nominated by the eighth-term Sejm, 
in the absence of a valid legal basis, had been admitted by the acting President of 
the court to take up their judicial duties.
[…]
Having regard to the above, the Court considers that the actions of the legislature 
and the executive amounted to unlawful external influence on the Constitutional 
Court. It finds that the breaches in the procedure for electing three judges, 
including Judge M.M., to the Constitutional Court on 2 December 2015 were of 
such gravity as to impair the legitimacy of the election process and undermine the 
very essence of the right to a “tribunal established by law”. 554
554 Xero Flor w Polsce sp. z o.o. v. Poland, op. cit., paras 284 and 287 (cross-referencing omitted from 
excerpt). 
221SIEPS 2021:3 Respect for the Rule of Law in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice
With the Court of Human Rights having most emphatically ruled that having 
questionably appointed members on a bench definitely disqualifies national 
courts from meeting the basic Article 6 ECHR criterion of a ‘tribunal established 
by law’, it is imperative that the Commission and the Court stop ignoring this 
structural reality. The ignorance of this vital aspect of the organisation of the 
judiciaries in the framing of the cases, which the Commission brings to the 
Court of Justice, has been criticised in the literature and is among the most 
obvious failures of the Commission as the Guardian of the Treaties since Poland’s 
rule of law crisis began in late 2015. It is deeply problematic that we have had 
to wait years and for a complaint to the Court of Human Rights to confirm the 
obvious: that the Polish Constitutional Tribunal is not lawfully composed. 
In a situation where the EU hears such news from Strasbourg while the 
Commission does not launch any infringement procedure on this direct basis, 
notwithstanding the abundant clarity of the situation on the ground,555 it is 
difficult not to conclude that the Guardian of the Treaties is largely missing in 
action in the face of repeated constitutional hooliganism directly undermining 
the effectiveness of EU law in an EU Member State as a whole.556 We would 
therefore find it difficult to agree with the characterisation of the current state 
of deployment of the infringement proceedings as being one ‘of maturity’.557 
Instead, we have seen a lack of legally sound results-oriented thinking coupled 
with what Scheppele, Kochenov and Grabowska-Moroz have characterised as a 
practice of ‘losing by winning’.558 In other words, while the Commission does 
win the infringement actions it brings to Court, it does so while totally ignoring 
the bigger picture of the ongoing assaults on the rule of law, which explains 
inter alia why Poland and Hungary became in 2020 the top two autocratising 
countries in the world using the past decade as a benchmark.559 This does not 
so much reflect maturity but a misplaced fear of losing a case, but what is the 
point of not losing a case when authoritarian regimes are consolidating in the 
meantime and threatening the whole EU legal order?
555 T.T. Koncewicz, ‘Of Institutions, Democracy, Constitutional Self-Defence, and the Rule of 
Law’ (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review 1753; T.T. Koncewicz, ‘The Capture of the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal and Beyond: Of Institution(s), Fidelities and the Rule of Law in Flux’ 
(2018) 43 Review of Central and East European Law 116; W. Sadurski, Poland’s Constitutional 
Breakdown (Oxford: OUP, 2019).
556 See, more generally, P. Castillo-Ortiz, ‘The Illiberal Abuse of Constitutional Courts’ (2019) 15 
European Constitutional Law Review 48.
557 L. Prete and B. Smulders, ‘The Age of Maturity of Infringement Proceedings’ (2021) 58 
Common Market Law Review 285.
558 K.L. Scheppele, D. Kochenov and B. Grabowska-Moroz, ‘EU Values Are Law, after All’ (2020) 
39 Yearbook of European Law 3.
559 See V-Dem Institute, Autocratization Turns Viral. Democracy Report 2021, March 2021. 
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7.2.3 Insufficient result-oriented use of the Charter
The third problem we could flag is the insufficient attention paid by the Court 
to the productive potential of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU,560 
which has only been used as a ‘sidekick’ for Article 19(1) TEU (due, strictly 
speaking, to the Court’s reading of the Charter provision which governs its scope 
of application)561 or as a self-standing set of standards for the national courts 
to consider when the Court of Justice is not inclined to intervene directly. The 
Charter deserves much more serious consideration to ensure that the standards 
of the independence of the judiciary in the EU do not fall below the minimum 
standards laid down in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
We should stress however that the Charter was deployed appropriately in the AK 
case, where the Court relied on Article 47 CFR to provide the Polish Supreme 
Court with a crystal clear set of criteria to be deployed in the context of the 
assessment of the independence of the disciplinary chamber of the Supreme 
Court.562 The need for the Charter standards consisted precisely in making the 
life of the Polish Supreme Court easier by outlawing the now infamous and 
discredited ‘Disciplinary Chamber’.
The alternative would be, of course, the direct application of the Charter by the 
Court of Justice itself, just as it applied Article 19(1) TFEU in other seminal 
cases involving the Polish government’s attacks on the rule of law. The choice 
of the mode of action is of fundamental importance, of course, both in terms 
of its perceived legitimacy and in terms of the effectiveness of the intervention. 
Having chosen to delegate the actual application of the Charter standards to 
the national court, a practice formally justified by the limits of the Court’s 
jurisdiction in preliminary cases, instead of providing a much more explicit 
and rigid interpretation leaving no room for doubt as to what the only possible 
answer is as a matter of EU law – which had hitherto been the standard way 
of reading the meaning of ‘interpretation’ by the Court of Justice for decades 
– the Court presumably hoped to increase the legitimacy of the verdict of 
the Polish Supreme Court against the phoney chamber. The rationale behind 
such thinking is unclear, as it has only led to more widespread unashamed 
 
560 D. Kochenov and J. Morijn, ‘Le rôle de la Charte dans la lutte pour l’État de droit au sein 
de l’Union européenne’ in A. Iliopoulou-Penot and L. Xenou (eds), La Charte des droits 
fondamentaux, source de renouveau constitutionnel européen? (Brussels: Larcier, 2020). For a 
slightly updated version of the argument, see, D. Kochenov and J. Morijn, ‘Augmenting the 
Charter’s Role in the Fight for the Rule of Law in the European Union: The Cases of Judicial 
Independence and Party Financing’, 27 European Public Law 2021 (forthcoming).
561 As recently reiterated by the Court of Justice, Article 47 of the Charter, which constitutes 
a reaffirmation of the principle of effective judicial protection and enshrines the right to an 
effective remedy, can only be relied upon in a situation where the person invoking the right is 
relying on rights or freedoms guaranteed by EU law. If national disputes do not concern the 
recognition of a right conferred on the parties under a provision of EU law, Article 47 will not 
be deemed applicable. See Section 6 supra and the analysis in relation to Case C-824/18 AB et 
al. (Appointment of judges to the Supreme Court – Actions)
562 See Section 4.1 supra.
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harassment, including via the initiation of the Putin-inspired absurd criminal 
charges against independent Polish judges. 
The Court of Justice must be more mindful that by the time its preliminary 
rulings need to be applied to the disputes at hand, there may well be no 
independent judges left to apply them. What we have witnessed, in other words, 
is a deepening of the conflict instead of a resolution to the crisis. Preferring 
‘legitimacy’ in the deployment of the Charter standards through instructing 
the Supreme Court to apply the European Court of Justice’s standards to 
the particular case of the phoney ‘Disciplinary Chamber’ has killed off the 
effectiveness of the legal intervention altogether.
7.2.4 Applying the same standards at the national and 
supranational levels
The difficulty of applying the principle of the rule of law consistently across the 
levels of the multi-layered legal systems has been mentioned in the literature.563 
The last problem we wish to flag is directly related to this issue. It consists in the 
towering necessity to apply the strict rule of law standards flowing from the latest 
case law equally to the courts at the Member State level and the supranational 
courts, including the Court of Justice itself. The case of AG Sharpston 
demonstrates with clarity that there might be a gap emerging here,564 to say 
nothing about the basic understanding of the meaning of the supranational rule 
of law post-Opinion 2/13.565 The EU cannot be a site of two types of rule of 
law applied side-by-side, as this would undermine the legitimacy of the whole 
exercise of defending the rule of law throughout the EU at all levels. 
Crucial in this regard is to see the full implications of the ‘established by law’ 
criterion in relation to the Court of Justice itself. If the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal is not lawfully composed, as confirmed by the European Court of 
Human Rights, because one of the judges was irregularly appointed to a position 
563 G. Palombella, ‘Beyond Legality–before Democracy: Rule of Law Caveats in the EU Two-Level 
System’, in C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European 
Union (Cambridge: CUP, 2016).
564 See Case C-423/20 P(R) Order of the Vice-President of the Court in Council v. Sharpston, 
EU:C:2020:700; Case C-424/20 P(R) Order of the Vice-President of the Court in Council and 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States v. Sharpston, EU:C:2020:705; Case 
T-550/20 Order of the Judge Hearing Applications for Interim Measures in Sharpston v. Council and 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States EU:T:2020:416; Case T-180/20 Sharpston 
v. Council and Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, EU:T:2020:473; Case 
T-184/20 Sharpston v. Court of Justice of the European Union, EU:T:2020:474; Case T-550/20 
Sharpston v. Council and Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, EU:T:2020:475. 
For a detailed analysis, see D. Kochenov and G. Butler, ‘The Independence and Lawful 
Composition of the Court of Justice of the European Union: Replacement of Advocate General 
Sharpston and the Battle for the Integrity of the Institution’ (2020) Jean Monnet Working Paper 
No. 2/2020 (NYU Law School).
565 P. Eeckhout, ‘Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR and judicial dialogue–autonomy or 
autarky?’ (2015) 38 Fordham International Law Journal 955.
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which was not vacant,566 what to make of the appointment by the Member States 
of a new ‘Advocate General’ in full knowledge that the seat to which that person 
had been so appointed was not vacant?567 The finding of the Vice President of 
the Court of Justice that such an appointment cannot be reviewable under 
EU law does not make the composition of the Court of Justice after the non-
reviewable questionable appointment necessarily lawful. In fact, the statement of 
non-reviewability only exacerbates the problem, since it hints at what we could 
describe as a weak spot in the structural independence of the Court of Justice vis-à-
vis the Member States. It cannot be that a Spanish tax tribunal is not sufficiently 
independent even to ask the Court of Justice a preliminary question because its 
members could be dismissed by the executive before the expiration of their term 
of office,568 while the Court of Justice, where similar interference is apparently 
possible and cannot be legally reviewed,569 is fully independent measured by the 
same standard, in order to answer such a question.
In a way, this problem goes to the core of the understanding of the rule of law 
as developed by the Court of Justice. The editors of the Common Market Law 
Review might be right in their analysis of the fundamentals underlying Portuguese 
Judges.570 If the Court states that the very existence of effective judicial review 
designed to ensure compliance with EU law is part of the essence of the rule of 
law,571 does that not imply a circular and unhelpful approach to the rule of law? 
‘How can the mundane objective of “compliance with EU law” be constitutive 
of “the essence of the rule of law?”’572 To make sure that the rule of law-enhancing 
case law of the Court, which began with Portuguese Judges is a success, the Court 
will need to think very hard, to be as convincing as possible in answering this 
question and any answer that does not presuppose that the same clear standards 
should be applicable at the national and at the supranational levels alike would 
unquestionably fail to convince. Clear, solid and workable standards consistently 
applied will be the key to success of the Court of Justice’s rule of law case-law in 
the long run – and a crucial legacy of the Lenaerts’ Court.
566 Xero Flor w Polsce sp. z o.o. v. Poland, CE:ECHR:2021:0507JUD000490718.
567 D. Kochenov and G. Butler, ‘The Independence and Lawful Composition of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union’, op. cit. For an argument that the key question in this instance 
is whether Brexit, in light of the legal framework applicable to an EU AG, can be construed as 
a legitimate and compelling ground to justify the premature and automatic termination of AG 
Sharpston’s fixed judicial term, while also not breaching the principle of proportionality and 
a response to the negative, see L. Pech, ‘The Schrödinger’s Advocate General’, VerfBlog, 29 May 
2020, <https://verfassungsblog.de/the-schroedingers-advocate-general>. 
568 Case C-274/14 Banco de Santander SA, EU:C:2019:802.
569 Case C-423/20 P(R) Order of the Vice-President of the Court in Council v Sharpston, 
EU:C:2020:700; Case C-424/20 P(R) Order of the Vice-President of the Court in Council and 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States v Sharpston, EU:C:2020:705. 
570 Editorial Comments, ‘EU Law between Common Values and Collective Feelings’ (2018) 55 
Common Market Law Review 1329, 1334.
571 Case C-64/16 ASJP, para. 36.
572 Editorial Comments, ‘EU Law between Common Values and Collective Feelings’, op cit., at 
1334.
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7.3 The Court of Justice’s rule of law case-law in a broader 
context
The Court of Justice has joined the global trend of co-shaping domestic judicial 
design by international courts.573 The European Court of Human Rights has 
been playing a significant role in this sphere for years, especially as far as the 
aspects of judicial independence and self-governance are concerned. The Court 
of Justice could in fact be inspired by its Strasbourg homologue in framing the 
issue – even if the Strasbourg standards of judicial independence appear to go 
further than what the Court of Justice has articulated so far, especially given the 
strict Strasbourg rules on judicial self-governance574 and its strengthening of the 
requirements connected to the right to a tribunal established by law,575 which 
even encompasses the emerging notion of ‘internal judicial independence’,576 
including the requirements for judges ‘to be free from directives of pressures 
from the fellow judges or those who have administrative responsibilities in the 
court such as the president of the court or the president of a division in a court’.577
In addition to the Court of Justice’s strengthening efforts to neutralise Poland’s 
‘fake judges’, the Court’s earlier efforts to neutralise Poland’s ‘Disciplinary 
Chamber’ could be viewed as a forceful intervention in support, precisely, 
of internal judicial independence. The same applies to the requirement of 
independence and self-governance of the judicial councils.578 The two European 
supranational courts thus adjudicate in concert with mutually reinforcing lines of 
case law. The two legal requirements of ‘internal independence’ and ‘established 
by law’ share obvious connections. As the European Court of Human Rights put 
it in Icelandic Judges, there is a ‘common thread running through the institutional 
requirements of Article 6 § (1), in that they are guided by the aim of upholding 
the fundamental principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers’579 – 
and only their joint and proactive enforcement will prevent the proliferation of 
fake courts and fake judges within the EU legal order.
573 D. Kosař and L. Lixinski, ‘Domestic Judicial Design by International Human Rights Courts’ 
(2015) 109(4) American Journal of International Law 714. The same criticism could apply to 
international bodies engaged in the elaboration of ‘soft law’ standards which quickly solidify, 
guiding day-to-day practice. See also M. de Visser, ‘A Critical Assessment of the Rule of the 
Venice Commission in Processes of Domestic Constitutional Reform’ (2015) 63(4) American 
Journal of Comparative Law 963.
574 See e.g. Denisov v. Ukraine, no. 76639/11, 25 September 2018; Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, no. 
21722/11, 9 January 2013. For further analysis, see D. Kosař (ed.), ‘Judicial Self-Government in 
Europe’ (2018) 19 German Law Journal (special issue).
575 Xero Flor w Polsce sp. z o.o. v. Poland, CE:ECHR:2021:0507JUD000490718.
576 J. Sillen, ‘The Concept of “Internal Judicial Independence” in the Case Law of the European 
Court of Human Rights’ (2019) 15 European Constitutional Law Review 104.
577 Parlov-Tkalčić v. Croatia, no. 24810/06, 22 December 2009.
578 See e.g. Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, no. 21722/11, 9 January 2013. 
579 Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], no. 26374/18, 1 December 2020, para. 233. 
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There is one crucial general question which arises in this context.580 How much 
can courts actually do in the face of a rising tide of populism? This is where 
the EU, rather than the backsliding Member States, seems to be emerging as 
a winner from the rule of law crisis it is going through. Indeed, the rule of 
law turn in the Court of justice’s case law that we have documented is a very 
significant development in the overall history of EU law, which will have lasting 
consequences. The EU should emerge, at least we hope, as a healthier and 
more powerful polity as a result. Moreover, the Court of Justice’s authority and 
legitimacy should also be strengthened as a result of its arguably rather lonely 
defence of judicial independence in a context where the Commission and the 
Council have proved unable to act promptly, effectively and coherently. The 
Court may be viewed in this context as ‘the last soldier standing’,581 offering a 
new vision of constitutionalism to the Union which is unmistakably attractive: 
from the world of proclamations, the core values of the Union are moving to the 
realm of the law, turning the Union into a true constitutional system.
The same cannot be said, unfortunately, about the Member States experiencing 
the democratic and rule of law decline. Indeed, the Union can seemingly do 
very little on the ground, the rapidly evolving supranational rule of law case 
law notwithstanding. This has nothing to do with any particular set of Member 
States in question. ‘Is something “wrong” with Central and Eastern Europe?’,582 
while obviously relevant in the context of Hungary and Poland, is not the most 
important question to consider. What the EU needs and is mostly missing is the 
will to use promptly and implacably the set of legal-political tools it possesses to 
prevent backsliding in any of its regions. Presenting this necessity as region-specific 
is not persuasive.
Populism no longer seems to be the exception but rather the rule. In this context, 
the assaults on the rule of law are bound to intensify, since populism, which 
amounts to authoritarianism in practice, and the attacks on the rule of law share 
a consubstantial relationship.583 It thus appears that ‘autocratic legalism’ is here 
to stay and the EU needs effective tools to combat it, wherever and whenever 
backsliding occurs.584
580 See in particular D. Adamski, ‘The Social Contract of Democratic Backsliding in the “New 
EU” Countries’ (2019) 56 Common Market Law Review 623; A. Sajó, ‘The Rule of Law as Legal 
Despotism: Concerned Remarks on the Use of “Rule of Law” in Illiberal Democracies’ (2019) 
11 The Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 371; M. Blauberger and R.D. Kelemen, ‘Can Courts 
Rescue National Democracy? Judicial Safeguards against Democratic Backsliding in the EU’ 
(2017) 24(3) European Journal of Public Policy 321; P. Blokker, ‘EU Democratic Oversight and 
Domestic Deviation from the Rule of Law’, in C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing 
Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge: CUP, 2016), 249.
581 Kochenov and Bárd, ‘The Last Soldier Standing’, op cit.
582 J. Dawson and S. Hanley, ‘What’s Wrong with East-Central Europe? The Fading Mirage of the 
“Liberal Consensus”’ (2016) 27 Journal of Democracy 21.
583 N. Lacey, ‘Populism and the Rule of Law’ (2019) 15 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 79.
584 K.L. Scheppele, ‘Autocratic Legalism’ (2018) 85 University of Chicago Law Review 545.
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As the law stands today, while the EU has received a much-needed rule of law 
upgrade thanks to the Court of Justice, the practical consequences of this upgrade 
in the backsliding jurisdictions remain very limited to date. As Dariusz Adamski 
put it: courts ‘cannot preclude a social contract of democratic backsliding when a 
society concludes that an illiberal system is superior to its previously tried liberal 
alternatives’.585 We should however not forget that authoritarianism in the two 
EU countries subject to Article 7(1) TEU has been very much an elite-driven 
top-down process586 relying on structurally compromised electoral frameworks 
and environments which prevent any rotation of power.587 
While supranational courts can on some occasions be much more effective than 
the supranational political institutions in bringing about tangible results, the 
bigger picture still remains quite grim, as the ‘populist’ forces are busy undoing 
not only judicial independence, but also essentially the idea of legality, and as 
long as important segments of the population will back these forces, the Court’s 
rule of law case law, however far-reaching, can only limit the damage, especially 
if political institutions fail to do their jobs. This towering problem has been 
outlined with particular clarity by David Kosař, Jiří Baroš and Pavel Dufek:
While the European Court of Justice surely plays an important role, especially 
in the current developments in Poland, the failure of the Pan-European template 
shows that a top-down approach to the separation of powers does not work in 
Central Europe and that any long-term solution must have the broad support of 
the people.588
Be it as it may, it can be hypothesised that such developments as the ones we 
have witnessed since Portuguese Judges could have occurred much earlier in the 
history of EU’s constitutionalism. Yet, there was probably no overwhelming 
need for their materialisation until democratic and rule of law backsliding 
585 D. Adamski, ‘The Social Contract of Democratic Backsliding in the “New EU” Countries’ 
(2019) 56 Common Market Law Review 623, 659. See also P. Blokker, ‘Building Democracy 
by Legal Means? The Contestation of Human Rights and Constitutionalism in East-
Central Europe’ (2020) Journal of Modern European History; P. Blokker, ‘Populist Counter-
Constitutionalism, Conservatism, and Legal Fundamentalism’ (2019) 15 European 
Constitutional Law Review 518
586 See e.g. H. Tworzecki, ‘Poland: A Case of Top-Down Polarization’ ANNALS, AAPSS, 681, 
January 2019, 97: ‘Democratic backsliding in Poland has been ‘a process driven from the 
top down by a segment of the political class that donned the cloak of radical populist anti-
establishmentarianism to gain popular support, win an election, and rewrite the constitutional 
rules of the game to its own benefit’.
587 As recently and aptly summarised by Freedom House in its 2021 Nations in Transit report, p. 9:  
‘it is unrealistic to expect that the leaders of hybrid or backsliding regimes will do anything 
to make it easier for voters to deliver electoral breakthroughs. Hungary’s ruling Fidesz party, 
for example, is constantly tinkering with the electoral framework to fortify its parliamentary 
supermajority’. 
588 D. Kosař, J. Baroš and P. Dufek, ‘The Twin Challenges to Separation of Powers in Central 
Europe: Technocratic Governance and Populism’ (2019) 15 European Constitutional Law Review 
427, 461.
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started acquiring critical mass, following the start of Poland’s rule of law crisis in 
late 2015. The presumption of compliance by all the Member State authorities 
with the rule of law589 had until then actually worked quite well.590 Should this 
process of backsliding or regression, to use the Court’s expression, continue, it 
will become increasingly ridiculous to present and praise the EU as a club of 
democracies. This evolution, in turn, risks driving citizens in rule of law-abiding 
democracies to start to seriously question the very raison d’être of the EU.591 The 
issue is thus not merely helping the Polish and the Hungarian people to remain 
free in rule of law based democracies and concerns the very preservation of the 
constitutional system in Europe.592 The very rationale of the Union, the EU’s 
DNA, as such is at stake.593 As recently and aptly observed by AG Bobek,
In a system such as that of the European Union, where the law is the main vehicle 
for achieving integration, the existence of an independent judicial system (both 
centrally and nationally), capable of ensuring the correct application of that law, is 
of paramount importance. Quite simply, without an independent judiciary, there 
would no longer be a genuine legal system. If there is no ‘law’, there can hardly 
be more integration. The aspiration of creating ‘an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe’ is destined to collapse if legal black holes begin to appear on 
the judicial map of Europe.594
In the face of this existential danger, the Court of Justice has done a by far 
superior job to any other EU institution to make sure that the promise of Article 
2 values is delivered on. In doing so, the Court of Justice must be commended 
for presiding over one of the most important developments in the law of the 
Union since its foundational jurisprudence of the early 1960s.
589 D. Kochenov, ‘The EU and the Rule of Law – Naïveté or a Grand Design?’, in M. Adams, A. 
Meuwese and E. Hirsch Ballin (eds), Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Bridging Idealism 
and Realism (Cambridge: CUP, 2017), 419.
590 T.T. Koncewicz, ‘Understanding the Politics of Resentment: Of the Principles, Institutions, 
Counter-Strategies, Normative Change, and the Habits of the Heart’ (2019) 26 Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Studies 501.
591 G. de Búrca, ‘Europe’s raison d’être’, in D. Kochenov and F. Amtenbrink (eds), European Union’s 
Shaping of the International Legal Order (Cambridge: CUP, 2013).
592 This includes both the national and the supranational level: D. Kochenov and B. Grabowska-
Moroz, ‘Constitutional Populism versus EU Rule of Law: A Much More Complex Story than 
You Have Imagined’, in M. Krygier and W. Sadurski, Responses to Constitutional Populism 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2021).
593 C. Closa, ‘Reinforcing of EU Monitoring of the Rule of Law’, in C. Closa and D. Kochenov 
(eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge: CUP, 2016), 15.
594 Opinion of AG Bobek delivered on 20 May 2021 in Joined Cases C-748/19 to C-754/19, 
Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim et al., EU:C:2021:403, para. 138. 
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Sammanfattning på svenska
Under senare år har EU-domstolen i grunden stärkt den europeiska 
konstitutionalismen med utgångspunkt i rättsstaten, som är ett etablerat värde 
och en princip i EU-rätten sedan lång tid tillbaka. Processen är ännu pågående 
och handlar om de bedömningar som domstolen har gjort under den tid som 
rättsstaten har försvagats, först i Ungern och sedan i Polen. 
Syftet med denna rapport är att presentera och kritiskt analysera EU-domstolens 
bedömningar i centrala mål och rättsfall. Genomgången börjar med domstolens 
dom av den 27 februari 2018 i mål C-64/16, ASJP (Portugisiska domare) 
och avslutas med domen av den 15 juli 2021 i mål C-791/19, Europeiska 
kommissionen mot Republiken Polen (Disciplinåtgärder mot domare). Rapporten 
är således utformad som en rättsfallsstudie: den innehåller centrala utdrag ur 
domar och en kritisk bedömning av de viktigaste beslut och domar från EU-
domstolen som sedan 2018 har omformat innebörden och räckvidden av EU:s 
rättsstatsprincip och därmed förknippade rättsliga skyldigheter. Studien är av 
intresse för alla dem som vill skaffa sig sakkunskap om den senaste och mycket 
viktiga utvecklingen av EU:s rättsstatsprincip sedd utifrån EU-domstolens beslut 
och domar, både tagna var för sig och som en helhet.
Precisering av kravet på effektivt domstolsskydd och 
oberoende domstolar
Rapporten inleds med en ingående granskning av en dom som ökar förståelsen 
av medlemsstaternas skyldighet att se till att deras domstolar uppfyller kravet 
på ett effektivt domstolsskydd. Det handlar om domen i målet ASJP, kallat 
Portugisiska domare, som EU-domstolen avgjorde (i stora avdelningen) och som 
kan anses vara lika banbrytande som avgörandena i målen Van Gend en Loos 
och Costa. 
Denna dom kan också betraktas som domstolens första viktiga men indirekta 
svar på den pågående tillbakagången för rättsstaten, en utveckling som först 
konstaterades i Ungern och nu pågår även i Polen. Den markerar ett nytt skede 
när det gäller rättsstaten som ett grundläggande och bindande värde i EU:s 
rättsordning. Detta värde slås fast i artikel 2 i EU-fördraget och får ett konkret 
och rättssäkert uttryck i bland annat artikel 19.1 andra stycket i EU-fördraget: 
”Medlemsstaterna ska fastställa de möjligheter till överklagande som behövs för 
att säkerställa ett effektivt domstolsskydd inom de områden som omfattas av 
unionsrätten.”
Därefter granskas flera beslut och domar från EU-domstolen som bygger på 
Europeiska kommissionens tillsyn av medlemsstaternas skyldighet att se till att 
deras domstolar uppfyller kravet på ett effektivt domstolsskydd. Först presenteras 
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fyra beslut som EU-domstolen utfärdade inom ramen för överträdelseärenden och 
som i samtliga fall rör Polen: C-441/17 R (Białowieżaskogen), C-619/18 R (Högsta 
domstolens oavhängighet), C-791/19 R (Oavhängigheten för disciplinnämnden 
vid Polens högsta domstol) och C-204/21 R (Polens munkavlelag). Det första 
beslutet, om urskogen Białowieża, fattades innan EU-domstolen utfärdade sin 
dom i målet Portugisiska domare. Det tas ändå upp här, eftersom det föregrep 
domstolens beslut i senare överträdelseärenden som direkt och på ett helt nytt 
sätt berörde skyddet av domstolarnas oberoende i Polen. När det gäller EU-
domstolens domar, och som avgetts inom ramen för överträdelseförfaranden, 
analyseras mål C-192/18 (De allmänna domstolarnas oberoende), mål C-619/18 
(Högsta domstolens oavhängighet) och mål C-791/19 (Disciplinåtgärder mot 
domare). I och med dessa tre domar blev Polen den första EU-medlemsstat 
som har befunnits skyldig till att ha brutit mot artikel 19.1 andra stycket i EU-
fördraget tre gånger i rad.
Efter detta granskas de två viktigaste avgöranden som domstolen hittills har 
meddelat i form av förhandsavgöranden till nationella domstolar som efterfrågat 
besked om hur EU-rätten ska tolkas. I båda fallen var det polska domstolar som 
hade begärt förhandsavgörande i fråga om kraven på domstolarnas oberoende 
enligt artikel 19.1 i EU-fördraget och/eller artikel 47 i EU:s stadga om de 
grundläggande rättigheterna. Det handlar om de förenade målen C-585/18, 
C-624/18 och C-625/18, A.K. m.fl. (Oavhängigheten för disciplinnämnden vid 
Högsta domstolen) och de förenade målen C-558/18 och C-563/18, Miasto 
Łowicz och Prokurator Generalny. 
Dessa två domar förtydligar skyldigheten att säkerställa att nationella domstolar 
uppfyller kravet på ett effektivt domstolsskydd men illustrerar också en ny 
utveckling: nationella domare som är föremål för påtryckningar och hot 
har börjat använda artikel 267 i EU:s funktionsfördrag som ett verktyg för 
självförsvar. Att begära förhandsavgöranden har därmed kommit att fungera 
som ett instrument för att upprätthålla EU:s grundläggande värderingar i ett 
sammanhang där Europeiska kommissionen tycks ha varit senfärdig och sparsam 
med att inleda överträdelseförfaranden. 
EU:s medlemsstater får inte försämra skyddet av rättsstaten
För att denna rapport inte ska bli än mer omfattande har domstolens 
förhandsavgöranden av den 20 april 2021 i mål C-896/19 (Repubblika-domen) 
och av den 18 maj 2021 i de förenade målen C-83/19, C-127/19, C-195/19, 
C-291/19, C-355/19 och C-397/19 (Rumänska domare) inte granskats var och 
en för sig utan slagits ihop med analysen av domstolens dom av den 15 juli 
2021 inom ramen för ett överträdelseförfarande om Polens nya disciplinåtgärder 
mot domare (mål C-791/19) samt domstolens förhandsavgörande av den 2 
mars 2021 om Polens ”falska domare” (mål C-824/18). Syftet med detta är inte 
att förminska deras betydelse och mervärde: i de båda avgörandena från april 
respektive maj 2021 klargör domstolen bland annat att nationella myndigheter 
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har en negativ såväl som positiv skyldighet att respektera EU:s krav på oberoende 
domstolar samt en skyldighet att inte sänka nivån på detta område. 
I mer praktiska termer innebär dessa avgöranden att en stat som har anslutit sig 
till EU inte får införa bestämmelser som undergräver domstolars oberoende. 
Det skulle strida mot artikel 19.1 andra stycket i EU-fördraget, enligt vilken 
nationella myndigheter är förbjudna att anta ny lagstiftning som försämrar 
skyddet av rättsstaten som värde, i synnerhet EU:s garantier om domstolars 
oberoende. Avgörandena innebär också en skyldighet att avstå från lagändringar 
som undergräver rättsstatsprincipen – vilket till exempel blir fallet när en 
ny särskild åklagaravdelning inrättas och används som ett instrument för 
påtryckningar och hot mot domare, eller när nationella myndigheter inför nya 
regler om domares personliga ansvar utan garantier för att de ska kunna stå emot 
risken för yttre påtryckningar på innehållet i rättsliga beslut.
Påverkan på rättspraxis och begrepp inom andra områden
I denna rapport undersöks även ett antal fall som inte direkt berör frågor om 
domstolars oberoende. Fallen visar att rättsstatens tillbakagång i vissa EU-länder 
har haft en betydande men ofta indirekt påverkan på andra områden som omfattas 
av domstolens rättspraxis. Av fallen framgår också att domstolen främst har utgått 
från situationen i Polen i sin omvärdering av tolkningar och tillvägagångssätt när 
det gäller flera grundläggande begrepp i EU-rätten. Denna påverkan framgår 
först och främst av en strängare tolkning av innebörden av begreppet ”domstol” 
(i den mening som avses i artikel 267 i funktionsfördraget), en tolkning som 
användes i mål C-274/14 Banco de Santander. En liknande skärpning av 
begreppet ”utfärdande rättslig myndighet” – i den mening som avses i den 
europeiska arresteringsordern – kan konstateras i de förenade målen C-508/18 
OG (Åklagarmyndigheten i Lübeck) och C-82/19 PPU PI (Åklagarmyndigheten i 
Zwickau) samt i mål C-509/18 PF (Litauens allmänna åklagare).
En annan viktig utveckling, som sannolikt åtminstone delvis har kommit till 
stånd som en reaktion på Polens rättsstatskris, kan konstateras i mål C-284/14, 
kommissionen mot Frankrike (Förskottsbetalning). Där erbjöd domstolen en 
efterlängtad justering av de så kallade Cilfit-kriterierna, som avgör när de högsta 
instanserna i medlemsstaterna ska begära förhandsbesked från EU-domstolen. 
I mål C-284/16 Achmea tryckte domstolen också på ett strängare försvar av de 
nationella domstolarnas behörighet att se till att EU-rätten får full verkan. I det 
här fallet skapar försvaret av de nationella domstolarna dock problem: investerare 
som tidigare omfattades av bilaterala investeringsavtal inom EU riskerar att stå 
utan rättsligt skydd i länder där rättsstatsprincipen sviktar.
I mål C-216/18 PPU LM (Celmer) gjorde domstolen det också möjligt, 
åtminstone i teorin, för rättskipande myndigheter som ska verkställa europeiska 
arresteringsorder att ställa högre krav i fråga om de skyldigheter som är 
förknippade med ömsesidigt förtroende. Nationella rättskipande myndigheter 
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ska således kunna ta hänsyn till systembrister som kan inverka på oberoendet för 
det nationella rättsväsendet i en medlemsstat där rättsstaten är på tillbakagång. 
Denna justering kan dock betraktas som uppenbart otillräcklig med hänsyn till 
den systemiska karaktären på och den nuvarande omfattningen av Polens brott 
mot rättsstatsprincipen.
Slutligen har EU-domstolen skärpt tolkningen av kravet på ”fastställd genom 
lag”. Det gjordes inom ramen för en omfattande översyn av ett EU-förfarande 
för utnämning av domare i domen av den 26 mars 2020, avgjord i stora 
avdelningen, i de förenade målen C-542/18 RX-II Simpson och C-543/18 RX-II 
HG. Domen gällde inte utnämning av domare på nationell nivå, men det var 
lätt att se hur domstolens resonemang kunde tillämpas på situationen i Polen 
där tydliga oegentligheter upprepade gånger har påverkat utnämningar av flera 
personer, särskilt till Högsta domstolen.
Senaste utmaningen: EU-rättens tillämpning på utnämning av 
domare på nationell nivå
Rapporten avslutas med domstolens senaste avgörande utmaning: hur ska 
de många felaktigt utnämnda ”domarna” hanteras? För att förstå det nya och 
komplexa med problemet analyseras domstolens dom av den 2 mars 2021 i mål 
C-824/18, AB m.fl. (Utnämning av domare till Högsta domstolen – talan). Detta 
är EU-domstolens hittills viktigaste dom när det gäller möjligheten att tillämpa 
EU-rätten på nationella förfaranden för utnämning av domare.
Domen i sig är domstolens tredje viktiga dom inom ramen för ett 
förhandsavgörande som bygger på en begäran från en polsk domstol (i det här 
fallet Polens högsta förvaltningsdomstol) och som tar upp frågor med koppling 
till den polska rättsstatens sammanbrott. Förhandsavgörandet är ett av totalt 
37 fall (och det kommer hela tiden fler) där polska domstolar har bett EU-
domstolen om förhandsavgörande i frågor som rör rättsstaten. Detta ska jämföras 
med totalt fyra överträdelseärenden som kommissionen hittills har överlämnat 
till EU-domstolen. Med så många preliminära fall som återstår att hantera 
kommer EU-domstolen sannolikt att ytterligare klargöra i vilken mån EU-
rätten kan åberopas för att hantera situationer där personer utnämns till domare 
på grundval av bristfälliga förfaranden, det vill säga förfaranden som röjer ett 
otillbörligt inflytande från den lagstiftande och den verkställande makten.
EU-domstolens rättspraxis har fördjupat EU som 
konstitutionellt system
Efter denna i stort sett kronologiska översikt avslutas rapporten med en 
övergripande analys av de centrala konsekvenserna av EU-domstolens bidrag i 
arbetet mot tillbakagången för rättsstaten. Även om det finns blinda fläckar i 
domstolens rättspraxis har den bidragit med en utveckling av EU-rätten som 
är en av de viktigaste sedan domstolen lade fast sin grundläggande rättspraxis 
i början av 1960-talet. Denna mångfacetterade rättspraxis – som förebådades i 
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domstolens interimistiska beslut i målet om Białowieżaskogen och utvecklades 
fullt ut i domen i målet Portugisiska domare – har med andra ord lett till en 
förnyelse av de viktigaste elementen i EU:s konstitutionalism. Förnyelsen innebär 
att det har utvecklats en mer substantiell idé om rättsstatsprincipen på överstatlig 
nivå. Stödet för detta har varit en rättslig ”aktivering” av den hittills outnyttjade 
potentialen i artikel 19.1 i EU-fördraget. Denna aktivering kan beskrivas som en 
operationalisering av EU:s princip om ett effektivt domstolsskydd som är fullt 
berättigad och som har stöd i fördragen. Domstolen har därmed kunnat ingripa 
till försvar av en central och väletablerad del av rättsstatsprincipen: principen om 
domstolars oberoende. 
Förutom alltmer detaljerade och bindande normer för domstolars oberoende har 
utvecklingen också inneburit en förbättrad rättslig dialog mellan EU-domstolen 
och nationella domstolar. I grund och botten handlar det om att EU:s värden 
håller på att överföras till det rättsliga området, vilket gör unionen till ett sant 
konstitutionellt system där rättsstatsprincipen och dess viktigaste komponenter 
har blivit en del av EU-rätten som kan göras gällande i domstol. Detta banar 
väg för en mer enhetlig europeisk dömande makt som vilar på grundläggande 
principer med bindande verkan på både nationell nivå och EU-nivå. Genom 
att leda denna utveckling har EU-domstolen stärkt EU:s ”värdedimension”, 
en dimension som tillsammans med den inre marknaden nu utgör EU:s 
grundpelare.
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